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Abstract 
This thesis advances our understanding of the effects of foreign aid programmes 
in the Spanish economy during the 1950s. It does so by concentrating on three 
aspects. 
First, it considers the contribution to economic growth of aid-financed 
goods by relieving input bottlenecks. Results from an input-output analysis 
downplay the alleged importance of aid in increasing Spanish output by 
providing raw materials and other inputs. 
Second, it discusses the extent to which foreign donors influenced 
Spanish economic policy-making. Based on original archival sources from both 
recipient and donors, it is argued here that the United States was particularly 
ineffective at imposing its economic policy agenda. Suiprisingly, the best way to 
increase the likelihood of the adoption of economic policy reform was not to 
exercise outright leverage but to provide further unconditional aid disbursements. 
The analysis of the involvement of the International Monetary Fund and 
Organisation for European Economic Co-operation to underwrite the 1959 
Spanish Stabilisation Plan suggests that the multilateral organisations were 
acutely aware of the overriding importance of a true commitment to the reforms 
by the local policy-makers. Rather than relying on formal conditionality, they 
ascertained such commitment by monitoring the internal support for the reform 
programme whilst carefully avoiding any instance that may jeopardise the 
cohesion of the domestic pro-reform coalition. 
Third, the dissertation motivates a 'credibility hypothesis' under which 
the American aid-for-bases programme improved the political credibility of the 
regime and with it private businesses' expectations. A range of both qualitative 
and quantitative evidence, of which the use of financial market data is 
paramount, supports the hypothesis. This result contributes to solving the puzzle 
of Spanish economic history during a period that sees the resumption of 
economic growth after a stagnant first decade under Franco's rule despite very 
limited policy change. 
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Ch. 1. Inti-oduction 
1.1. The historiography of foreign aid programmes to Spain 
In August 1950 the United States Congress earmarked $62.5 million to be loaned 
to Spain. The Spanish regime of General Francisco Franco, having being 
excluded from the Marshall Plan, was to become a recipient of American aid. 
The door to substantial American financial assistance to Spain would eventually 
be open wide with the signing in September 1953 of three executive agreements 
covering defence, economic co-operation and technical assistance. The Pact of 
Madrid, as the agreements were soon known, committed the Americans to 
provide economic and military aid in return for the use of military bases in 
Spanish territory. This bilateral aid would not be the only foreign assistance 
granted to Spain during the 1950s. Most notably, at the end of the decade Spain 
would benefit from multilateral aid provided by the International Monetary Fund 
and the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation to underwrite the 
economic policy reforms envisaged in the Stabilisation Plan of July 1959. 
How did these foreign aid programmes affect Spanish economic growth? 
Although this question has attracted some attention in the historiography, no 
monograph covers the effects of foreign aid in the Spanish economy and answers 
have thus far been based on limited evidence. Accounts of the effects of the 
American aid programme have focused on the contribution of aid as a provider 
of inputs and capital goods. Given the wide-ranging bottlenecks in the Spanish 
productive structure, it is argued that even a relatively limited amount of aid-
financed goods may have had significant multiplier effects.1 Other authors, 
however, argue that American aid contributed very little towards economic 
growth.2 The debate between optimists and pessimists about the incidence of aid-
financed goods in the Spanish economy has certainly not been facilitated by the 
1 J. Clavera et al., Capitalismo espanol: de la autarquia a la estabilizacion (1939-1959) 
(Madrid: Edicusa, 1973), vol. 2, p. 70; A. Vinas et al., Politica comercial exterior en 
Espaiia (1939-1975) (Madrid: Banco Exterior de Espana, 1979), vol. 2, pp. 742, 788, 
793-99 and E. Fanjul, 'Papel de la ayuda americana en la economia espanola,' 
Information Comercial Espanola, no. 577 (September 1981), 159-65. 
2 R. Tamames, La Republica. La Era de Franco (Madrid: Alianza, 1986[1974]), p. 222 
and F. Guirao, 'The United States, Franco, and the Integration of Europe,' in F. H. 
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lack of a formal quantification of such claims about multiplier effects of aid-
financed imports. 
Unlike the economic aspects of Spanish-American relations, the 
diplomatic ones have continued to attract most of the attention in the literature.3 
However, the voluminous historiography on the diplomatic negotiations between 
the U.S. and Spain contrasts with a scarcity of treatments of the relations 
between the parties during the implementation phase of the aid programme. 
Accounts of the foreign relations of Spain have only very marginally reflected on 
the donor-recipient relationship.4 This is especially regrettable because a second 
common argument about the effect of the American aid programme relates to the 
American influence over Spanish economic policy-making and hence indirectly 
on the Spanish economy. In fact, there are significant disagreements in the 
literature over the extent to which the U.S. exercised pressure to render Spanish 
economic policies less interventionist and as to the effectiveness of the 
Americans in inducing policy change.5 
Heller and J. R. Gillingham (eds.), The United States and the Integration of Europe. 
Legacies of the Postwar Era (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996), p. 91. 
3 B. N. Liedtke, Embracing a Dictatorship (London/New York: Macmillan/St Martin's 
Press, 1998) and A. Jarque Iniguez, «Queremos esas bases». El acercamiento de 
Estados Unidos a la Espana de Franco (Alcala: Universidad de Alcala, 1998). The 
classic study is A. Vinas, Los pactos secretos de Franco con Estados Unidos. Bases, 
ayuda economica, recortes de soberania (Barcelona: Grijalbo, 1981). 
4 F. Tennis, 'Los limites de la «amistad estable». Los Estados Unidos y el regimen 
franquista entre 1945 y 1963,' unpublished Ph.D. dissertation (Universidad Nacional de 
Education a Distancia, 2000), provides little evidence on the economic aspects of 
Spanish-American relations. 
5 Clavera et al., Capitalismo espanol, p. 256 detect no significant pressure from the U.S. 
to change Spanish policy-making. A much more vigorous and effective involvement of 
the U.S. in inducing policy change is reported in R. Pardo, 'La politica exterior del 
franquismo: aislamiento y alineacion internacional,' in R. Moreno Fonseret and F. 
Sevillano Calero (eds.), El Franquismo. Visiones y Balances (Alicante: Universidad de 
Alicante, 1999), p. 108n and F. Portero Rodriguez and R. Pardo, 'Las relaciones 
exteriores como factor condicionante del franquismo,' Ayer, no. 33 (1999), pp. 216-17. 
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As to the multilateral aid episode, the extensive literature on the 1959 
Stabilisation Plan accords great importance to external factors in the adoption of 
the economic policy reforms. The stabilisation 'had to be undertaken in Spain 
from overseas,' as put famously by the Minister of Commerce Alberto Ullastres.6 
The literature simply notes the decisive role played by the multilateral 
organisations in the shaping of the Stabilisation Plan through both technical and 
financial help but the particulars of the argument are not always sufficiently 
7 • • • 
explained. The contribution of multilateral organisations m the formulation of 
policy change has yet to be more solidly documented, a shortfall that this 
dissertation seeks to remedy. 
Each of these bilateral and multilateral aid episodes is typically discussed 
separately in the existing literature. However, common to the existing literatures 
on both the bilateral and the multilateral aid episodes is the limited evidence 
available. As noted above, analyses of the contribution of aid-fmanced goods to 
economic growth lack any quantification of, for example, multiplier effects of 
aid. Similarly, our knowledge about the relationship between donor and recipient 
relies on a very limited documentary base. Foreign aid is seen as one of the 
explanatory variables of the economic growth process that characterises the o 1950s yet there is surprisingly little discussion as to how it contributed. 
6 E. Fuentes Quintana, 'El Plan de Estabilizacion economica de 1959, veinticinco anos 
despues,' Information Comer cial Espanola, nos. 612-13 (August-September 1984), p. 
30. 
7 J. A. Biescas, 'Espana y las organizaciones economicas internacionales: el FMI y el 
Banco Mundial (1958-1993),' in M. Varela Parache (coord.), El Fondo Monetario 
International, el Banco Mundial y la economia espanola (Madrid: Piramide, 1994), p. 
292. Representative of the state-of-the-question is A. Vinas, 'Franco's Dreams of 
Autarky Shattered. Foreign Policy Aspects in the Run-up to the 1959 Change in Spanish 
Economic Strategy,' in C. Leitz and D. J. Dunthom (eds.), Spain in an International 
Context, 1936-1959 (New York: Berghahn Books, 1999), pp. 299-318. 
8 G. Tortella and S. Houpt, 'From Autarky to the European Union: Nationalist Economic 
Policies in Twentieth-Century Spain,' in A. Teichova, H. Matis and J. Patek (eds.), 
Economic Change and the National Question in Twentieth-Century Europe (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 146. The role of American aid is also briefly 
reviewed in J. Harrison, 'Towards the Liberalisation of the Spanish Economy, 1951-9,' 
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Consequently, the general literature is inevitably vague about the role of foreign 
aid programmes in Spanish economic history.9 The absence of a heated debate on 
the economic effects of the foreign aid programmes in Spain should not mislead 
us into the impression that a coherent and well-founded interpretation is readily 
available in the literature. On the contrary, the lack of such discussion is simply 
the result of our limited knowledge about the effects of foreign aid programmes 
on the Spanish economy. Moreover, and despite the subdued nature of the 
existing debate, there are non-compatible views on issues such as the impact of 
aid in alleviating production bottlenecks or the degree of influence that foreign 
donors exercised over Spanish economic policy-making. These and other claims 
will be discussed at length in the appropriate chapters, which provide a more 
comprehensive review of the existing literature related specifically to the 
research question addressed in each chapter. 
The possible existence and nature of links between the aid programmes 
and Spanish economic growth is particularly relevant since the initial stages of 
the aid programmes coincide roughly with an acceleration of economic growth in 
Spain. Real per capita income, which had remained stagnant throughout the 
1940s, almost doubled between the dates of 1950 and 1963 that comprise our 
in C. Holmes and A. Booth (eds.), Economy and Society: European Industrialisation 
and Its Social Consequences. EssaysPresented to Sidney Pollard (Leicester: Leicester 
University Press), p. 109. 
9 C. W. Anderson, The Political Economy of Modern Spain (Madison, Wise.: University 
of Wisconsin Press, 1970); J. Donges, La industrialization en Espana. Politicas, logros, 
perspectivas (Barcelona: Oikos-Tau, 1976), p. 40; M. J. Gonzalez, La economiapolitica 
delfranquismo (1940-1970). Dirigismo, mercadoyplanificacion (Madrid: Tecnos, 
1979), pp. 182-98 and M. J. Gonzalez, 'La autarqula economica bajo el regimen del 
General Franco: una vision desde la teoria de los derechos de propiedad,' Information 
Comercial Espanola, nos. 676-77 (December 1989-January 1990), pp. 19-31. For an 
overview of the literature see J. Harrison, The Spanish Economy in the Twentieth 
Century (London: Croom Helm, 1985), pp.133-34 and L. Prados de la Escosura and J. 
C. Sanz, 'Growth and Macroeconomic Performance in Spain, 1939-1993,' in N. Crafts 
and G. Toniolo, Economic Growth in Europe Since 1945 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996), pp. 363-69. 
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period of analysis.10 In fact, the two most widely entertained effects of foreign 
aid programmes to Spain, namely the relief of bottlenecks by aid-financed goods 
and foreign donors' influence in the reorientation of economic policy, relate to 
the very core of explanations given for the resumption of economic growth 
during the mid-Francoist period.11 
The 1950s have come to be seen as a 'hinge decade' in which economic 
19 
policy shifted very gradually towards freer and less rigid norms. However, 
there is a stark contrast with the very limited and slow policy change that even 
the most optimistic concede and the marked improvement in economic 
performance during the decade. Moreover, recent contributions have been 
increasingly dismissive of the alleged gradual relaxation of interventionist 
policies.13 Given the 'painstaking evidence' of substantial economic growth 
during the 1950s despite burdening economic policies, it has been argued that 
10 Per capita Gross Domestic Product measured in 1990 Geary-Khamis dollars stood at 
$2,356 in 1950 compared to $2,300 in 1940 and increased to $4,414 by 1963. See L. 
Prados de la Escosura, Spain's Gross Domestic Product, 1850-1993: Quantitative 
Conjectures. Appendix, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid Working Paper No.95/06. 
11 J. Catalan, 'Sector exterior y crecimiento industrial. Espana y Europa (1939-1959),' 
Revista de Historia Industrial, no. 8 (1995), pp. 99-145. 
12 J. L. Garcia Delgado, 'La industrialization y el desarrollo economico de Espana 
durante el franquismo,' in J. Nadal, A. Carreras and C. Sudria (comps.), La economia 
espanola en elsigloXX. Unaperspectiva historica (Barcelona: Ariel, 1987), pp. 164-89. 
13 A series of studies have found little change in the level and discretionary nature of 
state intervention throughout 1951-1957. The issue of industrial licences has been 
analysed by L. Pires, 'La regulation economica en las dictaduras: el condicionamiento 
industrial en Espana y Portugal durante el siglo XX,' unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 
(Universidad Complutense de Madrid, 1999); foreign exchange licensing studied by E. 
Martinez, 'Sector exterior y crecimiento en la Espana autarquica,' Revista de Historia 
Economica, vol. 19, special issue (2001), pp. 240-45; for the general attitude of the 
Instituto Nacional de Industria (INI)[National Institute of Industry] see A. Gomez-
Mendoza and E. San Roman, 'Competition Between Private and Public Enterprise in 
Spain, 1939-1959: an Alternative View,' Business and Economic History, vol. 26, no. 2, 
(Winter 1997), pp. 696-708 and E. San Roman, Ejercito e Industria: el nacimiento del 
INI. (Barcelona: Critica, 1999) 
14 
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scholars 'should be looking for those elements that could explain this evidence 
rather than limiting themselves to hammer again and again at the mass of 
obstructionist measures then in place.'14 Any interpretation of the economic 
history of the 1950s, whether it incorporates the effects of foreign aid 
programmes or not, needs to address this fundamental puzzle. 
Before we embark on our study, let us first step back and consider some 
methodological issues so as to provide a sound theoretical underpinning to the 
exercise and place it in the context of the wider literature. 
14 F. Guirao, Spain and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1945-57 (London/New 
York: Macmillan/St. Martin's Press, 1998), pp. 203-05. 
15 
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1.2. The analysis of the effects of foreign aid programmes in the wider 
literature 
The question of whether foreign aid contributes positively, negatively, or not at 
all to economic growth in recipient countries is not easily addressed. Regression 
analyses of economic growth on aid inflows usually suffer from omitted variable 
bias and other mispecifications resulting from the varied links through which aid 
may affect variables which in turn may affect economic growth. If we are to 
move inside the 'black box' that regression-based analysis would at best provide 
and derive more tractable research questions, we need to be specific about the 
transmission mechanisms through which foreign aid programmes may influence 
economic growth. As argued by a recent survey of methodological in analyses of 
country-wide effects of aid, '[w]e would be far better advised to analyse aid's 
impact by examining the various links in the chain running from aid to growth 
more carefully.'15 The use of the phrase 'political economy' in the title of this 
dissertation signals the intention to consider a variety of transmission 
mechanisms through which foreign aid may have affected economic growth. 
Economic historians have typically been aware of the multifaceted effects 
of foreign aid and have thus been more careful about specifying the transmission 
mechanisms through which foreign aid affected the macroeconomic performance 
of the recipient countries. In fact, the literature on the Marshall Plan is a good 
example of the wide range of issues that analyses of the economic effects of 
foreign aid programmes may consider. It has long distinguished between 'direct' 
and 'indirect' effects of foreign aid programmes. By 'direct' we refer to the 
impact that the availability of aid-financed raw materials or other inputs may 
have on the recipient's production. Similarly, aid may directly increase the 
productive capacity by supplying capital goods, technology, or reconstructing 
infrastructure.16 But the literature has also been keen in noting that there are 
further and 'indirect' effects of aid on the recipient's economy. Thus, the 
15 H. White and J. Luttik, 'The Countrywide Effects of Aid,' World Bank Policy 
Research Working Paper no. 1337 (1994), p. 29. 
16 K. Borchardt and C. Buchheim, 'The Marshall Plan and Key Economic Sectors: a 
Microeconomic Perspective,' in C. S. Maier (ed.), The Marshall Plan and Germany 
(New York: Berg, 1991), pp. 410-51. 
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literature has paid increasing attention to aspects such as the diffusion of 
American management models to Western Europe that was promoted by 
i n t 
Marshall planners. One of the most widely discussed of these indirect effects of 
foreign aid programmes in the recipient's economy is the possibility that the 
recipient country be obligated to reform elements of its economic policy by the 
donor. The rationale for the donor to do so is to ensure that the recipient adopts 
policies more conducive to economic growth. This is in the interest of the donor 
even if its ultimate goal is not the improvement in the economic performance of 
the recipient country per se because it decreases the chances that the recipient 
would permanently require the donor's assistance and improves the likelihood of 
repayment of loans. To the extent that the donor may be successful in affecting 
the policy-making of the recipient and that the economic policies thus adopted 
affect the environment in which economic agents make their decisions, the 
foreign aid programme would have an indirect impact on the recipient's 
economy. 
In fact, a significant part of the debate and disagreements in the literature 
about the economic effects of the Marshall Plan has concentrated on the issue of 
American ability to influence the economic policy-making process among 
recipient countries.18 Although this question has been at the centre stage of the 
17 For an overview see M. Kipping and O. Bjarnar, The Americanisation of European 
Business. The Marshall Plan and the Transfer of U.S. Management Models (London: 
Routledge, 1998). 
18 C. S. Maier, 'The Politics of Productivity: Foundations of American International 
Economic Policy after World War II,' International Organization, vol. 31 (Autumn 
1977), pp. 607-33 already refers to American persuasion rather than through outright 
pressure. More emphatic is Milward: 'Marshall aid was not in fact important enough to 
give the United States sufficient leverage to reconstruct Western Europe according to its 
own wishes,' A. S. Milward, The Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1947-1951 
(London: Methuen, 1987 [1984]), p. 469. For collections of seminal contributions on the 
Marshall Plan see C. S. Maier, In Search of Stability: Explorations in Historical 
Political Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987); C. S. Maier (ed.), 
The Cold War in Europe (New York: Markus Wiener, 1991) and B. Eichengreen (ed.), 
The Reconstruction of the International Economy, 1945-1960. Elgar Reference 
Collection. Growth of the world economy series, vol. 5 (Cheltenham: Elgar, 1996). 
17 
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discussion on the European Recovery Programme for at least two decades, views 
on this topic could hardly be more conflicting.19 Case studies of American 
attempts at exercising pressure to influence domestic policies of European 
Recovery Programme recipient countries have typically shown that the U.S. 
enjoyed a very limited bargaining power.20 In fact, the mainstream literature has 
since the mid-1980s conceded that Americans fell short from achieving all their 
policy objectives and has emphasised the necessary co-operation of Europeans in 
91 
shaping the postwar Western European economies. Yet, the case is by no 
means closed. A more relevant question is to ask not whether the U.S. was able 
to impose the entirety of its agenda on Europe, but whether specific policy 
options would have been adopted at all in the absence of American pressure. In 
particular, the hypothesis that American leverage, stemming directly from the 
Marshall Plan, was at least partly responsible in influencing the outward 
orientation of Western European economies has yet to be fully explored.22 
19 Contrast the previous excerpt from Milward with the following one: 'American 
control over economic policy was extensive. [...] Conditionality played an important role 
in shaping the effects of American aid,' B. Eichengreen and M. Uzan, 'The Marshall 
Plan: economic effects and implications for Eastern Europe and the former USSR,' 
Economic Policy, no. 14 (1992), pp. 47, 72. 
20 P. Burnham, The Political Economy of Postwar Reconstruction (London/New York: 
Macmillan/St. Martin's Press, 1990); C. Esposito, America's Feeble Weapon: Funding 
the Marshall Plan in France and Italy, 1948-1950 (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 
1994) and C. Esposito, 'Influencing Aid Recipients: Marshall Plan Lessons for 
Contemporary Aid Donors,' in B. Eichengreen (ed.), Europe's Postwar Recovery 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 68-90. 
21 See, for example, M. J. Hogan, The Marshall Plan: America, Britain, and the 
Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1947-1952 (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1987). 
22 B. Eichengreen, Reconstructing Europe's Trade and Payments. The European 
Payments Union (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993) and H. Berger and A. 
Ritschl, 'Germany and the Political Economy of the Marshall Plan, 1947-52: a Re-
revisionist View,' in B. Eichengreen (ed.), Europe's Postwar Recovery, pp. 199-245. 
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The Marshall Plan is an inevitable milestone that is often seen as the 
beginning of the 'era of foreign aid.'23 Similarly, the literature on the Marshall 
Plan provides us with a useful starting point as to how approach our general 
question. The importance and difficulty of addressing indirect transmission 
mechanisms from foreign aid to economic growth in the recipient country is 
borne out in that literature. It is worth emphasising that there are two different 
causal links involved in the argument about the significance of American 
pressure. First, the leverage that aid confers the donor has to induce policy-
reform, and secondly, those policy changes have to induce economic growth. 
Clearly, even if policy may have changed, it may well be possible that such 
change was not due to conditionality. Therefore, to substantiate the first link we 
need a case study of the political economy of decision-making and ultimately a 
judgement on the likely policy scenario in the absence of the foreign aid 
programme.24 Under certain restrictive assumptions, this question can be 
explored econometrically.25 However, a case-study approach is potentially a 
23 R. E. Wood, From Marshall Plan to Debt Crisis. Foreign Aid and Development 
Choices in the World Economy (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986). The 
explicit reference to drawing lessons from the Marshall Plan continues to be irresistible. 
See, for example, J. B. De Long and B. Eichengreen, 'The Marshall Plan: History's 
Most Successful Adjustment Programme,' in R. Dornbusch, W. Nolling and R. Layard 
(eds.), Postwar Economic Reconstruction and Lessons for the East today (Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press, 1993), pp. 189-230 and P. Collier and D. Dollar, 'Does Africa Need a 
Marshall Plan?,' Cambridge Review of International Affairs, vol. 14, no. 1 (Autumn-
Winter 2000), pp. 123-34. 
24 White and Luttik, 'The Countrywide Effects of Aid', p. 72. 
25 L. Dicks-Mireaux, M. Mecagni and S. Schadler, 'Evaluating the Effect of IMF 
Lending to Low-Income Countries,' Journal of Development Economics, vol. 61 (2000), 
pp. 495-526 use a control-group methodology in which, essentially, the experience of 
countries which did not undergo IMF-sponsored adjustment programmes is used to 
derive what would the likely policy path of those countries that did undertake IMF-
supported programmes. Assuming identical policy reaction functions, and that reforms 
are triggered by reaching threshold levels of some macroeconomic variables, the authors 
estimate a policy counterfactual which is then compared to the policies actually followed 
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useful approach to this question. Historical research can in fact provide one of 
the most in-depth methods of analysis of the political economy of policy-making, 
as it can make use of sources which are unavailable to the contemporary 
observer. 
Before we move further let us clarify some definitions. As noted above 
the Marshall Plan is usually regarded as the commencement of foreign aid in its 
modern form. Yet, 'foreign aid' has today a particular official meaning that is 
much more restrictive than the common use of the phrase at the time of Marshall 
aid. As defined by the Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development, 'overseas development assistance' 
refers to 'grants or loans undertaken by the official sector with promotion of 
economic development or welfare as main objectives and at concessional 
financial terms (if a loan, at least 25 per cent grant element).'26 Even more 
precise and narrow definitions in which only the concessional element of loans is 
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taken into account are also common in the literature. 
This definition is not as watertight as it may at first appear. The limit to 
loans and grants excludes sales in domestic currency that may have otherwise 
diverted foreign exchange from the recipient country. More importantly, 
determining that a transfer is exclusively or primarily driven by altruistic reasons 
is always questionable. Strictly speaking, much of American bilateral assistance 
during the Cold War, including the Marshall Plan, would not qualify under this 
definition given its ultimate political motivation of containing and providing a 
viable alternative to communism. Even grants of surplus commodities may be 
driven by the interest in protecting the world market position of domestic 
producers that may happily engage in de facto dumping so as to prevent the 
flourishing of foreign competitors. In short, the problem with the current official 
definition is its reliance on the true motivations of the donor as the yardstick to 
consider a particular flow of resources 'official development assistance.' 
and thus the policy-effects specific to the presence of IMF-supported programmes are 
claimed to be isolated. 
26 OECD, Development Co-operation. 1992 Report (Paris: OECD, 1992), p. A-99. 
27 C. C. Chang, E. Fernandez-Arias and L. Serven, 'Measuring Aid Flows: a New 
Approach,' World Bank Policy Research Working Paper no. 2050 (1999). 
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Thus, inevitably, there are different meanings of foreign aid and ways of 
measuring it. By 'foreign aid' we will refer to official transfers of resources 
from the donor to the recipient economy irrespective of whether the purpose of 
the donor was primarily to enhance the economic development of the recipient or 
such interest in strengthening the recipient's economy stemmed from a wider 
geo-political motivation. In a sense, we have adopted the broad definition of 
'foreign aid' that was common at the time of our study, the 1950s. It was 
precisely to get rid of the connotations of including less altruistic types of aid that 
the term 'overseas development assistance' was later coined as a substitute for 
'foreign aid.'29 A more extended discussion of a working definition of foreign 
aid for our purposes will be undertaken in Chapter Two below. 
Further explanation of the concept of 'conditionally' is also warranted. In 
the literature, conditionality is often defined as the linking of the disbursement of 
aid, either in grant or loan form, to the adoption of economic policy measures by 
•ja 
the recipient government. The widespread use of policy-based lending by 
donors has led to a burgeoning theoretical and empirical literature on whether aid 
increases the likelihood of the adoption of policy reform by the recipient 
countries.31 Moreover, the findings from cross-country analyses in the literature 
suggest that aid enhances economic growth only if the recipient countries enjoy a 
relatively sound economic management environment.32 Therefore, the question 
28 C. Lancaster, Transforming Foreign Aid. United States Assistance in the 21st Century 
(Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 2000), pp. 9-10. 
29 O. Stokke, 'Aid and Political Conditionality: Core Issues and State of the Art,' in O. 
Stokke (ed.), Aid and Political Conditionality (London: Frank Cass, 1995), pp. 3n, 5n. 
30 R. Cassen, Does Aid Work? A Report to an Intergovernmental Task Force (Oxford: 
Clarendon, 1986), p. 70. 
31 P. Mosley, 'A Theory of Conditionality,' in P. Mosley (ed.), Development Finance 
and Policy Reform (London: St. Martin's Press, 1992), p. 129. A. Casella and B. 
Eichengreen, 'Can Foreign Aid Accelerate Stabilisation?,' Economic Journal, vol. 106 
(May 1996), pp. 605-19 suggest that this is an empirical issue and construct a model in 
which foreign aid may accelerate or postpone policy reforms. 
32 P. Mosley, J. Harrigan and J. Toye, Aid and Power (London: Routledge, 1995), 2 
vols.; P. Boone, 'Politics and the Effectiveness of Foreign Aid,' European Economic 
Review, vol. 40, no. 2 (1996), pp. 289-329; C. Burnside and D. Dollar, 'Aid, Policies, 
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of whether donors can influence the economic policy of the recipient becomes 
crucial and has led to a substantial research effort to analyse theoretically and 
empirically the tying of foreign aid to the adoption of policy reform.33 
These studies caution about the danger of assuming that donors would 
enjoy an effective leverage —the capacity to impose a viewpoint over the 
recipient's— simply because the threat to withhold aid disbursements is at their 
disposal. The most important contribution of this literature is to focus on the 
time-inconsistency of the logic behind conditionality. This time-inconsistency 
arises from the fact that a recipient that agrees to undertaking policy reform as a 
condition for the disbursement of aid may reverse the reform in the event of 
discontinued aid flows. After all, one must confront the question of why, if the 
policies the donor advocate are welfare enhancing, had they not been adopted by 
the recipient country motu proprio in the first place? The only way to escape the 
time-inconsistency problem of conditionality is if the aid programme affects the 
policy-making equilibrium of the recipient country and shifts it to another 
equilibrium where it prompts the recipient to follow a different policy. The 
lesson drawn by the international organisations that experimented with 
conditional foreign aid is that rather than forcing reforms, a successful aid 
programme in bringing reform is one that changes the underlying parameters of 
the policy-making game so that the resulting equilibrium is altered.34 For our 
purposes, this literature highlights the necessity of paying closer attention and 
and Growth,' American Economic Review, vol. 90, no. 4 (September 2000), pp. 847-68 
and D. Dollar and J. Svensson, 'What Explains the Success or Failure of Structural 
Adjustment Programmes?,' Economic Journal, vol. 110 (October 2000), pp. 894-917. 
33 M. Guitian, 'Conditionality: Past, Present, and Future,' International Monetary Fund 
Staff Papers, vol. 42, no. 4 (December 1995), pp. 792-835; special conference issue of 
Journal of International Development, vol. 9, no. 4 (June 1997); P. Collier et aL, 
'Redesigning Conditionality,' World Development, vol. 25, no.9 (September 1997), pp. 
1399-1407; T. Killick et al., Aid and the Political Economy of Policy Change (London: 
Routledge, 1998) and J. Svensson, 'When is Foreign Aid Policy Credible? Aid 
Dependence and Conditionality,' Journal of Development Economics, vol. 61, no. 1 
(February 2000), pp. 61-84. 
34 World Bank, Assessing Aid. What Works, What Doesn't, and Why (Washington, D.C.: 
Oxford University Press, 1998). 
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documenting the alleged influence of foreign donors over domestic economic 
policy-making. 
It is worth emphasising that in the definition of conditionality given 
above the term often refers to economic policy conditions only. These are of the 
utmost interest but by no means the only conditions that may be attached to aid. 
'Commercial conditions' requiring the recipient to purchase the goods directly 
from the donor rather than from a third party, or stating the exchange rate at 
which transactions would be computed, are straightforward. 'Political conditions' 
may also be attached to aid programmes. In particular, the recent literature refers 
to 'political conditionality' as the donors' demands that the recipient country 
o r 
democratises its political regime and safeguards human rights. In the context of 
the Cold War, however, this narrow use of the term political conditionality needs 
to be expanded to accommodate a wider set of political conditions that were then 
part and parcel of the donor-recipient relationship. For example, the granting of 
military base rights to the donor can be seen as an inseparable political condition 
attached to the aid programme. 
This acknowledgement of the variety of types of conditions attached to 
aid is relevant because simply looking at the effect of policy-based conditions in 
changing the recipient's actual policies may not capture the total effect of aid 
programmes in shaping policy making. For example, in a recent review of 
foreign aid effectiveness the World Bank suggests that overseas-trained officials 
and professionals have often played a key role in bringing about policy reform.36 
This suggests that the way in which aid is disbursed may have policy effects even 
if outright leverage and economic policy conditionality may have been 
ineffective. In fact, because the manner in which aid programmes are conducted 
varies from case to case, this literature calls for the case study as a very valuable 
methodological approach.37 Once again, historical case studies may prove 
particularly fruitful given the availability of a documentary base often 
inaccessible for more recent episodes. The phrase 'conditional foreign aid' in the 
35 Stokke, 'Aid and Political Conditionality,' p. viii. 
36 World Bank, Assessing Aid, p. 55. 
37 S. Devarajan, D, Dollar and T. Holmgren (eds.), Aid and Reform in Africa 
(Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2001), p. 4. 
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title of this dissertation aims to highlight that we will be referring not only to 
economic policy conditions but also to the modus operandi or wider range of 
conditions under which foreign aid was furnished. 
Let us now specify which are the questions addressed in this dissertation. 
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1.3. What are the questions this dissertation addresses? 
This dissertation aims to improve our understanding of the impact of foreign aid 
in the Spanish economy by examining individual transmission mechanisms 
through which aid affected the Spanish economy. Concentrating on some aspects 
inevitably implies that other possible links are neglected. However, by focusing 
on defined and tractable research questions the aim is to provide a depth of 
analysis that would not be possible in a study that would attempt a 
comprehensive review of all possible effects of foreign aid programmes in the 
Spanish economy. 
Prior to making any assessment about the effects of foreign aid in the 
Spanish economy, we need to be precise about what programmes we are talking 
about. Thus, it is necessary to ask the question 'what were the amounts of foreign 
aid received?' This question, which will be the sole focus of Chapter Two, had 
not been fully answered in the literature and the chapter provides the modest 
contribution of producing the most complete picture of aid disbursements 
available in a form that enables the discussion of the effect of aid-financed goods 
in relieving bottlenecks. 
Once this has been accomplished we are in a position to examine a 
widely entertained claim in the existing literature, namely that despite its limited 
extent foreign aid had a considerable direct impact in the Spanish economy by 
providing essential imported goods. Hence, 'what was the effect of foreign aid in 
relieving input bottlenecks in the Spanish economy?' will be discussed in 
Chapter Three with the help of the input-output methodology. Thus, this chapter 
advances the literature by providing a quantification of an existing argument in 
the literature. 
The dissertation then pays closer attention to the political economy of the 
bilateral aid episode. Chapter Four asks 'what were the conditions attached to 
American aid?' The motivations of the donors and recipients are discussed 
within this chapter, as the conditions attached are inevitably part of the outcome 
of the bargaining between the two parties. Although the chapter serves primarily 
as background to the following ones it modestly contributes to our knowledge of 
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the negotiation process between Spain and the U.S. by making use of some 
archival sources previously not exploited. 
The dissertation then moves on to examine the consequences of the 
circumstances under which aid was granted. Chapter Five asks 'to what extent 
did American leverage contribute to policy change in 1950s Spain?' The focus of 
the chapter is therefore to investigate the extent to which American influence 
attempted to modify Spanish economic policy and how successful it proved. 
Although the literature had speculated about this question, the documentary 
evidence previously available was very limited. A contribution of Chapter Five is 
therefore to expand this documentary base. 
Chapter Six explores the political aspects of the conditions under which 
the bilateral aid programme was established. An indirect transmission 
mechanism running from the aid programme to an improvement in the political 
credibility of the Franco regime and with it business sentiment, investment and 
economic growth is suggested. By investigating 'the credibility effects of the 
American aid programme,' Chapter Six advances the literature by outlining and 
exploring a question that has not been previously asked in the context of the 
historiography of American aid to Spain. Its originality also lies in its use of 
financial market data and in particular the application of the event-study 
methodology, which has not been a common tool in economic history. 
Chapter Seven moves on to discuss the multilateral aid episode and the 
contribution of multilateral donors to the adoption of economic policy reform. 
The use of archival holdings of multilateral organisations such as the 
International Monetary Fund and the Organisation for European Economic Co-
operation allows a focus on the donor-recipient relationship. This is not only 
absent in the Spanish historiography of the economic effects of the aid 
38 In particular, among American sources it should be noted how the Records of U.S. 
Foreign Assistance Agencies (Record Group [RG] 469 in the National Archives) had not 
been previously used in connection with the aid programme to Spain. Similarly, 
substantial documentation not found in the Decimal Files of the General Records of the 
Department of State (RG 59) was located in the Records of the Foreign Service Posts of 
the Department of States (RG 84), an equally under-researched source for the study of 
American-Spanish relations. 
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programmes but can also be of interest to those concerned with the relations 
between donors and recipients in general. 
The questions that this dissertation addresses are therefore driven by both 
issues specifically raised in the Spanish historiography that have been given little 
empirical support, and by general methodological considerations. Figure 1.1. 
below provides the overall structure of the thesis in diagrammatic form. 
Figure 1.1. Diagram of overall thesis structure 
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As to the time-period considered, the initial year marks the beginning of 
American official assistance to Spain, while 1963 marks the end of the initial ten-
year period for which the bilateral agreements were signed in 1953. In fact, 
although the agreements would be renewed subsequently, from 1963 onwards aid 
will cease to be of a similar scale to that granted during the years 1953-1963. 
Although American military aid would continue in time, Spain would soon be 
deemed too rich to benefit from official financial assistance. During the years 
from 1950 to 1963 Spain received the bulk of foreign aid that she would 
eventually receive. The periodisation chosen also allows for a discussion of both 
the bilateral and multilateral aid episodes, enabling us to explore some elements 
of the relationship between recipient and donors that would be difficult to 
understand if we were to remove the interconnectedness between the two 
programmes from our analysis. 
Before we proceed with addressing these questions let us first emphasise 
the limits of this dissertation. 
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1.4. Limitations of scope and relevance 
As noted above, it should be emphasised that this dissertation makes no claim of 
an encyclopaedic discussion of all possible effects of foreign aid programmes in 
Spain or all aspects of the relationship with the donors. Some topics are 
necessarily touched upon only in a limited way. For example, the possible 
inflationary consequences of heavy counterpart funds releases in the 1960s or the 
long-run effects of the technical assistance programmes that enabled Spanish 
professionals and officials to travel to the U.S. fall among those issues that are 
only briefly discussed given the limited time-period covered. Socio-economic 
effects, such as how the organisation of firms that engaged with the American 
contractors in the building of the bases was affected, are not discussed. 
This dissertation is not a growth accounting exercise in which the puipose 
is to compute a counterfactual which would give us an idea of Spanish economic 
growth during the period in the absence of all possible effects, direct and 
indirect, of the aid programmes. The discussion of the indirect effects of the 
foreign aid programmes aims to elaborate on the ultimate enabling causes of 
growth and thus help our understanding of economic growth during the period 
considered in light of the puzzle that the decade of the 1950s constitutes in the 
literature. 
As such, this dissertation aims primarily to be relevant to students of 
Spanish postwar economic history. There are, however, issues of relevance to a 
wider readership. Firstly, it highlights the usefulness of case studies when 
examining specific transmission mechanisms, and vindicates historical research 
as it provides a most seasoned analysis of decision making. The nature of the 
case also prompted us to consider a further transmission channel through which 
aid may have affected economic growth, namely via improving the political 
credibility of the regime and enhancing the expectations of private economic 
agents. This is, of course, contingent on the particulars of our case study and no 
claim at generalising this can be made, but it highlights the importance of 
looking at cases individually. 
This dissertation may also be useful for the wider literature on the 
economic impact of foreign aid programmes. A rigorous look at the concepts of 
leverage and conditionality and the circumstances under which a donor can 
effectively induce policy change in the recipient country may be informative for 
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the Marshall Plan literature. Moreover, given the dictatorial nature of the Spanish 
regime and the low per capita income of Spain at the time, the case study 
presented may be instructive for research on other foreign aid recipients. Given 
that foreign aid is primarily a post-1945 phenomenon, as economic history 
increasingly discusses the second half of the twentieth century, foreign aid 
episodes will be encountered more frequently by historians. On one hand, history 
can but benefit from an awareness of the theoretical literature. On the other hand, 
the detail that historical sources avail may similarly contribute to our 
understanding of the relationship between donor and recipient countries by 
raising issues insufficiently addressed in the existing theoretical literature. 
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received by Spain in 1950-1963? 
Index 
2.1. Introduction 
2.2. First aid: Eximbank loans 
2.3. Pact of Madrid: Defence support 
2.4. Agricultural surpluses: Public Law 480 
2.5. Other aspects (counterpart funds, military aid, other lending) and 
summary of American aid programme to Spain 
2.6. Multilateral aid at the time of the Stabilisation Plan 
Abstract 
This chapter presents the amounts of aid that Spain received. The puipose 
is to establish clearly the picture of how much was received and, 
especially, the timing and composition of disbursements across the range 
of (American) aid programmes. In doing so, it complements existing 
estimates of aid-financed goods in the literature. 
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2.1. Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide an estimate of the amounts of aid 
disbursed to Spain throughout the period 1950-1963. It focuses on the American 
aid programme since this was by far the largest component of all foreign aid 
received by Spain, loans from other countries being too isolated and too little to 
constitute an 'aid programme.' A section at the end of the chapter discusses the 
idiosyncrasies of the multilateral aid episode. 
As noted in the introductory chapter above, the starting date of our 
analysis, 1950, marks the first official assistance from the United States to Spain, 
whilst closing our period in 1963 coincides with the expiration of the ten-year 
agreements signed in September 1953 between Spain and the U.S. Although the 
defence agreement was renewed, from 1963 the U.S. ceased the provision of 
economic aid to Spain and subsequently restricted its aid programme to military 
assistance only. 
The purpose of reconstructing the amounts of American aid to Spain is to 
provide a consistent estimate of aid actually received in Spain broken down by 
the type of aid-financed goods and at regular time intervals. Although there is a 
general agreement in the literature as to the total amount of aid furnished, 
approximately $1,500 million over the period considered here, many of these 
estimates are too aggregative, either by type of commodity or over time.1 This 
helps to explain the discrepancies existing in the literature when citing the total 
amount of aid Spain received: they simply refer to different things. Once we take 
into account that figures are usually produced for cumulative periods and the 
inclusion or not of all the numerous aid programmes, they do not appear so 
disparate and it is possible to reconcile to some extent the discrepancies reported. 
1 $1,690 million according to R. Rubottom and J. C. Murphy, Spain and the United 
States since World War II {New York: Praeger, 1984), pp. 44-45. Rubottom was an 
official at the U.S. Operations Mission (USOM) in Madrid during the mid-1950s. A. 
Vinas et al., Politica comercial exterior en Espana (1931-1975j(Madrid: Banco Exterior 
de Espana, 1979), p. 798 provides the figure of $1,523 million. Henceforth, all dollar 
figures refer to U.S. dollars. 
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The best breakdowns available are in the annual reports of the Bank of Spain and 
in a 1960 article published in Information Comercial Espanola. 
The recalculation of the amounts of aid to be undertaken here will expand 
the coverage hitherto available in the literature both in time and by providing a 
systematic breakdown. The purpose of the exercise is not to present a more 
detailed account of aid disbursements for its own sake, but rather to allow the 
exploration of an existing claim in the literature about the importance of aid-
finance goods in relieving bottlenecks in the Spanish economy. Unless we 
provide a coherent estimate at regular intervals of commodities imported 
financed through aid, we would not be in a position to assess the relevance of 
such arguments. 
Before we engage in detailing the amounts of aid through the numerous 
programmes, we should pause and think about what we want to report. Our aim 
is to provide a comprehensive analysis but also to provide comparable figures 
and make sense of some of the arguments endorsed in the literature, so that we 
need to report the amounts under meaningful categories. For a start, this means to 
establish a clear definition as to what we should consider as 'aid.' Any estimate 
will, in any case, depend on what definition of aid is used, an issue not often 
addressed in the existing literature but necessary if we are to construct an 
economically sensible estimate. Similarly, although most aid linked to the Pact of 
Madrid finally reached the country, it is important to distinguish between 
amounts authorised by the U.S. and the goods actually received in Spain. There 
are four different stages at which we could look into aid. In most programmes, 
the U.S. Congress will first earmark sums available to Spain. Specific purchases 
will then have to be authorised by the relevant agency on request of the Spanish 
government, which would subsequently grant sub-authorisations to Spanish 
2 Banco de Espana, Informe sobre la evolution de la economia espanola en 1959 
(Madrid: Banco de Espana, 1960), p. 63 does not provide a breakdown of goods 
financed with the amounts of aid reported. The article 'Cooperation Economica 
Hispano-norteamericana,' published in April 1960 in Information Comercial Espanola 
provides the most detailed and comprehensive classification of the aid programmes. For 
our purposes, its main shortcomings are that it covers up to 1959 only and does not 
decompose the goods financed with Eximbank loans or which sectors were receiving the 
capital goods financed under the defence support rubric of the American aid programme. 
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importers. Finally, the goods will have to be delivered. It is precisely the last 
stage in which we are most interested and given that, as we will see later, there 
were significant time lags between the two, there is a need for a clear distinction 
in this sense.3 
In what follows we have considered that any long-term capital flow 
where the beneficiary is the government of Spain (or where the government is 
involved in it by guaranteeing the repayment) should be labelled as 'aid.' This 
obviously combines three very different forms through which capital movements 
took place, namely outright grants, loans, and sales of American goods for 
pesetas. Whilst there is no doubt about considering grants as aid, the last two 
may be contentious. In fact, it is currently a common practice to estimate the 
concessional component of loans as the true amount of aid furnished.4 A similar 
argument could be made about the sales of American goods for Spanish pesetas. 
However, in both cases it is the total amount that represent the true contribution 
of goods to the Spanish economy from the dollar area. Moreover, if we were to 
exclude these as aid we would not be in a position to assess the 'relief of 
bottlenecks' argument, since its implicit rationale is the importance of the foreign 
exchange gap. Thus, we have included the total amount of loans and sales for 
pesetas as aid. 
Economically meaningful reporting also suggests that rather than 
providing an endless list of specific commodities we present the data as concisely 
as possible whilst being informative. Thus, we have initially grouped aid-
financed goods into three main categories: foodstuffs, inputs, and capital goods. 
Because the focus of this chapter is to present the data in a way that would enable 
us to assess the merits of the arguments put forward about the impact of aid, and 
in particular on the 'relief of bottlenecks' argument, it seemed unnecessary to 
split 'foodstuffs' into any further headings, such as wheat, barley, etc. Further 
3 It is important to make this distinction clearer than what it is done in the literature. It is 
often the case that a 'table of imports financed with aid' turns out to provide the data on 
authorised imports rather than actual disbursements, as in Vinas et al., Politico, 
comercial exterior, vol. 2, p. 791. 
4 As done by the Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD). OECD, Development Co-operation. 1992 
Report (Paris: OECD, 1992). 
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explanation is required on the categorization of inputs and capital goods. 
Particular classes of inputs (coal, cotton, and fertilizer) were selected for the 
potentially high bottlenecks effect. Capital goods were split according to the 
industry in which they were being incorporated. Since capital goods, by 
enhancing the productive capacity of the economy may be seen as having the 
most lasting effect we have provided a more detailed breakdown than for inputs 
and have selected: equipment that will enhance the infrastructure of the country 
(such as rolling stock and other equipment for the railways), agricultural 
machinery, capital goods allocated to the steel industry, equipment for the 
electricity generation sector and a residual category. 
The selected time unit for analysis is also a problem. American sources 
and literature use as time unit the American fiscal year (hereafter FY), which 
runs from 1st July to 30th June (i.e., FY1956 starts 1st July 1955 and ends 30th 
June 1956). In contrast, Spanish sources and literature often refer to calendar 
years. To enhance the comparability and usefulness of the data presented an 
effort has been made to provide the amounts of aid in a way that both calendar 
and fiscal year measures may be obtained. 
The recalculation of the aid figures also draws on sources hitherto little 
used. In particular, the quarterly reports from the Spanish Comision para el 
desarrollo de los acuerdos con Norteamerica [Committee for the development of 
the agreements with North America] have been located and extensively used.5 
Similarly, American official sources which had previously been little used in the 
Spanish historiography have been gathered to complete the picture of the 
disbursements of aid-financed goods. 
The remainder of this chapter provides a set of tables of aid 
disbursements under categories which are kept throughout our review of all 
elements of the American aid programme. For a narrative about the origin of the 
American aid programme to Spain, the reader is referred to Chapter Four below. 
5 The Spanish National Library holds issues 1 (covering from 26th September 1953 to 
30th June 1954), 5 (covering 1st April to 30th June 1955) and therefore quarterly until the 
last two issues, no. 37 (covering 1st April to 30th June 1963) and no. 40 (providing 
cumulative figures up to 31st May 1964) with the exception of the missing issues nos. 7 
and 17. The Comision was dissolved by Decree 967/1964. 
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2.2. First aid: Eximbank 
Throughout the years 1950 to 1963 the Export-Import Bank of Washington 
(Eximbank) was involved in loans to Spain under three different rubrics.6 
The first corresponded to the role of the Eximbank as 'agent for the 
Director for Mutual Security in establishing and administering credits for Spain 
in an amount not exceeding $62.5 million authorised under the General 
Appropriation Act of 1951.'7 This was the arrangement made when the first 
American official assistance to Spain was voted by the U.S. Congress in August 
1950. Harry S. Truman, President of the U.S. signed it into law instructing that 
the $62.5 million appropriated by Congress were to be lent to Spain under the 
operation of the Eximbank.8 The $62.5 million were allocated in a total of 38 
loans to Spanish concerns. All loans were issued at 3% p.a. interest rate, were to 
be repaid in 40 semi-annual payments starting after 5 years from the initial 
disbursement and were guaranteed by the government of Spain. The episode is 
well known in the literature, in particular the clashes between Spanish and 
Eximbank officials that resulted in the delay of the authorisation and 
6 The Eximbank, originally created in the midst of the New Deal with the aim to 
promote American exports and hence employment, would become much more active as 
an integral part of postwar American foreign economic policy. See R. M. Rodriguez 
(ed.), The Export-Import Bank at fifty: the international environment and the 
institution's role (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1987). 
7 Export-Import Bank of Washington, Fourteenth Semiannual Report of the Eximbank, 
covering January-June 1952 (Washington, D.C.), p. 27. 
8 Details of beneficiaries of credit appear on sources such as H. Villar Serraillet, 'El 
capital publico exterior a largo plazo y la economia espanola,' Boletin de Estudios 
Economicos, vol. 20, no. 65 (May-August 1965), p. 543 and Instituto de Estudios 
Fiscales, Datos basicospara la historiafinanciera de Espana (1850-1975), vol. 2 
(Madrid: Ministerio de Hacienda, 1976), p. 528. However, the Eximbank Semiannual 
Reports to Congress are preferred not only because of its original nature but also 
because they enable us to follow disbursements closely. Details of individual loans are 
given in Table A. 1 in Appendix A below. 
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disbursement of credits.9 However, Vinas does not follow the disbursements of 
the loan beyond 1953. A breakdown of disbursements at regular intervals of 
time and by goods financed is provided in Table 2.1 below. The table has been 
constructed by classifying, using the categories discussed above, each of the 
loans provided according to the type of goods financed and then following the 
disbursements of each of the 38 loans through the Eximbank Reports to 
Congress. The table shows the lengthy time that took for the credit line to be 
fully used. 
9 A. Vinas, 'La primera ayuda economica norteamericana a Espana,' in Ledums de 
Economia Espanola e Internacional (50 Aniversario del Cuerpo de Tecnicos 
Comerciales delEstado) (Madrid: Ministerio de Comercio, 1981), p. 86. 
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Outside the $62.5 million line of credit, the Eximbank granted to the 
government of Spain a loan to purchase cotton for $12 million in January 1952 
and another one for the same amount in April 1953. Some sources in the 
literature do not refer to these loans, perhaps not considering them aid because 
the loans were formally granted to six private Spanish banks.10 The government 
of Spain was, however, the ultimate guarantor of the operation and thus we will 
include them as aid. Table 2.2 below uses the Eximbank Reports to Congress to 
track the disbursements under these loans. 
Table 2.2. Disbursements of the Eximbank cotton credits (in thousand dollars) 
1952(1) 1952(11) 1953(1) 1953(11) 1954(1)" 
Authorised 12,000 12,000 
(3 Jan 1952) (9 April 1953) 
Disbursed 11,965 6,558 5,131 
Source: Export-Import Bank, Semiannual Report to Congress, nos. 14 to 18. 
A more vigorous second phase of lending by the Eximbank took place 
from the mid-1950s onwards. It started in July 1954, involving now the 
Eximbank's own funds and not limited to a special provision, as had been the 
case with the $62.5 million line of credit.11 The annual breakdown for this 
second phase of Eximbanlc lending follows in Table 2.3. below. 
10 Notably J. J. Rovira Sanchez-Herrero, 'La ayuda estadounidense,' 
in Centro de Estudios Tributarios, Las inversiones de capital extranjero en Espana, vol. 
1, (Madrid: AGESA, 1960). The first loan bore an interest rate of 2.65% p.a. whilst the 
second one was 3.5% p.a. They were both granted under the guarantee of the Bank of 
Spain and repayable in 18 months. 
11 Details in Table A.2 in Appendix A below. Rovira, 'La ayuda,' or J. J. Rovira, 'La 
ayuda Americana,' Cuadernos de la Escuela Diplomatica, vol. 1 (1960), pp. 59-127 and 
G. Fernandez de Valderrama, 'Espana-USA, 1953-1964,' Economia Financiera, no. 6 
(1964) pp. 14-51 provide the data on authorisations but not on actual disbursements. 
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2.3. Pact of Madrid: Defence support 
The executive agreements signed in September 1953 envisaged aid in two forms, 
military and economic or 'defence support.' Every year the U.S. Congress would 
vote a Mutual Security Act (MSA) including appropriations for individual 
countries.12 The amounts appropriated for Spain are detailed in Table 2.6 below. 
The table also provides the value of goods actually shipped into Spain, 
1 
information which is not usually provided in the literature. In order to construct 
the following table we used the reports of the Comision above mentioned, which 
detail the status in terms of disbursement for each of the authorizations through 
which aid was being disbursed. Thus, by following each of the approximately 
400 authorisations through time, we are able to provide a relatively accurate 
estimate of disbursements by type of commodity. In particular, we can provide a 
greater level of detail for capital goods than previously available.14 In our 
reconstruction we classify the capital goods according to the industrial sector 
they are allocated to. This will enable us, in Chapter Three below, to rehearse 
some arguments about the contribution of aid-financed capital goods to specific 
industries. 
12 The U.S. agency originally in charge was the Mutual Security Agency. Its functions 
were subsequently transferred to the Foreign Operations Administration, then to the 
International Cooperation Administration and finally to the Agency for International 
Development. 
13 For example Rovira, 'La ayuda', Fernandez de Valderrama, 'Espana-USA', or Vinas 
et al., Politico, comercial. 
14 The April 1960 article in Information Comercial Espanola provides great detail for 
foodstuffs (13 subcategories) and for inputs (26 categories) but no such disaggregation 
for capital goods. 
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Defence support disbursements also lagged considerably behind 
authorisations. However, because authorisations were produced on a fiscal year 
basis, it makes more sense to use disbursements on a fiscal year basis in order to 
establish the extent of such lags Table 2.5 below provides the data on defence 
support authorisations and disbursements arranged in fiscal years. It also shows 
the industries that received the capital goods. The reader may also note that for 
some groups of goods the cumulative disbursements exceeds the actual 
authorised values. The reason for this is that occasionally an authorisation to 
import a certain good was allowed to be used to import goods other than those 
earmarked initially. For example an authorisation to purchase coal may end up 
being used partly to purchase coal and partly to purchase other materials. We 
have also included technical assistance in this table, since the data available on 
procurements was in fiscal year form.15 
15 OECD, Technical Assistance and the Economic Development of Spain (Paris: OECD, 
1968), p. 40 provides data for disbursements under the American technical assistance 
programme. 
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2.4. Agricultural surpluses: Public Law 480 
The provision of agricultural surpluses to Spain under the American aid 
programme, as in the McCarran amendment noted in Table 2.5, had actually 
started even before the signing of the Pact of Madrid in 1953. Already in 
September 1951, a wheat sale to the government of Spain was arranged under the 
Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC), an American government agency. Spain 
was to purchase wheat for a value of $20 million which was to be paid in pesetas 
at an exchange rate of 42.50 pesetas/dollar.16 The sale of wheat under the CCC 
and the McCarran amendment were not going to be the only means through 
which American agricultural surpluses were shipped to Spain, hi the following 
years, the U.S. used extensively the Public Law 480 (PL480) for this type of sale, 
which contributed not only to alleviate the situation in Spain but also to provide 
foreign markets for the American farmer. PL480 was intended as a sales 
programme in which American agricultural surpluses would be exchanged for 
local currencies to be used by the American legations in the field. Exceptions to 
this are sales under title IV of the law, which were long-term credit sales but 
denominated in dollars and titles II and III which involved no sale as they were 
full donations, in one case for emergency purposes (title II) and in the other 
11 
channelled through private American non-profit organisations (title III). 
With the exception of the dollar sales (title IV), Spain received 
agricultural surpluses through all mechanisms envisaged in PL480. The 
agreements totalled $506 million dollars, though disbursements fell slightly short 
of that figure. The available data is provided in Table 2.6 below.18 Unfortunately, 
data on disbursements is relatively limited. The reports from the Comision only 
included PL480 activities at the very end of the period and it was not possible to 
16 Banco Hispano Americano, La situation econdmica en 1956 (Madrid: Banco Hispano 
Americano, 1957), p. 31. 
17 E. N. De Blois, 12 Years of Achievement under Public Law 480 (Washington, D.C.: 
U.S. Department of Agriculture, 1967), pp. 1-14. 
18 Details of the sales agreements entered upon Spain and the U.S. under PL480 are 
provided in Fernandez de Valderrama, 'Espana-USA,' pp. 47-49. 
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locate all the 'Semiannual reports to Congress on activities under PL480,' and 
those available did not report actual disbursements by country and commodity.19 
It is important that when we do the final breakdown by economic 
categories we bear in mind that although all PL480 involved sales of agricultural 
surpluses, for our purposes we should distinguish between foodstuffs and inputs, 
since cotton would have to be included in this latter category. 
Table 2.6. Amounts disbursed under PL480 (in thousands of dollars) 





Foodstuffs 8,642 10,300 18,923 4,839 13,700 56,404 82,500 
Cotton 7,324 7,907 17,804 26,445 16,740 76,220 121,200 
Other inputs'1 - 59,637 39,487 60,720 55,030 214,874 268,100 
Shippings 421 3,093 4,389 2,339 2,790 13,032 16,200 
Total 16,387 80,937 80,603 94,343 88,260 360,530 488,000 
Notes: 
a: excludes sale of $2,582,000 wheat to be resold to Switzerland. 
b: excludes sale of $1,862,000 wheat to be resold to Switzerland. 
c: we know the cumulative amounts disbursed but not actual disbursements over 
calendar years 1960-1962. In further calculations we will assume that the 
disbursements took place throughout those years evenly. 
d: 'oil' has been placed under the category of inputs (instead of foodstuffs) since 
this was cottonseed oil primarily for industrial use. 
Sources: 'Cooperation Economica Hispano-norteamericana,' 
InformacionComerical Espanola (April 1960) for data up to 1960. For total 
cumulative values the 40th and last report of the Comision provides data on 
disbursements by goods under PL480. Comision Delegada del Gobierno para el 
Desarrollo de los Acuerdos con Norteamerica, Informe sobre el desarrollo de la 
Ayuda Economica (hasta el 31 de mayo de 1964). 
19 For example, U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, 85th Congress, Document no. 
50, Fifth Semiannual Report on Activities carried on under Public Law 480, 83rd 
Congress, as amended, outlining operations under the Act during the period July 1 
through December 31, 1956 (Washington, D.C: U.S. Congress, 1957). 
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Under Title III of PL480, social assistance in the form of agricultural 
surpluses such as powder milk and other dairy products was also granted to 
Spain. The distribution was coordinated by the National Catholic Welfare 
Conference in the U.S. and by the Catholic organisation Caritcis in Spain. Table 
2.7 below shows the amounts disbursed under this scheme. 
Table 2.7. Social assistance disbursed by National Catholic Welfare Conference-
Caritas (PL 480 Title III donations) in million dollars, fiscal years2 
1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 
Foodstuffs 12,451 17,004 16,669 19,718 6,159 
1960 1961 1962 1963 Cumulative 
Foodstuffs 6,902 4,467 5,147 3,062 91,579 
Notes: 
a: in further calculations of total aid on a calendar year basis it will be assumed 
that the disbursements given here were evenly spread across the first and second 
semester of the fiscal year, thus enabling us to impute a value for the calendar 
year. 
Source: De Blois, 12 Years of Achievement under Public Law 480 , p. 97. 
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2.5. Other aspects (counterpart funds, military aid, other lending) and 
summary of American aid programme to Spain 
This section reviews other elements of the American aid programme and 
discusses why they have been included or excluded in the calculation of aid. 
Defence support aid generated a counterpart fund in pesetas - a 
mechanism well known as it mirrors that of the Marshall Plan. The Spanish 
government was required to pay in pesetas the equivalent value of dollars 
received, using for that purpose a specified exchange rate of 35 pesetas per 
dollar.20 During the first five years, 60% of counterpart funds of defence support 
was for base construction, and a further 10% was for U.S. government expenses 
in Spain. The remaining 30% would be allocated for development projects. 
Agricultural surpluses sold under PL480 also involved counterpart funds, 50% of 
91 
which were for development programmes. 
However, counterpart funds are not 'aid,' as it is the Spanish government 
that puts these pesetas at the disposal of Americans. Including them in our 
calculation would mean accounting twice for the value of aid since we will 
include first the dollar value of goods, say shipped under title I of PL480 and 
then their peseta value. Moreover, the Americans did not press the Spanish 
government to finance particular projects with the Spanish share of those funds, 
which was in any case relatively limited, hi the early years most of the 
counterpart funds were devoted to the construction of the military bases. As late 
as the end of 1958 projects that aimed directly at improving the Spanish 
economy had only received a fraction of the counterpart funds generated. Out of 
the 23,093 million pesetas deposited with the Bank of Spain by that date, there 
20 From 1958 onwards 90% of defence support counterpart funds was made available for 
development projects. The exchange rate was increased to 42 pesetas/dollar on April 
1957 and to 60 pesetas/dollar in July 1959. Fernandez de Valderrama, 'Espana-USA,' p. 
24. 
21 The McCarran amendment had its own terms: $20 million being a loan, $24 million a 
grant and the remaining $11 million giving rise to counterpart funds, computed at 38.95 
pesetas/dollar and available for the U.S. government expenses in Spain. PL480 sales 
were computed at 38.95 pesetas/dollar. Baldrich, 'Balance,' p. 37. 
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were 10,875 million unspent and projects for Spanish use had only benefited 
with 3,648 million pesetas.22 
Similarly, in our calculations of aid we have not included military aid. 
This type of assistance took the form of deliveries of military end-items to the 
Spanish armies. Authorisation through FY1959 amounted to $407 million, with 
actual deliveries being $315 million, although it has to be emphasised that these 
figures value second-hand equipment at acquisition cost and thus overstate the 
actual amount received.23 Moreover, it seems reasonable to assume that most of 
these military items would not have been bought by Spain had she been made to 
pay for them. For these reasons we have excluded military aid in our account. In 
any case, and given that the data are available, it is reported in Table A. 3 in 
Appendix A below. 
It must be noted that, unlike economic aid that came to an end after 1963, 
military aid continued to be forthcoming subsequently. It is also relevant to note 
that in the case of military aid all disbursements were in the form of outright 
OA grants, with no element of loans or sales involved. 
22 Banco de Espana, Informe sobre la evolution de la economia espanola en 1958 
(Madrid: Banco de Espana, 1959), pp. 139-40. The Bank of Spain held approximately 
95% of counterpart pesetas generated and, together with the quarterly reports from the 
Comision Delegada del Gobierno para el seguimiento de los Acuerdos con 
Norteamerica, its widely circulated annual reports for 1957 onwards provide the best 
breakdown of counterpart disbursements. 
23 A. P. Whitaker, Spain and the Defence of the West: Ally and Liability (New York: 
Harper, 1961), p. 240. The reference quoted, and which I have not been able to locate, is 
U.S. Department of Defence, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defence, International 
Security Affairs, The Military Assistance Program: Programs and Deliveries by Area 
and Country, Fiscal Years 1950-1960, release of February 26, 1960. 
24 S. Chavkin, J. Sangster and W. Susman, Spain: Implications for United States Foreign 
Policy (Stamford, Conn.: Greylock, 1976), pp. 34-44. This volume sponsored by several 
Democrat Senators in the mid-1970s is the best source for military aid and, in general, 
provides an excellent breakdown of aid programmes. 
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It has also been decided not to include in the calculation of aid the 
amounts of dollars that were raised through the dollar-peseta programme.25 This 
programme, organised between the Spanish government and the American 
private firm World Commerce Corporation was in practice an official parallel 
market for pesetas, organised and supplied with currency by the Ministry of 
Commerce. Its purpose was to attract the business of supplying foreigners 
travelling to Spain with pesetas, by providing a exchange rate which, although 
below the prevailing rate in the free market of Tangiers, was above the official 
level. Although it raised substantial amounts of dollars, it was decided not to 
include these as aid given that no involvement from the American authorities 
took place.26 
We have also omitted from our calculation of total aid the repayments to 
the Eximbanlc for maturing loans. The reason for not doing so is that the 
available data, which are provided in Table A.4 in the appendix below, are very 
limited. Moreover, deducting such repayments from the total aid disbursements 
would have required us to assign those values to a particular type of good. 
The final programme that we have included in our calculation is the 
lending under the Development Loan Fund, intended by the American 
administration to exemplify the shift from aid in grant to loan format. Table 2.8 
below reports the loans under this facility. 
25 M. J. Asensio, 'El proceso de apertura exterior de los cincuenta y el arancel de 1960,' 
unpublished Ph.D. dissertation (Universidad de Zaragoza, 1995) pp. 299-301. 
26 Estimates suggest that close to $260 million were raised during 1953-1957, Vinas et 
al, Politica comercial exterior, vol. 2, p. 824. 
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Table 2.8. Details of Development Loan Fund credits 
Date authorised Authorised amount Interest 
rate 
5 Jun 1959, RENFE $14,900,000 3.50% p.a. 
29 Jun 1960, ISODEL $350,000 3.50% p.a. 
22 Aug 1960, UNESA $1,840,000 5.75% p.a. 
Total $17,090,000 
Source: Fernandez de Valderrama, Espana-USA, p. 51. 
Because we have only incomplete data on disbursements of this loan we 
will need to make an assumption about disbursements to incorporate DLF loans 
in our final estimate of aid. We have assumed that disbursements took place 
during 1960.27 
We are now in a position to summarise the extent of American aid to 
Spain through the different programmes, namely the Eximbanlc (EIB label in 
tables below) $62.5 million credit line, the Eximbank cotton credits, the 
Eximbank second phase of lending, the CCC sale of wheat, defence support, the 
technical assistance programmes within defence support, the agricultural sales 
under PL480, the donation of foodstuffs through PL480(title III) (distributed by 
Caritas) and the loans by the DLF. Table 2.9 below provides a breakdown by 
programme whilst Table 2.10 immediately below presents the data arranged by 
categories of aid-financed goods. 
27 As reported in 'Cooperation Economica Hispano-norteamericana,' Information 
Comercial Espanola (April 1960), no disbursements had taken place by 31st December 
1959. 
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Overall the data provided are as accurate as is possible with the sources 
that have survived and bearing in mind that the purpose of the exercise is to 
proceed to assessing interpretative arguments on a firm basis. The figures 
presented are stronger for cumulative amounts, either temporal or encompassing 
groups of commodities. There is an inevitable margin of error even when the 
authorisations have been followed individually. In certain cases the heading 
given to a particular authorisation meant that it was unclear as to the actual 
goods, in particular it was difficult to ascertain the industry of destination of 
capital goods. Similarly, while in some instances the cost of freight was 
separated from the goods themselves on other occasions the transportation costs 
were included in the authorisation. Thus, in the latter case the true value of goods 
was biased upwards. The procedure here has been to report the value of 
shippings whenever known since it was not always possible either to assign a 
particular type of commodity to which those freights corresponded or 
alternatively to deduct from all those authorizations that included shipping the 
cost of transportation. 
Finally, it may be informative to report the percentage of the aid that was 
disbursed in the form of grants, loans, and sales for pesetas. Some of the items 
are straightforward to categorise: Eximbank and DLF were loans; the purchase of 
wheat through the CCC a sale, while PL480 title Ill-donation were grants. 
Defence support and PL480 title I have a more complex treatment. In the case of 
defence support, these generated counterpart funds, which can be considered as 
either a sale, when the Spanish government deposits pesetas at the disposal of the 
American government, or a grant, when the counterpart pesetas are to be used for 
general development projects of the Spanish economy. The proportion that was 
available for American use and thus considered sale was originally 70% (grant 
30%) but from FY1959 this figure was reduced to 10% (grant 90%). 
In the case of PL480 title I the counterpart pesetas were either at the 
disposal of the American government, and thus a sale, or lent to Spain for 40 
years at 3% p.a. The percentages changed for each sale agreement: 50% loan in 
the first agreement, 60% loan in the second, then 70% loan in the third and 
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subsequently reduced to 45% in the remaining agreements. Once all these 
particulars are taken into account, the calculation gives the following result, as 
reported in Table 2.11 below. 
Table. 2.11. Breakdown of total American aid according to concessional element 
(cumulative values at 30th June 1963, million dollars) 
Amounts disbursed Percentage of total 
Grants 380 29 
Loans 472 36 
Sales 459 35 
Total 1,311 
Source: as in tables 2.1 to 2.8. 
28 Baldrich, 'Balance,' p. 39 and Asensio, 'El proceso de apertura exterior de los 
cincuenta,' p. 290. 
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2.6. Multilateral aid at the time of the 1959 Stabilisation Plan 
There are many contrasts between the American aid that Spain received 
throughout the period 1950-1963 and the multilateral aid that Spain enjoyed in 
1959 to support the Stabilisation Plan. In July 1959 it was announced with great 
fanfare that Spain was to have at her disposal a large financial cushion to support 
her through the difficult moments in the balance of payments that the 
introduction of some trade liberalisation measures were expected to cause. The 
figure was trumpeted to be as high as $544 million. However, on closer 
inspection the amount of 'new' funds available to the Spanish government was 
much smaller. This is well known in the literature and, for the sake of clarity, we 
have transcribed the breakdown of the $544 million and reproduced it in Table 
2.12 below. This breakdown will help to guide us through a discussion of the 
• 9Q actual funds made available to Spain. 
Table 2.12. Foreign aid announcements in July 1959 
in support of the Stabilisation Plan 
in millions of dollars 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) 75 
European Monetary Agreement (EMA) 100 
Pool of private American banks 71 
European governments 45 
U.S. government 
Eximbank 30 
Defence support 40 
Agricultural surpluses (PL480) 60 
Counterpart fund releases 123 
Subtotal U.S. govt. 353 
TOTAL 544 
Source: taken from J. Sarda Dexeus, 'El Banco de Espana (1931-1962),' in F. 
Ruiz Martin et al, El Banco de Espana. Una historia economica (Madrid: 
Banco de Espana, 1970) and reprinted in M. Varela Parache (coord.), El Fondo 
Monetario International, el Banco Mundialy la economia espanola (Madrid: 
Piramide, 1994), p. 481. 
29 Data for this section has been taken from Sarda, 'El Banco de Espana,' and J. Muns, 
Historia de las relaciones entre Espana y el Fondo Monetario International 1958-1982 
(Madrid: Alianza, 1986), pp. 36-51. 
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The first element in the table is the $75 million made available by the 
IMF. This corresponded to drawings for a total amount of $50 million and the 
arrangement of a stand-by loan facility for $25 million, both approved by the 
IMF on 17th July 1959. The stand-by arrangement was renewed in August 1960 
but no drawings were made on it and was cancelled, at the request of the Spanish 
government, in March 1961. Soon after, in April 1961, Spain repaid the $50 
million that had initially been drawn. Thus, this $50 million from the IMF can be 
considered as multilateral aid, despite the relatively short term in which it was 
repaid. Moreover, it should be noted that the $50 million drawing was made 
against the quota of Spain, which was set at $100 million out of which $10 
million had been paid in gold upon becoming a member of the Fund. 
The second row in Table 2.12 above reports $100 million to be lent to 
Spain by the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation through the 
European Monetary Agreement. It was agreed that $75 million would be at the 
immediate disposal of Spain and the further $25 million would become available 
in February 1960 provided the Managing Board of the EMA submitted a 
favourable report. In the event, Spain repaid her drawings of $24 million by the 
beginning of 1961 cancelling the credit line altogether. Simultaneously, Spain 
cancelled the credit line for $71 million that had been made available by a pool 
of American banks and which was never utilised. 
Reading down the table we encounter $45 million to be provided by 
several European governments. This amount was the extent of short-term debts 
that Spain had on her bilateral trade agreements with several OEEC member 
countries who agreed not to demand immediate payment of those balances and 
consolidated the debts. 
A similar re-labelling of previously committed funds was undertaken to 
arrive at the figure of $353 million that the U.S. was to provide to underpin the 
stabilisation operation. It involved including in the calculation the programmed 
amounts of American assistance to Spain during FY1960. Thus, the figures 
reported in Table 2.12 above do not represent further allocations from the 
Eximbank, defence support or PL480, but the values that would have been made 
available to Spain in any case. Moreover, the figure was inflated by announcing 
that the equivalent of $123 million of the unspent balance of counterpart pesetas 
for American use was to be lent to Spain. Including this as aid is doubly 
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misleading because those counterpart pesetas had originated from deposits from 
the Spanish government. 
It is clear therefore that looking at the multilateral aid episode of 1959 
from the standpoint of the additional availability of goods that this aid permitted, 
the amounts were minimal and for a very limited period. 
This should not be interpreted as an attempt to diminish the overall 
importance of these credits and facilities in underpinning the whole stabilisation 
programme of 1959. On the contrary, this first glance at the operation can but 
whet the interest in examining further the relationship between aid donors and 
Spain in respect to the Stabilisation Plan, a topic which will be discussed at 
length in Chapter Seven below. 
Let us now proceed to use the estimates of aid disbursements elaborated 
in this chapter and evaluate some of the existing claims about the direct impact of 
the aid-financed goods in the Spanish economy. 
62 
Chapter 3. What was the effect of foreign aid in relieving 
input bottlenecks in the Spanish economy? 
Index 
3.1. Introduction: why focus on input bottlenecks? 
3.2. Theoretical considerations when analysing input bottlenecks 
3.3. Estimating the effect of aid in alleviating input bottlenecks 
3.4. Conclusion 
Abstract 
This chapter explores the hypothesis put forward in the existing literature 
that American aid during the 1950s, despite its relatively modest amount, 
allowed the Spanish economy to overcome serious shortages of necessary 
imported inputs. The argument has not been explored in quantitative 
terms hitherto and the chapter contributes to the literature by applying 
standard input-output analysis to examine the bottlenecks hypothesis. It 
concludes that accounting for this effect would not have reduced 
substantially the (fast) rates at which the Spanish economy was growing. 
This, however, should not be interpreted as dismissive of the overall 
effects of aid in Spanish economic growth and underlines the importance 
of looking at other transmission mechanisms through which aid may have 
affected economic growth indirectly, which will be the focus and main 
contribution of the remainder of the thesis. 
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According to what Camilo [Alonso Vega] has told me, the best thing that the 
Americans did for us was empty the Madrid bars and cabarets of whores, 
since they almost all marry American sergeants and GIs. 
General Francisco Franco in private, as quoted in P. Preston, Franco: A 
Biography (London: Harper Collins, 1993), p. 627 
Given the wide range of bottlenecks that threatened the Spanish economy, an 
increase in imports, even of not a large amount in absolute terms, would 
have immediate effects on domestic production provided that those imports 
were directed to the goods in shortest supply. 
J. Clavera et ah, Capitalismo espaiiol: de la autarqida a la estabilizacion 
(1939-1959) (Madrid: Edicusa, 1978), p. 254 
3.1. Introduction: why focus on input bottlenecks? 
The historiography of foreign aid programmes to Spain, and in particular of the 
direct economic effects of American aid during the 1950s, lacks agreement as to 
the extent of the effects of aid-financed goods in the Spanish economy. On one 
hand, many authors were quick to note the relatively limited amounts of aid that 
Spain enjoyed.1 The Spanish government and (government controlled) press 
wasted no opportunity to call for larger aid amounts from the United States. As 
the initial quote suggests, these complaints did reflect, at least partly, the opinion 
of many Spanish policy-makers. From a Spanish point of view, it was not only 
the actual amounts that were disappointing but also the composition of the goods 
financed with aid. The bias towards agricultural produce came to be particularly 
resented. The Spanish commercial attache in Washington went as far as to report 
1 A. Baldrich, 'Balance y efectos economicos de la ayuda norteamericana,' Moneday 
Credito, vol. 61 (June 1957), pp. 27-56. This view was an integral part of the classic 
study on the Spanish-American base agreement, A. Vinas, Los pactos secretos de 
Franco con Estados Unidos: bases, ayuda economica, recortes de soberania 
(Barcelona: Grijalbo, 1981), p. 315. 
Unsigned document 'Economia espanola y ayuda americana,' 11th July 1956. Archive 
of the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs [henceforth MAE], Leg. 4615, Exp. 15. In the 
press, see for example Ya, 6th February 1958, or ABC, 23rd June 1963. The latter 
newspaper underlined that Spain had barely received $3.75 per person per year. 
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the 'little or zero value of the new agricultural surpluses programmes offered.' 
The view that the American aid programme had financed an unfortunate mix of 
commodities would in fact be a common theme in the subsequent literature.4 
On the other hand, it has also been argued that, despite the limited 
amount of aid, its direct impact on Spanish economic growth may have been 
substantial given the severe bottlenecks that afflicted the Spanish economy.5 
From a very early stage, the Spanish historiography was prone to highlight the 
importance, in particular, of the provision of raw materials for Spanish industry 
under the aid programme.6 The Bank of Spain, although it conceded that the 
initial amounts of aid were 'certainly modest,' emphasised the good use to which 
aid had been put and argued that the 'multiplier effects' of aid-fmanced goods 
were already noticeable.7 The second of the opening quotes in this chapter 
exemplifies this argument. However, the literature has so far failed to provide 
estimates of the alleged importance of aid financed goods in relieving supply 
bottlenecks.8 Thus, in the absence of further quantification of these claims, the 
3 Jose Antonio Gimenez-Arnau [Director-General of Economic Cooperation at Spanish 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs], as quoted in letter from Ambassador Areilza to Minister of 
Commerce Arburua, Washington, D.C., 31st December 1954. MAE, Leg.4615, Exp.15. 
4 R, Tamames, La Republica. La Era de Franco (Madrid: Alianza, 1986), p. 222. More 
recently F. Guirao, 'The United States, Franco, and the Integration of Europe,' in F. H. 
Heller and J. R. Gillingham, The United States and the integration of Europe: legacies 
of a postwar era (New York: St Martin's Press, 1996), p. 91. 
5 J. Sarda, 'Prologo,' in J. Clavera et al., Capitalismo espanol: de la autarquia a la 
estabilizacion (1939-1959) (Madrid: Edicusa, 1978) and J. L. Garcia Delgado, 
'Crecimiento industrial y cambio en lapolitica espanola en el decenio de 1950. Guia 
para un analisis,' Hacienda Publica Espanola, no. 100 (1986), p. 292. 
6 J. J. Rovira, 'La ayuda estadounidense,' in Centro de Estudios Tributarios, Las 
inversiones de capital extranjero en Espana, vol. 1 (Madrid: AGES A, 1960), p. 165 
already emphasised the importance of aid in the provision of very important raw 
materials for industry, highlighting cotton for the textile industry. 
7 Banco de Espana, Memoria leida en la Junta General de Accionistas (10 y 24 de abril 
de 1955) (Madrid: Banco de Espana, 1955), p. 68. 
8 E. Fanjul, 'Papel de la ayuda americana en la economia espanola,' Information 
Comercial Espanola, no. 577 (September 1981), pp. 159-66. Fanjul provides a 
theoretical discussion of gap models as a justification of the possibly large multiplier 
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economic historiography of the period has inevitably been careful and vague.9 
Further attention to this issue is warranted given the existing disagreements on 
the extent to which an alternative allocation of aid-financed goods may have had 
a larger impact on the Spanish economy. In fact, the bias towards the provision 
of foodstuffs and raw materials was publicly justified by the American officials 
as a way of enhancing the overall contribution of aid to economic growth: 
Although it was the Spanish and American government's intention when 
starting the aid programme to focus on the provision of industrial 
equipment, the great need of raw materials by existing industries to 
maintain their output growth rates ended up determining the massive 
financing of these products after the first year of the aid programme.10 
Irrespective of whether other factors were more significant in determining 
the allocation of aid, a topic discussed in Chapter Five below, this raises the point 
that there existed an optimum allocation of goods given a particular aid level. It 
is also interesting to contrast this statement with the suspicion voiced by some 
Spanish authors, already before the American aid programme gathered 
momentum, that aid allocations would not be driven by what was in the best 
interest of the Spanish economy.11 
The chapter addresses two issues. It quantifies the effect of aid-fmanced 
goods in relieving input bottlenecks and then asks whether an alternative 
allocation of commodities would have had a larger direct contribution in 
alleviating those bottlenecks. In other words, the chapter will judge alternative 
aid allocations according to the criterion of their effects in easing shortages of 
effects of easing the foreign exchange gap but does not undertake the empirical exercise 
is to estimate such effects. 
9 J. Harrison, The Spanish economy in the Twentieth Century (London: Croom Helm, 
1985), pp. 133-34. 
10 E. B. Shearer, 'Significado para Espana de la ayuda economica norteamericana,5 
Revista de Economia Politica, vol. 10, no. 3 (September-December 1959), p. 996. 
Shearer was an official with the U.S. Operations Mission in Madrid. 
11 "Will the government of the U.S. be willing to channel aid in the most favourable way 
for Spain? We doubt it." E. Fuentes Quintana and J. Plaza Prieto, 'Perspectivas de la 
economia espanola,' Revista de Economia Politica, vol. 4, nos. 1-2, (May-September 
1952), p. 112. 
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inputs, what we refer to as input bottlenecks. The focus on input bottlenecks 
stems primarily from the emphasis that such claims have received in the 
literature and alternative criteria to judge the direct contribution of aid-financed 
goods to the Spanish economy are of course possible. Let us, therefore, provide a 
brief overview of other possible criteria under which to judge the direct 
contribution of aid-financed goods to the Spanish economy. 
A common first indicator to gauge the extent of an aid programme is 
comparing it to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the recipient economy. 
Table 3.1. American aid as a percentage of GDP 
Year Aid Distribution of aid Year Aid Distribution of aid 
disbursed as disbursed (in %)* disbursed as Disbursed (in %)* 
% of GDP Inputs Foodstuffs Capital % of GDP Inputs Foodstuffs Capital 
Goods Goods 
1951 0.45 22% 73% 5% 1958 1.19 35% 50% 13% 
1952 0.50 26% 62% 12% 1959 1.56 41% 42% 16% 
1953 0.27 51% 0% 49% 1960 1.21 31% 33% 35% 
1954 0.41 69% 0% 30% 1961 1.19 15% 57% 25% 
1955 0.51 58% 22% 18% 1962 0.89 16% 33% 49% 
1956 1.12 35% 50% 11% 1951-1962 1.0 29% 42% 26% 
1957 1.62 19% 56% 23% 1954-1958" 1.2 34% 46% 17% 
Notes and sources: 
* : percentages do not add up to 100 since when available shippings have 
been accounted separately, as well as technical assistance programmes. 
a : 1954-1958 corresponds to the first five-year period after the signing of 
the 1953 Spanish-American agreements. It is also a period of interest as it 
is immediately before the adoption of the 1959 Stabilisation Plan. 
See Chapter Two above for sources of aid disbursements, which lagged 
considerably from appropriations. 
As presented in Table 3.1 above, aid to Spain during the 1950s averaged 
approximately 1% of GDP, far below the average 2.5% of GDP that Marshall 
1 9 Plan recipients enjoyed. As in Chapter Two, by considering disbursements 
12 All GDP figures and deflators are taken from L. Prados de la Escosura, 'Spain's Gross 
Domestic Product, 1850-1993: Quantitative Conjectures. Appendix,' Universidad Carlos 
III Working Paper No.95/06 (1995). Aid in dollars has been converted into pesetas using 
the average exchange rate for imports as calculated by J. M. Serrano Sanz and M. J. 
Asensio, 'El ingenierismo cambiario. La peseta en los anos del cambio multiple,' 
Revista de Historia Econdmica, vol. 15, no. 3 (1997), pp. 545-73 for 1950-1958 and the 
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rather than authorisations, the picture that emerges is one in which aid becomes 
more forthcoming towards the end of the 1950s. This should be stressed since it 
contradicts the view in some of the existing literature that, by the end of the 
decade, the reduction of American aid exacerbated the difficulties in the balance 
of payments that ultimately led to the Stabilisation Plan in 1959.13 According to 
that literature 'the stimulating effect of American aid soon evaporated.' 14 
Because the stimulus that aid is supposed to be providing is the alleviation of 
supply bottlenecks, this argument is particularly difficult to reconcile with the 
picture of increasing aid deliveries. 
One direct impact that aid could have had is in reconstructing the 
infrastructure of the Spanish economy. However, if we compute all capital goods 
that were devoted to infrastructure, see Tables 2.1 and 2.5 above, only $11 
million (or 3.1%) of all aid-financed capital goods were allocated to such 
projects. Moreover, the Spanish Civil War had finished long before the American 
aid programme and, in fact, it had caused little damage to overhead physical 
capital.15 American aid could not have been crucial for the reconstruction of 
Spain after the Civil War. 
A second direct effect of aid in the Spanish economy stems from the 
provision of capital goods under the aid programme. Machinery is not an input 
incorporated into the production of other goods but rather it enhances the 
productive capacity of the economy. Aid-financed capital goods may have 
official unified exchange rate for 1959-1963, as reported in J. Aixala, La peseta ylos 
precios (Zaragoza: Prensas Universitarias de Zaragoza, 1999). For American aid to 
Marshall Plan countries see J. B. De Long and B. Eichengreen, 'The Marshall Plan: 
History's Most Successful Structural Adjustment Program,' in R. Dornbusch, W. 
Nolling and R. Layard (eds.), Postwar Economic Reconstruction and Lessons for the 
East Today (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1993), pp. 189-230. 
13 M. J. Gonzalez, La economiapolitico, delfranquismo (1940-1970) (Madrid: Tecnos, 
1979), p. 36. 
14 J. Fontana and J. Nadal, 'Spain, 1914-1970,' in C. M. Cipolla (ed.), The Fontana 
Economic History of Europe. Contemporary Economies, vol. 6, part 2 (Glasgow: 
William Collins Sons, 1976), p. 513. 
15 J. Catalan, La economia espanola y la segunda guerra mundial (Barcelona: Ariel, 
1995), Ch. 2. 
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helped to alleviate a situation in which the absence of those capital goods was the 
constraining factor in output. Some authors are particularly optimistic about this 
1 fi 
impact. However, it seems unlikely that aid-financed capital goods were of 
crucial importance. Aid-financed capital goods constitute a small portion of all 
aid-financed goods (see Table 3.1 above). Crucially, they also represented a 
relatively small fraction of total net investment as shown, for the years before the 
1959 Stabilisation Plan, in Table 3.2 below. 
Table 3.2. Contribution of aid-financed capital goods 
to net investment, 1952-1958 
Total net stock Net investment Aid-financed Aid-financed Contribution of Contribution of 
of capital (increase in total capital goods in capital goods in aid-financed aid to net 
(million of net stock of million of M 1990 pesetas capital goods to investment if all 
1990 pesetas) capital) (million current pesetas (using Prados' net investment aid had been 
of 1990 pesetas) (using exchange deflator (%) devoted to 
rate for imports) BPGDPMP8) purchase capital 
goods(%) 
1950 13,547,136 
1951 13,802,076 254,940 59 1,690 0.7 13.0 
1952 14,226,996 424,920 264 7,548 1.8 5.2 
1953 14,691,804 464,808 432 11,878 2.6 3.8 
1954 15,365,043 673,239 345 8,991 1.3 5.1 
1955 16,226,046 861,003 884 21,806 2.5 11.4 
1956 17,231,605 1,005,559 1,288 29,564 2.9 14.8 
1957 18,288,428 1,056,823 795 16,165 1.5 12.9 
1958 19,467,185 1,178,757 971 17,707 1.5 13.4 
Sources: Prados de la Escosura, Gross Domestic Product and A. Cubel and J. 
Palafox, 'El stock de capital de la economia espanola, 1900-1958,' Revista de 
Historia Industrial (1997), pp. 113-46. 
Even in the extreme case that aid had been devoted in its entirety to the 
purchase of capital goods it would still constitute a relatively modest figure. This 
reflects the substantial increase during the 1950s in the rate of accumulation of 
physical capital, which took place primarily in the private sector - a point to 
which we will return at length in Chapter Six. It is conceivable that those 
relatively small amounts allowed for the import of machinery with higher 
16 R. R. Rubottom and J. C. Murphy, Spain and the United States Since World War II 
(New York: Praeger, 1984), p. 21. 
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productivity than domestic capital goods. However, it appears more difficult to 
argue that it had a dramatic immediate impact, especially if we consider the type 
of projects into which those capital goods were incorporated. To explore this 
argument we can descend to the level of the industries that received these goods, 
for example to the electricity generation sector. 
It is commonplace in the Spanish historiography that electricity shortages 
during the early Francoist period were severe and substantially hindered output 
growth.17 In this setting, foreign aid may have contributed, for example, by 
providing machinery that was incorporated into power plants that increased the 
production of electricity and hence contributed to ease the constraint. Electricity 
producers received, in fact, the largest share of capital goods, about $100 million 
(or 28.3%) of all capital goods financed with aid. It is, however, noteworthy that 
the bulk of this was received in the latter stages of the aid programme. In the 
years 1952 to 1958 it only received $30 million of the almost $100 million that 
would ultimately be received, as shown in Table 3.3 below. 
Table 3.3. Aid-financed capital goods assigned to 
electricity generation, in thousands of dollars 
1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 
1,336 1,888 3,935 1,154 295 17,241 4,947 
1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1952-1963 1952-1958 
4,540 15,049 9,781 19,116 19,626 98,908 30,796 
Sources: as .in Tables 2.1 and 2.5 above. 
If we also consider that these capital goods were incorporated into 
projects with an especially long construction period (power stations), it seems 
difficult to argue that foreign aid helped to relieve the constraint that low 
electricity production may have represented. Moreover, it appears that electricity 
17 J. Castaneda and J. L. Redonet, 'Incidencia de las restricciones electricas sobre la 
economia nacional,' in J. Velarde (sel.), Lecturas de Economia Espanola (Madrid: 
Gredos, 1969), pp. 397-421. 
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shortages were no longer a problem by the mid-1950s.18 It is also worth noting 
that there is a significant difference between authorised capital goods assigned to 
utilities ($138 million) and actual disbursements ($100 million). This could be 
compatible with a view that this industry did not require so much imported 
machinery after all and hence the relinquishing of authorisations that had been 
originally granted to it. Let us emphasise that our argument is not that the 
relaxation on the constraint on electricity was of no importance to the Spanish 
economy, but rather that foreign aid played no role in this alleviation. 
That aid-financed capital goods arrived relatively late and that they were 
primarily directed to projects of a long gestation period is further exemplified by 
the case of capital goods destined to the Instituto Nacional de Industria (INI) 
steel mill ENSIDESA,19 Overall, the small amounts devoted to the import of 
capital goods and the lengthy process of construction make it difficult to believe 
that the effect of aid in contributing directly to the expansion of fixed capital 
could have been extensive. 
In any case, those suggesting that aid had a significant direct impact on 
the Spanish economy have not tended to rely on 'reconstruction' or 'import of 
capital goods' as the crucial aspect of the direct effects of aid. The more 
widespread view is that aid proved to be crucial in alleviating a general foreign 
exchange shortage, which is seen as the most severe restriction in the entire early 
Franco period and in particular of the 1950s.20 Most accounts are, however, not 
18 C. Sudria, 'Un factor determinante: la energia,' in J. Nadal, A. Carreras and C. Sudria 
(eds.), La economia espanola en elsigloXX. Una perspectiva historica (Barcelona: 
Ariel, 1987), p. 333 does not report electricity shortages after 1955. 
19 Approximately 50% of those capital goods that we have classified as assigned to the 
steel industry were allocated to ENSIDESA, the other 50% to Altos Hornos de Vizcaya. 
ENSIDESA would only start production in the 1960s. See Direction General de 
Cooperation Economica, Informe sobre el desarrollo de la ayuda economica, various 
issues numeros. 
20 J. Catalan, 'Reconstruction, polltica economica y desarrollo industrial: tres economias 
del sur de Europa, 1944-1953,' in L. Prados de la Escosura and V. Zamagni (eds.), El 
desarrollo economico de la Europa del Sur: Espana e Italia en perspectiva historica 
(Madrid: Alianza, 1992), pp. 377-78. For strong views on the foreign exchange gap as 
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very clear nor explicit about the modelling of the transmission mechanism 
through which the availability of foreign exchange had such significant 
repercussions for the Spanish economy.21 Let us provide a short discussion of 
how to provide measurements of such claims. 
the most crucial bottleneck see the editorials of Information Comercial Espanola, for 
example 'El sector exterior' in no. 333 (May 1961), p. 15. 
21 E. A. Diaz Berenguer, 'La ayuda americana a Espana durante los anos cincuenta y 
sesenta con especial referenda a la P. L. 480,' unpublished Ph.D. dissertation (E.T.S. 
Ingenieros Agronomos, Universidad Politecnica de Madrid, 1982) is another optimistic 
account of the resolution of the foreign exchange constraint by aid, in this case 
emphasising the role played by agricultural surpluses. 
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3.2. Theoretical considerations when analysing input bottlenecks 
The instinctive idea that greater effect can be achieved by concentrating on 
where aid is most needed can be formalised by using so-called 'gap models.' 
These models are based on the idea that output in the economy is limited by one 
binding constraint. Overall output is below its potential and easing the binding 
constraint will lead to increases in output since there are idle resources in the 
economy. In the original two-gap models output is constrained because either 
there existed investment opportunities but insufficient savings to fund them (the 
savings gap) or because the exports of the country were inadequate to purchase 
the required imports (the foreign exchange or trade gap). The most constraining 
of these gaps sets the potential maximum output. 
Figure 3.1. Gap-modelling the recipient economy 
Source: H. White, Aid andMacroeconomic Performance (London: Macmillan 
/St. Martin's, 1998), p. 96. 
Figure 3.1 depicts the nature of the gap-modelling exercise, which 
provides a quantity clearing model so that output is constrained by the binding 
element of the constraints at each level. Output is first constrained by the smaller 
of either demand or supply. Then, assuming the supply constraint is binding, 
22 L. Taylor, 'Gap models,' Journal of Development Economics, vol. 45 (1994), p. 17 
and references therein for a review of the literature on gap-models 
23 A model incorporating a third fiscal gap, reflecting that if the government fixes public 
sector borrowing the availability of government savings may be a tighter constraint on 
total investment than domestic savings, is discussed in E. L. Bacha, 'A Three-Gap 
Model of Foreign Transfers and the GDP Growth Rate in Developing Countries,' 
Journal of Development Economics, vol. 32, no. 2 (April 1990), pp. 279-96. 
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maximum output would be constrained by the most constraining of the savings, 
trade and fiscal gap. Within the trade gap, we can think of capital goods and 
intermediate goods as two separate constraints of which the most binding will 
ultimately determine the level of output attainable. 
Gap-modelling is useful for both its practical applications and the insights 
it provides. One such is the issue of fungibility. Aid is said to be fungible if the 
aggregates that were supposed to increase (imports or investment) do so by less 
than the value of the aid inflow.24 Given that aid was provided in the form of 
commodities there can be no talk of fungibility in the case of American aid to 
Spain. Yet, if access to resources from the dollar area is the key, then it could be 
possible to speak of 'dollar fungibility.' In other words, aid may have substituted 
for imports that would have been financed with export earnings. 
Graph 3.1. Current account and aid receipts, 1951-1958 
Sources: Imports and exports in thousand dollars (left-hand side scale) from E. 
Martinez Ruiz, cLas balanzas de pagos de la autarquia. Una revision,' 
Universidad Carlos III Working Paper 98-23 (1998); aid in thousand dollars as 
in Table 2.14 above, and real effective exchange rate (REER)(right-scale) as 
calculated by Serrano Sanz and Asensio, 'El ingenierismo,' p. 578 is the 
nominal effective exchange rate multiplied by the evolution of (weighted) 
relative prices of Spain and trading partners and indexed at 100 for the post-
1959 Stabilisation Plan value. 
24 White, Aid andMacroeconomic Performance, p. 20. 
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Although casual inspection of Graph 3.1 cannot settle the issue of 
fungibility, it is worth noting some features revealed by the graph. Increases in 
exports and imports appear to be difficult to explain away by either the index of 
export competitiveness or by changes in the availability of aid. The structure of a 
highly regimented Spanish foreign trade and its dependence on agricultural 
exports help to explain the pattern. In any case, and whether this was due to 
fungibility, to its limited extent or to a combination of both, American aid did not 
allow a substantial increase in import intensity. As shown in graph 3.2 below, the 
ratio of imports to GDP stagnates below 8% during the period 1955-1958, 
paradoxically when aid becomes more forthcoming. Thus, the degree of 
openness of the Spanish economy during the 1950s remains at very low levels, 
reaching a peak at 11% in 1953, again, before aid became substantial. A word of 
caution about the reliability of this trade data is, however, mandatory. In fact, 
previous estimates of Spanish foreign trade key statistics had shown the 
stagnation in real terms of imports throughout the period 1953-1958.25 
25 A. Tena, 'Comercio exterior,' in A. Carreras, Estadisticas historicas de Espana. Siglos 
XIX-XX(Madrid: Fundacion Banco Exterior, 1989), pp. 327-62. More recent estimates 
of the balance of payments, Martinez, 'Las balanzas', have not achieved higher levels in 
various indices of reliability of the figures (basically contrasting data from Spanish 
sources with the major trading counterparts' data shows serious discrepancies, especially 
for the 1950s). 
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Graph 3.2. Openness of Spanish economy, 1949-1958 
—o - (X+M)/GDP in % (Martinez data) — ( X + M ) / G D P in % (Chamorro data) 
---D- Imports to GDP (in %) (Martinez data) —"—Imports to GDP (in %) (Chamorro data) 
— Aid disbursements (in million dollars, right-scale) 
Sources: Martinez, 'Las balanzas,' and S. Chamorro et al., 'Las balanzas de 
pagos de Espana del periodo de la autarquia,' Information Comercial Espanola, 
no. 502 (1975), pp. 161-87. 
Secondly, from a theoretical perspective there is little point in arguing 
that the foreign exchange gap was binding under a situation in which the 
exchange rate is fixed and overvalued, hampering exports. This self-imposed gap 
could be resolved by policy. Still, we may be interested in knowing whether aid 
proved to be a cure of a self-inflicted ailment. Similarly, strictly speaking 
causality runs from aid to gap and not vice versa. Transfers from the donor will 
be accounted as imports without the corresponding matching exports, thus 
worsening the figures on current account balance. In other words, in an 
accounting sense 'the aid itself creates the gap.'26 Thus, it is not very helpful to 
suggest that American aid was important because otherwise the gap would have 
been too big. This type of statement is common in the general literature, and also 
on the Spanish case: 'from 1955 onwards, American assistance was vital to 
26 H. White and J. Luttik, 'The Countrywide Effects of Aid,' World Bank Policy 
Research Working Paper 1337, Washington, D.C. (1994), p. 31. 
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resolve the balance of payments situation.'27 Let us now return to the main issue 
of how to capture the effects of the use of aid-financed goods as inputs. 
An activity that does not cater exclusively to final demand, should be 
expected to induce attempts to utilise its outputs as inputs in some new activities. 
This is the forward linkage effect. Similarly, an activity that employs significant 
amounts of intermediate inputs from other activities, should be expected to 
induce attempts to supply these inputs through expanding domestic production. 
This is the backward linkage effect. Thus, only forward linkage effects should be 
considered when studying the impact of aid-financed goods in relieving input 
shortages. After all, an imported good (aid-financed or otherwise) may be 
incorporated into the production process but would not generate an increase in 
the domestic production of the inputs that were required into its production. 
This is the spirit in which input-output analysis has entered the discussion 
about the effects of aid programmes, such as in the Marshall Plan literature. 
The input-output methodology, by providing a picture of the inter-sectoral 
relationships within an economy, offers a simple way of measuring such 
linkages. The exercise involves comparing the actual vector of final demand [D] 
90 
with a counterfactual final demand [D'] in the absence of aid-financed goods. 
Using the basic equations of the input-output methodology (see Figure 3.2. 
below), the exercise can be expressed as follows: 
(eq.3.1) [D'] = [I-A][X'] cf. [D] = [I-A][X], where [X'] = [X] - [Aid] 
27 M. J. Asensio. 'El proceso de apertura exterior de los cincuenta y el arancel de 1960,' 
unpublished Ph.D. dissertation (Universidad de Zaragoza, 1995), p. 309. 
28 De Long and Eichengreen, 'The Marshall Plan,' examine the coal bottleneck for the 
Italian economy using a 14-sector input-output table. 
29 We are ultimately interested in the sum of the elements of vectors D and D' since this 
sum equates GDP under the assumption that no inventories are kept. 
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Figure 3.2. Input-output analysis 
Sectors 1 i i | 
xn X L 2 XLN D T x, 
X 2 I x 2 2 x 2 n D 2 X2 
o -t-> 
CD 
CO X N L X 2 N • x nn D N Xn 
Factors of 
production 
F I F 2 . • F „ 
Total output X, x2 . . xn 
Notes: Leontief s input-output model gives us three identities to work with: 
[X] = [A][X] + [D]; [D] = [I-A][X]; [X] = [I-A]_1[D], where [D] is the vector 
of final demand (which by assuming that no inventories are kept equates to 
GDP), [X] is the vector of total output, [A] represents the technical coefficients 
matrix where Cjj= Xy/Xj, [I-A] is usually referred to as Leontief s matrix and 
[I-A]"1 is Leontief s inverse. 
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where aidN represents the amounts of aid-financed goods that would have been 
produced by sector N of the Spanish economy if those goods had been 
domestically produced. 
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It can be shown that a change in the j-th element of [X] affects [D] 
depending on the value of the sum of the j-th column of [I-A] and is usually 
referred to as the 'forward linkage' of the j-th sector.30 In other words, by 
calculating the forward linkage for each sector of the economy and cross-
referencing them with the amounts of aid we will be in a position to represent 
graphically how much the actual allocation of aid-financed goods deviated from 
the optimum. 
It should once more be emphasised that the relevance of our measure of 
linkages is contingent on the criterion under which we are judging the impact of 
aid-financed goods, namely the effect of aid-financed goods in relieving input 
bottlenecks. In other words, if we were to shift our focus from the effect of aid in 
relieving input bottlenecks to other possible supply effects of aid, we would need 
to reconsider the tools and measurements used. For example, the forward linkage 
calculated captures 'direct' effects only. Let us clarify this point with an 
example. A forward linkage of the steel sector would be in the production of 
machinery which uses steel as an input. A backward linkage would be in the 
production of coal that is incorporated into steel. These are the 'direct' linkages 
defined above. However, the increased production of machinery would generate 
of itself backward linkages as it demands paint, rubber, chemicals, and other 
inputs needed in the production of the machinery. These are indirect effects 
which are not captured in the 'direct' linkages. However, they are not of interest 
in our exercise because the variable we are interested in examining, the vector of 
final demand, is unaffected. There are of course other variables on which we 
could have focused our attention and it is always possible to construct alternative 
indicators of the relationship between sectors of an economy.31 The usefulness of 
such indicators will necessarily depend on the argument under consideration. 
30 P. Yotopoulos and J. B. Nugent, 'A Balanced-Growth Version of the Linkage 
Hypothesis: A Test,' Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 87, no. 2 (May 1973), pp. 
157-71. 
31 For a review of criticisms to the linkage measure used here see P. Yotopoulos and J. 
B. Nugent, 'In Defense of a Test of the Linkage Hypothesis,' Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, vol. 90, no. 2 (May 1976), p. 334 who remind us that it should be 'no 
surprise that interdependence in an economy can be measured in a number of different 
ways.' 
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Irrespective of the possibility of constructing other linkage indicators, 
there are obvious limitations in using such a simplified model of an economy as 
input-output analysis. Among these, the most relevant for our discussion is the 
assumption of non-substitutability between inputs, which leads to fixed technical 
coefficients in production. This assumption most likely leads to overstating the 
output effects of particular inputs, and hence the output effects of aid-financed 
goods.32 Given that much of the literature has emphasised the impact of aid in 
relieving bottlenecks this bias a la Fogel in the methodology would strengthen 
results that show a limited impact of aid via this transmission mechanism. As 
such, input-output analysis will provide an upper-bound estimate of the effects of 
aid in alleviating input bottlenecks. Moreover, while backward linkages can be 
interpreted more safely, forward linkages cannot be said to be causal in that 
sense, but rather are, to use the existing phrase in the literature, 'permissive' of 
further expansions of output. 
Bearing these shortcomings in mind, it should however be emphasised 
that, to the best of my knowledge, no use whatsoever of input-output analysis in 
the context of the Spanish literature on the impact of aid has been undertaken 
hitherto and that as such, the exercise below constitutes an original contribution 
to the Spanish historiography. 
32 As Eichengreen puts it, ' [t]here is no doubt, however, that input-output analysis with 
its assumption of fixed coefficients overstates the output effect of additional raw 
material supplies.' Eichengreen, 'Mainsprings,' p.19. 
33 Assuming fixed technical coefficients to increase the output of, for example, steel, 
requires an increase in the supply of inputs such as coal used in the production of steel. 
Once steel is produced it may be incorporated into other goods but could also be simply 
left unused. L. P. Jones, 'The Measurement of Hirschmanian Linkages,' Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, vol. 90, no. 2 (May 1976), p. 325. 
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3.3. Estimating the effect of aid in alleviating input bottlenecks 
This section uses the 28-sector input-output table for the Spanish economy in 
1954 to undertake the exercise described above.34 The first step is to compare the 
aid-financed goods to the output of the 28 sectors in the input-output table and to 
consider which sector would have been the likely producer of the aid-financed 
goods. We then equate the aid-financed goods with a reduction in the output of 
that particular sector and consider the impact on the vector of final demand 
according to equation 3.2 above. We thus capture their forward linkage because 
those goods would not have been available by the Spanish economy to use as 
inputs in the absence of the aid programme. 
The assignments are relatively straightforward and are shown, as well as 
some explanation of the residual categories, in Table 3.4 below. In the exercise 
the matrix of technical coefficients, [A], as well as the relationship between total 
output, [X], and final demand, [D], are obtained from the input-output table for 
1954 and assumed constant through the time-span of our exercise.35 In other 
words, the possibility that the structure of the economy may have changed as a 
result of the availability of aid-financed goods is ruled out by assumption. We 
also assumed no fungibility. 
34 A. Alcaide et al., La estructura de la economia espanola: tabla input-output (Madrid: 
Instituto de Estudios Politicos, 1958). The table does not provide a separate entry for 
imports. 
35 Nominal GDP from Prados de la Escosura, 'Gross Domestic Product,' was used as the 
time-series for [D]. Using the assumption of fixed relationship between [X] and [D] 
from the 1954 input-output table the imputed time-series for [X] was calculated. 
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Graph 3.3. Aid as a percentage of total output by sector, cumulative 1951-1962 
20% 
18% 
Graph 3.3 above complements Table 3.4 by relating aid-financed goods 
to the total output of equivalent goods produced by the Spanish economy. The 
large proportion that aid-financed goods represent of the output of sector nine in 
this graph is probably due to the excessively aggregative nature of the 'other 
inputs' category used here (see Table 3.5 below for a list of sectors in the input-
output table used). Note however, that by assigning the 'other inputs' to the 
output of sector nine we are biasing upwards the overall impact of these goods 
via forward linkages, since all other sectors that produce the goods that had been 
bundled together with minerals in the 'other inputs' category are to the right on 
the graph. Having identified the inputs that the Spanish economy had at its 
disposal due to American aid, we proceed to estimate their impact on production 
using input-output analysis. This depends on the value of the forward linkages 
associated with the sector of the Spanish economy that would have been the most 
likely producer of the aid-financed goods. Table 3.5 below reports the value of 
those forward linkages for the 28 sectors of the Spanish economy. 
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Table 3.5. Forward linkages by sector 
Sector Forward linkage 
5. Forests 0.89 
25. Industrial and personal services 0.87 
4. Fruits & other agricultural produce (incl. raw cotton) 0.82 
2. Olive trees 0.81 
26. Transport 0.74 
6. Fishing 0.72 
22. Gas, oil and other petroleum products 0.69 
9. Mining 0.68 
27. Retail 0.67 
8. Mineral coal 0.67 
1. Cereals and pulses 0.62 
20. Industries of non-mineral metals 0.59 
24. Water supply 0.55 
23. Electricity 0.53 
16. Manufacturers of wood, cork and paper 0.50 
3. Vineyards 0.49 
13. Textile manufacturers 0.46 
21. Construction and public works 0.44 
17. Chemicals 0.43 
19. Mechanical industries 0.41 
18. Iron and steel 0.41 
15. Industries of intermediate goods of wood, cork and paper 0.40 
14. Leather and shoe manufacturers 0.39 
7. Animal products 0.36 
28. Hospitality and tourism 0.31 
10. Canning industry (except canned meat) 0.27 
11. Foodprocessing plants 0.20 
12. Drinks and alcohol 0.19 
Source: the forward linkage of sector j is the sum of elements in column j in the 
matrix (I-A). Calculations based on Alcaide et al., La estructura de la economia 
espanola. 
The weighted average of the direct forward linkage for the economy as a 
whole, using the shares of sector total output by the economy-wide total output 
as weights, was calculated to be 0.52. Thus, all aid that was disbursed in the form 
of goods that had a higher than 0.52 forward linkage would have higher than 
average multiplier effects. 
Graph 3.4 below shows these sectors arranged in decreasing order 
according to the forward linkage as well as the amounts of aid disbursed. 
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Graph 3.4. Forward linkages and aid disbursements by sectors, 1951-1962 
Source: see text. 
In Graph 3.4 aid disbursements would have had a more significant effect 
in relieving input bottlenecks the further to the left they had been. This confirms 
the view that an alternative distribution of goods would have had a higher impact 
on the Spanish economy. It also confirms that raw materials, and in particular 
cotton, would have been a better use of the aid allocations, always judged by the 
criterion of easing input shortages. This view of the importance of aid-financed 
cotton featured already, as we have seen, in some of the early discussions about 
the aid programme. 
Table 3.6 below provides the results of the counterfactual exercise 
outlined in Equation 3.2. To address the argument that although the imports 
financed with American aid did not have high forward linkages, they freed 
foreign exchange which may have been used to purchase other goods with higher 
multiplier effects, Table 3.6 shows the effect on national income had all aid been 
goods with a greater linkage effect. 
36 See footnote 6 in this chapter. 
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The results from this exercise suggest that, with the exception of the years 
1959 and 1960 in which the Spanish economy was in recession, the contribution 
of aid-financed goods to Spanish economic growth by providing additional 
inputs was relatively limited. Over the 1952-1963 time period, accounting for the 
forward linkage effect of aid-financed goods explains less than a tenth of actual 
GDP growth. Spain would have obviously benefited had she received aid in a 
similar fashion as other Marshall Plan recipients. However, it is worth noting that 
the difference would have been made by the increased level of aid rather than 
from higher forward-linkage goods. In fact, the overall distribution of Marshall 
aid was not too dissimilar to that of American aid to Spain. 
37 A. S. Milward, The Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1947-1951 (London: Methuen, 
1987[1984]), p. 101 provides the breakdown of Marshall Plan as follows: tobacco, 4.4%; 
fuel, 15.5%; cotton, 14.0%; other inputs, 18.8%; food and fertilisers, 32.1%; machinery, 
14.3%. As noted in Table 3.1 above, Spain received 26% of aid as capital goods, 42% as 
foodstuffs and 29% as inputs, of which cotton was the largest component. 
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3.5. Conclusion 
Accounting for the relief of input bottlenecks suggests that the Spanish economy 
could have grown at similar rates even in the absence of American aid during the 
1950s. This discussion does not necessarily imply that all has been said about the 
role of foreign aid in Spanish economic growth. The naive reading of the 
counterfactuals undertaken may be that the Spanish economy could have grown 
at similar rates in the absence of aid. We believe that this is not the end of the 
story, and that there is more to it than simple relief of supply bottlenecks. 
However, any explanation provided will have to come to terms with the findings 
of this chapter. Graph 3.5 below shows the lack of correlation between the 
amounts of aid and economic growth, a finding that is not surprising given our 
analysis of the limited effects of aid in relieving input bottlenecks. 
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Sources: as in Table 3.1 above. 
Note: Eliminating the outlier to the far right (33% of GDP growth and 0.5% aid 
as percentage of GDP for 1951) the single regression line gained a positive slope 
although the R2 was still less than 0.05. Using the 1- and 2-lagged variable for 
aid disbursements as a percentage of GDP showed an even weaker correlation. 
Although this only shows a lack of correlation and should not be 
interpreted in causal terms, it may be insightful as to where to find possible 
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connections between aid and growth. In other words, our analysis needs to be 
consistent with the findings in these graphs, that is, were we still to pursue the 
argument that the amounts were of paramount importance we would need to 
explain what counterbalancing forces are driving the results in graphs 3.5-7 
above. Alternative, we may pursue a line of argument in which if aid is to affect 
economic growth it is not primarily through the actual amounts but due to the 
very fact that aid was granted in a particular manner. This latter point should 
make us look into the conditions attached to aid, and the effect of those. 
It should be emphasised that there is nothing in the different channels to 
be examined in this dissertation that makes them mutually exclusive. Given its 
pre-eminence in the existing Spanish historiography, a review of the direct 
effects, with particular emphasis on the relief of input bottlenecks was felt 
necessary. But failing to shift our focus and to move on to other transmission 
mechanisms through which aid may have affected Spanish economic growth 
O O 
would be to 'remain trapped in 1960s growth models.' 
38 H. White, 'The Macroeconomic Impact of Development Aid: A Critical Survey,' 
Journal of Development Studies, vol. 28, no. 2 (January 1992), p. 207. 
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attached to American aid? 
Index 
4.1. From ostracism to rapprochement 
4.2. The supply of aid 
4.3. The demand for aid 
4.4. At the negotiations' table 
4.5. The outcome of the negotiations 
Abstract 
Prior to discussing the effects of foreign aid conditionality on Spanish 
policy-making we must be clear about how we think about conditions, 
and what were the conditions attached to aid as set out de jure. The 
chapter considers, for the bilateral aid episode, four main headings: the 
supply of aid, the demand for aid, the bargaining between the parties, and 
the outcome of the negotiations. The bilateral negotiations between Spain 
and the United States is a well researched topic which is approached here 
from the somehow novel angle of focusing on the discussion about the 
conditions under which the aid was to be granted. The main purpose of 
this chapter is to provide the necessary background for the subsequent 
discussion in Chapters Five and Six, and therefore an overview of the 
negotiation is briefly presented. 
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4.1. From ostracism to rapprochement 
This chapter inquires about the terms on which American aid to Spain was 
granted. The purpose is to provide a meaningful context in which to interpret the 
American attempts at influencing Spanish economic policy in Chapter Five and 
to examine the political credibility effects of the American support in Chapter 
Six. The subject of American-Spanish relations up to the signing of the Pact of 
Madrid in 1953 is, in fact, much discussed in the literature.1 This is unsurprising 
given that the hope for 'a peaceful withdrawal of [General Francisco] Franco' 
gave way to the signing of bilateral agreements covering defence and economic 
aid within the span of very few years. As a contemporary analyst put it, Spain 
had gone 'from United Nations outcast to United States partner.' Published 
monographs include detailed discussions of issues such as the bureaucratic 
formulation of American policy towards Franco's Spain,3 the role of Anglo-
American relations in such process,4 or the problems for the U.S. in reconciling 
its new policy toward Spain with North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) 
commitments.5 Several unpublished dissertations deal with the general 
1 The classic accounts are, using public information, A. P. Whitalcer, Spain and the 
Defense of the West. Ally and Liability (New York: Harper, 1961) and, using Spanish 
archival material for the first time, A.Vinas, Los pactos secretos de Franco con Estados 
Unidos. Bases, ayuda economica, recortes de soberania (Barcelona: Grijalbo, 1981). 
2 'Franco's Foreign Policy: From U.N. Outcast to U.S. Partner,' World Today, vol. 9, no. 
12 (December 1953), pp. 511-21. On 12th December 1946 the United Nations passed a 
resolution recommending the recall from Madrid of the ambassadors of U.N. member 
states as well as debarring Spain from membership of any U.N. agencies. The resolution 
was adopted with the support of all major powers. See J.A. Lleonart Anselem, Espanay 
O.N. U.t vol. I (1945-46) (Madrid: CSIC, 1978) and subsequent volumes (II-V) for 
developments up to 1950. 
3 T. J. Lowi, 'Bases in Spain,' in H. Stein (ed.), American Civil-Military Decisions: A 
Book of Case Studies (Birmingham, Ala.: University of Alabama, 1963), pp. 668-705. 
4 Q. B. Ahmad, Britain, Franco and the Cold War 1945-1950 (New York: Garland, 
1992); J. Edwards, Anglo-American relations and the Franco question, 1945-1955 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999). 
5 J. Edwards, 'Circumventing NATO: Spain, Drumbeat and NATO,' in B. Heuser and R. 
O'Neil (eds.), Securing Peace in Europe, 1945-1962: Thoughts for the Post Cold War 
Era (London: Macmillan, 1992), pp. 159-72. 
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formulation of American policy towards Franco's Spain,6 or with specific aspects 
of it, such as the role of Spain within the wider Cold War,7 of the American 
Congress,8 or that of public opinion in the U.S.9 Similarly, the agreements with 
the U.S. feature in Spanish works which, although not monographs, deal with the 
issue at length.10 
As new (mainly American) archival sources have become available, there 
has been a recent revival in the interest on the topic.11 Among the revisions that 
this literature has put forward is a more balanced view of the bargaining position 
of the parties: Spain is no longer seen as being forced to sign whatever the 
Americans suggested.12 However, it is unfortunate that contributions to the 
6 R. W. Gilmore, 'The American Foreign Policy-Making Process and the development 
of a Post-World War II Spanish Policy, 1945-1953: A Case Study,' Ph.D. dissertation, 
(University of Pittsburgh, 1967); S. B. Weeks, 'United States Policy Towards Spain, 
1950-1976,' Ph.D. dissertation (American University, Washington, D.C., 1977). 
7 R. B. Jones, 'The Spanish Question and the Cold War 1944-1953,' Ph.D. dissertation, 
(University of London, 1987); F. G. Balch, 'The United States and Spain, 1945-1953: A 
Study in the Evolution of the Cold War,' Ph.D. dissertation (Tufts University, 1963). 
8 A. J. Dorley, 'The Role of Congress in the Establishment of Bases in Spain,' Ph.D. 
dissertation (St. John's University, New York, 1969). 
9 S. C. Bengal, 'The Unites States and Spain, 1939-1946,' Ph.D. dissertation (Fordham 
University, New York, 1959). 
10 M. Espadas, Franquismo y Politica Exterior (Madrid: Rialp, 1988) and A. Marquina, 
Espana en lapolitica de seguridad occidental, 1939-1986 (Madrid: Ed. Ejercito, 1986) 
11 Liedtke, Embracing a dictarorship, based on the author's thesis, B. N. Liedtke, 
'International relations between the U.S. and Spain: economics, ideology and 
compromise,' Ph.D. dissertation (London School of Economics, 1996) published as B. 
N. Liedtke, Embracing a dictatorship (New York: St Martin's Press-Macmillan, 1998), 
and A. Jarque Iniguez, «Queremos esas bases». El acercamiento de Estados Unidos a la 
Espana de Franco (Alcala: Universidad de Alcala-Centro de Estudios Norteamericanos, 
1998). Similarly, B. N. Liedtke,'Spain and the United States, 1945-1975,' in P. Preston 
and S. Balfour (eds.), Spain and the Great Powers in the Twentieth Century (New York: 
Routledge, 1999), pp. 229-44 discusses mainly the negotiations leading to the Pact of 
Madrid. 
12 Liedtke, Embracing a dictatorship, p. 4. This contrasts with Vinas, Lospactos, which 
heavily criticised the agreements for their imbalance. The overall tone in Vinas echoes 
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literature have not engaged with each other.13 Liedtke and Jarque do not interact 
(though they arrive at similar conclusions) and it is even more unsatisfactory that 
neither of the two actually discuss the more revisionist findings of Guirao.14 
This chapter therefore addresses, and to a limited extent complements, the 
existing interpretations in the literature on the role of conditionality in the signing 
of the agreements between Spain and the U.S. The chapter is organised around 
the following questions -which, to facilitate comparisons, are the same questions 
to be addressed in Chapter Seven about the multilateral aid episode: 
- What were the motives of the U.S. in granting aid and its attitudes as to the 
attachment of conditions to it (the supply of aid)? 
- What were the motivations of Spain in requesting aid (the demand for aid)? 
What role, if any, did discussions on conditionality play during the 
negotiation process? 
- What was the outcome of the negotiations (i.e., the formal conditions, policy-
based, political, and other, resulting from the negotiations)? 
The contribution of this chapter to the literature of the American-Spanish 
relations up to 1953 is limited to a refocusing of the topic. It rearranges available 
material, archival and otherwise, in a way that concentrates on two aspects of the 
American-Spanish rapprochement that have not featured highly in existing 
accounts: the ambiguous assessment by the U.S. of its interest in Spanish 
economic policy-making and the Spanish yearning for a durable long-term 
commitment of U.S. assistance. 
the instruction that Franco allegedly gave his negotiators: 'in the last resort, if you don't 
get what you want, sign anything they put in front of you. We need that agreement.' As 
quoted in J. M. de Areilza, Diario de un Ministro de la Monarquia (Barcelona: Planeta, 
1978), p. 45. Areilza was Spanish Ambassador in Washington from 1954 to 1960. 
13 In particular, the work of F. Guirao, 'Spain and European Economic Cooperation, 
1945-1955. A Case Study in Spanish Foreign Economic Policy,' Ph.D. dissertation, 
European University Institute, 1993, chapter 4, is not addressed by recent contributions 
to the literature such as Jarque, Queremos esas bases and Liedtke, Embracing a 
dictatorship. 
14 Guirao, 'Spain and European Economic Cooperation', Chapter 4. 
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Other topics which the literature has discussed at length, and where a sort of 
consensus has been reached, will only be briefly reviewed. Among the latter is 
the role of American Congress or the efforts to finance a Spanish lobby that 
would press for pro-Spanish policies in Washington. The vigorous lobbying by 
high Spanish officials in Washington such as Jose Felix de Lequerica, a former 
Foreign Minister, probably added little to a change of policy that was largely 
dominated by events outside the control of the Franco regime.15 Given the dislike 
of Lequerica in the State Department, to some extent the American change in 
policy was adopted 'despite Lequerica's efforts rather than because of them.'16 
Let us then turn to discuss the American position, focusing, as noted above, 
on the extent to which Spanish economic policy-making and attempts at 
influencing it featured in their approach. 
15 A more optimistic view about the decisiveness of the Spanish lobby in modifying 
American policy can be found in M. J. Cava Mesa, Los Diplomaticos de Franco. J.F. de 
Lequerica, temple y tenacidad (1890-1963) (Bilbao: Universidad de Deusto, 1989). This 
author also provides details of the several hundred thousand dollars spent in this venture 
(pp. 345-47). 
16 Memorandum of conversation between Mariano Yturralde, Director General of 
Economic Affairs, Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Theodore W. Achilles, State 
Department, by the Theodore W. Achilles, Director of the Office of Western European 
Affairs, Washington, 24th January 1950, Foreign Relations of the United States 
(henceforth FRUS), 1950, III, p. 1556. Pro-Spanish elements existed in the American 
Congress before Lequerica's mission to Washington. For example, the O'Konsky 
amendment in March 1948 to include Spain in the European Recovery Program was 
approved in the House of Representatives and only overruled by presidential initiative. 
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4.2. The supply of aid 
In 1947, as the prospect of cooperation with the Soviet Union evaporated, 
American foreign policy became increasingly driven by the doctrine of 
containment sponsored by George F. Kennan, head of the Policy Planning Staff 
at the Department of State. In short, the doctrine of containment suggested that 
dialogue could never curtail Soviet expansionism and pressed for the necessity of 
building a firewall around the Soviet Union. American policy towards Spain was 
accordingly reviewed. In October, the Department of State reached the 
conclusion that security considerations required that policy toward Spain be 
modified with a view to an early normalisation of relations and, in December, the 
National Security Council (NSC) issued its 'Report on U.S. Policy toward Spain' 
(known as document NSC 3).17 The purpose of NSC 3 was, in the words of U.S. 
Under-Secretary of State Robert Lovett, 'to quit kidding ourselves as to our 
interest in Spain and to reorient our policy in relation thereto.'18 NSC 3 was, if 
grudgingly, approved by President Harry S. Truman and became official U.S. 
policy in January 1948.19 
The underlying rationale behind this change of policy was the geo-
strategic importance of Spain. The Iberian Peninsula provided an excellent 
location for naval bases near the straits of Gibraltar while the high central 
plateau could serve as a springboard in medium-range air operations.20 By mid-
17 A. Kasten Nelson (ed.), The State Department Policy Planning Staff papers, 1947-
1949, vol. 1, (New York: Garland, 1983), pp. 124-28. 
18 Minutes of the 4th meeting of the National Security Council (NSC), 17th December 
1947, reproduced in D. Merril (ed.), Documentary History of the Truman Presidency, 
vol. 23 (Bethesda, Md.: University Publications of America, 1998), p. 248. 
19 Acheson, in his memoirs, gives precisely the example of Truman's dislike of Franco 
as an example of the president's deep-seated beliefs. D. Acheson, Present at the 
Creation (London: Hamilton, 1970), p. 169. As recalled by Paul Nitze, who had 
replaced George Kennan as head of the Policy Planning Staff, as late as 1952 Truman 
still had outbursts when he appeared determined to veto the new U.S. policy towards 
Spain, P. H. Nitze, From Hiroshima to Glasnost: At the Center of Decision: A Memoir 
(New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1989), p. 83. 
20 L. Fernsworth, 'Spain in Western Defense,' Foreign Affairs (July 1953), pp. 648-62, 
analyses in detail Spain's strategic importance. 
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1947 the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) had already voiced their interest in the 
Iberian Peninsula considering that, of potential areas of interest for development 
01 
of bases, rights from Spain were 'the most essential.' American military 
planners argued that the U.S. 'should furnish economic aid to Spain as soon as 
feasible in order to strengthen her capacity for military resistance.'22 
It should be emphasised, however, that the change in policy was not an 
all-out endorsement of military views. At first, it was limited to attempting a 
revocation of the U.N. General Assembly 1946 resolution and NSC 3 simply 
called for a 'normalization of U.S.-Spanish relations, both political and 
economic' without mentioning a possible aid programme. Opposition from 
Truman and influential sectors in public opinion formation made the articulation 
of the policy change not an easy task. The U.S. was also aware that 
rapprochement with Spain could upset its Western European allies, not only 
because of the strong anti-Francoist sentiments in Western Europe but also 
because of the suspicion that if they secured bases in Spain the Americans would 
retreat behind the Pyrenees in the event of hostilities.24 For this reason, American 
diplomats stressed the need of a political and economic overhaul of the Spanish 
regime for NSC 3 to be activated.25 
In fact, although this may at first appear paradoxical, the military 
reappraisal of the importance of Spain was the closest that the U.S. came to 
sponsoring an uprising against Franco. If Spain was essential from a strategic 
point of view and the Franco regime was the only obstacle in securing American 
interests, this provided a rationale for working towards Franco's ousting. The 
U.S. even consulted with the British on whether they would cooperate in such 
moves. Eventually, it was concluded that there was considerable uncertainty 
21 Joint Strategic Survey Committee, 29th April 1947, FRUS, 1947,1, p. 747. 
22 As quoted in Liedtke, 'International relations,' p. 47. The Drumbeat report of August 
1947, formally 'The Soviet Threat Against the Iberian Peninsula and the Means to Meet 
It,' is also discussed by Edwards, 'Circumventing NATO,' p. 164. 
23 FRUS, 1947, m, p. 94. 
24 'Foreign Military and Economic Assistance,' prepared by the International Security 
Affairs Committee, Washington, 8th August 1951, FRUS, 1951,1, p. 374. 
25 Culbertson to the Secretary of State, Madrid, 26th December 1947, FRUS, 1947, III, p. 
1098. 
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about the type of regime that would succeed Franco and opening Pandora's box 
in such a way was deemed to be too risky a policy.26 
However, the new American policy toward Spain was as unsuccessful as 
the previous one, since it neither brought Spain into the U.N. nor prompted any 
substantial political or economic change within Spain. Consequently, from the 
beginning of 1949 the Department of State conducted another review of U.S. 
economic policy toward Spain. On 13th April 1949, Dean Acheson, U.S. 
Secretary of State, informed the Embassy in Spain of the decision to 'no longer 
object in principle to [the] filing [by Spain] of applications with [the] Eximbank 
for credits.'27 
News about Soviet atomic capability in September 1949 and the outbreak 
of the Korean War in late June 1950 contributed to a reassessment of American 
national security policy, by now guided by National Security Council directive 
(NSC) 68. The change in policy toward Spain could only accelerate. The 
communist scare had swept across much of the West and attitudes towards 
Franco's Spain changed accordingly. This change was not limited to military 
circles. The Economist, for example, hitherto fiercely anti-Francoist, now thought 
support to Franco to be justified because 'if [Spain] is not propped up, it will 
collapse into Communism.'28 
A not too dissimilar line of thinking had been taking shape among 
American diplomats. The American Charge d'Affaires in Spain, Paul Culbertson 
worried that although economic breakdown in Spain was by no means certain, it 
was 'clearly [a] possibility' which would 'seriously affect Spanish political 
stability with no immediate alternative to replace Franco which could control 
situation.'29 Culbertson emphasised that such an eventuality was 'not in our 
26 Liedtke, 'International relations,' p. 40. 
27 Acheson to the Embassy in Spain, Washington, 13th April 1949, FRUS, 1949, IV, p. 
735. 
28 The Economist, 'The Deal with Franco,' 25th August 1951, p. 434. Contrast with its 
earlier dwelling on its repulse of dealing with Franco's Spain (3rd April and 22nd May 
1948) and confident that 'as the Communist threat to Western Europe recedes Franco's 
raison d'etre will disappear,' 16th October 1948, p. 613 
29 Culbertson to Acheson, Madrid, 17th February 1949, FRUS, 1949, IV, p. 730. 
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•3 A 
interest' and suggested that Spam had access to Eximbank loans. 
American attitudes in relation to the political and economic conditions 
which would be required from Spain as a prerequisite for any agreement changed 
accordingly. In February 1948 Culbertson had informed the Spanish Foreign 
Minister, Alberto Martin Artajo, that although the U.S. was not ready to grant 
credits now, these would be possible 'if the Spanish government gave concrete 
signals of their intention to progress towards greater economic efficiency and 
democratic liberalization.' However, this official position contrasts with the 
private acknowledgement that Franco may have well realised that not only there 
was little to be gained from political liberalisation, it could well be 
counterproductive for the Franco's government aim of securing American 
assistance: 
Praise of their regime by many visiting Americans, especially the military 
minded, have moreover encouraged a feeling that they are a better financial 
risk with a 'strong' government than with one 'weakened' by reforms 
' encouraging to troublemakers. '32 
The U.S. Congress, which had been significantly pro-Spanish since the 
discussions of the European Recovery Program, resumed its pressure on the 
Executive to provide support to Spain irrespective of political developments in 
the Franco regime. The encouragement to liberalise politically the Franco 
regime, it was felt in the Department of State, was being 'neutralized' by the 
attitude and statements of the American military and staunch pro-Spanish 
politicians such as Senator Pat McCarran.33 
From 1949 onwards political liberalisation demands were permanently 
dropped by the U.S.34 There was little doubt that economic aid to Franco would 
strengthen his regime but by now this was precisely the objective of U.S. policy. 
The question then was how to ensure that the economic aid to be furnished made 
the greatest contribution to Spanish economic rehabilitation. The issue of 
30 Ibid. 
31 Note by Culbertson, Madrid, 2[?] February 1948, FRUS, III, p. 1023. 
32 Culbertson to Acheson, Madrid, 14th February 1949, FRUS, 1949, IV, pp. 727-29. 
33 Culbertson to Acheson, Madrid, 3rd October 1949, FRUS, 1949, IV, p. 761. 
34 Vinas, Los pactos secretos, p. 115 et seq. 
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economic policy conditions to be attached to this assistance was therefore 
inevitably raised. 
The potential benefits of attaching economic policy conditionality 
The Americans were conscious of the potential importance of attaching policy 
conditions to aid disbursements both in using conditionality as a substitute for 
collateral and in maximising the impact of aid. In mid-1949 the instructions 
given to the American representatives in Madrid were to make it 'quite clear to 
Spanish authorities' that economic policy reform was a 'prerequisite [for] 
obtaining financial assistance from the U.S. Government.'35 Acheson stressed 
that economic policy conditions were necessary because both the Department of 
State and the Eximbank 'have most serious doubts and reservations at present 
time as to Spanish capacity to make repayment,' saw the critical economic 
situation in Spain as clearly self-inflicted and called for policy conditionality: 
You should make it quite clear to Spanish authorities that general 
demonstration of capacity and willingness to make more effective use of 
Spain's own resources is prerequisite obtaining financial assistance from 
U.S. Government.36 
In the same communication, Acheson went on to outline three necessary 
reforms in the Spanish economic policies relating to the adoption of a realistic 
unitary exchange rate, the removal or moderation of barriers to foreign 
investment in Spain, and the progressive reduction in scope of the I.N.I. (Instituto 
Nacional de Industria -National Industry Institute). Similar language was in fact 
used when discussing the prospects of aid with Spanish officials. 
In November 1949, a representative from Spain, the Count of Marsal, was 
received by Theodore Achilles, Director of the Office of Western European at 
the Department of State. Achilles went through the need to rectify Spanish policy 
on exchange rates, 'excessive controls over imports, the influence of the INI, and 
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the restriction of 25% on foreign investment and the treatment of such 
investment as for instance in the case of Barcelona Traction Company.' 
The emphasis on economic policy change as a prerequisite for assistance 
was a strong feature of the letter from Acheson (and cleared with Truman) to the 
Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Senator Tom Connally, 
in January 1950. The letter was distributed to the press with the intention of 
indicating the changes in policy toward Spain, primarily that political objections 
to the Franco regime were no longer to be raised. The text was also very clear 
about the prospect of economic assistance. It stated that Spain could apply for 
Eximbank credits emphasising the need to ensure that there was a 'reasonable 
prospect of repayment.' The letter also regretted the 'little action' of the Spanish 
government in simplifying policies such as the exchange rate system or the 
export and import controls. In short, Acheson complained about the Spanish 
government's slowness in 'taking constructive steps to promote its trade and to 
ON 
attract foreign investment.' 
There was little indication up to mid-1950 that such demands for 
economic policy change would be dropped by the Americans. If anything, it 
appeared that Truman had regained some of the ground lost in his anti-Franco 
policy. On 30th March 1950, Truman in a press conference equated Franco's 
OA 
regime with Hitler's and Stalin's. In private, as late as mid-June 1950, Truman 
found the National Security Council policy towards Spain 'decidedly militaristic 
and in my opinion not realistic.'40 This will change with the outbreak of 
hostilities in the Korean peninsula on 23rd June 1950. The Korean War is usually 
seen as a turning point at which Truman's struggle to contain postwar military 
spending finally buckled. In terms of American policy toward Spain, many 
commentators have similarly noted the turning point around the Korean War, 
37 Memorandum of conversation between Count of Marsal, Marquis of Nerva, Achilles, 
Randall and Dunham, by William B. Dunham of the Office of Western European Affairs 
(State Department), Washington, 1st November 1949, FRUS, 1949, IV, p. 763. 
38 Acheson to Connally, Washington, 18th January 1950; FRUS, 1950, III, pp. 1554-55. 
39 'There isn't any difference between the totalitarian Russian government and the Hitler 
government and the Franco government in Spain. They are all alike.' in Merrill, 
Documentary History of the Truman Presidency, vol. 25, p. 45. 
40 Truman to Acheson, Washington, 16th June 1950, FRUS, 1950, HI, p. 1562. 
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suggesting that it 'shifted the [American] priority from political to military 
considerations.'41 In particular, it was to lead to the gradual dropping of the 
demand for economic policy reform as a prerequisite for the provision of aid. 
The first substantial change that took place was the approval on August 
1950 of the $62.5 million loan to Spain to be administered by the Eximbank. 
Only in April a similar vote had been lost in Congress.42 Although it is true that 
the President reluctantly signed the bill including the appropriation for Spain, as 
the military situation in Korea continued to deteriorate he would not be in a 
position to stop the evolution of the new policy toward Spain, NSC 72, to which 
in June 1950 he had opposed. On 4th November 1950 the U.S. supported the UN 
General Assembly vote in favour of nullifying the 1946 Resolution excluding 
Spain.43 
By January 1951, Acheson agreed that the 'potential military value of 
Spain's geographic position grows steadily in direct proportion to the 
deterioration of the international situation' and conceded that it was 'necessary to 
incorporate Spain into the strategic planning for [...] our national security.'44 
Most significant of all, in his comments on the new policy toward Spain (NSC 
72/2), the Secretary of State had dropped any mention of the economic policy 
conditions that Spain needed to satisfy to receive aid. On the contrary, he worried 
that the 'longer we delay before seeking Spanish cooperation, the more we 
41 Whitaker, Spain and the Defense of the West, p. 38. 
42 To earmark $50 million for Spain under the European Cooperation Act. Vinas, Los 
pactos, p. 55. 
43 Guirao refines the argument of the importance of the Korean War as a turning point in 
American policy toward Spain, suggesting that as a result of the conflict the Americans 
felt their policy towards Spain freed from reaching a previous consensus with its 
European allies, Guirao, 'Spain and European Economic Cooperation,' pp. 282, 294. 
Similarly, the fact that the deterioration of the military situation in Korea peaked 
towards the end of 1950 with China's involvement in December and that in any case the 
process of policy formulation in the U.S. did involve a considerable period of time may 
contribute to help explain why the change in policy is more visible in early 1951 than in 
mid-1950. 
44 Draft report by Acheson to the NSC, Washington, 15th January 1951, FRUS, 1951, IV, 
p. 773. 
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encourage [...] the Spaniards to place an exorbitantly high price on their 
cooperation.'45 
Secretary of Defence George C. Marshall advocated that the American 
government's attitude toward Spain should 'reflect more of a sense of urgency in 
securing our objectives.'46 The JCS argued that the coalition of Western powers 
to fight communism in Europe would be 'greatly strengthened' by the inclusion 
of Spain and that measures should be 'immediately initiated by the United States 
to make Spain one of our military allies.'47 The clout of the military had become 
so important that despite numerous warnings from the Department of State about 
the impracticability of a policy attempting to force Spain into NATO (NSC 72/3) 
the revised statement of policy (NSC 72/4) still aimed at 'early Spanish 
participation in the North Atlantic Treaty.'48 
When Acheson wrote to the Ambassador-Designate to Spain, Stanton 
Griffis, the briefing included the usual complaints about Spanish economic 
policy on the treatment of foreign investors, exchange rates, and exchange 
controls. However, these were now 'subjects which you may discuss with 
Spanish officials.'49 The American military recognised the French and British 
opposition, but were determined in seeing through the new American policy 
toward Spain and only conceded on pursuing a bilateral arrangement rather than 
bringing Spain into NATO.50 
The consensus reached in Washington by Congress, Defence and State 
would prove insurmountable opposition for the President to overcome. At the 
time of accepting a further revision of U.S. policy toward Spain (NSC 72/6), 
Truman stated that he 'would not let [his] personal feelings override the 
convictions of you military men.'51 By this date, the military had already been 
granted permission to send a senior figure for exploratory talks with Franco on 
45 Ibid., p. 774. 
46 Marshall to the NSC, Washington, 29th January 1951, FRUS, 1951, IV, p. 783. 
47 Study by the JCS, Washington, 15th January 1951, FRUS, 1951,1, p. 66. 
48 Statement ofPolicy by the NSC, Washington, 1st February 1951, FRUS, 1951,111, 
p.789. President Truman approved it on 2nd February, becoming official U.S. policy. 
49 Acheson to Griffis, Washington, 6th February 1951, FRUS, 1951, IV, p. 793. 
50 Study prepared by the JCS, Washington, 13th April 1951, FRUS, 1951,1, p. 77. 
51 19th July 1951, as quoted in Liedtke, Embracing a dictatorship, p. 106. 
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the possibility of establishing military bases in Spain.52 As a result of those early 
talks it was agreed that the U.S. would send two teams, one to focus on military 
matters and one on economic issues, to survey the country during the summer of 
1951. 
The earlier concern of Acheson about the advisability of lending to or 
assisting a regime which was following a self-destructive economic policy had 
now given way to a calculation in which the price of acquiring bases dominated 
policy formation. Aid was the ' quid pro quo [...] our chief bargaining weapon in 
53 
negotiations with the Spanish Government.' 
It is important to emphasise that the abandonment of that early concern 
about the importance of Spanish economic policies did not derive from a revised 
analysis of its premises but rather from an increased sense of urgency in 
achieving the immediate goal of securing base rights. Analysts for the American 
administration continued to argue that for an aid programme to have its 
maximum impact, Spanish economic policies would require modification. 
Professor Sidney Sufrin, head of the economic mission sent to Spain in the 
summer of 1951 expressed his fears that 'we might end up just sinking money in 
Spain' and suggested budgetary and monetary discipline if the Spanish economy 
was to grow steadily.54 For years to come, the Americans would remain acutely 
52 Admiral Forrest Sherman arrived in Madrid on 16th July 1951 and met Franco in order 
to assess the prospects of engaging in negotiations with Spain to secure base rights. 
Sherman was thoroughly optimistic about such prospect. Vinas, Los pactos, pp. 92-114. 
53 Acheson to the Embassy in Spain, Washington, 23rd June 1951, FRUS, 1951, IV, p. 
849. 
54 Sufrin's diary, part 4, Madrid 1st October 1951, in Spain, Country Files of Harlan, 
1949-1953, Deputy Assistant Administrator, Economic Cooperation Administration 
(ECA), Records of U.S. Foreign Assistance Agencies, 1948-1961 [henceforth RFAA], 
Record Group 469 (entry 66, box 3), National Archives at College Park, MD. (NACP). 
Citations of records in the National Archives of the United States follow the guidelines 
provided by the repository itself (www.nara.gov/publications/leaflets/gil 17.html, 10th 
February 2000), albeit entry and box numbers are also given here to facilitate locating 
the records. Liedtke, Embracing, p. 136. Liedtke emphasises that Sufrin's trip to Spain 
was close to disastrous, and that he did not succeed in freeing himself from the influence 
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aware of the limited impact that aid might have and therefore realised that 
Spanish policies were of the utmost importance for economic and political 
stability within the country.55 
However, requiring the overhaul of Spanish economic policy as a 
precondition for any American involvement was no longer on the cards. This was 
also the perception of many informed observers. An example may serve to 
illustrate this point. In April 1952 H. M. Treasury was asked by the Americans 
for a British view on a possible application by Spain for membership of the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF). Upon request from the Treasury, the Bank 
of England provided tentative estimates on the possible quota in the Fund for 
Spain. A futile exercise according to the Bank, which in its transmittal letter to 
the Treasury, expressed its view that Spain would be 'unlikely to make any move 
towards joining an international organisation like the Fund if there is any risk of 
a snub for their exchange or other financial practices' and felt that 'the Spaniards 
might well hope to get more out of the Americans by direct assistance under 
Military Aid, etc, and to see what they can get in this field before considering 
joining the Bretton Woods institutions.'56 
However, there were discrepancies as to whether the promise of aid ought 
to be used exclusively as a way of securing base rights. Those greatly fearing 
possible Communist threats, endorsed outright support in the hope that Franco 
would return favours. The newly appointed American Ambassador to Spain, 
Stanton Griffis, in a similar fashion to members of the Spanish lobby in 
Congress, complained to the Secretary of State that '[i]f the U.S. government 
wants starvation and a trend towards communism in Spain, they are going to get 
of INI people and had difficulty gathering independent data. A reading of Sufrin's 
diaries shows, however, that he did meet with personalities across the board. 
55 ' [I]n our opinion, it remains true that general policies and programs of the Spanish 
government will have a more important total impact on Spanish future developments 
than the U.S. aid program in itself.' Airgram from Gulik, Foreign Operations 
Administration (FOA), Washington to Madrid U.S. Operations Mission (USOM), 11th 
December 1954, in Office of the Director, Office of European Operations, Geographic 
Files, 1953-54, RFAA, RG469 (entry 337, box 141), NACP. 
56 'IMF-Spain,' letter from L. F. Crick (Bank of England) to F. W. Essex (H.M. 
Treasury), 25th April 1952, BoE, OV61/4. 
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it very quickly with their present indecision.'57 As we will see below, during the 
negotiations this would prove a fault line in American policy, as had previously 
been the case with the demands for political liberalization. 
With this outlook the U.S. entered the negotiations with Spain in 1951. 
Let us now review the attitude with which the Spanish entered the negotiations. 
57 Griffis to Acheson, Madrid, 24th April 1951, FRUS, 1951, IV, p. 815. 
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4.3. The demand for aid 
The prospect of foreign aid represented a sought-after opportunity for the 
Spanish regime. Economically, Spain was in dire straits. In 1950 real output per 
capita was at pre-Civil War levels, and sheer hunger and bottom-rock living 
standards prompted sporadic civil unrest in the cities of Madrid and Barcelona.58 
Imbued with this grim picture, some researchers have stated that Spain's main 
foreign policy goal was the receipt of American aid. Thus, for example, it has 
been argued that Franco's main interest in a rapprochement with the U.S. was 
'understandably centered around obtaining financial and economic assistance to 
overcome the deplorable state of the Spanish economy.'59 However, this misses 
an important point about the circumstances in which the Spanish regime was 
willing to be the recipient of aid. The ultimate Spanish goal appears to be 
recognition by the international community, a final seal of approval for the 
Franco regime. Consequently, the type of aid that Franco was considering ought 
to be devoid of any strings: 
[I]f that help were conditioned by blackmail, we should refuse it and 
pursue our unchanging aims alone, although more slowly.60 
Policy was ultimately decided by Franco himself and an extremely 
limited circle around Franco himself, with his aide Luis Carrero Blanco, Under-
Secretary of the Presidency, playing a significant role.61 Within this inner circle 
58 Per capita consumption of meat and wheat in 1950 was half of pre-Civil War. In 
Madrid there were demonstrations complaining about the lack of food, while in 
Barcelona the rise of tram fares in February 1951 led to a general strike and the reversal 
of the rise in fares by the government, S. Balfour, Dictatorship, Workers, and the City 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), p. 22. 
59 C. Collado Seidel, 'U.S. Bases in Spain in the 1950s,' in S. W. Duke and W. Krieger 
(eds.), U.S. Military Forces in Europe. The Early Years, 1945-1970 (Boulder, Co.: 
Westview Press, 1993), p. 287. 
60 Franco's declarations as quoted in Guirao, 'Spain and European Economic 
Cooperation,' p. 274. 
61 From the American records, the limited room for manoeuvre even for ministers is 
clear. The Foreign Minister, for example, did not even feel authorised to give the go 
ahead to the arrival of American negotiators without previously consulting Franco. 
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of advisors to Franco the shift in American policy toward Spain was seen as the 
vindication that since 1945 they had all along been right in their 'wait-and-see 
policy,' an attitude based on the hope that in due time the world would come to 
realise the virtue of the Franco regime in having been the first to fight and win 
over communism.62 Culbertson had grasped it back in 1948: 
Franco and [the] Spanish authorities seem convinced [that] Spain [is] 
strategically so important [that] we will of necessity, in our own interest, 
not only accept [the Franco] regime as is but will extend economic and 
military aid.63 
The Spanish leaders were willing to sacrifice little other than dropping 
the press campaigns accusing the Western powers of conspiring against Spain. 
Franco was happy to accept the Argentine aid that Spain had been receiving 
since the accession of Juan Domingo Peron to the Argentinean presidency in 
1946, which allowed Spain some foodstuffs and propaganda and came with no 
strings attached. 
The coming negotiations with the U.S. were seen as primarily of a 
politico-military nature. Carrero warned about the danger that the Spanish 
society was now 'willing to go through anything as long as it betters their life 
quickly,' in direct reference to the fact that some groups might be willing to 
MacVeagh to the Department of State, Madrid, 1st April 1952, FRUS, 1952-1954, VI, 
part 2, p. 1829. The problem therefore is the lack of documentation by Franco, a point 
raised by Vinas, Lospactos, and Guirao, 'Spain and European Economic Cooperation,' 
p. 266, who highlights how even L. Suarez, 'Francisco Franco y su tiempo,' vol. 5 
(Madrid: Fundacion Nacional Francisco Franco, 1984), despite benefiting from 
privileged access to the private papers of Franco must rely on Vinas' study. 
62 J. Tusell, Carrero. La eminencia gris del regimen de Franco (Madrid: Temas de Hoy, 
1993), pp. 180, 193, 213. Tusell, who enjoyed privileged access to the private papers of 
Carrero, underlines the involvement of Carrero in formulating policy toward the U.S. 
and in the negotiations with the Americans. 
63 Culbertson to the Secretary of State, Madrid, 24th March 1948, FRUS, 1948, HI, p. 
1029. 
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make concessions to the Americans in exchange of aid and, to prevent any such 
temptations, he suggested putting an end to 'the softness of our diplomacy.'64 
As one would expect in a regime that had so recently been ostracised, 
there was also a strong sense of suspicion about the American intentions.65 The 
Spanish authorities had displayed, in fact, 'great expectations' of Marshall aid 
and engaged in a 'diplomatic offensive' to attain membership.66 However, the 
ideological basis of the Marshall Plan made it inconceivable in 1947-48 for the 
U.S., and not only Europe, to accept Spain unless the Franco regime was 
removed from office. In the absence of Franco's willingness to step down the 
Spanish authorities' expectation to join in the European Recovery Programme 
was unjustified and the response to the announcement of the Marshall Plan an 
unnecessary effort. Most important, it must be stressed that even if political 
demands had been dropped, there is no clear indication that the Spanish 
authorities would have seriously considered anything but cosmetic changes in 
their economic policies. Guirao, however, argues that '[h]ad the Truman 
administration not made economic assistance [in 1947-48] conditional on 
political transformation, Spain might have anticipated economic stabilization and 
64 Carrero to Franco, 24th January 1950, as quoted in Tusell, Carrero, pp. 195, 199. 
Carrero recommended replacing Martin Artajo as Foreign Minister with Lieutenant-
General Juan Vigon. Franco did not dismiss Martin Artajo but placed the negotiations 
under the control of Vigon. Nota en relation con la actual situation politica (note 
directed to Franco), 4th April 1951, as quoted in Tusell, Carrero, p. 202. 
65 'They deal with us out of fear of the soviets, but they dislike us; when they do not to 
need us anymore, they will try to destroy us.' Carrero to Franco and Artajo, undated, as 
quoted in Suarez, 'Francisco Franco,' vol. 5, p. 110. 
66 F. Guirao, Spain and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1945-57 (London/New 
York: Macmillan/St. Martin's Press, 1998), p. 107. 
67 In this point Guirao modifies the previous consensus that Spain had been excluded 
from the Marshall Plan out of European initiative, see A. Vinas, 'El Plan Marshall y 
Franco,' Historia 16, no. 64 (August 1981), pp. 27-42. As Guirao puts it, 'it is difficult 
to believe that the Department of State could have ever considered Spain joining the 
Marshall Plan when its initiative to remove Franco from power was being discussed with 
the British until the end of July 1947.' Guirao, Spain and the Reconstruction of Western 
Europe, p. 59. 
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liberalization by a decade.' Guirao effectively argues that the 'will to join the 
Marshall Plan shows, in itself, that isolation was not the aim of Francoist 
economic policy' and, certainly, the absence of foreign resources in 1947-48 
made the adoption of foreign exchange controls more likely.69 Yet, even if 
'isolationism' was not an end in itself, this should not prompt us to conclude that 
the acceptance of the philosophy of economic policy that inspired American 
efforts was on the verge of being sincerely endorsed by the Spanish decision-
makers. 
From late 1948, the Spanish representatives in Washington, headed by the 
controversial Lequerica, had perceived the possibility that aid may be de-linked 
from political considerations yet given under economic conditions. Lequerica 
regarded this as unacceptable. Lequerica thought that the foremost objective of 
any dealings with the Americans was to underline that the approach to the U.S. 
was a pure political effort and not simply a mere 'economic bargain.' He 
believed that any suggestion about economic policy reform should be met with a 
complaint about undue interference in internal affairs. Otherwise, what he saw as 
the 'hostility' that I.N.I. men displayed when discussing economic policy matters 
would only antagonise the Eximbank. At times, Lequerica overstated the extent 
of the differences in views between the I.N.I. people and himself. A point that 
illustrates this is the interview between Achilles and the Count of Marsal in late 
1949 that we have already referred to above. Lequerica had been particularly 
critical of the Count of Marsal's visit to Washington and his treatment of the 
question of Eximbank loans.70 Presumably, Lequerica felt that by discussing the 
Eximbank issue, the Count of Marsal was giving the impression that Spain was 
after all willing to get into the details of an economic bargain. The record of the 
conversation as drafted by the Americans help us to clarify this. When 
questioned by Achilles about the lack of Spanish applications for Eximbank 
Ibid., p. 114. 
69 Ibid., p. 122. 
70 The correspondence between Lequerica and Martin Artajo is reviewed in Cava, Los 
Diplomaticos, pp. 257, 314-17, 335. For obvious reasons, this type of open criticism is 
very rare in the Spanish records. Lequerica, having been Minister and confident of 
Franco's support enjoyed himself liberties unheard of for other officials. 
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loans despite the withdrawal of political objections, the Count of Marsal replied 
emphasising that if such an offer was set 'simply as cold banking proposition, 
devoid of any warmth or cordiality, he felt Spain would not wish to risk the 
71 
presentation of applications.' 
However, Lequerica had some grounds for complaint. The attitudes of 
Juan A. Suanzes, Chairman of I.N.I. (1941-1963) and Minister of Commerce and 
Industry (1938-1939, 1945-1951), and his men appear to have lacked 
consistency. On occasions they went as far as making offers of economic policy 
reform. In response to Acheson's letter to Connally in January 1950, Suanzes 
told the Americans of his 'total agreement' with the need to liberalise the 
Spanish economy and highlighted that such measures were 'already under 
discussion.'72 Similarly, officials of the Chase National Bank stated that the 
Spanish representatives with whom they negotiated a $25 million loan in 
February 1949 were now 'willing to remedy objectionable economic practices 
and policies in order to qualify for further private or official United States 
loans.'73 But were these offers genuine? Researchers that have studied the private 
papers of Suanzes have concluded that he consciously attempted a 'mise en scene 
of deceptive cooperation' motivated by Suanzes' 'attempt to obtain U.S. 
financial assistance.'74 Although this claim relates specifically to I.N.I, attempts 
at appearing to be cooperating with private concerns, it would be surprising if a 
deceptive strategy was not used when addressing the Americans, especially given 
the fact that the rationale for the strategy was precisely to persuade the 
Americans to furnish aid.75 
71 Memorandum of conversation Count of Marsal, Marquis of Nerva, Achilles, Randall 
and Dunham, by Dunham, Washington, 1st November 1949, FRUS, 1949, IV, p. 765. 
72 Culbertson to Acheson, Madrid, 24th Januaiy 1950, 611.52/1-2450, Decimal Files, 
Central Files, General Records of the Department of State (G.R.D.S.), Record Group 59 
(RG59), NACP. 
73 Culbertson to Acheson, Madrid, 14th February 1949, FRUS, 1949, IV, p. 729. 
74 A. Gomez-Mendoza and E. San Roman, 'Competition between Private and Public 
Enterprise in Spain, 1939-1959: An Alternative View,' Business and Economic History, 
vol. 26, no. 2 (1997), p. 707. 
75 Perhaps Suanzes' deceptive tactics in 1950 may have stemmed from his interpretation 
of the earlier failure of Spain to secure Marshall Plan aid, for which the Ministry headed 
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The Spanish were particularly concerned with the terms of the Benton 
Amendment of the Mutual Security Act (M.S.A.), which stipulated that free 
enterprise and free labour union movements 'where suitable' were to be 
encouraged, whilst cartel and monopolistic practices discouraged 'to the extent 
that it is feasible.'76 
The Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs undertook an assessment of the 
opportunities that the M.S.A. provided Spain as well as the possible conditions 
under which aid would be forthcoming. It noted, firstly, that unlike Eximbank 
credits, the M.S.A. could provide an 'indefinite' flow of funds which could be 
appropriated year after year, and, secondly, that the American Embassy had 
indicated that even the Spanish restrictions on trade unions would not constitute 
an insoluble problem.77 The Spaniards received direct indications that the 
possibility of aid would not be linked to the adoption of specific economic policy 
reform from officials at the highest level. Paul Porter, head of the M.S.A. in 
Europe, visited Madrid in the last days of 1951. The result of that visit was 
that... 
... the [g]eneral impression given by local versions of [the] Porter 
statement is that [a] bilateral pact will be signed shortly, military and 
economic missions will be here this month, [and] no strings [will be] 
attached to [the] aid.78 
by Suanzes had prepared an extremely detailed 'Import Programme.' The programme, 
which Guirao, Spain and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, Chapter Four analyses 
in great detail was, however, nothing more than 'an import shopping list of goods the 
Ministry of Industry and commerce would have wanted to purchase had it had the 
resources' (p. 66), which expressed no resolutions as to economic policy. 
76 See FRUS, 1952-1954, VI, part 2, p. 1782n. 
77 Note for Martin Artajo, 17th January 1952, Archive of the Spanish Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, Renovated Series [henceforth MAE], Leg. 4615, Exp. 15. 
78 GrifEs to Acheson, Madrid 9th January 1952, in Director of Administration, 
Administrative Services Division, Geographic Files 1948-53, RFAA, RG469 (entry 236, 
box 286), NACP. Porter was clearly of the opinion that internal changes 'cannot, of 
course, be expected to come quickly'. Porter to the Mutual Security Agency, Paris, 7th 
January 1952, FRUS, 1952-1954, VI, part 2, p. 1782. 
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Confirmation of this view was provided by the Americans whenever 
necessary. The Spanish Foreign Exchange Institute (Institute Espanol de Moneda 
Extranjera -IEME) dependent upon the Ministry of Commerce but based in the 
Bank of Spain, expressed concerns about the possibility that the Americans 
would demand free convertibility for repatriating profits with a consequent drain 
of foreign exchange reserves. The IEME feared that possible liberalising 
commitments would prove extremely costly. For example, they estimated that the 
• • • • 70 
stabilisation of the peseta 'would require no less than $500 million.' The 
Spanish sought confirmation from the Americans about the extent of a possible 
requirement to liberalise the foreign exchange regime. The Americans happily 
provided such reassurance that 'Spain [was] not expected to make all necessary 
adjustments immediately.'80 
With the understanding that the economic reform clauses were to be 
interpreted in a lax way, the Spanish side felt comfortable enough. Including 
them in the agreements would do no harm. In fact, given Arburua's taste for 
economic liberalism and that his new position as Minister of Commerce gave 
him overall responsibility over the conduct of the economic negotiations there 
was no reason why he would oppose such clauses. Perhaps this helps to explain 
the complaints by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs about the attempts of • • • 81 
Commerce to deal 'exclusively' about the economic aspects of the negotiations. 
Presumably, had the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and of Industry not been given 
the assurances on the lack of intention by the Americans to push hard for 
economic policy reform, the disagreements between Commerce and the other 
Ministries would have surfaced more prominently. 
Some elements in or close to power may nevertheless have been truly 
convinced that the possibility of foreign aid gave a window of opportunity for 
economic policy reform. Manuel Arburua, Chairman of the Banco Exterior and 
79 Minutes of meetings of the Executive Commission for M.S. A. loan, as quoted in 
Vinas, Lospactos secretos, p. 156. The statement in the text was made by Manuel Vila, 
General Manager of IEME, on 16th February 1952. 
80 MacVeagh to Acheson, Madrid, 4th May 1952, in Director of Administration, 
Administrative Services Division, Geographic Files 1948-53, RFAA, RG469 (entry 236, 
box 286), NACP. 
81 Navasques to Martin Artajo, 24th April 1952, MAE, Leg. 4048, Exp. 22. 
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who would become Minister of Commerce in July 1951, wrote two articles in 
February 1950 arguing that foreign aid to Spain would help her both in the 
reconstruction effort and to diminish intervention. Declarations such as those of 
Martin Artajo to the New York Times on 27th March 1949 suggesting that 
American capital would 'enjoy profitable opportunities and would be safe in 
Spain' may be interpreted as subtle hints at the possibility of a more flexible 
regime for American foreign direct investment. However, when members of staff 
in the Spanish diplomatic mission in Washington suggested the convenience of 
practical measures to enhance the international profile of the regime, such as the 
suspension of the judicial intervention in the Barcelona Traction case, this was 
ignored and policy did not change. A similar fate would meet any report that 
R4 
suggested adaptive change, even in 'somehow vague terms.' There were 
disagreements within the Spanish administration on how to argue most 
effectively the Spanish case but it seems that the differences were of a strategic 
rather than a substantial nature. 
Together with an absence of political or economic conditions, the Spanish 
authorities were also interested in securing a long-term commitment by the 
Americans.85 Aid was to be part of that commitment and it was of the utmost 
importance to avoid the impression that aid was to be granted as a price or rent to 
be paid for the use of military bases. The regime depended upon the support of 
the armed forces and could not risk giving the impression of any loss of 
82 Arriba, 9th and 25th February 1950, as quoted in Guirao, 'Spain and European 
Economic Cooperation,' p. 275. 
83 Cava, Los Diplomaticos, p. 309. 
84 Report by Pedro Prat de Soutzo, Marquis of Prat, Director or American Policy at the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1st August 1949, MAE, Leg. 3599, Exp. 44, as quoted in 
Vinas, Los pactos, p. 40. The quote refers to the passage of Prat's report advising for a 
freer commercial policy. 
85 Prat de Soutzo, who had been present at the Franco-Sherman interview in July 1951, 
told the British Embassy in Madrid shortly after the interview that the agreements could 
be signed within two or three months. Liedtke, Embracing a dictatorship, p. 119. 
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sovereignty in the coming negotiations. The Americans soon realised that this 
caused the Spaniards certain 'anxiety.'86 
The characteristic feature of the Franco regime during the 1950s with 
regards to aid was that it did not adapt itself to pressure in order to secure foreign 
R7 
aid. If it had been willing to do so, it would have received American support at 
a much earlier date. As was the case with the Americans, for the Spanish side the 
economic programme was meant to have limited and subordinated objectives. 
Political recognition and military considerations (need to preserve sovereignty 
and provide materiel for the armed forces) were to be paramount. 
Let us now focus briefly on the negotiation process between Spain and 
the U.S. 
86 John Wesley Jones, former Charge d'Affaires and Counsellor of Embassy, to 
Acheson, Madrid, 21st March 1952, in Director of Administration, Administrative 
Services Division, Geographic Files 1948-53, RFAA, RG469 (entry 236, box 286), 
NACP. 
87 Jarque, Queremos esas bases, p. 365. 
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4.4. At the negotiations' table 
From the review of the positions of the two sides, it will be no surprise that 
economic policy conditions were to be virtually absent in the agenda for these 
negotiations, A brief review of the negotiations is, however, a necessary 
background for subsequent chapters, especially for Chapter Six on the credibility 
effects of bilateral American aid on the Spanish private business community. 
The negotiations lasted longer than expected. At several points in time it 
was rumoured that they were about to be concluded. In January 1952 the 
American press speculated that U.S. officials expected that the negotiations 
would soon be concluded.88 Even those taking part underestimated the length of 
OQ # 
negotiations ahead. As we will see, much of this delay was related to two 
topics: (a) the Spanish demands for military end-items, and, (b) the discrepancies 
between a quid pro quo approach favoured by the State Department and the long-
term alliance that the Spaniards aimed to achieve. Let us first review some other 
arguments for the delay that the literature has suggested. These include the 
opposition of Western powers, the change of administration in the U.S., and the 
concentration by the Spanish on signing the Concordat with the Vatican. 
Britain's Labour government appeared to be militantly anti-Franco. Prime 
Minister Clement Attlee and Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin had records of 
outspoken opposition to Franco dating back to the Spanish Civil War.90 
However, the reasons for the British reluctance to accept the agreements between 
the U.S. and Spain were not simply ideological. The British, who had continued 
to trade with Spain, were traditionally dependent on citrus imports from Spain 
88 E.g., The New York Times, 16th January 1952, or Griffis to Acheson, Madrid 17th 
January 1952, Director of Administration, Administrative Services Division, Geographic 
Files 1948-53, RFAA, RG469 (entry 236, box 286), NACP. 
89 'Target date for signing of bilateral agreements and thus activation of mission is 
January 15 [1953]. This considered most realistic estimate by all concerned with 
negotiations here.' George F. Train, head of the American team negotiation the 
economic agreements, to MSA, Madrid, 10th December 1952, in Director of 
Administration, Administrative Services Division, Geographic Files 1948-53, RFAA, 
RG469 (entry 236, box 286), NACP. 
90 The Ambassador in the United Kingdom to Acheson, London, 24th January 1951, 
FRUS, 1951, IV, p. 779. 
115 
Ch. 4. Conditions attached to American, aid 
and were her trading partner of preference and Britain had not decreased trade 
with Spain as much as she could have.91 The Foreign Office also feared that the 
commercially aggressive American businessmen threatened the privileged 
position that British businesses enjoyed in the Spanish market. 
To some extent, British opposition to the American-Spanish 
rapprochement was exaggerated by elements within the State Department 
opposed to the new policy. As late as December 1951, after the interview 
between Franco and Admiral Sherman had taken place, an official from the Bank 
of England reported that, despite the pressure from the military, 'the State 
Department have cold feet at the size of the commitment and are secretly glad at 
European opposition to any large-scale help to Franco.'92 According to this 
observer, Franco was similarly bent on exaggerating the importance of Britain's 
resistance to the Spanish-American agreements. Franco feared being blamed for 
the delays of an aid programme which had been much-rumoured to be imminent 
and 'attempted to insure against thus by circulating the report that the British 
have been intervening to block the loan.' British opposition, moreover, 
decreased after the electoral victory of Sir Winston Churchill in October 1951. 
Churchill, mistaken in his belief that Franco had not entered World War II out of 
sympathies for the allies, favoured closer ties with Spain.94 
It has also been often argued that, especially towards the final stages in 
the summer of 1953, the Spanish delayed the signing of the agreements in order 
to give precedence to finalising the Concordat with the Vatican.95 As Guirao 
convincingly argues, this view implies that by then the agreements were 
finalised, which appears not to be the case.96 In fact, diplomatic exchanges 
91 Ahmad, Britain, Franco Spain, p. 162. 
92 Report by J. M. Stevens, 31st December 1951, in Bank of England Archive [hereafter 
BoE], OV61/4. 
93 'Visit to Barcelona, Madrid and Tangier, 17th May-22nd August 1953,' by Turner, 
BoE, OV61/4. 
94 Edwards, Anglo-American relations, esp. pp. 104, 107, 124. Preston, Franco, p. 425. 
95 Vinas, Los pactos, p. 180 and R. Rubottom and J. C. Murphy, Spain and the United 
States since World War II (New York: Praeger, 1984), p. 24. Rubottom was an official 
with the USOM Madrid in the mid-1950s. 
96 As argued by Guirao, 'Spain and European Economic Cooperation,' p. 321. 
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during the summer of 1953 highlight the significant differences that still existed 
between the parties.97 
The impact of the change of American administration has also 
traditionally been overstated in the outcome of the negotiations.98 The personal 
attitudes of Eisenhower and the newly appointed Secretary of State, John Foster 
Dulles, towards the Franco regime were much friendlier than Truman's.99 The 
possibility of a breakdown in the negotiations with Spain was present even after 
the inauguration of Eisenhower as President. Spanish bases were still on the 
agenda, but there was no sense of urgency.100 In fact, if Eisenhower did not have 
an ideological bias against the Franco regime as Truman had, he was extremely 
aware that there was a price beyond which the bases in Spain were not worth 
obtaining: 
Mr Potofsky [a trade union leader] came to see me. [He] opposes any 
thought of dealing with Spain -quite bitter about it. Insists that for every 
advantage we would obtain we could lose so many friends as to suffer a net 
loss. There is a definite chance he is completely right, particularly if our 
efforts to deal with Spain place another early drain on our scarce items and 
raw materials. All these erstwhile enemies and near-enemies want the 
'world' and sometimes they are close to arrogant in saying what they will 
not give as quid pro quo.101 
Spain had been favoured over Morocco as a site for bases for both 
geographical and political reasons. Once base rights were secured in Spain, 
Eisenhower noted the advisability of 'ceasing all base development in Morocco 
and making the Spanish bases alternative to the final two that we had intended to 
97 Franco to Eisenhower, San Sebastian, 22nd August 1953, FRUS, 1952-1954, VI, part 
2, p. 1950. 
98 Rubottom and Murphy, Spain and the U.S., p. 25. 
99 Dulles had actually acted as legal counsel of the Franco-controlled Bank of Spain in a 
suit in 1938 brought against the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (seeking 
compensation for a sale of Bank of Spain silver carried out by Republican-controlled), 
R. W. Pruessen, John Foster Dulles. The Road to Power (New York: The Free Press, 
1982), p. 123, as noted by Guirao, 'Spain and European Economic Cooperation,' p. 317. 
100 Guirao, 'Spain and European Economic Cooperation,' p. 318. 
101 R. H. Ferrell (ed.), The Eisenhower Diaries (New York: W. W. Norton, 1981), p. 
196. 
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build m the Moroccan area.' This may be an indication that bases in French 
Morocco were being pursued as a contingency plan in case negotiations with 
Spain failed.103 
Delays in the conclusion of the negotiations were working against 
Spanish interests. The strategic importance of bases in Spain was diminishing as 
progress was being made in American military programmes capable of delivering 
long-range atomic weapons independently of forward bases on foreign soil (B-
52, Polaris, inter-continental ballistic missile).104 Similarly, the securing of base 
rights in French Morocco and the Azores by the Americans and the stabilisation 
of the military front in the Korean War would decrease the urgency of the 
American military build-up. Finally, the death of Stalin in early March 1953 led 
to some confusion within the American administration as to the extent to which it 
was in the interest of the U.S. to give the new Soviet leadership the option of 
ending confrontation.105 In short, with the benefit of hindsight it is tempting to 
'explain' the 'inevitability' of the agreements. However, it is not that difficult to 
imagine why things may have gone wrong even after the inauguration of 
Eisenhower as president. Let us then focus on two further elements that help to 
explain the delay in concluding the negotiations, the Spanish demands for 
military assistance and the importance for the Spanish of securing a long-term 
commitment from the Americans. 
The issue of military end-items was a cause of concern for the 
Americans, who did not want to infuriate other NATO countries to which the 
U.S. had promised priority in the delivery of military goods. Although the 
Spanish interest on military end-items had been made obvious as early as 
102 Ferrell, Eisenhower Diaries, p. 254. 
103 As late as June 1953, Rubottom, who was to join the economic mission of the 
M.S.A. in Madrid as Deputy Director, was briefed in Washington that if Spain 
overreached, the U.S. would simply 'walk away from the table.' Rubottom and 
Murphy, Spain and the U.S., p. 27. 
104 T. Hoopes, 'Overseas Bases in American Strategy,' Foreign Affairs (October 1958), 
p. 76. The author had been Under-Secretary of the Air Force in the Truman 
administration. 
105 W. W. Rostow, Europe after Stalin: Eisenhower's three decisions of March 11, 1953 
(Austin: University of Texas Press, 1982), pp. 69-70. 
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Sherman's visit in July 1951 by Franco himself, the State Department held on to 
its interpretation that base-rights could be obtained 'without giving such end-item 
aid.'106 It proposed that military end-item aid beyond training purposes 'should 
107 
be postponed for future consideration.' 
The chief Spanish negotiators for the economic talks, Minister of 
Commerce Manuel Arburua and Jaime Argiielles, Under-Secretary of Economic 
Affairs at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, urged the State Department to 
reconsider its position. Arburua candidly stated that it was 'essential [...] to give 
the Spanish military what they needed in the way of equipment,' much to the 
Americans' surprise that the Minister of Commerce 'should make such a strong 
plea in behalf of the military.'108 Argtielles insisted to the Americans that '(a) the 
position of the Spanish government depends on the support of the army and (b) 
that the army would not be satisfied to see a base agreement executed unless it 
was given sufficient equipment.'109 The Americans consequently suggested an 
increase in the share for military aid of the maximum figure that Washington 
allowed negotiators to offer at that time, which was set at $125 million.110 They 
similarly offered technical and military training programmes instead of military 
end-items. The Spanish military showed no interest in such training, leading the 
Americans to infer that it was prestige rather than real military capability that the 
Spaniards desired.111 
106 Deputy Director of the Office of European Regional Affairs to the Assistant Secretary 
of State for European Affairs, Washington, 6th February 1952, FRUS, 1952-1954, VI, 
part 2, p. 1798. 
107 Acheson to the Secretary of Defence, Washington, 11th February 1952, FRUS, 1952-
1954, VI, part 2, p. 1802. 
108 Memorandum of conversation between Arburua and Jones, by Jones, Madrid, 16th 
May 1952, FRUS, 1952-1954, VI, part 2, pp. 1851-52. 
109 Record of a Meeting Between United States and Spanish Representatives, Madrid, 5th 
July 1952, FRUS, 1952-1954, VI, part 2, p. 1861. 
110 Interim guidance for the negotiations was the paper known as DMS D-7, issued on 
20th March 1952 by the Interdepartmental Working Group on Spain, FRUS, 1952-1954, 
VI, part 2, p. 1824. 
111 Liedtke, Embracing a dictatorship, p. 122. 
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It took time, however, for the Americans to realise that they could not get 
the agreements with the amounts of aid they were offering, no matter how this 
119 
was sliced. Similarly, it was a while before the Americans realised that the 
minimum military aid required by the Spanish could be lowered significantly if 
the Americans committed in principle to long-term support and there was no 
apparent loss of Spanish sovereignty. Such a commitment was in fact beyond 
the powers of the negotiators who felt bound by NATO priorities and future 
congressional appropriations and helps to explain the slow progress made 
between July 1952 and August 1953. 
Despite reports in July 1953 from the new American Ambassador in 
Madrid, James C. Dunn, that 'Spaniards are anxious for early conclusion 
negotiations,'114 Franco wrote to Eisenhower in August in a worried but firm 
tone. Franco complained that American negotiators are 'at times forgetful that 
[the pact] is a question of a momentous negotiation in a common interest and not 
of the hiring of certain services' and, elsewhere in his letter, asked for details 
about the 'aid towards the equipping of our armies,' emphasising the importance 
of this point by suggesting that until this is added the 'whole structure of the 
agreements will not be completed.'115 Franco wanted a specific commitment as 
to military aid and simultaneously an open-ended commitment from the 
Americans as to the wider economic assistance programme. Whilst the itemising 
of military end-items to be delivered would help to appease the Spanish military, 
stating a definite figure of economic aid might appear as a price tag for loss of 
112 Only in May 1953 the NSC recognised the need to provide 'continuing aid to Spain 
over a period of several years totalling approximately $465 million,' see documentation 
an FRUS, 1952-1954, VI, part 2, pp. 1937-47. 
113 Liedtke, Embracing a dictatorship, p. 167. 
114 Dunn to Acheson, Madrid 2nd July 1953, in Office of the Director, Office of European 
Operations, Geographic Files 1953-1954, RFAA, RG469 (entry 337, box 43), NACP. 
115 Franco to Eisenhower, San Sebastian, 22nd August 1953, FRUS, 1952-1954, VI, part 
2, pp. 1950-51. Guirao interprets Franco's letter as a complaint about the 'unwillingness 
of the U.S. Government to specify what they would do to assist the Spanish armed 
forces and economy,' Guirao, 'Spain and European Economic Cooperation,' p. 319. It is 
of relevance to the argument put forward here to emphasise the different nature of the 
complaint in relation to military and to economic aid. 
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sovereignty; this ought to be avoided at all costs. Judging by these exchanges, 
Franco appeared to be particularly concerned with satisfying the armed forces, 
which perhaps he regarded as the only pressure group that could conceivably 
topple him. 
In contrast, the Department of State had always favoured a strict quid pro 
quo approach to the negotiations. As William Dunham, in charge of the Spanish 
Desk at the State Department put it: 
We still think that negotiations for economic assistance should not precede 
military negotiations [...] because we still lean, to some extent, toward the idea 
of using the promise of economic assistance as a carrot to attain our military 
objectives.116 
Dunham conceded that this view was being abandoned even within the State 
Department. The principal reason was that Congress kept weakening the State 
tVi Department policy. On 18 October 1951, the Senate voted to include an 
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amendment specifying $ 100 million for Spain. This had not been requested by 
the executive, who saw it as undermining their efforts in the negotiations.118 In 
fact, this was precisely what the State Department was trying to avoid. 
The American military were more responsive to the Spanish desire to 
establish a general commitment based on reciprocity and trust. The JCS, 
116 Dunham to Jones, Washington, 30th January 1952, FRUS, 1952-1954, VI, part 2, p. 
1794. 
117 Acheson to the Chairman of the House Appropriations Committee, Washington, 19th 
October 1951, FRUS, 1951,1, p. 428n. This practice was to be continued by Congress, 
rolling over undisbursed amounts from previous years and earmarking further 
appropriations for Spain. By the time the agreements were concluded in September 1953 
Congress had earmarked $225 million. See FRUS, 1952-1954, VI, part 2, p. 1949. 
118 Memorandum by the Deputy Director of Mutual Defence Assistance, Department of 
State, to the State Department Member of the Military Assistance Advisory Committee, 
Washington, 21st November 1951, FRUS, 1951, IV, pp. 853-54. 'Since aid mentioned as 
quid pro quo will be our chief bargaining weapon in negotiations with the Spanish 
Government, we plan to make every effort to forestall any Congressional action which 
would require such aid to be given before we have obtained the desired military 
facilities.' The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Spain, Washington, 18th 
September 1951, FRUS, 1951, IV, p. 852. 
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however, favoured the latter approach and were ready to agree that 'military 
relations between the United States and Spain should be on a continuing friendly 
basis.'119 The Americans were in a difficult legal position as they could not 
guarantee future appropriations by Congress and stuck to the hard bargaining 
approach for some time with the consequence of delaying the negotiations. The 
Embassy in Madrid, the head of the military survey team sent to Spain during the 
summer of 1951, General August W. Kissner, and the JCS were all seen by 
officials in the Department of State as too soft on Spain and unaware of the need 
for a quid pro quo. Acheson complained that the Embassy in Madrid was giving 
the impression to Spaniards that aid would aim at a wide-ranging overhaul of the 
• • 120 Spanish economy, instead of the limited programme that was in mind. 
According to Liedtke, the State Department stalled the negotiations when they 
realised that General Kissner, head of the U.S. military negotiating team, had 
shown the Spanish the agreement in principle to long-term provision of military 
and economic aid.121 
In the event, the successful termination of the agreements relied on 
satisfying both the State Department that a good bargain had been struck and the 
Spaniards that the commitment to Spain would go beyond the amounts of aid 
agreed at the time of signing. In this sense, one of the main reasons for the delay 
in the conclusion of the negotiations was the slowness of the Americans to 
realise that the minimum figures suggested by the Spaniards could be 
significantly lowered if a long-term commitment was made. Ambassador Lincoln 
MacVeagh, who had replaced Griffis in February 1952, was quick in 
emphasising that what the negotiations needed to be successfully concluded was 
a more dignified treatment of Spain by the U.S. He quickly realised that 'Spain is 
by no means so anxious to receive our aid as we are to get something by giving 
it' and was convinced that 'a modicum of attention to their pride is worth many 
119 Liedtke, Embracing a dictatorship, p. 159. 
120 Acheson to the Embassy in Spain, Washington, 2nd May 1952, FRUS, 1952-1954, VI, 
part 2, p. 1847. 
121 Liedtke, Embracing a dictatorship, p. 127. 
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dollars.' MacVeagh believed that Spain did not require a fully-fledged military 
alliance with the U.S. but simply 'a statement for the purpose of public 
opinion.' The Americans were also slow at picking up the importance that 
appearances had for the Franco regime. Only in March 1953 did the Americans 
suggest that the use of bases by Americans in the event of peace or war without 
consultation with the Spaniards could be incorporated in a secret clause. 
The final breakthrough in the negotiations, which as we have seen in 
Franco's letter of late August 1953 were by no means finalised, appears to have 
come after the Americans decided to inform the Spanish of their intentions to 
provide $465 million through fiscal year 1957.124 On 11th September the Spanish 
Foreign Minister met with Ambassador Dunn and, upon being informed him of 
the text of the note in which the $465 million figure was given, he suggested that 
discussion of the signature date could take place in their next meeting, scheduled 
for 16th September.125 Martin Artajo reported to Dunn that Franco and the 
Spanish Cabinet, which met on 11th September, received 'very favorably' the 
news.126 
In summary, the delay in closing the negotiations was not related to the 
attachment of policy conditions. The Spanish always insisted on the need to 
avoid the appearance of a hard-bargain and to be reasonably assured of the long-
term commitment of the U.S. toward Spain. The agreements were not signed 
until the appearances in terms of sovereignty and promises of military aid were 
enough to satisfy the Spanish military. 
122 MacVeagh to the Department of State, Madrid, 25th July 1952, FRUS, 1952-1954, VI, 
part 2, p. 1868. 
123 Liedtke, Embracing a dictatorship, p. 164. 
124 Guirao, 'Spain and European Economic Cooperation,' pp. 321-22. 
125 Dunn to Acheson, Madrid, 14th September 1953, 711.56352/9-1453, Decimal File, 
Central Files, GRDS, RG59, NACP. 
126 Dunn to Acheson, Madrid, 17th September 1953, 711.56352/0-1753, Decimal File, 
Central Files, GRDS, RG59, NACP. 
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4.5. The outcome of the negotiations 
Much has been said about the general conditions that Spain agreed to by signing 
the agreements with the U.S. on 26th September 1953. Of the three agreements 
signed between Spain and the U.S. on 26th September 1953, the Economic 
Assistance Agreement dealt with economic policy conditions most extensively. 
The other two, the Defence Agreement and the Mutual Defence Assistance 
agreement were of a military nature. 
The Economic Assistance Agreement committed the Spanish to general 
principles such as the 'establishment of a sound economy' and expanded this 
commitment in ten articles. The Spanish government agreed to 'stabilize its 
currency, establish or maintain a valid rate of exchange, balance its government 
budget as soon as practicable, create or maintain internal financial stability, and 
generally restore or maintain confidence in its monetary system.' Spain also 
agreed to 'discourage cartel and monopolistic business practices' and 'to 
encourage competition.' Similarly, Spain was to assist the United States in 
'reporting on labor conditions.' Of a more specific nature was the provision 
under which Spain was to agree with the U.S., 'as soon as feasible,' the 
convertibility of pesetas accumulated by American nationals and companies.127 
The Defence Agreement also called for the Spanish to take action to ensure that 
their commercial policy complied with the requirements of American legislation 
on not dealing with nations that were threatening world peace - in reference to 
trade with the Soviet bloc. 
These conditions were in such stark contrast to the practices in Spain that 
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Spanish agreement appears to be 'remarkable.' Had they been enforced the 
economic policy reform implied would have been dramatic. However, such 
conditions were also stated in extremely vague terms. This vagueness ensured 
that even the pro-autarkic Falangistas in Spain could be reconciled with such 
127 For the text of the agreements see 'Agreements Concluded with Spain,' The 
Department of State Bulletin, 5 th October 1953. For an analysis of the text of the 
agreements see Rubottom and Murphy, Spain and the U.S.; Vinas, Los pactos\ S. 
Tacconi, 'Acuerdos y convenios de Espana con los Estados Unidos de America,' De 
Economia, nos. 37-38 (September-December 1955), pp. 601-35 and G. Fernandez de 
Valderrama, 'Espana-USA, 1953-1964,' Economia Financiera, no. 6 (1964), pp. 14-51. 
128 Rubottom and Murphy, Spain and the U.S., p. 32. 
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190 provisions. Moreover, we have already noted that both parties had come to the 
agreements with the understanding that such was not going to be the case. The 
inclusion of the economic policy conditions in the text of the agreements was 
driven primarily by the need to satisfy certain pieces of American legislation, 
such as the Benton amendment or the trading with the enemy provisions - a 
situation which was known to the Spaniards.130 In Chapter Five below we will 
explore the issue of the extent to which these conditions were enforced. 
If there is one area where the Americans drove a hard bargain, it was on 
commercial conditions. Even the military agreements (Defence Agreement and 
Mutual Defence Assistance agreement) included specific commercial conditions, 
especially the tax exemptions that all American operations were to enjoy in 
Spain.131 
In a document separate from the Economic Assistance Agreement the 
exchange rate at which to calculate the amount of pesetas was fixed at 35 pesetas 
per dollar, a figure closer to the black market rate than to the official average 
exchange rate. 
Similarly, the percentage of counterpart funds to be used by the 
Americans was fixed at 70% (60% to finance the base construction programme 
plus 10% for administrative expenses in the country). This compares with 
Marshall Plan recipients, who enjoyed 90% (as opposed to 30% in the Spanish 
case) of counterpart funds to be used for the development of the recipient's 
economy. Other episodes of American aid, Eximbank, and especially PL480 
129 It did require though, great spinning to argue, as the famous economist Juan Velarde 
did in the falangista newspaper Arriba in the aftermath of the conclusion of the 
agreements that 'they did not marvel at that obscure, confused and anti-scientific 
concept of free enterprise, nor a condemnation of the so-much castigated state 
interventionism.' As quoted in Vinas, Lospactos, pp. 264-65. 
130 Resumen de la situation actual de la ayuda de los Estados Unidos, undated, in MAE, 
Leg. 3172, Exp. 10. 
131 Tacconi, 'Acuerdos,' p. 611. 
132 Fernandez, 'Espana-USA,' p. 24. On 12th April 1957 the exchange rate was increased 
to 42 pesetas per dollar, and on 21st July 1959 to 60 pesetas per dollar. At the time of 
signing, the Tangiers market for pesetas situated the dollar at approximately 43 pesetas 
per dollar. See Vinas, Los pactos, p. 268. 
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sales, would also have commercial conditions that do not appear especially 
favourable to Spain, as discussed in Chapter Two above. Despite the American 
fears throughout the negotiation that these terms may prove unacceptable for 
Spain, the issue proved to be very low in the priorities of the Spanish 
negotiators.133 The Spanish negotiators had initially suggested that the complex 
system of multiple exchange rates would be applicable. While American pressure 
succeeded in ensuring that a single exchange rate would be used, the Spanish 
were saved from public embarrassment by relegating the agreement on the 
exchange rate to a secret note. Note that the actual build-up of counterpart funds 
is a commercial condition while the actual disbursement of the counterpart funds 
may be considered as a policy-based condition since the donor has to give its 
consent before disbursements from such funds are made. 
Most notable is the fact that no political liberalisation was demanded 
from Spain. Spain was re-admitted into the Western world without having to 
make any concessions about the nature of its political regime. It was a victory for 
Franco, because the . agreement had been reached on his terms, without 
sacrificing his regime, without 'opening his fist' as he would himself note.134 
1 ^  
Franco had secretly conceded significant sovereign rights, but had also 
achieved the promise of military end-items to please the Spanish military as well 
as the recognition that the American aid to Spain was not a hard bargain but truly 
the manifestation of acceptance and support by the U.S. of his regime. 
The overriding proximate aim of the Spanish negotiators throughout the 
process was twofold: to avoid the impression of loss of sovereignty and to ensure 
the delivery of American military end-items to the Spanish armed forces. The 
Spanish regime achieved both. At the end, this issue was only resolved with the 
inclusion of secret clauses in the agreements which guaranteed that ostensibly the 
133 There is little documentary evidence of the Spanish concern with this issue. Even 
Vinas, Los pactos, pp. 267-68, who argues that the Spanish 'paid great attention to this 
issue,' can only unveil an internal document of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs dated 12th 
April 1957 but no evidence of such preoccupations at the time of the negotiation. 
134 Jarque, Queremos esas bases, p. 358. 
135 Vinas, Los pactos. It was obvious that the stationing of American bases in Spain gave 
little hopes for neutrality in the event of war in Europe. The location of the bases near 
densely populated areas was also an act of sheer irresponsibility. 
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bases were formally under Spanish command but the Americans were allowed 
their use to launch offensive attacks by simply informing the Spanish 
government. Similarly, the Americans only committed to the defence of Spain 
insofar as the bases were concerned. This wording enabled the formalisation of 
the accords as executive agreements that, unlike treaties, would not need 
congressional approval. 
It was clear, however, that the agreements meant a military alliance in 
everything but name. As Harold Stassen, Director of the M.S. A., told the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee: 'you cannot really defend Spain without 
defending the U.S. bases. You cannot defend the U.S. air bases without 
defending Spain.'137 The Defence Agreement and the Mutual Defence Assistance 
Agreement provided for the granting of base rights on Spanish soil to be used 
'jointly with the Government of Spain.' The bases were to remain 'under Spanish 
jurisdiction' and a secret note made it clear that the bases will remain 'under 
Spanish flag and command.' The Americans committed to provide an 
unspecified amount of military aid for a period of 'several years.' 
There was no reference in the text of the agreements as to the amounts of 
aid to be furnished. Franco's letter to Eisenhower in August 1953 reveals clearly 
that vagueness about amounts of economic aid was in fact in the interest of the 
Spanish regime, since otherwise it would have undermined the objective of 
portraying the agreements as a major alliance based on mutual trust and 
reciprocity. The Americans, however, committed themselves to the principle of 
ongoing aid to Spain. It is difficult to imagine how could it have been otherwise. 
As Senator J. William Fulbright put it, the American presence in Spain could 
only expect to 'tie the hand of the [American] administration' into providing 
further aid in the future.138 Hence, substantial amounts of aid would be at the 
136 Vinas, Los pactos. 
Declarations made on 18th My 1954, as quoted in J. Dura, U.S. Policy Toward 
Dictatorship and Democracy in Spain, 1931-1953. A Test Case in Policy Formation 
(Sevilla: Arrayan, 1985), p. 344. 
138 Remarks of Senator Fulbright before Congress, as quoted in Rubottom and Murphy, 
Spain and the U.S., p. 72. 
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disposal of Spain through programmes outside the consideration of the 
agreements signed in 1953, such as the sale of agricultural surpluses. 
The agreements also provided for the delivery of technical assistance and 
the funding of training of Spanish officials. We will explore the workings of this 
element of the aid programme in Chapter Five below. 
However, the agreements were also a victory for the Americans. 
Although dealing with Franco meant that the United States government 'had to 
swallow its pride,' the U.S. enjoyed a substantial military gain with a relatively 
limited aid programme. Bases in Spain provided significant cost reduction.139 
The mutual understanding that this relationship was a long-term commitment 
helps to explain why the Spaniards would in the future agree to the deployment 
of atomic submarines and planes in Spain, a point which had not been explicitly 
discussed in the negotiations. 
This emphasis on the bargaining power of Spain given by Liedtke and 
Jarque and, to a great extent here, coincides with the conclusions drawn in the 
recent literature on U.S. intervention in Third World countries, which has made 
researchers qualify the 'bipolar' nature of the Cold War given the influence 
exerted by supposedly weak countries.140 It therefore conflicts with those that see 
the culmination of the agreements as a 'subordinated' association or accounts 
that want to use it explicitly as an example of semi-peripheral status and 
becoming a 'satellite/client state and political and ideological agent of the 
hegemonic U.S.'141 This stress on Spanish bargaining power would not surprise 
139 J. W. Cortada, Two Nations over Time. Spain and the United States, 1776-1977 
(Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1978), p. 222. See also S. S. Kaplan, 'American 
Military Bases in Spain,' Public Policy (Fall 1974) for an assessment of the military 
value of the facilities on Spanish soil. 
140 Z. Karabell, Architects of intervention: the United States, the Third World, and the 
Cold War, 1946-1962 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1999), p. 225, 
examines the cases of Italy, Greece, Cuba, Guatemala, Lebanon, Iran, and Laos. 
141 M. F. Tayfur,' Semiperipheral development and foreign policy: the cases of Greece 
and Spain,' Ph.D. dissertation (London School of Economics, 1997), p. 228. A. Vinas, 
'Spain, the United States and NATO,' in C. Abel andN. Torrents, Spain: conditional 
democracy (Beckenham: Croom Helm, 1984), p. 41. 
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readers of the loosely called 'new' cold war history and its more sceptical view 
1 AO 
on the alleged omnipotence of the superpowers. 
In dropping political considerations as a prerequisite for the granting of 
assistance, American policy toward Spain was in line with its stance toward 
right-wing dictators worldwide.143 However, the change of policy toward Spain 
appears to have been marked crucially by strategic considerations and external 
shocks. This view, resonant of traditional realist interpretations of the Cold War, 
contrasts with recent revisionist accounts that changes in the dominant group 
within the Truman administration even before the outbreak of the Korean War 
provide a better explanation for the militaristic approach finally pursued by the 
U.S.144 
The inclusion of vague economic policy conditions in the text of the 
agreements did not find opposition from any side and was a small concession to 
the gallery rather than the manifestation of any serious discussion. The U.S. was 
not interested in economic policy-making in Spain per se, relegated this issue 
throughout the negotiations and concentrated on achieving its goal of securing 
base rights for the minimum price tag possible. Its own earlier analysis indicating 
that trends in Spanish economic policy-making were of the utmost importance 
for stability in Spain was sidelined the moment the negotiations became a 
possibility. How the premises of those analyses resurfaced once the Americans 
established bases in Spain and how it translated into pressure for policy change, 
we will see in Chapter Five. 
142 J. L. Gaddis, 'On Starting All Over Again: A Naive Approach to the Study of the 
Cold War,' in O. A. Westad (ed.), Reviewing the Cold War (London: Frank Cass, 2000), 
p. 3 1 . 
143 D. F. Schmitz, Thank God they are on our side (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 1999). 
144 B. O. Fordham, Building the Cold War Consensus. The Political Economy of U.S. 
National Security Policy, 1949-51 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1998). 
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contribute to economic policy change? 
Index 
5.1. Introduction 
5.2. Policy conditionality in the American aid programme after the Pact 
of Madrid 
5.2.1. Attempts at exercising leverage in good times, 1953-56 
5.2.2. Attempts at exercising leverage in not-so-good times, 1957-... 
5.3. The role of political conditionality and the modus operandi of the 
American aid programme in bringing about domestic policy 
change 
5.3.1. Initial attitudes, 1953-56 
5.3.2. Coming to terms with a deadlock, 1957-... 
5.3.3. Putting a spoke in the wheels of reform? 
5.4. Conclusion 
Abstract 
This chapter deals with de facto conditionality, the effect that the strings 
attached to American aid reviewed in chapter four actually had on 
Spanish policy-making. The topic has attracted only limited attention in 
the literature, leading to a somewhat confused picture in the existing 
historiography, which will be reviewed in the first part of the chapter. The 
chapter contributes to the literature by providing a documentary based 
account of the interactions between the two sides, the Spaniards and the 
Americans, in respect to discussions about policy-making. 
130 
Ch. 5. Conti'ibution of American leverage to policy change 
5.1. Introduction 
Compared with the abundant literature on the negotiations that led to the Pact of 
Madrid, relations between Spain and the U.S. after the signing of the agreements 
have attracted little attention. There is still no monograph on the period 1953-
1963 and studies of postwar Spanish-American relations focus heavily on the run 
up to the 1953 agreements.1 As such, discussions of the influence of the 
Americans in Spanish economic policy-making are very limited, yet often 
contradictory. The first part of this chapter is therefore a review of the existing 
historiography. 
Although broad-ranging interpretations of the period under General 
Francisco Franco's rule pay significant attention to the change in economic 
policy during the 1950s, they typically skip over the possible effects of American 
influence on such changes.2 They usually state briefly the absence of any 
'rectification, conversion, nor adaptation' on the part of the Spanish regime to 
reach the agreements with the U.S., though this refers specifically to political 
change rather than economic policy.3 Even monographs on Spanish foreign 
policy under Franco highlight the imbalance of the agreements but fail to discuss 
the possible leverage of the U.S. in Spanish domestic economic policy-making, 
or simply mention in passim that '[t]he problems of economic liberalisation and 
liberalisation of the regulation of foreign investment continued to be a bilateral 
battleground.'4 Typically, chronological accounts of the foreign relations of 
Spain focus on the Pact of Madrid during the early 1950s, but when discussing 
1 B. N. Liedtlce, 'Spain and the United States, 1945-1975,' in S. Balfour and P. Preston 
(eds.), Spain and the great powers in the twentieth century (New York: Routledge, 
1999), pp. 229-44. 
2 J. Tusell, La Espana de Franco (Madrid: Historia 16, 1989), pp. 129-51 and S. G. 
Payne, The Franco Regime, 1936-1975 (London: Phoenix Press, 2000 [1987]), pp. 417-
20. 
3 J. P. Fusi, Franco (Madrid: El Pais-Aguilar, 1995 [1985]), p. 132. 
4 A. Marquina, 'La politica exterior,' in J. Andres-Gallego et al., Espana actual. Espana 
y el mundo (1939-1975), Historia de Espana, vol. 13.3 (Madrid: Gredos, 1995), p. 472 
and M. Espadas Burgos, Franquismo y politica exterior (Madrid: Rialp, 1988), pp. 197-
200. 
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the mid- and late-fifties they tend to shift their attention from the relations with 
the Americans to other issues such as the decolonisation of Morocco.5 
Yet, the question was of clear importance to many writers which, lacking 
access to primary materials could but speculate on an answer to the contribution 
of American leverage to Spanish economic policy change. Based on the publicity 
of American representations to the Spanish government, it was argued that the 
Americans were increasingly 'urging a liberalization of economic policy in 
Spain.'6 American views on economic policies were tentatively viewed as having 
'influenced decisively [...] the new government's approach' since, for these 
authors, the slightly reformist economic policy of the 1951 government 'can only 
be explained if, more or less informally, there was an existing commitment of 
foreign aid.'7 However, instances of alleged direct American influence were very 
o 
rarely identified. 
In fact, those suggesting the possible importance of American aid in 
inducing policy change concede that there were 'no relevant efforts to demand 
the Spanish government a greater liberalisation of its economic policy.'9 This 
constitutes a puzzle for a literature that, taking as a departing point the traditional 
view on the imbalance of the agreements, expected the weak Spanish bargaining 
5 C. R. Halstead, 'Spanish foreign policy, 1936-1978,' in J. W. Cortada (ed.), Spain in 
the twentieth-century world (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1980), pp. 41-96 
and R. Calduch Cervera, 'La politica exterior espanola durante el franquismo,' in R. 
Calduch (coord.), La politica exterior espanola en el siglo XX (Madrid: Ed. Ciencias 
Sociales, 1994), pp.107-56. 
6 C. W. Anderson, The political economy of modern Spain (Madison: University of 
Wisconsin Press, 1970), pp. 91-92. 
7 J. Clavera et al., Capitalismo espanol: de la autarquia a la estabilizacion (1939-1959), 
(Madrid: Edicusa, 1973), pp. 42n, 49n. 
8 Balfour argued that the tram fares rise in Barcelona in February 1951 was 'the latest in 
a series of price increases that had followed the first liberalization measures urged by the 
U.S. government in exchange for its recent $62.5 million loan to Spain.'S. Balfour, 
Dictatorship, workers and the city. Labour in Greater Barcelona since 1939 (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1989), p. 23. 
9 Clavera et al., Capitalismo espanol, p. 71. 
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power to translate into significant leverage of the Americans over Spanish 
policy-making.10 
The puzzle is not always clearly grasped. For example, it is stressed how 
the 1953 agreements ushered in 'an ideological and economic turnabout' that is 
contrasted with how the 'early Francoist legislation had strictly controlled 
foreign investment on nationalist principles.'11 However, as these authors in fact 
note, this policy was only changed in the 1960s. The contrast between Spanish 
and American ways is so profound that it cannot failed to be noted: '[b]eyond the 
high-sounding rhetoric, there were practical conditions, in terms of establishing a 
realistic exchange rate for the peseta, balancing the state budget, restoring 
confidence in the financial system, all of which struck at the very existence of his 
cherished system of autarky,' as emphasised by Preston.12 Though Preston is 
quick to note that these conditions would only mean changes 'in the medium to 
long term' it is apparent from the previous quote that it is not clear whether 
American leverage did matter to change Spanish economic policy or not, nor 
through which mechanism. Similarly vague is Gonzalez's treatment of this issue, 
arguing that 'the philosophy that inspired the sine qua non conditions to receive 
aid define a line of continuity on the side of the U.S. since its change of policy 
towards Spain.'13 The implicit solution to the internal inconsistency in the 
accounts given by Carr and Fusi, Preston and Gonzalez is that American leverage 
manifested itself with a lag, that by 1959 it was yielding results. In this chapter 
we will explore the American-Spanish interaction throughout the 1950s to 
illuminate this point. 
10 A. Vinas, Los pactos secretos de Franco con Estados Unidos: bases, ayuda 
economica, recortes de soberania (Barcelona: Ed. Grijalbo, 1981). 
11 R. Carr and J. P. Fusi, Spain: dictatorship to democracy (London: George Allen & 
Unwin, 1979), p. 58. 
12 P. Preston, Franco (London: Harper Collins, 1993), p. 624. 
13 M. J. Gonzalez, La economiapolitica delfranquismo (1940-1970): dirigismo, 
mercado y planificacion (Madrid: Tecnos, 1979), p. 198. In a section entitled 'The role 
of the United States in the formulation of the policy and ideological change', pp. 182-98, 
he provides in fact an account of the early change in American policy towards Spain, 
rather than an account of the influence in policy-making. Gonzalez's is arguably the 
standard text on political economy of Spain during the Franco years. 
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At worst, the existence of de jure conditions attached to American aid is 
confused with de facto conditionality. American economic aid, it is argued, 
'helped directly to the relaxation of autarky due to aid being linked to 
liberalisation and anti-inflationary conditions and recommendations.'14 Even 
more forceful is the following quotation from another recent survey: 
The [1953] agreements facilitated the acquisition of raw materials and 
foodstuffs at low prices and were decisive in attracting foreign 
investments. They also forced the relaxation of autarky, the 'new economic 
policy of Minister of Commerce Manuel Arburua,' and initiated the 
process of international integration and co-operation. They imposed a more 
realistic exchange rate, a certain budgetary balance and more economic 
rationality to avoid the excessive inflation that the inflow of American 
dollars may cause.15 
Such statements are, however, not given further attention and very little 
effort has been made to document the alleged American leverage. Lack of solid 
documentary evidence is perhaps the only common feature of the different 
interpretations thus far reviewed. There are, of course, notable exceptions.16 
Vinas et al. explore the role of American policy in Spanish approach to the 
OEEC, yet without access to American documentation suggest 'when the 
government of Washington releases the documentation of the period we could 
• 17 
know with precision the internal arguments of the American administration.' 
To some extent, this chapter can be seen as taking Vinas' suggestion up. Guirao 
emphasises how the Spanish requested assistance as a prelude to trade and 
14 R. Pardo, 'La politica exterior del franquismo: aislamiento y alineacion internacional,' 
in R. Moreno Fonseret and F. Sevillano Calero (eds.), El Franquismo. Visiones y 
balances (Alicante: Universidad de Alicante, 1999), p. 109. 
15 F. Portero and R. Pardo, 'Las relaciones exteriores como factor condicionante del 
franquismo,' Ayer, no. 33 (1999), pp. 216-17. 
16 In particular, A. Vinas et al, Politica comercial exterior en Espana (1931-1975) 
(Madrid: Banco Exterior de Espana, 1980), vol. 2, especially pp. 830-68 and F. Guirao, 
'Spain and European economic cooperation, 1945-1955. A case study in Spanish foreign 
economic policy,' Ph.D. dissertation, European University Institute, 1993, pp. 330-40. 
For a summary of the arguments see F. Guirao, 'The United States, Franco, and the 
integration of Europe,' in F.H. Heller and J.R. Gillingham (eds.), The United States and 
the integration of Europe (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996), pp. 79-102. 
17 Vinas et al., Politica comercial exterior, vol. 2, p. 854. 
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payments liberalization and how the Americans turned these requests down, 
i o 
resulting in a slow down of the speed at which the reforms could proceed. 
Similarly, for Vinas et al. the Americans are seen as 'impeding' and 'frustrating' 
the change in policy as exemplified by the Spanish request to join in the OEEC 
in 1956.19 
Thus, it is unsurprising that those wishing to be on safer grounds simply 
refer to this topic in as vague terms as possible. A recent introductory text on 
early Francoism, after noting that the arrival of American aid allowed for 
importing capital goods and inputs, deals with the leverage issue by simply 
stating that '[w]ith these measures Francoism embraced the liberal capitalist 
ideology.'20 There is a similarly calculated vagueness in stating that the 1953 
agreements did have a positive effect 'by beginning the process of opening up 
the economy to the outside world.'21 It is unclear whether this relates to the 
increased aid-fmanced imports, the arrival of American contractors and other 
investors or to a relaxation of Spanish foreign economic policy. A recent survey 
on the very topic of the abandonment of autarkic policies in Spain, has 
disappointingly little to say over the relationship between policy-making and 
American influence, simply mentioning 'the onset of Spanish-American co-
22 
operation'-as one of the three causes for the resumption of growth in the 1950s. 
Authors synthesising the period sometimes avoid the discussion simply by 
commenting that the Spanish government 'did not comply with the totality of the 
content of the liberalisation intentions contained in the agreements signed with 
the U.S.'23 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the extent to which American 
influence stemming from its aid programme contributed to policy change in 
18 Guirao, 'The United States, Franco, and the integration of Europe,' p. 92. 
19 Vinas et al., Politica comercial exterior, vol. 2, p. 849. 
20 A. Cazorla, 'Early Francoism, 1939-1957,' in J. Alvarez Junco and A. Shubert, 
Spanish history since 1808 (London: Arnold, 2000), p. 272. 
21 J. Grugel and T. Rees, Franco's Spain (London: Arnold, 1997), p. 167. 
22 Ibid., p. 146. The other two sources of growth noted are the pull of Europe's growth 
and the gradual loosening of the most extreme autarkic policies. 
23 J. P. Fusi and J. Palafox, Espaiia: 1808-1996. El desafio de la modernidad (Madrid: 
Espasa Calpe, 1997), p. 344. 
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Spain, thus filling in a gap in the existing literature. We will follow the 
distinction made in the introductory chapter between policy- and political-
conditionality (conditions targeting economic policy reform and other strings that 
did not have that specific aim). Section Two of this chapter provides a 
chronological account of the role of policy conditionality in Spanish-American 
relations after the successful conclusion of the Pact of Madrid in 1953. Section 
Three considers a wider range of levers through which the U.S. may have 
affected the domestic policy-making process, which we referred to as the modus 
operandi of the aid programme in the introductory chapter. As discussed in the 
introductory chapter, this distinction aims to help us in making a judgement on 
the overall effect of an aid programme on the recipient's policy-making. This is 
so because conditions other than those strictly aimed at changing domestic 
economic policy may in fact have an impact on the domestic policy-making. This 
distinction is not only theoretically advised but may help to explain why, as 
argued in the literature, '[t]he very programme of economic policy, initiated in 
1951 and consolidated in 1957-1959, could not have even been outlined without 
such [American] aid.'24 Similarly, it has also been argued that American support 
to Spain succeeded in 'strengthening the position of economic liberals within the 
Spanish cabinet.'25 These views may then be reconciled with an ineffective direct 
policy conditionality, as the Americans may have influenced Spanish economic 
policy-making in other indirect ways. 
24 Clavera et al., Capitalismo espanol, p. 70. 
25 J. Harrison, 'Towards the liberalization of the Spanish economy, 1951-9,' in C. 
Holmes and A. Booth (eds.), Economy and society: European industrialisation and its 
social consequences. Essays presented to Sidney Pollard (Leicester: University of 
Leicester Press, 1991), p. 109. 
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5.2. Policy conditionality in the American aid programme after the Pact of 
Madrid 
5.2.1 Attempts at exercising leverage in good times, 1953-1956 
After the signing of the Pact of Madrid in 1953, the relationship between the 
Spanish and American governments developed into a comfortable one. Perhaps 
the high tide of this calm was marked by the trip on 1st November 1955 of John 
Foster Dulles, first U.S. Secretary of State ever to visit Madrid. Most of the two-
hour meeting with Franco was spent on discussing world affairs. Bilateral issues 
focused on the coming decision of the United Nations to consider Spanish 
membership, the discussion of the American aid programme being relegated to a 
secondary importance.26 Dulles was 'particularly appreciative of the 
extraordinary degree of co-operation' displayed by the Spaniards and did not 
raise even a single concern in relation to the economic agreements. On the 
contrary, the Secretary of State volunteered that the U.S. 'fully understood the 
problems which the [base] construction programme had produced' and, himself, 
27 
mentioned the 'inflationary aspects of the expenditures for construction.' Not 
even lip service was paid by the U.S. Secretary of State to the necessity that 
Spain reformed her economic policy. Dulles, oblivious to the increasing pressure 
within the American administration to cut aid expenditures, went out of his way 
to state that the U.S. hoped 'to continue a modest but nevertheless substantial 28 
economic aid programme for Spam.' 
To some extent, the language in the Dulles-Franco meeting reflects the 
platitudes usually exchanged between officials at the highest level, but it also 
captures the mutually satisfactory state of Spanish-American relations. Franco 
could but thrive in the new international prestige that his regime had obtained, 
26 Spain was accepted into the U.N. in December 1955 as part of a package deal in 
which some states of the Soviet bloc were included. Only one of the seven-page 
memorandum was devoted to cover the discussion on the American aid programme to 
Spain. Memorandum of conversation Franco-Dulles, Madrid, 5th November 1955, 
FRUS, 1955-1957, XXVII, p. 547. 
21 Ibid., p. 551. 
28 Ibid., p. 552. The New York Times would on 16th November 1955 comment John B. 
Hollister's [Director of International Cooperation Administration, successor of the 
Foreign Operations Administration] plans to cut U.S. economic aid by 20%. 
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and the subsequent peace reflected at home. The Americans generally considered 
the agreements 'a hard bargain' which offered the U.S. 'very favourable terms.'29 
There were, of course, unresolved issues. Spanish officials outspokenly 
complained about the insufficient amounts of aid granted, especially in 
comparison with Marshall aid recipients.30 The press served as a loudspeaker for 
these claims.31 Given that official Spanish-American meetings never showed the 
degree of victimisation that the Spaniards publicly portrayed, these utterances 
appear to reflect primarily Spaniards' attempts at securing the continued support 
of the American Congress for their cause.32 
These demands put the American administration in an uneasy position. 
On one hand, they were vigilant not to 'raise false hopes' that the U.S. was 
prepared 'to do more to strengthen the Spanish economy than is presently the 
case.' This fitted within the overall attitude of the administration to foreign aid. 
29 'Programme descriptions for Spain,' S. H. Van Dyke to D. A. FitzGerald, 
Washington, 17th June 1955, in Geographic Files of the Director, 1948-55; Office of 
Director; RG469 (entry 181, box 26), NACP. 
30 Martin Artajo at Fordham University, New York, 16th April 1956, argued that the aid 
was insufficient and stated that he had requested the U.S. to cover the complete re-
equipping of the Spanish army; quoted in J.L. Shneidman, Spain & Franco, 1949-59 
(New York: Facts on File, 1973), pp. 123, 167. 
31 The New York Times, 14th February 1955. Certain circles added that these complaints 
were 'natural and legitimate,' Chicago American, 16th February 1955. 
32 For example, Martin Artajo's meetings with American officials at the very time of his 
incendiary Fordham speech reveal that neither he had make such requests nor the tone of 
the meetings was other than cordial. See Memorandum of conversation, Washington, 
10th April 1956, FRUS, 1955-1957, XXVII, pp. 563-67. 
33 The Embassy in Madrid was reprimanded since it was 'not an approved primary 
objective of the U.S. Government to strengthen the Spanish economy in and of itself.' 
Dulles to Embassy in Madrid, 25th October 1954, Washington, in Geographic Files, 
1953-54; Office of European Operations, Office of the Director; RG469 (entry 337, box 
141), NACP. Joseph Dodge [President's Special Assistant and head of the Council on 
Foreign Economic Policy] was determined, in December 1954, to avoid leading 'foreign 
countries to expect a great deal more from us that we could or would provide,' as quoted 
in W. W. Rostow, Eisenhower, Kennedy, and foreign aid (Austin: University of Texas 
Press, 1985), p. 106. 
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Although during the Eisenhower administration foreign economic policy would 
be transformed from a 'trade-not-aid' to a 'trade-and-aid' philosophy, the change 
was to be a slow one.34 Throughout most of the 1950s, therefore, the American 
foreign economic programme is marked by the fiscal conservatism of 
35 
Eisenhower and his Secretary of the Treasury, George M. Humphrey. 
On the other hand, the question of what economic objectives arose from 
the military interest was 'highly complex and fluid,' as serious economic 
deterioration 'would impair U.S.-Spanish joint interests.'36 The vagueness of the 
commitments the U.S. had undertaken had American officials worried that their 
position be interpreted as 'an open end commitment for continuing U.S. 
economic assistance.'37 At the highest level, it was decided that this interest 
required the U.S.... 
to grant Spain that minimum amount of additional economic aid necessary 
to insure internal stability in Spain so that the use of our bases there would 
38 not be jeopardised by civil disorders in Spain. 
34 B. I. Kaufman, Trade and aid. Eisenhower's economic policy, 1953-1961 (Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982), p. 7. Proponents of more vigorous aid, such as 
Walt Rostow and Max Millikan from MIT, would not get the upper hand until the late 
1950s. See also K. C. Pearce, Rostow, Kennedy, and the Rhetoric of Foreign Aid (East 
Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 2001) and Rostow's own account in Rostow, 
Eisenhower, Kennedy, pp. 58-151. 
35 Kaufman, Trade and aid, p. 30. Humphrey would criticise the aid programme to Spain 
as suffering from 'sloppy thinking,' demanded that it ought to be 'much more 
businesslike,' and that, in any case 'our representatives must clearly know the limits to 
which they were authorised to go.' National Security Council Discussion, Washington, 
3rd May 1956, FRUS, 1955-1957, XXVII, pp. 569-71. 
36 Van Dyke to FitzGerald, Washington, 17th June 1955, in Geographic Files of the 
Director, 1948-55; Office of Director; RG469 (entry 181, box 26), NACP. 
37 'United States policy toward Spain,' Acting Secretary of State to Dodge, Washington, 
7th October 1955, FRUS, 1955-1957, XXVII, p. 544. 
38 This was the position of Eisenhower himself, 'Memorandum of Discussion at the 248th 
Meeting of the National Security Council,' Washington, 12th May 1955, FRUS, 1955-
1957, XXVII, p. 537. 
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Those responsible for implementation were baffled by a policy that 
directed them to provide some support for Spain's efforts to meet its most 
pressing economic problems but did not specify the character or extent of 
assistance considered appropriate. A similar vagueness applied to American 
goals in relation to influencing Spanish economic policy-making and the means 
to achieve those goals. The stake the Americans now had in Spain inevitably 
implied that there were 'a number of aspects of Spanish economic policy which 
are of direct concern to the U.S,' yet the policy implementation guidelines called 
for 'considerable caution [...] in pressing for changes' as they feared that pressure 
OQ 
'would be resented.' 
Therefore, Spanish officials were not feeling any type of pressure from 
the Americans to change economic policy. In fact, the only issue of Spanish 
economic policy raised by the Americans was the regulation of foreign 
investment.40 That this was the only question to be raised by the U.S. echoed the 
'trade-not-aid' philosophy that characterised the Eisenhower administration of 
that moment41 
This lack of attempts at exercising leverage is unsurprising. In fact, the 
very same reasoning that would prompt the U.S. to be willing to get Spain out of 
its most pressing economic problems would mean that it had no intention in 
providing a dollar more than necessary and if stability politically and 
economically was there, why do so. This somewhat ambiguous position 
39 Van Dyke to FitzGerald, Washington, 17th June 1955, in Geographic Files of the 
Director, 1948-55; Office of Director; RG469 (entry 181, box 26), NACP. 
40 Van Dyke to Hollister, Washington, 10th April 1956, in Geographic Files of the 
Director, 1948-55; Office of Director; RFAA, RG469 (entry 181, box 26), NACP. For a 
report on Hollister's meetings with Spanish authorities, Lodge to Dulles, Madrid, 24th 
July 1956, in Geographic Files of the Director, 1948-55; Office of Director; RFAA, 
RG469 (entry 181, box 26), NACP. 
41 The Randall report, to serve as the basis of foreign economic policy from FY1954 
onwards, emphasised as guidelines the termination of aid, encouragement of private 
investment abroad, currency convertibility, and trade liberalisation. Hollister, a reputed 
'trade-not-aid' proponent, had been appointed to direct the foreign aid programme 
because he was seen as much more conservative than his predecessor Harold Stassen, a 
member of the Republican party's liberal wing, Kaufman, Trade and aid, pp. 24, 52. 
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compares with a much more straightforward stance from the Spaniards: they 
simply wanted as much as possible. To get as much as they could they would 
have to play up the severity of the situation. This is not to say, however, that 
there were no disagreements about how best to proceed.42 These were, in fact, 
bitter times for the Spanish officials, which saw how the Americans were 
effectively withholding aid disbursements over minor disagreements which were 
only resolved if agreed upon American terms. One such stern negotiation 
involved the counterpart formula for the $55 million in McCarran amendment.43 
Overall, the American bargaining position was strong. The Americans protracted 
the negotiations on the programming of allocated aid, for example FY1954 aid, 
the first year after the signing of the agreements, was only announced on 29th 
April 1954, and simply ignored Spanish demands for changes in the disposition 
of the counterpart funds 44 In fact, they had managed to impose their will in 
matters such as the terms in which the McCarran amendment was to be 
implemented 45 
42 Jose Antonio Gimenez-Arnau [Director-General of Economic Cooperation at Spanish 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs] complained about Lequerica's view that further lobbying of 
Congress would be counterproductive in achieving a higher FY1955 appropriation, J.A. 
Gimenez-Arnau to Arburua, Madrid, 16th August 1954; Spanish Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs Renovated Series [henceforth MAE], Leg. 4615, Exp. 4. Spanish archival 
material presented in this dissertation derives from the MAE and the General Archive of 
the Administration [henceforth AGA]. Research in the Historical Archive of the Bank of 
Spain and to the Archive of the Presidency of Government proved less time-effective. 
The first because it lacked a catalogued system identifying records with material on the 
American aid programme, the second because the request for access to material resulted 
in being granted authorisation to consult a very limited number of files which made no 
substantial contribution. 
43 Eventually, it was agreed to split McCarran counterpart pesetas as follows: $20 
million loan, $24 million as grant and $11 million at the disposal of ICA. A exchange 
rate of 38.95 pesetas/$ was also agreed upon. Unsigned note, 11th February 1955; MAE, 
Leg. 4615, Exp. 15. 
44 Arguelles to Rubottom, Madrid,2nd December 1955, in MAE Leg. 4615, Exp. 15. 
45 The McCarran amendment read that '95% of the foreign currencies generated 
hereunder shall be used to strengthen and improve the civilian economy of Spain', 
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This situation was to characterise the first two and a half years after the 
signing of the agreements, right up to mid-1956. As this was a period of relative 
bonanza and stability, the conflict of interests and internal contradictions of this 
ad hoc policy would not manifest themselves. Let us see how the issue of the 
possibility of exercising American leverage over Spanish economic policy-
making evolved in less placid times. 
5.2.2. Attempts at exercising leverage bygone in not-so-good times, 1957-... 
Following wage increases of 20% in February and a further 10% in November 
1956, American officials were busily engaged in the exercise of assessing the 
inflationary risks in Spain. They expected a 50% increase in prices for 1957 and 
feared that the inflationary threat would 'become increasingly serious during 
1957.,46 Although the concern with inflation had been an early one for those in 
charge of the American aid programme to Spain, when the much talked 'fear that 
inflation would develop' presented itself, it left the Americans uncertain as how 
best to proceed.47 
In the first place, and given that inflation had not escalated to runaway 
levels, the Americans worried that the base construction programme would 
. . . 48 
almost inevitably be portrayed 'as major factor in public attribution of cause.' 
Ambassador John Davis Lodge warned about these repercussions, noting that the 
Congressional Record, Senate, 14th August 1954, p. 13778. This would have left ICA 
with $2.75 million at its disposal, not the $11 million agreed upon with the Spaniards. 
46 'Inflation in Spain: magnitude and significance,' by R. Holben, Madrid, 27th 
December 1956, in Subject Files, 1948-57; Office of African and European Operations; 
RFAA, RG469 (entry 379, box 98), NACP. 
47 E. L. Williams [Director of U.S. Operations Mission (USOM)- Spain] to FOA, 26th 
October 1954, in Geographic Files, 1953-54; Office of European Operations, Office of 
the Director; RFAA, RG469 (entry 337, box 141), NACP. The quote is from 
Eisenhower, referring to the Spanish aid programme. National Security Council 
Discussion, Washington, 3rd May 1956, FRUS, 1955-1957, XXVII, p. 569. 
48 As recognised to Hollister by Spanish Ministers Martin Artajo, Arburua, Planell 
[Industry] and Cavestany [Agriculture]; Hollister to FitzGerald, Madrid 22nd July 1956, 
in Subject Files, 1948-57; Office of African and European Operations; RFAA, RG469 
(entry 379, box 98), NACP. 
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press had already started blaming the rise in prices to the presence of 'large 
number of 'foreigners', understood by public to refer to U.S. personnel.'49 
The Spanish argument about inflation was that the base construction 
programme had diverted resources from the civilian economy and hence driven 
prices up. However, it was difficult to see how this could have had overall 
inflationary pressures. The Americans reiterated that the amounts of resources 
imported into Spain under the various economic aid programmes was 'six or 
seven times greater' than the amount of resources consumed in the military base 
programme.50 Moreover, the base construction programme continued to 
experience delays.51 Difficulties were being experienced by suppliers in 
matching the specifications and way the Americans worked and by the Spanish 
52 
government in furnishing all necessary land free of charge to the U.S. 
Similarly, the use by Americans of only counterpart pesetas and the scaling down 
of the overseas base construction programme also contributed to a fairly limited 
and slow pace.53 
49 Lodge to Dulles, Madrid, 11th November 1955, GRDS (RG59), Decimal File, 
711.56352/11-1155,NACP. 
50 Lodge to Martin Artajo, 5th October 1956; MAE, Leg. 7741, Exp. 3. 
51 It took approximately a year for the first contract (Torrejon de Ardoz air base), 
Economia, 15th September 1954. Part of the press suggested that the delays were due to 
Spanish disappointment with the meagre funds of aid furnished, see articles by J. 
Creach, Le Monde, 13th March 1955, or D.Pearson, Washington Post, 13th March 1955. 
52 W. G. Bowman, 'Spanish bases reach construction stage' in Engineering News-
Record, June 2, 1955. This would help explain episodes such as the one reported by The 
Economist, 30th October 1954, p. 396, reported that in September 1954 the Americans 
invited tenders for 30,000 tonnes of cement. No Spanish firm bid, despite Spain's annual 
production of almost 3 million tonnes.) Bowman, 'Spanish bases reach construction 
Stage' suggests that it already owned the great bulk of the land, so did not plan for an 
expenditure of upwards of $20 million of the extra parcels. 
53 Developments in long-range fighter planes and missiles led the American military to 
downgrade the strategic importance of the bases, reducing the number of bases 
originally planned from 8 or 9 to 4 and slowing down construction D. A. Quarles [U.S. 
Air Force Secretary] during a hearing before the House Committee on Appropriations in 
February 1956, as quoted in Shneidman, Spain & Franco, p. 168. 
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The American administration was aware that ultimately the inflationary 
threat could only be averted 'by Spanish budgetary action.'54 This provided a 
rationale for exercising pressure on Spanish government, as instability might 
jeopardise the Franco regime and with it the bases. 
The occasion to step up the attempts at leverage was the Spanish request 
for an additional $30 million in defence support for FY1957. John B. Hollister, 
Director of ICA, was briefed before his scheduled meeting with Spanish Foreign 
Minister Alberto Martin Artajo on 20th November 1956 to 'urge a careful 
appraisal of [the Spanish government] general fiscal capacity.'55 A letter from 
Lodge followed, requesting the Spanish government to specify what were 'the 
internal fiscal and monetary measures [that] have been taken and are 
contemplated to minimise the inflationary threat.'56 For the first time, the 
Americans not only raised the issue of freeing of foreign investment, but overall 
Spanish economic policy. 
The Spanish government met at the highest level and decided on sending 
a letter to the Embassy outlining the economic steps to meet the inflationary 
problem.57 The note emphasised the desire for liberalisation of the economy but 
also their position that they did 'not wish [to] make detailed statements.'58 The 
response by the Spanish government was judged by the Americans to leave much 
to be desired as the Spaniards provided 'few quantitative measures and many 
generalisations, and that when quantitative data are offered, they are sometimes 
inconsistent.'59 Spanish officials would insist in calling for more aid to end the 
54 Van Dyke to FitzGerald, Washington, 17th June 1955, in Geographic Files of the 
Director, 1948-55; Office of Director; RFAA, RG469 (entry 181, box 26), NACP. 
55 FitzGerald to Hollister, Washington, 16th November 1956, in Geographic Files of the 
Director, 1948-55; Office of Director; RFAA, RG469 (entry 181, box 26), NACP. 
56 Lodge to Martin Artajo, Madrid, 23rd November 1956; MAE, Leg. 7741, Exp. 3. 
57 H. Byngton [Charge of American Embassy in Madrid] to Dulles, Madrid, 30th March 
1957, GRDS (RG59), Decimal File, 852.00/3-3057, NACP. 
58 Summary of note in Lodge to Dulles, Madrid, 8th April 1957, GRDS (RG59), Decimal 
File, 852.00/4-857, NACP. 
59 Embassy despatch by Richard S. Aldrich [Counselor of Embassy for Economic 
Affairs and Director of USOM], Madrid, 12th December 1956, in Subject Files, 1948-57; 
Office of African and European Operations; RFAA, RG469 (entry 379, box 98), NACP. 
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inflationary pressures.60 The Spanish response was simply to step up their 
strategy of emphasising the 'seriousness of the Spanish economic situation and 
the likelihood of political repercussions' in the absence of further aid.61 There 
were no clear signs that things might change in the way the Spanish government 
conducted its economic affairs and the extent to which it will employ effective 
anti-inflationary measures, despite some promises to the contrary. 
The reaction within fiscally conservative circles in Washington was to toy 
with 'the idea of using the additional $25 million as bargaining leverage for 
assurances on internal reforms' and in particular 'assurances on inflation 
control.'63 To prevent the recurrent fact that Congress would appropriate 
amounts to Spain in excess of those suggested by the executive, the report 
proposed 'putting the Congress on notice that we will increase the aid level, if 
necessary, and if the Spanish undertake inflation control measures.'64 The 
Spaniards were informed that the U.S. 'felt strongly that the Spanish Government 
itself was not taking sufficient steps to bring the inflation under control,' and, 
hinting at withholding aid, that the U.S. 'would be more sympathetic to a request 
for increased aid if Spain would undertake the necessary measures of self-
help.'65This could 
not be a credible strategy. The same report that eagerly 
endorsed the use of strict policy conditionality was convinced that the crisis in 
60 Views of Spanish Commercial Attache (Vallaure), Washington, 9th November 1957, 
GRDS (RG59), Decimal File, 852.00/11-956, NACP. 
61 As put by Ullastres-and Castiella; Lodge to Dulles, Madrid, 29th August 1957, GRDS 
(RG59), Decimal File, 711.56352/8-2957, NACP. 
62 Martin Artajo to Byngton, 7th January 1957; MAE, Leg. 7741, Exp. 3. Martin Artajo 
pledges that reduction in fiscal expenditures and increases in discount interest rates were 
being studied. 
63 Report on Consultation Madrid, Lisbon, and Paris, February 7- 22, 1957, by H. K. 
Lennon, in Geographic Files of the Director, 1948-55; Office of Director; RFAA, 
RG469 (entry 181, box 26), NACP. 
"ibid. 
65 Hollister to Eisenhower, Washington, 27th June 1957, in Geographic Files of the 
Director, 1948-55; Office of Director; RFAA, RG469 (entry 181, box 26), NACP. 
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Spain was 'more serious than even Embassy despatches indicate.'66 This 
prompted the usual corollary that the effect 'on our base rights is unpredictable 
since the political direction, if matters should get out of hand, is also 
f\7 
unpredictable.' Although the reporter may have got carried away with the 
language, it is true that some instability developed throughout 1956-1957. The 
first attempt at institutionalising a regime that had no clear constitution led to 
unexpected frictions as the Falange party tried to regain a share of power that it 
had previously lost. Similarly, there was renewed labour unrest and all the 
uncertainties involved in a change of government, especially if it is not simply a 
substitution of persons as was the February 1957 cabinet reshuffle, in an 
autocratic regime. 
In such circumstances, attempts at exercising direct leverage were little 
more than wishful thinking. The Embassy in Madrid certainly thought so, 
conceding that Spanish co-operation 'will be determined by our willingness to 
extend military and economic aid in sums exceeding current commitments.'69 
The increasing current account problems, rising prices, and political uncertainty 
prompted Homer Byington, Charge of Embassy 
in Madrid, to argue that the 
'[o]nly escape open from the exceedingly grim prospect of inflation and 
shortages appears to be U.S. economic aid.'70 Lodge concurred and favoured 
increased aid in the form of agricultural commodities and raw materials 'before 
economic crisis expected next fall comes upon us, and we find our large 
investment in [Spain's] strategic advantages placed in jeopardy.'71 The 66 Report on Consultation Madrid, Lisbon, and Paris, February 7- 22, 1957, by H.K. 
Lennon, in Geographic-Files of the Director, 1948-55; Office of Director; RG469 (entry 
181, box 26), NACP. 
61 Ibid. 
68 Fusi, Franco, p, 148 et seq. 
69 'Spanish foreign relations in 1956', by R. A. Johnson [Counselor of Embassy], 
Madrid, 4th January 1957, 
in Spain, Madrid Embassy, Classified General Records 1953-
1963, FSPF, RG84 (entry 3167B, box 5), NACP. 70 Byington to Dulles, Madrid, 17th January 1957, in Subject Files, 1948-57; Office of 
African and European Operations; RG469 (entry 379, box 99), NACP. 
71 Lodge to Dulles, Madrid, 7th August 1957; GRDS (RG59), Decimal File, 852.00/8-
757, NACP. 
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Ambassador conceded that the U.S. was in a classical hold-up problem and that 
'our only practical alternative is to continue on a year-to-year basis using military 
and economic aid [...] to secure effective operation of the bases.' Lodge, 
despite finding the Spanish 'unreceptive,' urged for increases in the aid 
allocations to Spain 'as soon as possible.'73 
Lodge was similarly unwilling to press the Spanish government, arguing 
7 A 
that 'it would be counter-productive to insist on further detailed assurances.' 
When, following the unification of exchange rates at 42 pesetas by the Spanish 
government in April 1957, the State Department and ICA wanted to review 
upwards the exchange rate at which counterpart funds are calculated, Lodge 
predictably opposed such attempts. He argued that 'such precipitate action would 
be extremely unwise' since 'the gravest damage to U.S. security could be 
inflicted through hasty, over-legalistic disputes over issue of relatively minor 
importance.'75 
This was so for the sake of the 'continued stability' in the country, as the 
briefing for Dulles in his second visit to Spain in December 1957 emphasised.76 
The visit, though cordial, saw Franco raising the issue of insufficient aid and the 
dissatisfaction with the 90% counterpart arrangement. Dulles promised 'to look 
into this problem.'77 Franco's demands reflected a renewed confidence by the 
Spaniards, who had consequently stepped up their demands for aid. Minister of 
Commerce Alberto Ullastres, for example, had been crystal clear when 
72 Lodge to Dulles, Madrid, 4th May 1957; GRDS (RG59), Decimal File, 852.00/8-757, 
NACP. 
73 Lodge to Dulles, Madrid, 29th August 1957; GRDS (RG59), Decimal File, 
711.56352/8-2957, NACP. 
74 Lodge to Dulles, Madrid, 4th April 1957; GRDS (RG59), Decimal File, 852.00/4-957, 
NACP. 
75 Lodge to Dulles, Madrid, 22nd April 1957; GRDS (RG59), Decimal File, 711.56352/4-
2257, NACP. 
Briefing book for Dulles' visit to Spain on 
20th December 1957, in folder visits, 
Records relating to Spain 1956-1966, Lot Files, Europe (I), Bureau of European Affairs, 
Country Director for Spain and Portugal, RG59 (entry 5295, box 6), NACP. 77 Memorandum of convers tion Dulles-Franco, Madrid, 20th December 1957, FRUS, 
1955-1957, XXVII, p. 596. 
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demanding that Spain needed 'a great deal more' in aid because otherwise 
'political and social problems for both Spain and the U.S. bases are bound to 
arise. He said the real guardian of the American bases is the Spanish people, and 
they are hungry and poorly clothed.'78 
The American response to this 'all-out attempt' to substantially increase 
the amounts of aid is a good example of how the U.S. was to give up attempts at 
• 7Q 
exercising direct leverage over Spanish economic policy-making. 
The extension of FY1957 defence support allocation is representative. 
When Brundage, Director of Bureau of the Budget, complained to Dulles that he 
'understood they had made commitments to put their financial house in order and 
sees no evidence of it,' Dulles said that this further allocation was 'important 
irrespective of that'.80 Hollister, who on 25th April 1957 had not recommended 
further allocations for FY1957 'until sufficient evidence had been developed that 
the Spanish Government was undertaking the necessary self-help steps' was, by 
late June, endorsing such allocations despite recognising that 'the Spanish 
government has not announced any new measures to bring their inflation under 
control.'81 ih 
On 27 January 1958 a $69.1 million sales agreement under Public Law 
[PL] 480 was concluded. As the Embassy in Madrid had long emphasised, PL 
480 was a perfect match for the Spanish aid programme as the Spaniards were 
already interested in this form of supply of agricultural surpluses.82 The 
78 Report on a Conversation with Minister of Commerce Ullastres, by Milton Barall 
[Counsellor of U.S. Embassy], Madrid, 24th October 1957, GRDS (RG59), Decimal File, 
852.00/10-2457, NACP. 
79 Lodge to State Department, Madrid, 31st January 1958, FRUS, 1958-1969, VII, p. 697. 
80 Brundage to Dulles, Washington, 25th June 1957, FRUS, 1955-1957, XXVII, p. 582. 
Brundage managed to reduce the amount requested by Dulles from $25 to $20 million. 
81 Hollister to Eisenhower, Washington, 27th June 1957, in Geographic Files of the 
Director, 1948-55; Office of Director; RFAA, RG469 (entry 181, box 26), NACP. 
82 As manifested by Spain's purchases in pesetas through the Commodity Credit 
Corporation. Williams to FOA, 26th October 1954, in Geographic Files, 1953-54; Office 
of European Operations, Office of the Director; RG469 (entry 337, box 141), NACP. PL 
480, enacted on 10th July 1954 in the midst of a relatively sharp recession and falling 
prices for agricultural produce, would become a favourite of American administrators as 
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Americans increased the tempo of their provision of agricultural surpluses 
through PL 480 sales. Additional defence support allocations were frequently 
announced: $20 million on 29th June 1957 on top of $50 million for FY1957, 
with a further $15 million for FY1958 on 25th March 1958. 
The Americans advised that the defence support counterpart formula was 
revised and would provide 90% for Spanish uses, and a further PL 480 sale of 
cotton was agreed.83 The counterpart formula on PL 480 sales had already been 
altered and the portion to be used by Spain raised to 70% from FY1957.84 The 
Spaniards escaped also the application of the Cooley amendment on PL 480 
sales.85 Similarly, Spain resisted pressures to end its practice of reselling aid-
financed cotton to Spanish producers at a profit.86 The Eximbank resumed its 
loan programme to Spain by approving on 18th June 1958 a $24.5 million loan 
whilst the Development Loan Fund announced on 31st December 1958 its first 
two loans to Spain totalling $22.6 million. All these explain the build up in aid 
allocations and disbursements that we saw in Chapter Two. 
The ICA was now expecting to furnish $120 million a year until 1963 and 
even these estimates were questioned within the American administration as 
optimistic and considered 'doubtful that Spain will be able to stand on its own by 
1963.,87 For FY1958, the American executive estimated an overall programme 
of approximately $175 million.88 Compare this with the $30 million requested 
for FY1955 and the $28 million requested by the Administration for FY1956.89 It 
they could point to the dollar equivalent of those sales to the aid recipients and 
simultaneously please Congress at home, Rostow, Eisenhower, Kennedy, pp. 94-95. 
83 'United States economic aid,' by Thompson, 25th March 1958; GRDS (RG59), 
Decimal File, 852.00/3-2558. Lodge to Sate Department, Madrid, 11th February 1958, 
FRUS, 1958-1960, VII, p. 704. 
84 Lodge to Artajo, Madrid, 5th October 1956, in FRUS, 1955-1957, XXVII, p. 576. 
85 Memorandum of conversation, 28th November 1958, in FRUS, 1958-1960, VII, p. 
720. The Cooley Amendment to the PL480 provided that up to 25% of the sales 
proceeds be made available for loans to foreign and U.S. private investors. 
86 Corry to ICA, Madrid, 17th April 1957, in Subject Files, 1948-57; Office of African 
and European Operations; RG469 (entry 379, box 99), NACP. 
87 Intelligence Report, 7th August 1958, in FRUS, 1958-1960, VII, pp. 718-19. 
88 Including PL 480 sales. 'Progress report on Spain by OCB,' Washington, 3rd October 
1957, FRUS, 1955-1957, XXVII, p. 586. 
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FY1955 and the $28 million requested by the Administration for FY1956.89 It is 
difficult, therefore, to agree with the characterisation of the bargaining position, 
on economic matters, of the Spanish regime in the Franco-Dulles 1957 meeting 
as 'weak.'90 
With a sense of defeatism, the American Embassy referred to how 'the 
Spanish have rejected [...] the conditions we tie to our aid programme.'91 Under-
Secretary of State, C. Douglas Dillon candidly told the Spanish Ambassador in 
Washington, Jose M. de Areilza, that their aim was 'not to insist on acceptance 
of any unilateral conditions.'92 The Americans were to give up completely on the 
idea of influencing directly economic policy in Spain: 
It is very difficult to influence this situation from abroad, and past 
experience indicates that direct bilateral insistence by the U.S., either as a 
requirement for aid or on other bases, is not a particularly useful 
approach.93 
Although the situation did not get completely out of hand, the intimation 
of a serious potential inflationary and stability risk left the Americans 
uncomfortable. The Spaniards were getting more aid than what they had, by now, 
come to expect. If this situation had confirmed the Spaniards in their strategy, it 
could but prompt a revision within the American camp. 
89 Though Congress eventually extended those figures by $55 million for FY1955 
(McCarran amendment) and by $22 million for FY1956. Acting Secretary of State to 
Dodge, Washington, 7th October 1955, FRUS, 1955-1957, vol. XXVII, p. 544. 
90 Vinas et al, Politica comercial exterior, vol. 2, p. 782. 
91 Barall to Amstrong, Madrid, 11th December 1957, in folder 1957 General Economic, 
Records of the Spanish and Portuguese Desk Officers, 1942-1955, Lot Files Europe (II), 
RG59 (entry 1400, box 9), NACP. 
92 Memorandum of conversation, 28th November 1958, in FRUS, 1958-1960, VII, p. 
720. 
93 Biddle to Dean Rusk [U.S. Secretary of State], 'Spain: transtion to international 
development,' Madrid, 20th July 1961, in 'folder 500 US Aid to Spain', Spain, Madrid 
Embassy, Classified General Records 1953-1963, FSPF, RG84 (entry 3167B, box 11), 
NACP. 
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That the U.S. objectives with regard to Spain were 'not at all clear' had 
long been recognised at high-levels within the American administration.94 The 
numerous changes in the running of the foreign aid programme had not helped to 
establish a clear policy line.95 Officials criticised the myopia of a policy aimed at 
simply 'keeping the ship afloat.'96 Increasingly, they questioned whether the U.S. 
• 07 
should not look to an economic objective with 'validity of its own.' 
The new overall approach of the American administration to foreign 
economic policy, embodied in the Eisenhower Doctrine and the enactment of the 
Development Loan Fund, called for an expanded role to be played by foreign aid 
and the wider aim of long-run development in replacement of defence support. 
It is therefore unsurprising that economic growth per se was increasingly seen as 
an objective to be achieved by the Spanish aid programme. As we saw in Chapter 
Two, the emphasis was now put on delivering a lot more capital goods. 
Spain would eventually feel the new approach to American foreign 
economic policy but this did not affect the Americans' stance on not requiring 
94 Stassen to H.Struve Hensel [Assistant Secretary of Defence], Washington, 29th 
December 1954, in folder 1954 OCB, Records of the Spanish and Portuguese Desk 
Officers, 1942-1955, Lot Files Europe (II), RG59 (entry 1400, box 3), NACP. 
95 FitzGerald, a senior American official, criticised these as driven by a 'mistaken belief 
that persistent and intractable problems of substance could be resolved by a radical 
change in the form of the organisation.' D. A. FitzGerald, 'Musical chairs in the foreign-
assistance programme,' press release, 16th November 1962, as reprinted in D.A. 
Baldwin, Foreign aid and American foreign policy. A documentary analysis (New York: 
Praeger Publishers, 1966), p. 136. 
96 Barall to Lodge, 7th November 1957, in folder Briefing Books, Records of the Spanish 
and Portuguese Desk Officers, 1942-1955, Lot Files Europe (II), RG59 (entry 1400, box 
8), NACP. 
97 'Memorandum for the members, OCB Working Group on Spain' by O. Holder [OCB 
Staff], 3rd November 1959, in folder OCB working file October-December 1959, 
Records relating to Spain 1956-1966, Lot Files, Europe (I), Bureau of European Affairs, 
Country Director for Spain and Portugal, RG59 (entry 5295, box 5), NACP. 
98 E. Conteh-Morgan, American foreign aid and global power projection (Aldershot: 
Gower, 1990), p. 162 and R. Edgerton, Sub-cabinet politics and policy commitment: the 
birth of the Development Loan Fund (Syracuse: Inter-University Case Programme, 
1970). 
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her to comply with policy reform." In fact, the main impact of this 
reorganisation of the American foreign aid programme was rendering Spain 
ineligible to qualify under the new Agency for International Development, which 
programmes now focused on underdeveloped areas. Spain was put under the 
concept of 'token eligibility' to receive AID support.100 Despite attempts by the 
American Embassy in Madrid to sweeten this bitter pill, the new policy was there 
to stay.101 The success of the 1959 Stabilisation Plan, ensuring price stability and 
the resumption of growth, was music to the ears of the Americans. Despite a lack 
of direct leverage, they were 'quite satisfied with the arrangements' as a State 
Department official put it when the Spaniards first suggested a study of changes 
that should be made in the renewal of the defence agreement due to lapse in 
1963.102 
In the event, in January 1963 the Spaniards invoked the consultation 
procedure to renegotiate the Defence Agreement. The Spanish attempted to 
increase the strategic importance of the bases for the U.S., for example 
permitting the basing of nuclear-armed Polaris submarines in the base of Rota, 
99 The Rostow-Millikan proposition adopted by the Eisenhower and subsequent 
administrations failed to emphasise the effect of internal government reforms on 
economic development abroad and gave too much credit to the role of aid; Kaufman, 
Trade and aid, p. 10. 
100 Biddle to Rusk, Madrid, 31st August 1961, in 'folder 500 US Aid to Spain', Spain, 
Madrid Embassy, Classified General Records 1953-1963, FSPF, RG84 (entry 3167B, 
box 11), NACP. 
101 When McLaughling [Deputy Director of AID] informed Lopez Rodo [Technical 
Secretary-General of the Presidency] on 9th March 1962, the strident reaction of Carrero 
and Franco to the news prompted Robert H. McBride [Charge of Embassy in Madrid] to 
implausibly argue that such were only McLaughling's 'personal views' and not reflected 
American policy. See Lopez Rodo's own understated account in his memoirs, L. Lopez 
Rodo, Memorias, vol. I (Barcelona: Plaza & Janes, 1990), pp. 321-22. 
102 Memorandum of conversation between Kohler, Beigel, Areilza and Rovira, 
Washington, 28th June 1961, in folder 320 memos of conversation, Spain, Madrid 
Embassy, Classified General Records 1953-1963, FSPF, RG84 (entry 3167B, box 8), 
NACP. 
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and unexpectedly offering to establish bases in Spanish Sahara.103 The 
negotiations, which will not be discussed here, reflected a strong American 
bargaining position and led to a simpler arrangement in which the economic aid 
programme was scrapped and the only quid pro quo for the use of the military 
bases would be solely in the form of military aid.104 Let us now discuss the 
American attempts at indirectly influencing Spanish economic policy-making 
throughout the decade of the 1950s. 
103 'Briefing paper for the President's press conference,' 24th January 1963, in folder 
briefing memos 1963, Records relating to Spain 1956-1966, Lot Files, Europe (I), 
Bureau of European Affairs, Country Director for Spain and Portugal, RG59 (entry 
5295, box 4), NACP. McBride to State Department, Madrid, 17th December 1961, in 
'folder 050 Ruslc', Spain, Madrid Embassy, Classified General Records 1953-1963, 
FSPF, RG84 (entry 3167B, box 8), NACP. 
104 Liedtke, 'Spain and the U.S.A., 1945-1979,' p. 240. 
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Our present procedure gives us neither adequate information on which to 
form a judgment, influence over Spanish policy, a defensible position with 
the Congress nor, for that matter, the moral righteousness of ignoring a 
discreditable regime. I have come to believe that US interest would be 
better furthered by establishing an ECA mission in Spain which could 
exercise a positive influence on Spanish policy.105 
5.3. The role of political conditionality and the modus operandi of the 
American aid programme in bringing about domestic policy change 
5.3.1. Initial attitudes, 1953-56 
The quote that precedes this section captures the conclusion drawn by American 
administrators over the attempts at exercising direct leverage over Spanish policy 
makers by withholding Eximbank loans. Overruled by politico-military 
considerations, officials conceded the failure and, as the quote suggests, 
advocated more traditional diplomatic means to deal with the Spaniards. This 
could only busy the Americans at employing channels other than aid to influence 
the Spaniards. 
That the Ministers of Commerce, Army, Navy, Air Force were all invited 
before the Foreign Minister did not escape the Spaniards.106 These visits had 
specific and limited goals in mind. Admiral Salvador Moreno, Minister of the 
Marine, upon returning from the U.S. in June 1955 said that what he had seen in 
his trip had 'convinced him that the first step necessary in the modernization of 
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the Spanish Navy is the training of personnel.' The trip was deemed a success 
by the Americans since it served to lower Spanish demands for deliveries of 
105 Paul R. Porter to Bissell, Washington, 23rd May 1951, in Country Files 1950-51; 
ECA, Office of the Deputy Administrator; RG469 (entry 24, box 3); NACP. 
106 'Spanish Ambassador's suggestion regarding possible visit to the United States of the 
Spanish Foreign Minister,' 1st December 1954, in Records of the Spanish and 
Portuguese Desk Officers, 1942-1955, Lot Files Europe (II), RG59 (entry 1400, box 4), 
NACP. 
107 'Spanish Navy- Reaction of Minister of Marine and members of his party to their 
recent visit to U.S. (10 May- 7 June),' 20th June 1955, in Records of the Spanish and 
Portuguese Desk Officers, 1942-1955, Lot Files Europe (II), RG59 (entry 1400, box 4), 
NACP. Handwritten on the margin was 'trip was well worth the cost.' 
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military end-items, which, as we saw in Chapter Four, was the cause of some 
frictions between the Americans and their NATO allies. 
The Americans also aimed to use technical assistance programmes as part 
of their overall strategy. These programmes were initially seen as cheaper 
substitutes for the delivery of end-items -as advocated to the Spanish military 
ministers in Washington. Civilian technical assistance programmes gathered pace 
throughout the decade, some being dedicated to the training of Spanish 
bureaucrats and policy-makers. Although this may be expected to lead to more 
liberal minded officials, effects on policy-making would most likely only 
manifest themselves in the long run. If we are to focus on the pre-1959 period 
there is little evidence that the participants in technical assistance programmes 
played a substantial part in the unfolding of economic reform in the late 1950s. 
Most of the 200 or so Spanish participants in this programme annually were, in 
fact, affiliated to technical ministries.108 Thus, it appears safe to conclude that the 
possible impact of these programmes on the formulation of policy in Spain 
would be of more relevance to a period after the one we are considering. 
A further item of American concern was the treatment of foreign direct 
investment. The Americans quickly realised that there were two currents of 
opinion within the Spanish government on the issue of freeing the foreign 
investment regime, limited to a maximum of 25% capital participation. The 
Embassy was also aware that hopes of any changes in the near future to ease 
foreign investments were 'unduly optimistic.'109 The Americans were aware of 
Minister of Commerce Manuel Arburua's orthodox economic policy agenda. It 
was no coincidence that he would be the first non-military Spanish minister to be 
invited to the U.S.: 
108 Up to 1963 a total of 2,000 Spaniards participated in technical assistance programmes 
in the U.S. Of these only 150 were in programmes aimed to improve Public 
Administration (less than those from the Ministry of the Air Force; Industry and Mining 
topped the table with nearly 1,000 participants). Figures in Fernandez de Valderrama, 
£Espana-USA,' p. 45. 
109 Airgramby Rubottom, Madrid, 15th March 1954, in Geographic Files, 1953-54; 
Office of European Operations, Office of the Director; RFAA, RG469 (entry 337, box 
141), NACP. 
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Department is well aware of Arburua's leadership in Spanish Government 
towards a more liberal economic policy in Spain and a more pro-western 
orientation of Spanish policy in general. Brief courtesy call by Arburua on 
President would contribute more than anything else to success his visit and 
encouragement of pro-western elements in government here.110 
We will return to discuss this visit of Arburua in April 1954 at length in 
section 5.3.3 below. Arburua's connections with New York bankers and open 
ambitions made him the perfect man for Americans to bet on for the reform of 
the regime at least in economic policy terms. Arburua himself cultivated this 
role, letting it be known that he shared American criticisms.111 This type of 
interaction with the Spanish government provided the Americans with a fairly 
good knowledge of internal politics within the Spanish regime. It was clear to the 
Americans that the split in the Spanish cabinet over freeing foreign investment 
was mirrored on many other policy issues. Throughout the years 1953-1956 the 
American diplomatic effort concentrated on following very closely events within 
the Spanish regime, fme-tuning their knowledge of the internal policy making 
process within the Spanish administration and getting to know the pro-reform 
elements within the Spanish government. 
5.3.2. Coming to terms with a deadlock, 1957-... 
Despite the lack of assurances on anti-inflationary policies from the Spanish 
government, the intrinsic interest of the U.S. in the stability of the country 
contributed to ever increasing amounts of American bilateral aid. In section 5.2.2 
above it was argued that the Americans gave up attempting to exercise direct 
110 Dunn to Dulles, Madrid 29th March 1954, in Geographic Files, 1953-54; Office of 
European Operations, Office of the Director; RFAA, RG469 (entry 337, box 141), 
NACP. 
111 Disappointment about aid disbursements 'would strengthen the hand with Franco of 
elements unsympathetic to the agreements with the U.S. and to Mr Arburua's efforts to 
liberalize Spain's economic regime.' Memoradum of conversation Gulik-Bogdan, 26tb 
April 1954, in folder 1953-54 Agreements General, Records of the Spanish and 
Portuguese Desk Officers, 1942-1955, Lot Files Europe (II), RG59 (entry 1400, box 3), 
NACP. 
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leverage. This, however, does not imply that the U.S. gave up attempting to 
influence Spanish policy-making via other means. This section explores those 
indirect attempts. 
The U.S. was willing to grant aid beyond the established amounts on the 
assumption that 'favourable U.S. action on the Spanish request for additional aid 
112 
could strengthen the position of the more pro-U.S. members of the Cabinet.' 
This was done on the assessment that there was 'considerable subsequent 
evidence that the economy-minded bloc in the Spanish cabinet was attempting to 
supply the U.S. with such assurances but had failed to override the opposition of 
the more expansion-minded bloc in the cabinet.' The lack of specific measures 
from the Spanish to put their financial house in order was... 
.. .not surprising, however, in view of the strong divisions within the 
Spanish Cabinet over the type of stabilisation measures needed which to 
date apparently have prevented any effective decision by the Government 
u 114 as to such measures. 
The Americans perceived the struggle within the Spanish cabinet as 
sufficiently important to justify basing their policy around attempts at influencing 
the outcome of that clash. The Embassy was particularly vocal about the 
potential power of using the aid programme indirectly to shape Spanish 
economic policy, and, in particular, the response to the inflationary and current 
account crises that were developing.115 Advocating further aid to Spain was 'to 
strengthen our influence with the new Spanish Cabinet.'116 Aid disbursements 
were crucial because... 
112 'Additional FY1957 aid for Spain -Political and economic implications,' Elbrick to 
Murphy, 18th January 1957, 
in Records of the Spanish and Portuguese Desk Officers, 
1942-1955, Lot Files Europe (II), RG59 (entry 1400, box 7), NACP. 113 Hollister to Eisenhower, Washington, 27th June 1957, in Geographic Files of the 
Director, 1948-55; Office ofDirector; RG469 (entry 181, box 26), NACP. 
114 Despatch by Aldrich, Madrid, 12th December 1956, in Subject Files, 1948-57; Office 
of African and European Operations; RG469 (entry 379, box 98), NACP. 
115 Byington to Dulles, Madrid, 17th January 1957, in Subject Files, 1948-57; Office of 
African and European Operations; RG469 (entry 379, box 99), NACP. 
116 Hollister to Eisenhower, Washington, 27th June 1957, in Geographic Files of the 
Director, 1948-55; Office ofDirector; RG469 (entry 181, box 26), NACP. 
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...with adequate support from the U.S. in form of direct aid [...] Franco 
may find it practicable to continue along present path of Government 
policy toward a fuller rapprochement with the Western world.117 
Demanding detailed commitments from the Spaniards was unnecessary 
and perhaps counter-productive since it was in the U.S. interest to promote the 
pro-reformers. The very provision of aid was believed to have an impact on the 
policy adopted. 
On 12th April 1957 the Spanish government announced a new unitary 
exchange rate system. Although the modification of exchange rates in April 1957 
had been less of a readjustment than it would appear, the Americans believed 
Ullastres when he told them that his ultimate objective was complete unification 
but asked them to recognise that 'immediate changes would be politically 
1 i o 
difficult.' Ullastres also asked them not to request a change in the existing 35 
pesetas to the dollar exchange rate applicable for counterpart funds purposes. In 
the analysis of the Embassy, this plea... 
...should be given most careful consideration. Our general impression is 
Economic Minister is trying hard for sound economic policies. If we 
immediately follow attempt to unify exchange rate with demand for higher 
rate for PL480 sales and counterpart generation, believe we will provide 
undesirable opportunities for potentially dissident members of cabinet to 
criticise new policies.'119 
Once more, we see the careful hand of the Americans in trying to tilt the 
balance in favour of pro-reformers but no pressure had really been exercised to 
achieve that outcome. The Americans were also receptive enough to normalise 
for past Spanish habits and thought that the 1957 developments 'by Spanish 
standards [the Spanish government] has made progress in this [anti-inflationary] 
1 
direction in a very short time.' 
117 Byington to Dulles, Madrid, 17th January 1957, in Subject Files, 1948-57; Office of 
African and European Operations; RG469 (entry 379, box 99), NACP. 
118 Corry to ICA, Madrid, 17th April 1957, in Subject Files, 1948-57; Office of African 
and European Operations; RG469 (entry 379, box 99), NACP. 
119 Ibid. 
120 Hollister to Eisenhower, Washington, 27th June 1957, in Geographic Files of the 
Director, 1948-55; Office of Director; RG469 (entry 181, box 26), NACP. 
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But this was not going to be the big break, the move from promises of aid 
and then reform to reform and then aid or at least reform and aid simultaneously. 
The Americans felt they could not push it. That break was going to come in the 
form of a stabilisation plan announced by the Spanish authorities in July 1959 
and concluded in co-operation with the IMF and OEEC. Let us now examine the 
relationship between the U.S. and Spain in relation to that plan. 
The U.S. was supportive of a reform programme. The U.S. was 
concerned that 'without steps of this kind, Spanish reliance on United States' 
121 
support for the expansion of the economy would not be reduced.' It was 
clearly in the interest of the U.S. to avoid a situation where the Spanish economy 
'deteriorate to the point where other countries would have to come in for a 
bailing operation.'122 The U.S. saw in the involvement of international 
organisations the possibility of 'greatly increased leverage to influence Spanish 
economic policies in desirable directions.'123 These international organisations 
did not suffer from the conflict of interest that, in their own admission, now 
pervaded the American policy and limited its room for manoeuvre. The 
Americans, in short, wanted Spain 'to work out an economic reform programme 
with OEEC and IMF and then consider how it might be possible to help Spain 
124 carry out the programme.' 
121 These were words addressed to Jose M. de Areilza [Spanish Ambassador in 
Washington], 'United States Economic Aid,' by Thompson, 25th March 1958, GRDS 
(RG59), Decimal File, 852.00/3-2558. 
122 As a Spanish source told Barall, Madrid, 23rd January 1959, in folder 320 memos of 
conversation, Spain, Madrid Embassy, Classified General Records 1953-1963, FSPF, 
RG84 (entry 3167B, box 5), NACP. 
123 'U.S. Mutual Security programme for Spain, FY1961,' by Lodge, Madrid, 16th 
October 1959, in folder OCB working file October-December 1959, Records relating to 
Spain 1956-1966, Lot Files, Europe (I), Bureau of European Affairs, Country Director 
for Spain and Portugal, RG59 (entry 5295, box 5), NACP. 
124 Memorandum of conversation between Christian A. Herter [U.S. Secretary of State] 
and Selwyn Lloyd [British Foreign Secretary Lloyd], Paris, 29th April 1959, in 'OEEC 
1959-1961', Spain, Madrid Embassy, Classified General Records 1953-1963, FSPF, 
RG84 (entry 3167B, box 11), NACP. 
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To the credit of the Americans, they did not interfere much with the 
process. Even when concerned that the delay of the adoption of the plan would 
damage the needed confidence of economic actors they were cautious in pressing 
for the conclusion of the negotiations: 
[It is] essential that sufficient time be taken to obtain satisfactory results [in 
the] Madrid negotiations. But once this substantive stage [is] passed, [we] 
suggest [the] U.S. [to] exert all necessary influence to minimise [the] time 
needed for [the] mechanics and politics of OEEC processing.125 
They were also willing to make concessions on issues of substance to 
please the OEEC. Thus, for example, just before the final go-ahead to the 1959 
Stabilisation Plan, there was a point of disagreement between the OEEC and 
American policy on the extent of multilateralisation that would be required from 
Spain. The Americans were expected to push for greater multilateralisation and 
not agree with the regional integration process that OEEC favoured. Per 
Jacobsson, Managing Director of the IMF, informed the OEEC that higher 
multilateral quotas would need to be agreed with Spain if the Americans were to 
give the support to the deal. The issue raised some problems between the OEEC 
and IMF delegations, eagerly awaiting the wire from the Americans. In the 
end, the telegram from Washington implied a reliance on the IMF's judgement, 
stating that 'the U.S. government would probably accept what Per Jacobsson 
found reasonable.'127 
The U.S. regarded the IMF and OEEC as a substitute for exercising a 
leverage which itself had renounced by dealing in Franco's terms and considered 
acceptance of OEEC's agenda on regional integration to be a lesser evil. In this 
sense, the Spanish experience fits in the complex overall evolution of American 
foreign economic policy towards integration during the 1950s, which has been 
characterised as American policymakers realistically accepting modifications of 
125 Armstrong to Herter, 15th June 1959, in 'OEEC 1959-1961', Spain, Madrid Embassy, 
Classified General Records 1953-1963, FSPF, RG84 (entry 3167B, box 11), NACP. 
126 Per Jacobsson [Managing Director of the IMF in 1956-1962] Diary [henceforth PJ 
Diary], Entry for 21st June 1959: 'It was agreed that we should wait for the U.S. 
telegram,' and 22nd June 1959: 'we waited for a telegram from Washington,' 23rd June 
1959: 'no wire yet from the U.S.A.' 
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their original plans and accepting European integration as a second best to 
achieve their goals.128 In the case of Spain, the Americans had effectively 
'outsourced' the task of directly pressing for policy change in Spain to the 
international organisations: 
[EJxperience in Spain shows that advice and pressure of an international 
organisation is the most effective way of influencing the direction of basic 
economic policies. U.S. efforts to improve Spanish development planning 
should, therefore, be directed to an important extent toward fostering 
Spanish participation in international organisations.129 
Still, the Americans would continue to be a risk factor for the successful 
implementation of the plan because, ultimately, 'if this [stabilisation] programme 
is permitted to fail in such a manner as to engender political instability, NSC 
objectives will be in serious danger.'130 The Embassy would continue to worry 
about the length of the crisis, possible second thoughts of Franco on stabilisation 
1Q1 
and disagreements among the pro-reformers well into 1960. To the credit of 
the Americans, they kept themselves at a distance, though it should also be noted 
that they were not asked for further aid.132 Fortunately for the success of the 
127 PJ Diary, Entry 24th June 1959. 
128 F. Romero, 'U.S. attitudes towards integration and interdependence: the 1950s,' in F. 
H. Heller and J. R. Gillingham (eds.), The United States and the integration of Europe 
(New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996), p. 105. 
129 Biddle to Rusk, 'Spain: transition to international development,' Madrid, 20th July 
1961, in 'folder 500 US Aid to Spain', Spain, Madrid Embassy, Classified General 
Records 1953-1963, FSPF, RG84 (entry 3167B, box 11), NACP. 
130 'U.S. Mutual Security programme for Spain, FY1961' by Lodge, Madrid, 16th 
October 1959, in folder OCB working file October-December 1959, Records relating to 
Spain 1956-1966, Lot Files, Europe (I), RG59 (entry 5295, box 5), NACP. 
131 Lodge to Herter, Madrid, 23rd September 1959, GRDS (RG59), Decimal File, 
852.00/9-2359; 'Views of Spanish Bankers on Implementation of the Stabilisation Plan,' 
by Barall, Madrid, 17th August 1959, GRDS (RG59), Decimal File, 852.00/8-1759; and 
'Current Public Reaction to Spanish Stabilisation Plan,' by E. Shearer [USOM-Spain], 
Madrid, 9th October 1959, GRDS (RG59), Decimal File, 852.00/10-959. 
132 Economic Summary for Spain, Fourth Quarter 1959, by F. Weaver, Madrid, 12th 
January 1960, in 'Spain Quarterly Economic Reports 1959-1961', Spain, Madrid 
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reforms, the recession that followed the adoption of the plan was short-lived and 
milder than expected. Much to the relief of the Americans the stabilisation plan 
was a success. A success that vindicated those who had sponsored the American 
policy to Spain: 'Our policies in Spain and for Spain have been the catalysts of 
its present evolution into the modern society of nations.'133 
The effectiveness of this type of moves should not be overstated. The 
argument made here agrees that they acted as a catalyst, but the decisiveness of 
this external factor should not be exaggerated. That there were elements within 
the Spanish administration that had been particularly keen on advancing a 
liberalising agenda in economic policy had been evident since the late 1940s and 
increasingly so throughout the 1950s. Pro-reformers, in fact, appear in the 
Spanish government as a result of the 1951 cabinet reshuffle, long before these 
American attempts at influencing Spanish policy-making. Similarly, the pace of 
the reform programme did but accelerate after Arburua's replacement. Arburua, 
in whom the Americans had invested substantial 'diplomatic capital' and who 
would eventually be dismissed among widespread rumours of corruption. Much 
of what the Americans did was providing photo opportunities for pro-reformers, 
and ultimately for Franco.134 The importance of appearances, that had prolonged 
the negotiations in 1952-53, were now fully understood by the Americans: 
A favourable statement from a foreign statesman that can be quoted by the 
press and radio is sometimes worth more to the Spanish Government than a 
real achievement that cannot be translated into propaganda terms.135 
This all suggests that the direction that Spanish economic policy was 
taking throughout the 1950s was primarily driven by internal dynamics within 
the Spanish regime. External support may have been a necessary but not a 
Embassy, Classified General Records 1953-1963, FSPF, RG84 (entry 3167B, box 11), 
NACP. 
133 Dillon [Acting Secretary of State] to Eisenhower, 4th June 1959, in FRUS, 1958-1960, 
VII, p. 728. 
134 'United States Loans and the Stabilisation Plan,' by Barall, Madrid, 23rd October 
1959, GRDS (RG59), Decimal File, 852.00/10-2359, NACP. 
135 'Intelligence Report,' 7th August 1958, mFRUS, 1958-1960, VII, p. 711. 
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sufficient condition.136 This is not to say, however, that the American attempts at 
influencing Spanish economic policy-making made no difference whatsoever. 
The agreements with the U.S. had positive effects for the long-term 
development of economic policy-making in Spain, in that advocates of autarky 
could no longer use the siege mentality in support of their views. Aid 
disbursements contributed to removing the excuse that autarky had been imposed 
from the outside. Crucially, the absence of strict policy conditionality attached to 
such disbursements disarmed critics of freer policies who had always being 
prompt to argue that aid in such terms was equivalent to a 'loss of sovereignty.' 
Substantiating this point calls for evidence of critics of the reform programme 
and what were their claims at the time, as well as the weight attached to those 
criticisms by the ultimate policy-makers, about which further research would be 
most welcome. In the absence of Franco's personal papers, we know that the 
number two of the regime, Admiral Luis Carrero, Under-Secretary of the 
Presidency, was particularly susceptible throughout the 1950s to criticisms about 
loss of sovereignty that the American programme.137 We also have evidence in 
the form of pro-autarkic press reactions. For example, at the very time of 
Arburua's visit to Washington in April 1954, the newspaper La Vanguardia 
issued an editorial with the revealing title of 'No Financial Gibraltars' in which it 
opposed any change in the regulation of foreign investment.138 Even at the time 
of the Stabilisation Plan there were still reactions which complained about the 
'lost independence' that the Plan implied because of the conditions from the IMF 
and OEEC that Spain had accepted.139 Whether genuine or cynical, these critics 
136 A. Vinas, 'Franco's dreams of autarky shattered,' in C. Leitz and D. J. Dunthorn, 
Spain in an international context, 1936-1959 (New York: Berghahn Books, 1999), p. 
312. 
137 Vinas et al., Politica comercial exterior, vol. 2, p. 992 et seq. 
138 As reported in The Economist, 9th October 1954, p. 137. 
139 Editorial of magazine SP. By 1959 the pro-reformers were already in a position of 
enough power to order the seizure of the publication by the censorship. E. Tertsch, 
[Spanish Economic News Service] to Per Jacobsson, Madrid, 6th July 1959, in Archive 
of the International Monetary Fund, Central Files, C/Spain/810 Mission, Jacobsson, 
Ferras and Staff, June 1959. 
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were not given further ammunition by instances in which the Americans 
blatantly exercised direct leverage over the Spanish policy makers. 
So far we have been discussing the arguments about the U.S. promoting policy 
reform, yet we saw in the introduction to this chapter that there were also claims 
that the Americans may have actually delayed the adoption of reforms. Let us 
review the two episodes most commonly used to support that argument. 
5.3.3. Putting a spoke in the wheels of reform? 
The first is the alleged request by Arburua in April and November 1954 for 
American assistance in order to liberalise Spanish trade and proceed towards 
integration in the OEEC/EPU.140 Arburua, however, did not visit Washington in 
1954 with a well prepared programme of trade and economic liberalisation but 
with further requests for aid, backed up by a multiplicity of arguments, one of 
which was that Spain was anxious to liberalise but could not do so without aid. It 
is true that Arburua had vaguely raised the issue of economic policy. The record 
of the conversations kept by the Americans included that according to Arburua: 
'j. Spain is most anxious to stabilize its currency, liberalize trade and in 
particular to serve foreign investments in the country in order to encourage 
further investment along the lines accepted in the Economic Aid 
Agreement. However, its ability to do these things depends upon its 
foreign exchange position, which continues extremely tight. Until Spain is 
in a better position on foreign exchanges, it would not be practical for it to 
take substantial steps to liberalize further.'141 
This, the only place where Arburua discussed the possibility of economic 
policy reform was the tenth of a total of twelve points raised, which focused 
mostly on demanding further aid disbursements, needed according to Arburua to 
offset the adverse effect of the recent drought and freeze that had affected 
Spanish cash crops. Arburaa's comments to American officials can hardly be 
characterised as serious liberalisation proposals. That the Spanish government's 
140 'The lack of assistance postponed Spain's full incorporation into those [OEEC/EPU] 
despite the Spanish government's intention to move towards freer and multilateral 
trade;' Guirao, 'Spain and European Economic Cooperation,' p. 344. Similar argument 
in Guirao, 'The United States, Franco, and the integration of Europe,' p. 92. 
141 'Discussion of Spanish Minister of Commerce with U.S. officials,' by Gulik, April 
1954, Washington, in FRUS, 1952-1954, VI, 2, pp. 1973-76. 
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anxiety to liberalise was not the important aim of Arburua can be grasped by 
simply reading the memorandum of the conversation with Stassen, in which there 
is no mention of liberalisation whatsoever but, of course, the request for further 
aid is discussed.142 The Americans did not reject proposals for liberalisation 
since the vague comments raised in one meeting do not qualify as such.143 Much 
the same can be said about the meeting between Arburua and Stassen in the 
autumn of 1956. These meetings also did not represent a discussion about the 
reorientation of Spanish economic policy but concentrated on the programming 
of American aid disbursements. 
Rather than an all-out trade liberalisation programme, rumours had it that 
what was going on behind the scenes were attempts at freeing foreign 
investments in Spain. In striking contrast to the above-mentioned article in La 
Vanguardia, the fortnightly Economia was fully supportive of allowing in 
foreign investment more freely. This latter publication, perhaps naively or 
militantly, had 'assumed' that discussion would have inevitably touched upon 
'the need to consolidate the spirit that informed the agreements' and argued that 
'the realisation of the agreements means in many instances a considerable 
transformation of certain socio-economic orders'.144 As we know, Arburua's 
meetings in 1954 with American officials never got to a point of substance in 
relation to the freeing of foreign investment either. In March 1954 the American 
Ambassador had publicly asked for a 51% foreign ownership to be allowed, to 
which Arburua had replied that Spain could not afford the foreign exchange to 
finance such a high percentage. As an outside observer noted, this 'is not, of 
course, a logical argument and is only used as an excuse, for a high level of U.S. 
investment would obviously be to Spain's advange economically and would 
itself produce increased foreign exchange' but was simply an indication 'that 
Spain intends to retain her control'.145 Arburua, though probably sincere about 
142 Memorandum of conversation Stassen-Arburua, 20th April 1954, Washington, in 
FRUS, 1952-1954, VI, part 2, pp. 1976-77. 
143 Cfr. F. Guirao, Spain and the reconstruction of Western Europe, 1945-1957 
(London/New York: Macmillan/St. Martin's Press, 1998), p. 183. 
144 Economia, 12th June 1954, 15th November 1955. 
145 'Spain,' by MacGillivray, 21st May 1954, Bank of England Archive, OV61/5. 
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his intentions to open up the Spanish economy was also cautious and felt that he 
could not afford to appear to give in to pressure.146 
The second major episode in which the Americans allegedly retarded the 
adoption of the multilateralisation process by ignoring Spanish requests for aid in 
order to join the OEEC was the letter of Martin Artajo to Lodge of 31st August 
1956. The letter is reproduced almost in its entirety by Vinas et al., who highlight 
how it specifically requested $200 million to the U.S. in order to allow Spain to 
offset the strain that joining the OEEC would cause in its balance of payments.147 
It is plausible that, as the literature suggests, these Spanish requests 'fell 
on deaf ears.' However, Martm Artajo's letter is surprisingly elusive in the 
American sources.149 Nor did Martin Artajo refer to this letter when, in February 
1957, he sent Areilza the following instructions: 
Among the matters discussed with the Director of ICA with negative 
results during my visit to Washington last April, it is worth stressing now 
the request for structural aid to enter the OEEC. Given that we ought to 
decide on the position of Spain with regards to such organisation by 31st 
July, I ask you to bring before Mr Hollister again this issue of the 
American government attitude on this point.150 
146 FitzGerald to the Director of FOA, Washington, 4th February 1955, in Geographic 
Files of the Director, 1948-55; Office of Director; RFAA, RG469 (entry 181, box 17), 
NACP. 
147 Vinas et al., Politica comercial exterior, vol. 2, pp. 849-54. 
148 A. Vinas, 'Franco's dreams of autarky shattered,' in C. Leitz and D. J. Dunthorn 
(eds.), Spain in an international context, 1936-1959 (Oxford: Berghan Books, 1999), p. 
302. 
149 None of the American holdings consulted for this research contained the letter or 
documents in which such letter was discussed. The American Embassy in Madrid, for 
example, when discussing the economic developments in retrospect of the entire year of 
1956 does not mention this. 'Spain -Economic and Financial Review for the 4th Quarter, 
1956,' American Embassy in Madrid, 14th February 1957, GRDS (RG59), Decimal File, 
852.00/2-1457, NACP. 
150 Artajo to Areilza, Madrid, 23rd February 1957; MAE, Leg. 5883, Exp. 4. 
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Areilza replied as follows: 
In the conversation that took place in Washington last April we referred to our 
request for structural aid to enter the OEEC only by the way and without 
specifying at any rate, as the minutes of the meetings reflect. I take good note of 
you instructions to bring up the issue now.151 
Whether or not Martin Artajo's letter reached the Americans, the latter 
152 
interpreted the Spanish approach in a similar fashion to Areilza. The 
Americans were nevertheless acutely aware that they would eventually be asked 
to contribute to the bill for Spanish accession to OEEC membership: 
[The] Government of Spain has made no formal request here for U.S. 
financial assistance in joining OEEC-EPU. However, we [are] aware [that 
the] Spanish view assistance as necessary element in effective membership 
(one of [the] first official statements [to] this effect [was] made in June 
1955 by [the] representative chief [of the] Spanish mission to OEEC. He 
mentioned [the] need for $120-170 million before Spain could risk 
abandonment [of] bilateral payments arrangements).153 
In fact, the question of 'whether the U.S. was likely to assist Spain 
financially in joining the OEEC' was repeatedly put before the U.S. 
representative at the OEEC.154 The American position on financial assistance to 
help Spain into the OEEC would soon need to be decided: 
Spain has not, as yet, raised this question in such a way that we have had to 
state whether we intend to provide such assistance. It is highly likely that 
151 Areilza to Artajo, Washington, 25th February 1957; MAE, Leg. 5883, Exp. 4. 
152 It is not unheard of that the Spanish prepare a note for the Americans and this is never 
delivered. Lodge reported F. Castiella [Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs] as saying 
how 'the Cabinet wished him to deliver to me [a note]. He had [the] note before him but 
said he had convinced Cabinet that he should not deliver this note.' Lodge to State 
Department, Madrid, 11th February 1958, in FRUS, 1958-1960, VII, p. 700. 
153 Aldrich to ICA, Madrid, 24th May 1956, in Subject Files, 1948-57; Office of African 
and European Operations; RFAA, RG469 (entry 379, box 98), NACP. 
154 C. Burke Elbrick [Assistant Secretary of State] to Hollister, Washington, 28th May 
1956, in Geographic Files of the Director, 1948-55; Office ofDirector; RG469 (entry 
181, box 26), NACP. 
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we shall have to make known our position on this question in the near 
future.155 
Given that the U.S. saw it as 'highly advisable to make Spain a full 
member [of the OEEC]' and worried that '[w]hen the Spanish Foreign Minister 
was here he seemed to take it for granted that his country would become a 
member,' an instinctive reaction of Hollister was to suggest to Dulles that, 'if 
you have a good opportunity, you raise with the important countries mention of 
Spain's membership in the OEEC.'156 However, the U.S. remained silent as to its 
willingness to provide financial assistance.137 A primary reason was an obvious 
attempt at shifting the financial burden of assistance to Spain to the OEEC. They 
thus preferred to see the Spanish themselves approach directly the multilateral 
organisations.158 This position was similarly reinforced by the increasingly held 
view within the American administration that international organisations might 
be better suited at exercising leverage over the Spaniards. Events in 1956-1957 
had shown attempts at direct bilateral leverage to fail. The Americans, having 
concluded that '[w]hat is important is the degree of influence on Spanish 
economic policies,' were eager 'to see OEEC influence exercised on Spanish 
policies in order to encourage greater economic and social stability.'159 
155 Ibid. 
156 Hollister to Dulles, Washington, 1st May 1957, in Subject Files, 1948-57; Office of 
African and European Operations; RFAA, RG469 (entry 379, box 98), NACP. 
157 When, while discussing Spain in June 1956, 'the OEEC Secretariat pointed out [the] 
possibility [of] Spain obtaining EPU special resources form [the] U.S.' the 'U.S. 
observer [remained] silent.' Perkins to ICA, Paris, 21st June 1956, in Subject Files, 
1948-57; Office of African and European Operations; RFAA, RG469 (entry 379, box 
98), NACP. 
158 Dulles to Embassy in Madrid, Washington, 12th September 1957, in Subject Files, 
1948-57; Office of African and European Operations; RG469 (entry 379, box 99), 
NACP. 
159 Empasis in the original. The ultimate goal was nevertheless unchanged: 'Greater 
stability would contribute to the security of U.S. military bases.' 'Spain in the OEEC,' 
Perkins to ICA, 3rd September 1957, in Subject Files, 1948-57; Office of African and 
European Operations; RG469 (entry 379, box 99), NACP. 
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Mart in Artajo's letter to Lodge of 31st August 1956 is probably only 
useful in saying something about the formulation of policy within the Spanish 
administration rather than about the possible retarding element in the U.S. This is 
not to say that Spain was not interested in joining the OEEC. In fact, there was 
increasing talk of a 'continued lively interest' of Spain in that organisation.160 
What we want to emphasise is that this lively interest was not a well prepared 
programme but rather the initial steps to join. This would take time, not because 
the Americans refused the aid, but because the internal politics of Spain did not 
permit a faster pace. There would be continued statements from individual 
Spanish officials as to their personal inclination towards membership of the 
OEEC and of the usefulness of an independent agency making a study of the 
Spanish economy.161 By then Spain was moving towards these organisations that 
we will review in detail in chapter seven. What interests us here, however, is the 
Spanish-American relationship on this issue and it can only be concluded that 
there is no evidence that the U.S. retarded the entrance of Spain into the OEEC. 
The episode probably reflects the lack of a cogent and clearly defined 
Spanish foreign economic policy. This was certainly the case on several issues. 
For example, from April to June 1956, the American administration was first 
informed of the Spanish requests that 'a greater portion [of aid be] devoted to 
capital goods' only to be told in June that 'a larger part [should] be devoted to the 
procurement of raw materials.'162 Examples of contradictions in Spanish 
officials' dealings with the U.S. did not end with the arrival of the new 'pro-
reform' Ministers. Not long after Ullastres' insistence on deliveries of aid with 
160 Madrid Embassy to State Department, 14th February 1957, GRDS (RG59), Decimal 
File, 852.00/2-1557 HBS, NACP. 
161 Areilza as quoted in 'IMF study of Spanish economy,' GRDS (RG59), Decimal File, 
852.00/1-758 and Jaime Alba [Counselor of Spanish Embassy] as quoted in 'Spanish 
request for IMF study of Spanish economic situation, ' 22nd January 1958, GRDS 
(RG59), Decimal File, 852.00/1-2258, NACP. 
162 Memorandum of conversation Martin Artajo-Dulles, Washington, 10th April 1956, in 
FRUS, 1955-1957, XXVII, p. 565; Rovira to Garnett, Washington, 12th April 1956; 
MAE, Leg. 4615, Exp. 15 and Martin Artajo to Lodge, Madrid, 21st June 1956, in FRUS, 
1955-1957, XXVII, p. 574. 
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an 'immediate' impact, Navarro Rubio said that 'Spain wanted long-term loans 
1 /TQ 
more than any other kind of aid.' 
The crucial break to come was in endorsing reform prior to or at least 
simultaneously with aid disbursements. That break was not directly imposed by 
the U.S., but it is difficult to argue that it was hindered on the basis of the two 
episodes just reviewed. As we have seen in section 5.3.2 above, it also seems 
most likely to have been facilitated by the conduct of the U.S. in its relations 
with the international organisations in the run up to the 1959 Stabilisation Plan. 
163 'Some views of Minister of Finance Navarro Rubio,' by Barall, 24th March 1958, 
GRDS (RG59), Decimal File, 852.00/3-2458, NACP. 
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5.4. Conclusion 
This chapter has shown that the contribution of American aid conditionality to 
economic policy change in Spain was very limited. When direct pressure was 
trusted to bring about policy reform, such as in the early stages of the Eximbank 
loans at the beginning of the decade and in late 1956, the American authorities 
quickly felt powerless and retracted their approach. 
The Spaniards were reluctant to give 'the appearance that the Spanish 
action resulted from pressure' - a position which marked Spanish attitudes 
towards the Americans from the early stages of the rapprochement.164 This 
remained throughout the 1950s a sine qua non of any foreign policy for the 
Spanish government. Appearances of undiminished sovereignty and full control 
over its policy were essential for a dictatorial regime that derived part of its 
legitimacy by asserting national independence. As the Spanish Ambassador in 
Washington, Mariano de Yturralde, would put it to Rusk in his first contact with 
the Kennedy administration, 'any attempt to put pressure on Spain had always 
been counterproductive.'165 
Could the Americans have exercised greater direct leverage over Spanish 
economic policy-making? This chapter has shown that the Americans were 
unable to escape their overriding military interests in their policy formulation. By 
virtue of the military base network in Spain, the U.S. 'acquired a more than a 
passive interest in what was going on in Spain.'166 As an American official 
questioned by Congress would put it, 'this aid programme [to Spain] is very 
closely connected with the base programme.'167 It was recognised by the State 
Department and other agencies of the American administration that once military 
164 'Conversation with Propper de Callejon [new Charge in Washington],' by Dunham, 
22nd September 1949, in Top Secret file, Records of the Spanish and Portuguese Desk 
Officers, 1942-1955, Lot Files Europe (II), RG59 (entry 1400, box 10), NACP. 
165 Memorandum of conversation Rusk-Yturralde [new Spanish Ambassador in 
Washington], Washington, 7& February 1961, in FRUS, 1961-1963, XIII, p. 990. 
166 Dillon [Acting Secretary of State] to Eisenhower, 4th June 1959, in FRUS, 1958-1960, 
VII, p. 727. 
167 Elbrick before the Senate Appropriations Committee, 29th July 1957, as quoted in 
Shneidman, Franco & Spain, p. 195. 
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i r o 
programmes were under way they would prove difficult to stop. Moreover, 
and in contrast with standard accounts that assume that a 'lagged leverage' was 
at work in the 1959 stabilisation operation, the bargaining position of the 
Americans, if anything, deteriorated throughout the decade. 
The Americans did, however, try to influence the policy-making 
environment in indirect ways. Pro-reform elements within the Spanish 
government were encouraged and probably benefited from American support by 
pre-empting criticisms from autarkic elements. The contribution of Americans 
was the conscious attempt at not damaging these elements. Beyond that, they too 
were constrained by their military involvement. This will be useful to bear in 
mind when we look at the multilateral aid episode. 
Paradoxically, unconditional aid disbursements contributed positively to 
the reform whilst a more strict approach to aid conditional on the adoption of 
reforms in fact would have reduced the likelihood of the reform. As such, this 
historical case study supports the literature that suggest that the effectiveness of 
conditionality would depend on each scenario and cannot be blindly advocated a 
priori}69 However, the extent of American influence in shifting the balance 
should not be exaggerated. There appears to be an autonomous origin in the 
desire for sounder economic policies among certain Spanish circles. There is an 
internal crescendo in favour of reform. 
Yet, it cannot be argued that American aid delayed the adoption of 
reforms. On the contrary, by consciously stepping aside from the negotiations 
between Spain and the multilateral organisations and only coming in at the end to 
underwrite the announcement of the Plan, the U.S. may have contributed to 
promote the simultaneity of reform and aid which was to be the characteristic 
feature of the 1959 Stabilisation Plan. The chapter has shown that the American 
administration was acutely aware of the conflict of interests in their policy and 
increasingly came to see the appearance of multilateral donors as a chance for 
168 C. J. Pach, Arming the free world: the origins of the United States military assistance 
program, 1945-1950 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1991), pp. 230-
32. 
169 See for example, P. Mosley, J. Harrigan, and J. Toye, Aid and power (London: 
Routledge, 1991), vol. 1, esp. ch. 3. 
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increased leverage over the recipient. We will explore such an episode in Chapter 
Seven below, when discussing the conditionality around the multilateral aid that 
was granted in support of the 1959 Stabilisation Plan. 
Finally, it should be emphasised that this chapter has not attempted to 
provide a comprehensive review of all possible indirect effects of the aid 
programme. Even within the realm of indirect effects of the aid programme on 
policy-making it may be suggested that a further topic for research is the possible 
effect that aid-induced economic growth had in altering the domestic policy-
making equilibrium and hence contributing to policy change. Similarly, the 
chapter has only given brief coverage to the implementation of commercial 
conditions, touched upon only to the extent that they could contribute to our 
argument about effects on the domestic policy-making and bargaining strength of 
the parties. In the next chapter we will concern ourselves with a possible indirect 
impact of the very fact that American support was granted to Spain on the 
business community. 
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programme: did it change private agents' expectations? 
Index 
6.1. Introduction 
6.2. The credibility hypothesis: a theoretical rationale 
6.3. Initial evidence: how 'credible' and relevant is the credibility 
hypothesis? 
6.4. Improved sentiment: evidence from the trading floor 
6.5. An event study analysis of the credibility hypothesis 
6.5.1. Theoretical underpinnings of the analysis 
6.5.2. An event study of the Pact of Madrid 
6.5.3 An event study of the Franco-Peron Protocol 
6.6. Estimating the equity risk premium 
6.7. Conclusion 
Abstract 
This chapter explores the effect that the granting of bilateral American 
aid had on Spanish business sentiment. It suggests that the American 
backing of the Franco regime provided a 'commitment technology' that 
solved reputational problems, which would have otherwise hindered the 
resumption of growth. This 'credibility hypothesis' is both theoretically 
motivated and then confronted by a range of available evidence, of which 
the use of financial assets market data is paramount. 
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Men of liberal thought and ability do not want to associate themselves with 
the Regime. [...] Spain today, that is the business world of Spain, has no 
confidence in the conduct of the economy of Spain. 
Paul T.Culbertson, American charge in Spain to the Secretary of State, 
Acheson. Madrid, 20th June 1950, FRUS, 1950, III, pp. 1564-65 
Spain is to receive an economic aid, which volume is not in our view the 
most important, but the influence that it could have on the normal 
development of our economy. 
Editorial of Economia, 30th September 1953 
[0]ne important factor underlying the confidence in the future is the 
psychological reaction to the U.S. agreement. I say 'psychological' 
because it is the potential effects of the Agreement which has made the 
impact rather than the assistance itself (for this, although welcome, is a 
mere 'drop in the ocean' in the light of Spain's requirements), i.e., the very 
fact that an agreement of any sort has been concluded with the U.S.A. as 
representing an end to Spain's isolation and an indication of U.S. 
Government confidence in the future stability of the country [...]. 
Exceipt from report by G. J. MacGilivray, 21st May 1954, Bank of 
England Archive, OV61/5 
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6.1. Introduction 
This chapter is concerned with one particular indirect effect of the American 
bilateral aid programme on the Spanish economy. In the words of our initial 
quotes, we are asking if one of the influences of American aid was an 
improvement in the confidence of Spanish businesses that Culbertson noted in 
the above quote was lacking in the late 1940s. hi particular, we have in mind the 
possibility that the American bilateral aid programme was interpreted by 
economic agents as contributing to the final consolidation of the Franco regime 
with the subsequent reduction in uncertainty, as the initial quote from the Bank 
of England official suggested. We will refer to this as the 'credibility hypothesis.' 
The importance of credibility aspects in the practical world has led to a 
substantial effort in economic theory to incorporate it explicitly in theoretical 
models. It is precisely the potential importance of credibility issues as an ultimate 
cause for private capital formation that is usually presented to motivate the 
theoretical literature.1 Given the crucial role that is assigned to investment in old 
and new growth models alike, and, as we will see in more detail in Section 6.3 
below, the substantial growth of private investment that takes place in the 1950s, 
• • 2 
the search for explanations of what facilitated such investment is not trivial. 
That business confidence improved in the 1950s, perhaps as early as the 
return of Ambassadors to Madrid in 1950, has been suggested in the literature. 
1 A. Drazen, Political Economy in Macroeconomics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton 
University Press), p. 101 and R. Bates et al., Analytic Narratives (Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton University Press, 1998). For a book-length treatment of these issues see T. 
Persson and G. Tabellini, Macroeconomic Policy, Credibility and Politics (Harwood 
Academic Publishers, 1991). 
2 Investment is particularly important in the case of endogenous growth models, but 
even so in a Solow-type model. See J. Temple, 'Equipment investment and the Solow 
model,' Oxford Economic Papers, vol. 50, no. 1, pp. 39-62. 
3 F. Comin, ' Sector publico y crecimiento economico en la dictadura de Franco,' in P. 
Tedde de Lorca (ed.), El estadoy la modernization economica, Ayer no. 21 (Madrid: 
Marcial Pons, 1996), p. 174 and P. Fraile, 'Industrial Policy under Authoritarian Politics, 
the Spanish Case,' in J. Foreman-Peck and G. Federico (eds.), European Industrial 
Policy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 240, point at the importance of 
expectations although do not provide any further discussion. M. J. Gonzalez, 'La 
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To some extent, it is commonplace to note that the end of Spanish isolation 
implied that during 'the 1950s few continued to expect a quick collapse [of the 
Franco regime].'4 However, little effort has been devoted to provide evidence of 
its link to the episode of American aid.5 Therefore, one of the contributions of 
this chapter is to furnish evidence for such a link. The remainder of the chapter is 
devoted first to filling in the logic of the so-called credibility hypothesis, and, 
secondly, to exploring some evidence that will refute or support its interpretative 
power. 
autarquia economica bajo el regimen del General Franco: una vision desde la teoria de 
los derechos de propiedad,' Information Comercial Espanola, nos. 676-77 (December 
1989-January 1999), pp. 19-31 is mainly concerned with providing a theoretical 
justification of the importance of looking at property rights rather than an empirical 
examination. 
4 K. Medhurst, Government in Spain. The Executive at Work (Oxford: Pergamon, 1973), 
p. 25. The New York Times sceptic about the agreements throughout, argued that '[o]ne 
of the clear facts that Americans must face is that if we go ahead with this arrangement, 
we will be helping to perpetuate Franco in power [...],' editorial, 30th August 1953, as 
quoted in in J. Dura, U.S. Policy Toward Dictatorship and Democracy in Spain, 1931-
1953. A Test Case in Policy Formation (Sevilla: Arrayan, 1985), p. 354. 
5 E. Spitaller and M. Galy, 'Spain, Landmarks in Economic Development, 1939-92,' 
IMF Working Paper 92/78 (Washington, D.C., 1992), p. 2 suggest it but do not go any 
further. 
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6.2. The credibility hypothesis: a theoretical rationale6 
In this section, we explore, in simple game theoretical terms, a rationale for the 
effectiveness of American aid in enhancing the credibility of the government and 
making investment profitable.7 It should be stressed that the exercise is 
undertaken primarily for heuristic purposes. This is the spirit under which game 
theory has made a breakthrough in the analysis of institutions, both in economic 
o 
history, and in international relations. 
At the most basic level, any regime, and a fortiori an authoritarian one, 
needs to resolve the paradox that a government strong enough to enforce 
property rights is also able to confiscate its citizens' wealth, and thus might 
discourage private economic activity.9 This source of credibility problem stems 
from time- inconsistency in the government's strategy (its optimal ex post 
strategy differs from its ex ante strategy). Private economic agents will recognise 
the government's incentive to renege and will not believe the government in the 
6 A paper drawing from Sections 6.2 to 6.4 below was published as O. Calvo Gonzalez, 
' jBienvenido, Mister Marshall! La Ayuda Economica Americana y la Economia 
Espanola en la Decada de 1950,' Revista de Historia Econdmica, vol. 19, special issue 
(2001), pp. 253-75. 
7 Our analysis will be of a non-cooperative nature, as opposed to cooperative game 
theory in which it is assumed that the agreements reached between the players are 
binding. Were we to assume binding contracts we would precisely be interested in what 
makes those contracts binding. For this reason we restrict to non-cooperative game 
theory. For definitions and explanation of these issues see D. M. Kreps, Game Theory 
and Economic Modelling (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), p. 9. 
8 D. C. North, 'Institutions,' Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 5 (1991), pp. 97-
112, and especially A. Greif, 'Microtheory and recent developments in the study of 
economic institutions through economic history,' in D. Rreps and K. Wallis (eds.), 
Advances in Economics and Econometrics, vol. 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1997), pp. 79-113 and J. Hovi, Games, threats, and treaties, understanding 
commitment in international relations (London: Pinter, 1998). 
9 See B. R. Weingast, 'The Economic Role of Political Institutions, Market-Preserving 
Federalism and Economic Development,' Journal of Law, Economics and 
Organizations, vol. 11, no. 1 (1995), pp. 1-31. 
i 
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first place.10 However, the incentives faced by an autocratic government, will 
depend on how long it expects to hold on to power. A long-lived autocrat does 
not have the same temptations for looting than a short-lived or unstable one.11 
Credibility may also be running low due to other problems such as the 
recognition that policies followed are inconsistent and would ultimately need to 
be abandoned, due to imperfect or asymmetric information about the true 
intentions of the government, or the uncertainty regarding the predictability of 
the government's agenda.12 The bottom-line is that resolving commitment 
problems raises the predictability of the government and thus it encourages 
economic activity.13 
Recent literature on postwar European economic growth, and in particular 
on the effect of aid programmes, has focused on commitment issues that may 
help to explain the resumption of private economic activity and investment. In 
particular, it has been argued that the provision of Marshall aid conditioned to the 
undertaking of institutions such as the European Payments Union enabled 
10 P. R. Agenor and M. P. Taylor, 'Testing for Credibility Effects,' IMF Working Paper 
91/110 (Washington, D.C., 1991), p. 3. 
11 M. C. McGuire and M. Olson, 'The Economics of Autocracy and Majority Rule: The 
Invisible Hand and the Use of Force,' Journal of Economic Literature, vol. 24, no. 1 
(March 1996), pp. 72-96 and M. Olson, Power and Prosperity. Outgrowing Communist 
and Capitalist Dictatorships (New York: Basic Books, 2000). 
12 The literature makes the distinction between credibility of policy-makers (sometimes 
referred as reputation) and credibility of a policy. Credibility of a policy is defined as the 
expectation that the policy will be carried out, while credibility of the policy-maker is 
defined as the expectation that the policy-maker will act as he announced. This 
distinction aims to capture the possibility that under certain circumstances even a totally 
credible policy-maker will not be able to undertake a particular policy due to external 
shocks, A. Drazen and P. Masson. 'Credibility of Policies versus Credibility of 
Policymakers.' Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 109, no. 3 (1994), pp. 735-54. 
13 A very similar argument to the interpretation of the effects of the settlement after the 
Glorious Revolution by D. C. North and B. R. Weingast, 'Constitutions and 
commitment, evolution of institutions governing public choice in seventeenth-century 
England,' Journal of Economic History, vol. 49, no. 4, pp. 802-32. 
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Western European countries credibly to commit to increased levels of openness 
to intra-European trade.14 
This appears to emphasise the role of conditionality in bringing about 
change in the recipient country. Yet, as we saw in Chapters Four and Five above, 
the effect of American leverage over Spanish economic policy-making was very 
limited. Is it still possible to think of a 'credibility hypothesis' in the case of 
American aid to Spain? To answer this question we need to re-examine the 
structure of incentives of the donor.15 
The U.S., by virtue of committing itself to setting up bases in Spain, 
could not avoid an interest in the political and economic stability of the country. 
It was, as we have seen in Chapter Five above, a limited interest. Yet, for that 
purpose, the U.S. was willing 'to provide the minimum additional aid that would 
guarantee internal stability in Spain so that the use of our bases is not jeopardised 
by civil disorders'.16 It was as if the Spanish government signed a de facto 
insurance policy underwritten by the U.S. against possible instabilities. Thus, the 
argument hinges not on the amounts of aid granted but rather on the commitment 
that the Americans towards Spanish economic stability, explicit in the text of the 
agreements signed in 1953 and, crucially, implicit through the base construction 
programme.17 
14 B. Eichengreen, Reconstructing Europe's Trade and Payments/ The European 
Payments Union (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993); B. Eichengreen, 
'Institutions and Economic Growth,' in N. Crafts and G. Toniolo (eds.), Economic 
Growth in Europe Since 1945 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 38-
72 and H. Berger and A.-Ritschl, 'Germany and the Political Economy of the Marshall 
Plan, 1947-52: A Re-revisionist View,' in B. Eichengreen (ed.), Europe's Postwar 
Recovery (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 199-245. 
15 J. Svensson, 'When is foreign aid policy credible? Aid dependence and 
conditionality,' Journal of Development Economics, vol. 61 (2000), pp. 61-84. 
16 Memorandum of the 248th meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, 12th 
May 1955, in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957, vol. XXVII, p. 539. 
17 Although referring to some years later, the reaction of Senator J. William Fulbright, 
Chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to his visit to the Spanish bases in 
1969 is perhaps informative of the extent of the American commitment. Fulbright 
suspected that 'in "cooperating" with the Franco government the American military had 
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It was, crucially, a commitment that was well understood by observers 
and the public at large. In the words of The Economist, '[n]ow that the 
Americans have an interest in the country, it is reasonable to assume that they 
• • • • • • 1 8 will help it get out of the most serious economic difficulties'.10 The Pact of 
Madrid contributed to securing the Spanish government and, to a certain extent, 
tied its hands. By doing so, it rendered the Spanish economic market place more 
secure and reduced uncertainty about the future. In other words, it secured 
property rights more effectively and encouraged investment.19 
This argument shares the concern with the role of property rights 
90 
enforcement in some of the existing literature. However, Gonzalez suggests 
that, through deregulation and liberalisation property rights became better 
defined during the 1950s and thus contributed to capital accumulation and 
economic growth, an argument that hinges on actual policy change. Our thesis is 
different since it suggests that the change in expectations was not primarily 
prompted by deregulation and liberalisation but by the way in which the 
American support was established, which committed the Americans to ensuring 
stability in Spain. The 'credibility hypothesis' to be explored here suggests that 
credibility was enhanced not so much because the American aid programme was 
a promoter of policy reform, but rather because it guaranteed stability. Neither 
was its role limited to providing 'resources that came also to expand the 
production possibilities frontier of the Spanish economy,' but crucially it also 
proved to be an enabling factor that allowed the economy to move towards that 
made a de facto commitment to defend the autocratic regime against enemies both 
external and internal' and was appalled at discovering that the annual joint American-
Spanish military manoeuvres were such that the 'scenario for these exercises was a 
domestic insurrection in which the American military intervened to save the Spanish 
government,' R. B. Woods, Fulbright: a biography (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1995), p. 511. 
18 The Economist, 17th April 1954. 
19 Particularly if an investment involved large sunk and irreversible fixed costs. See A. 
K. Dixit, 'Investment and Hysteresis,' Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 6, no. 1 
(1992) and R. S. Pindyck, 'Irreversibility, Uncertainty, and Investment,' Journal of 
Economic Literature, vol. 26, no. 3 (September 1991), pp. 1110-48. 
20 Gonzalez, 'La autarquia.' 
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frontier.21 This argument is much in line with the spirit of the recent empirical 
literature connecting political credibility and economic growth, which 
emphasises the importance of stability and predictability of the policy 
22 
environment. 
What sort of threats to the stability of Spain may have American support 
helped to reduce? The lack of major political crises and instability during the 
1940s would appear to indicate that the Franco's regime enjoyed solid 
foundations throughout. There were, however, numerous underlying factors that 
could have plagued the early years of the Franco regime with insecurity. 
During World War II the changes in the attitude of Spain, which turned 
from neutral to non-belligerent (in support of the Axis), to moral belligerence, 
and eventually back to neutrality provided for enough uncertainty during the 
years and the immediate aftermath of the war as to the implications of such 
alignment with the Axis. Moreover, in 1944-1945 the guerrilla war by the so-
called 'maquis' -many Republican veterans of the Spanish Civil War and World 
War II- intensified.23 In the event, the 'maquis' achieved little more than 
temporary disruptions in isolated rural areas but it is difficult to see these events 
as not increasing the uncertainty surrounding the ultimate viability of the Franco 
regime. In fact, as we have seen in Chapter Five above, the Americans came 
closest to sponsoring an uprising against Franco as late as 1947, prompted by 
their reassessment of the strategic value of Spain's geographical position. The 
economic conditions inside Spain were so poor that demonstrations as late as the 
1951 strike in Barcelona were primarily the cause of discontentment with living 
standards that were yet to surpass those of 1935. 
With the benefit of hindsight we also know that the disunity of the 
Spanish anti-Franco opposition grew as the 1940s progressed, contributing to the 
strengthening of Franco's hold on power. That there are numerous and complex 
factors other than the American support to Franco that help to explain the 
21 Ibid., p. 40. 
22 S. Borner, A. Brunetti and B. Weder, Political Credibility and Economic Development 
(New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995). 
23 S. Serrano, Maquis: historia de la guerrilla antifranquista (Madrid: Temas de Hoy, 
2001). 
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improvement in the political credibility is not, however, contradictory to the 
credibility hypothesis, since the latter does not claim any sort of exclusivity for 
the role of American support. Still, it noteworthy how many of those factors are 
intertwined, and in fact, American support may be regarded as playing a role in 
some of them. For example, the reversion of Don Juan de Borbon, the Pretender 
to the throne, to Francoist collaboration has been interpreted in the light of the 
changes in Spanish-American relations: "[i]n the final years of the decade 
[1940s] the Pretender saw only too well that the intensifying Cold War, with its 
promise of American-Spanish rapprochement, was making Franco's hold on 
power increasingly secure."24 
Probably the most serious threat remained the possibility of a military 
uprising against Franco. The greatest source of dissent within the military was 
found among the high command. This stemmed from the way in which Franco 
had reached to power. Franco had in fact been made supreme commander of the 
Nationalist Army in September 1936 for the purpose of defeating the Republic in 
a vote among the high-command, whose members could not have envisaged that 
Franco would become regent for life upon the end of the hostilities. The pro-
monarchic position of some of the highest-ranking military and their discontent 
with the links between the government and the Falange, made the possibility of a 
monarchic restoration sponsored by a military coup against Franco a common 
rumour during the late 1940s.25 This helps to explain the importance placed by 
Franco in ensuring that the outcome of the negotiations with the U.S. produced a 
satisfactory result for the military. 
Let us then review the claims that need to be substantiated if the 
credibility hypothesis is to have any explanatory power. Figure 6.1 below puts 
the hypothesis in its crudest, graphical terms. 
24 D. J. Dunthorn, Britain and the Spanish Anti-Franco Opposition, 1940-1950 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2000), p. 165. 
25 P. Preston, The Politics of Revenge. Fascism and the Military in Twentieth-Century 
Spain (London: Unwin Hyman, 1990), pp. 137-42. The death of many of the generals 
sufficiently senior to be able to show dissent to Franco in the late 1940s and early 1950s 
(e.g., Orgaz in 1946, Queipo de Llano and Yarela in 1951, Yague, Monasterio and Ponte 
in 1952 and Solchaga in 1953) must have also contributed to the reduction in uncertainty 
felt by the Franco regime. 
183 
Ch. 6. Credibility effects of American aid 
















It should be emphasised that Figure 6.1 does not imply that the only cause 
for the improvement in business sentiment was the American aid programme. As 
noted in the introductory chapter, there were policy elements that changed during 
the early 1950s, in particular after the cabinet reshuffle that took place on 18th 
July 1951. This makes it even more pressing to fine-tune when exploring the 
claim that American support had an effect on Spanish investors' perceptions of 
the future. Thus, the bulk of this chapter will be devoted to investigate what in 
terms of the diagram depicted in Figure 6.1 above is the first left-hand side arrow 
of causality. Validating this causal link is crucial, since it could well be the case 
that the argument holds for the second and third arrows yet the origin of 
improved business sentiment could be due to other factors, such as changes in 
government policies or regulatory framework that may be unrelated to the 
support received from foreign donors. Let us first rehearse the evidence available 
that supports the right hand side elements (going right-to-left) of Figure 6.1. 
Recent estimates of output measures for the Spanish economy show a 
significant increase in economic growth during the decade of the 1950s. This 
compares notably with the stagnation that Spain suffered throughout the 1940s. 
Graph 6.1 below displays this information. 
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Graph 6.1 Real per capita GDP, 1940-1975 
(in million of 1980 pesetas, log scale) 
Source: L. Prados de la Escosura, 'Spain's Gross Domestic Product, 1850-1993: 
Quantitative Conjectures. Appendix,' Universidad Carlos III Working Paper 
No.95/06 (1995). 
The role that private investment played in this resumption of growth was 
substantial, increasing from an average of 8.7% of gross national income in 
1941-1949, to 15.2% in the period 1950-1958.26 Graphs 6.2 and 6.3 below, 
capture the continuous acceleration in the growth of physical capital 
accumulation by private agents in the Spanish economy. 
26 Based on A. Carreras, 'Gasto Nacional Bruto y Formacion de Capital en Espana, 
1849-1958, primer ensayo de estimacion,' in L. Prados de la Escosura and P. Martin 
Acena (eds.), La nueva historia economica en Espana (Madrid: Tecnos, 1985), pp. 17-
51. 
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Graph 6.2. Annual growth of real private net stock of capital, 1940-1958 
Source: based on. Cubel and J. Palafox, 'El stock de capital de la econoxnia 
espanola, 1900-1958,' Revista de Historia Industrial (1997), pp. 113-46. 
Graph 6.3. Real capital disbursed by operating firms, 1941-1959 
(in millions of 1940 pesetas) 
Source: based on X. Tafunell, 'Asociacion mercantile y Bolsa,' in A. Carreras 
(ed.), Estadisticas historicas de Espana. Siglos XIXy XX (Madrid: Fundacion 
Banco Exterior, 1989), pp. 465-91 and Prados de la Escosura, 'Gross Domestic 
Product.' 
Obviously, the fact that graphs 6.2 and 6.3 above could be easily 
reconciled with the hypothesis entertained does not necessarily imply that this 
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spurt of growth in private investment was causally linked to the granting of 
American aid. Still, it is useful to note that no rebuttal of the hypothesis comes 
from these readily available indicators. The two right-hand side causal 
relationships suggested in Figure 6.1 (between improved expectations and 
increased investment, and the latter to economic growth) would appear to be 
solidly established within the literature. The empirical growth literature supports 
the link between political credibility and economic growth and it would appear to 
be reasonably safe to assume that such basic relationships hold in our case.27 
The 'credibility hypothesis' is also of potential relevance to the Spanish 
historiography. In particular, it could contribute to the explanation of two 
existing puzzles in the current literature. The first one relates to the anomalous 
behaviour of private investors throughout the 1940s, a decade in which profits 
sky-rocketed to unprecedented levels, yet investment in productive activities was 
9 R 
not stimulated by the prospect of easy returns. Secondly, the argument to be 
explored here may contribute to our understanding of the vigorous resumption of 
economic growth during the 1950s that we have seen in Graph 6.1 above, despite 
the persistence of the majority of interventionist and regulatory policies that are 
70 
usually charged with the sluggish growth during the 1940s. 
Let us now turn to discuss ways in which we may find evidence that will 
refute or support this line of argument. 
27 S. Knack and P. Keefer, 'Institutions and Economic Performance, Cross-Country 
Tests Using Alternative Institutional Measures,' Economics and Politics, vol. 7, no. 3, 
pp.207-27. 
28 X. Tafunell, 'Los beneficios empresariales en Espana, 1880-1981. Estimacion de un 
indice anual del excedente de la gran empresa,' Revista de Historia Economica, vol. 16 
(1998), pp. 707-46. For a less aggregated analysis, as well as an exposition of the 
paradoxical simultaneous existence of high profits and low investment, see J. M. 
Lorenzo Espinosa, Dictadura y dividendo: el discreto negocio de la burguesia vasca 
(Bilbao: Universidad de Deusto, 1989), especially pp. 233-35. 
29 See footnote 14 in the introductory Chapter One above. 
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6.3. Initial evidence: how 'credible' and relevant is the credibility 
hypothesis? 
This section is concerned with providing evidence that will help us establish the 
explanatory power (or lack of it) of the line of argument exposed above. The task 
will ultimately involve the need to pin down expectations of Spanish 
businessmen and investors. Measuring economic agents' expectations is not a 
straightforward task. Cross-sectional studies tend to measure credibility by 
constructing subjective indices of business confidence, typically based on either 
the informed opinion of experts (as in the country risk indicators) or by direct 
surveys of the business perceptions on the government. Although the explanatory 
power in cross-country growth regressions may be high, this avenue is clearly 
not open for historical research. 
A recent contribution to the literature is precisely an objective measure of 
the security of property rights.30 The proponents of this measure highlight that 
individuals make a choice as to in which form hold their money balances. The 
underlying idea is that particular types of money (deposits, etc) require more 
enforcement of contracts by the government than others, they are contract-
intensive. The contract-intensive money (CIM) indicator is thus said to reflect the 
extent to which societies can capture the potential trades that are intensive in 
contract enforcement and property rights.31 Graph 6.4 below shows the CIM 
indicator plotted for the 1950s. 
30 C. Clague et al., 'Contract-Intensive Money, Contract Enforcement, Property Rights, 
and Economic Performance,' Journal of Economic Growth, vol. 4, no. 2 (1999), pp. 
185-211. 
31 Defined as (M2-C)/M2, where M2 is a broad definition of the money supply and C is 
currency, Clague et al., 'Contract-Intensive Money,' p. 188. 
188 
Ch. 6. Credibility effects of American aid 
Graph 6.4. Contract-Intensive Money indicator, 1949-1959 








Sources: data from P. Martin Acena, Una estimation de losprincipales 
agregados monetarios en Espana, 1940-1962 (Madrid: Banco de Espana, 1989). 
That this CIM indicator may be a true measure of country-wide risk and 
not simply of banking risk is, to some extent, justified given the stability in the 
Spanish banking system of the period.32 However, although the CIM increases 
coinciding with the intensification of the American backing of the Franco regime 
(thus supporting the view that business confidence improved as its result), there 
are several problems interpreting this graph. Firstly, it is difficult to gauge the 
true significance of the increases. This indicator may not only be a measure of 
enforceability of contracts but also be affected by GDP, financial depth, inflation, 
etc. This is especially relevant as inflation in the early years of the 1950s is 
higher than during the middle years of the decade.33 In the absence of a 
32 P. Martin Acena and M. A. Pons, 'Spanish banking after the Civil War, 1940-1962,' 
Financial History Review, vol 1, no. 2 (1994), pp. 121-38. 
33 The authors of the CIM suggest that inflation has a different effect on CIM depending 
on whether a country suffers hyperinflation (which drives people out of deposits and 
decreases CIM as people want cash to translate into purchases) or moderate inflation 
(which increases CIM as agents perceive that they can hedge against inflation via 
interest-earning deposits). Although the authors test that the overall results of their CIM 
data are not driven by inflation, this is done in a cross-country regression analysis 
fashion and thus it is not possible to rule out that for a particular country and a particular 
period the evolution of CIM does in fact depend on inflation. See Clague et al., 
' Contract-intensive money.' 
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watertight measure for business confidence, we will have to make use of a 
variety of evidence to capture the elusive business sentiment and the role that the 
American bilateral aid programme played. 
Although there is anecdotal evidence similar to the initial quotes of this 
chapter, this is not always easy to interpret. The following excerpt provides an 
example: 
Modesto Canal, branch manager of the Banco de Vizcaya in Seville, said 
he was absolutely delighted at the successful outcome of the Spanish-
American negotiations. [... He] assured me that people in business and 
banking circles are enthusiastic [and] already confidence in the future has 
picked up, the peseta is strengthening, and everything points to continued 
34 improvement. 
American sources refer to 'the reluctance of private capital to move into 
certain sectors of the economy' and contrast it to the vigorous investment in the 
late-1950s.35 However, most of this evidence comes from American sources who 
were perhaps interested in showing such reaction. In fact, the more pro-Spanish 
elements within the American administration had always emphasised the 
necessity to buttress Franco for businesses to thrive and economic growth to 
o zC 
resume in Spain. Moreover, all items published by the Spanish press had to be 
previously cleared with the strict censorship. The repressive nature of the Franco 
34 Memorandum of conversation between Robert E. Wilson, U.S. Consul in Seville, and 
Modesto Canal, Seville, 30th September 1953, Spain Madrid-Embassy, Classified 
General Records, 1953-1963, Foreign Service Post Files, National Archives at College 
Park. 
35 Report of Special Study Mission of Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of 
Representatives. December 1961. In MAE, Leg. 7741, Exp. 2. The passage refers to the 
early 1950s. Other foreign observers also noted an apathetic investment climate, see G. 
Clinton Pelham, Economic and Commercial Conditions in Spain. May, 1951 (London: 
HMSO Overseas Economic Surveys, 1952), p. 4. 
36 'Certainly I cannot, nor will I, defend dictators nor dictatorship. But I believe that 
almost every important business and thinking man in Spain today would be horrified if 
he felt that Franco would die tomorrow.' Stanton Griffis, Lying in State (Garden City, 
N.Y.: Doubleday, 1952), p. 297. Griffis was the first U.S. Ambassador to Spain since the 
U.N. recommendation to withdraw ambassadors from Spain in 1946 and held the 
position between March 1951 and January 1952. 
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regime, and in particular of its early period, makes it difficult to exploit sources 
which otherwise would have normally survived. 
It is, to some extent, possible to read in between the lines of the press and 
other publications. For example, the annual reports of the Banco Urquijo for 
1950 to 1953 were introduced by a very brief three-page statement. In any of 
those years the Bank gives the utmost importance to the possibility of American 
assistance to Spain, although it does not provide a discussion as to why it judges 
the possible event so relevant.37 Once the agreements with the U.S. were signed, 
the analysis of that Bank as to the effects of the conclusion of the agreements 
included sentences such as the following one: 
At the end of 1953, and perhaps due to the agreements with the U.S., we 
have seen a new trend [in the private sector] to build new and important 
38 power-stations. 
Our theoretical framework helps to explain this comment particularly 
well. Large industrial projects are the type of assets that are more prone to be 
nationalised in the event of a change of policies or of regime altogether. 
Moreover, large sunk costs make it particularly important to enjoy stability. 
However, this very patchy evidence could hardly be conclusive. It is nevertheless 
relevant to note that, again, it does not refute the argument under study. Let us 
now discuss an alternative way of exploring the argument. 
37 Banco Urquijo, Memoria, in particular those corresponding to the activities of years 
1950, 1951 and 1953. 
38 Banco Urquijo, La economia espanola, 1952-53 (Madrid: Servicio de Estudios del 
Banco Urquijo, 1954), p. 30 
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All we point out now is, that this quality of interest-bearing will be valued 
in a certain way in a community in equilibrium, and that this is what is 
meant by the price of the securities in that community. [...] If a community 
is itself unstable and capital more or less insecure, the adjustment will 
probably be made at a higher rate of yield than if the community were 
stable and capital well protected. 
Sir Robert Giffen, Stock Exchange Securities: An Essay on the General 
Causes of Fluctuations in their Price (London: 1877) 
6.4. Improved sentiment: evidence from the trading floor 
Asset prices can be used as a strong indicator of the sentiments of market 
participants because they are ultimately determined by people who are putting 
their money where their mouths are. The advantage of using financial market 
data is their availability, accuracy, completeness and that it will enable us to look 
more closely at particular instances where news relates to the programme of 
American support only, and thus allowing the possibility of disentangling this 
from the different effects that other contemporary events may cause, for example 
from the effects derived from policy changes (which may or may not be related 
to conditionality). Let us provide an overview of some of the financial markets 
that are potentially useful for our purposes. 
Given that Spain had in place a fixed-multiple-exchange-rate system 
throughout the period under analysis, the official market for pesetas cannot serve 
our purposes. However, there existed black markets for dollars in Spain and 
abroad. The more important of these was the one in the North African city of 
Tangiers. We can then look at the reaction of the peseta curb market for signs of 
improved confidence in the future of the Spanish economy. 
The impact of the signing of the Pact of Madrid had a significant short-
term effect. In September 1953 in Tangiers, the peseta was traded at 43.55 
OQ 
pesetas/dollar, dropping to 42.50 pesetas to a dollar in October. Graph 6.5 
below shows the evolution of the official exchange rate as well as data for the 
Tangiers market and for the New York peseta-dollar market. 
39 Banco de Espana, Informe sobre la evolution de la economia espanola en 1957 
(Madrid: Banco de Espana, 1958), p. 137. Despite being an official source, it quotes the 
Tangiers exchange rate. 
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Graph 6.5. Official and unofficial exchange rates, 1947-1959 (pesetas per dollar) 
Sources: 
Exchange rate in the market of Tangiers as quoted in J. Clavera et al, 
Capitalismo espanol: de la autarquia a la estabilizacion (1939-1959), (Madrid: 
Edicusa, 1973), p. 270; the official exchange rate for the multiple exchange rate 
period is the average for the basic balance constructed by J. M. Serrano Sanz 
and M. J. Asensio, 'El ingenierismo cambiario. La peseta en los anos del 
cambio multiple,' Revista de Historia Economica, vol. 15, no. 3 (1997), for 
1950-1958 and F. Pick, Black Market Yearbook (New York: Pick's World 
Currency Report), several years, for the New York rate. See Tables A.5 and A.6 
in Appendix below for data. 
Even more detailed data has been collected for the Zurich market, which 
is presented in Graph 6.6 below. 
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Graph 6.6. Peseta rate in Zurich, 1946-1961 (in Swiss Francs per 100 pesetas) 
14 n 
^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 
Source: weekly data provided by Credit Suisse, as reported by El Economista. 
See Table A.7 in the Appendix for data. 
Although it is not possible to ascertain the volume traded in markets such 
as the Tangiers one (the New York and Zurich were significantly smaller), and 
thus it cannot be ruled out that erratic volume is driving the price of the peseta, 
Graphs 6.5 and 6.6 above show a similar pattern, giving us confidence that the 
evolution is not contingent on which unofficial market we select. 
As in the previous graphs, four phases can be identified: up to 1950 there 
is a period of substantial instability in which the peseta is nevertheless steadily 
falling, from 1950 to 1953 there persists some instability but the peseta regains 
value, followed by a very stable three years after 1953 and a subsequent 
deterioration towards the end of the 1950s. 
A more informative measure of the premium paid for the peseta on the 
unofficial market is given by the spread between the unofficial rate and the 
exchange rate that satisfies the Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) between the dollar 
and the peseta. This is shown in Graph 6.7 below. 
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Graph 6.7. Unofficial exchange rate premium, 1947-1959 
Sources: as in Graph 6.5 above and J. Aixala, La peseta y los precios (Zaragoza: 
Prensas Universitarias de Zaragoza, 1999)for an estimate of the PPP exchange 
rate between peseta and dollar. 
Because the PPP estimation is independent of official exchange rates and 
takes into account the different evolution of prices, Graph 6.7 shows that the 
reduction in the exchange rate premium from the early 1950s was not simply due 
to the hidden devaluation of the peseta during 1948-1952. The data, however, is 
only annual, not giving us much room for a detailed study of the market around 
specific points in time. For this reason any conclusions must be drawn with care. 
This is not the only shortcoming when using this information. Participants in this 
market may not be seen as representative of the average Spanish businessperson 
or investor. Not only foreigners operated in these markets, the Spanish 
government itself took part regularly in the unofficial Tangiers market, thus 
rendering the interpretation that price movements reflected the sentiment of 
private Spanish investors more doubtful. 
A further indicator based on unofficial markets in Spain can be 
constructed. The price of gold (which was legal to own yet illegal to trade) in 
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dollars inside Spain is compared to the gold price in Zurich, so as to control for 









The spread shown in Graph 6.8 displays a similar pattern to the other 
unofficial markets we have reviewed. This spread can be interpreted as the 
premium that Spanish agents were willing to pay for holding their wealth in a 
relatively easy to hide asset. As such, we can argue that a perceived improvement 
in the political credibility of the regime would be expected to show a decrease in 
such premium. However, the flight to gold would obviously reflect other pieces 
of information such as inflationary expectations or an expected devaluation, as in 
fact has been argued for the peak shown in late 1956.40 
Another asset that may be examined is Spanish government bonds.41 
Graph 6.9 below reports the prices of some government bond issues that were 
40 Pick, Black Market Yearbook, 1963, p. 562 suggests that '[i]n 1956, gold smuggling 
into Spain increased substantially and in the first quarter of 1957 "imports," aided by 
high officials, soared to about $500,000 a month, as the crowd "in the know" of the 
coming devaluation coldly commercialised this knowledge.' 
41 We will restrict ourselves to Spanish debt traded inside Spain. There was a small 
proportion of government debt (approx. 76 million pesetas or 0.1% of total outstanding 
Graph 6.8. Spread of price of ounce of gold between 
Madrid (unofficial market) and Zurich markets (in %) 
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Source: Pick, Black Market Yearbook, several years. See Table A.8 in the 
Appendix for data. 
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consistently reported in the press, and can thus be regarded as benchmark 
bonds.42 The pattern seen in the other financial markets, with a deterioration of 
prices during the late 1940s, followed by an improvement in the early 1950s 
appears to be roughly replicated in this market. 
A shortcoming to bear in mind when analysing this data is that debt 
issued up until the late 1950s had the privilege to be pledged, the so-called 
pignoration, with the Bank of Spain for a percentage of the nominal value. In a 
sense, this ensured there was a floor in bond prices that would not be reached, as 
bondholders would be better off pledging the bonds for cash with the Bank of 
Spain. This, together with the usual caveat that inflationary expectations and 
other factors may well be driving the prices, should be borne in mind. 
government debt) held by foreigners abroad. These were perpetuities at 4% p.a. with 
interest payable in sterling pounds in London, francs in Paris or marks in Berlin. 
London. The Stock Exchange Official Year-Book 1953, vol. 1 (London: T. Skinner, 
1954), p. 237 and Stock Exchanges London and Provincial, Ten-Year Record of Prices 
and Dividends, 1944 to 1953 Inclusive (London: F. C. Mathieson, 1954), p. 91 provide 
annual minimum and maximum but no other more disaggregated data or volume traded. 
42 For information on debt issues and the secondary market up to 1951 see Banco de 
Bilbao, Agenda Financiera 1951 (Bilbao: Banco de Bilbao, 1952). See Clavera et al., 
Capitalismo espanol, pp. 310-11 for debt issues during the 1950s. 
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Graph 6.9. Price of selected Spanish government bonds 
(Madrid trading), 1946-1960 
Notes and sources: the issues reported here are the 4% perpetuity (pledgeable 
for 80% of nominal, outstanding amount in 1959: 9.6 billion [,000 million] 
pesetas), the 4% issue of 1908 (maturity 50 years, pledgeable for 90%, 
outstanding amount in 1950: 94 million pesetas) and the 3% issue of 1928 'tax-
free' (maturity 70 years, pledgeable for 80%, outstanding amount in 1950: 1.9 
billion pesetas: The total stock of Spanish government debt in 1950 was 
approximately 58 billion pesetas (approx. 30% of GDP). Debt issues through the 
1950s would total approximately 38.5 billion pesetas. 
See Table A.9 in the Appendix for data. 
Let us now turn to the stock exchange. Casual inspection of the stock 
exchange real index, focusing on the period 1951-55 to try to capture the 
immediate impact of the announcements of American aid to Spain, in figure 
below suggests a significant change from a bear to a bull market precisely around 
the signing of the Pact of Madrid in September 1953. 
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Graph 6.10. Madrid stock exchange monthly price index 
(in real terms, September 1953=100) 
Source: Bolsa de Madrid, Indices de Cotizacion. This index, unlike the one 
provided by INE in Boletin Mensual de Estadistica, deals with the issue of 
bonus shares (stock dividends), a common feature of the period. See J. Martinez 
de Ibarreta Oses, La bolsa en Espana (Madrid: Aguilar, 1962). 
Contemporary observers were quick to suggest that the signing of the 
treaties was the most determinant cause of the strong reaction of the stock 
exchange.43 Overall, both national and foreign analysts saw a positive effect on 
the stock exchange of the signing of the agreements. Significantly, the impact 
does not seem to have been a short-term one.44 This shift from a bear to a bull 
market can be interpreted as a sign that investors were discounting future 
economic growth.45 It was not only the stock exchange index that experienced a 
sustained rise. The turnover in the market for shares also increased significantly 
43 See the weekly Espana Econdmica, 10th October 1953, p. 815. 
44 T. E. Rogers, Economic and Commercial Conditions in Spain. October, 1956 
(London: HMSO Overseas Economic Surveys, 1957), p. 80, writing three years after the 
signing of the Pact of Madrid emphasised it as a cause for the still bullish stock market. 
45 R. Barsld and J. B. De Long, 'Bull and Bear Markets in the Twentieth Century,' 
Journal of Economic History, vol. 50, no. 2 (1990), p. 269, suggest that even small 
changes in prospects for economic growth rates can justify large swings in the stock 
markets. 
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after the deal with the Americans had been reached. Annual volume traded in 
shares in the Spanish stock exchanges soared 46.7% in real terms in 1954, 
increasing a further 38.6% the following year.46 
Yet, neither should the claim of observers be taken at face value nor is 
Graph 6.10 above as user-friendly as may appear to be. Even if we could assign 
such a bear-to-bullish change to a shift in fundamentals, there is a danger in 
slipping into an analysis which is based simply on a series of unsatisfactory ad 
hoc interpretations of events in the stock exchange. The way to obtain relevant 
answers from stock data is not by plotting the data and then arriving at a formal 
or informal model that would explain it, but rather the reverse: assuming a 
particular model of how the stock exchange works, asking a particular question, 
and letting the data speak. Such a method will be outlined below. 
46 Instituto Nacional de Estadistica (INE), Boletin Mensual de Estadistica, various 
issues. 
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6.5. An event study analysis of the credibility hypothesis 
6.5.1. Theoretical underpinnings of the analysis 
Since prices of financial assets reflect the opinion of those trading in them about 
the future, we can talk of the information content of security prices. Using net 
present value calculations, we can derive a simple formula for valuing a 
perpetuity (as a stock in fact is) assuming a constant growth rate of dividends, g, 
and discount rate, r, as shown in equation 6.1 below.47 
, ,,, . dividend (eq. 6.1) price = 
r-g 
If the credibility hypothesis explained above has any explanatory power, 
we would expect that the reduction in uncertainty associated with the signing of 
the U.S.-Spanish agreements would lead to a decrease in the discount factor, thus 
affecting the price of securities. This theory of valuation presented is based on 
the weak form of efficient market hypothesis (EMH), which simply refers to the 
idea that the market will take account of all the existing available information in 
the formulation of prices. 
Using stock exchange data is, nevertheless, likely to raise some concerns. 
Firms listed in the stock exchange were limited in number, biased towards large 
size and in general unrepresentative of the Spanish economy; however, of those 
taking part in the market, the sellers and buyers of the stock, it can be much more 
confidently be argued that they are closer to the well-informed Spanish investor 
of the time. 
Stocks were (relatively) freely traded in the market. Although the market 
was burdened with regulations, they related to issues such as who could act as a 
trader or the level of commissions charged.48 Furthermore, and unlike the foreign 
47 This is known as the dividend discount model (DDM) or Gordon model. It is much 
more difficult (and unnecessary for our exposition) to work with present-value relations 
when expected returns are time-varying, as the relation between prices and returns 
becomes non-linear. For the mathematical formulation see K. Cuthbertson, Quantitative 
Financial Economics (Chichester: John Wiley, 1996). 
48 J. A. Torrente Fortuno, Historia de la Bolsa de Madrid, vol. 3 (Madrid: Colegio de 
Agentes de Cambio y Bolsa, 1974). 
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exchange market of Tangiers, in the stock exchange the government was absent. 
The only interference of the government was via the regulation of the market, 
which remained relatively unaltered around the period of interest. 
That firms were not allowed to distribute dividends freely does not appear 
to be of significance either. In order for dividend regulation and stock dividends 
or bonus share issues to be substantial problems in our analysis they would have 
had to preclude the realisation of capital gains through the sale of stocks.49 
Provided the market was sufficiently liquid and investors could sell their shares 
they would realise the capital gain and the outcome of valuation should not have 
been affected.50 
Having established more confidently the relevance of the data available, 
we can now proceeded to derive a quantitative test of the hypothesis that the aid-
for-bases American programme caused a significant change in business 
expectations. We will do so by using the so-called event study methodology. An 
event study is simply an inquiry into the response in equity pricing to news. If 
prices are expected to respond to news we need to establish that the observed 
price movements were in fact significant.51 
49 Martinez, La bolsa. 
50 In 1953 the Madrid stock exchange traded a volume of stocks which equalled 
approximately one thirtieth of its market capitalisation, Bolsa de Madrid, Indices de 
cotizacion de acciones de la Bolsa de Madrid, 1941-1987 (Madrid: Bolsa de Valores de 
Madrid, Servicio de Estudios, 1988), pp. 9, 120-22. This turnover is approximately that 
of an emerging market such as Chile traded during the mid-1980s, R. Bootle (ed.), 
Directory of World Stock Exchanges (Cambridge: Woodhead-Faulkner for The 
Economist Publications, 1988), p. 76. 
51 This method has not been prominent in the economic history literature yet. For an 
example of its use see H.-J. Voth, 'Stock Market Liberalization, the Cost of Capital and 
Economic Growth in Post-War Europe,' paper presented at the 61st Annual Meeting of 
the Economic History Association, Philadelphia, 26th-28th October 2001 (circulated 
previously as 'Convertibility, Currency Controls and the Cost of Capital in Western 
Europe, 1950-1999,' Universitat Pompeu Fabra Working Paper no. 552, May 2001, 
available at http://www.econ.upf.es/deehome/what/wpapers/postscripts/552.pdf as of 15th 
August 2001). 
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It is important to underline the similarities and differences between this 
approach and the search for turning points in financial time series that has 
become increasingly popular in economic history.52 The purpose of the search 
for turning points is to let the data speak for itself and not to impose 
preconceived breaks on it. Interpreting what causes the change in trends, the 
turning points, is, however, beyond the method -unless, of course, only one 
variable is driving the valuation of the financial time series. This is the reason 
why the search for turning points has mostly been used for wartime situations, 
where there was no identification problem as to the cause that is driving the 
results.53 In our case, however, the increased security of the Franco regime 
derived from the American support is just one of the numerous factors that are 
driving stock valuations, or in fact all other financial indicators reported here. 
A second point to note about the search for turning points procedure is 
that it cannot discriminate, when two events are too close to each other, whether 
it is the two of them that are causing the effect or only one of them. In our case 
study, for example, Admiral Sherman arrived in Madrid for talks with Franco on 
the possibility of a bases deal on 16th July 1951. This event conveys substantial 
information about the interest of the Americans, yet were we to find a turning 
point around that time in the financial time series we would be unable to 
differentiate its effect from that of the cabinet reshuffle in the Spanish 
government that took place on the 18th July 1951 and which was unrelated to 
Sherman's visit. Similarly, the search for turning points necessarily involves the 
establishment of an arbitrary period of time by which, if the increase in valuation 
is sustained, it is assumed that a turning point took place. The event study, on the 
52 See in particular the Symposium: High Politics and Low Finance in vol. 60, no. 2 
(June 2000) issue of the Journal of Economic History with articles by J. Wells and D. 
Wills, 'Revolution, Restoration, and Debt Repudiation: The Jacobite Threat to England's 
Institutions and Economic Growth,' pp. 418-41, N. Sussman and Y. Yafeh, 'Institutions, 
Reforms, and Country Risk: Lessons from Japanese Government Debt in the Meiji Era,' 
pp. 442-67 and B. S. Frey and M. Kucher, 'History as Reflected in Capital Markets: The 
Case of World War II,' pp. 468-96. 
53 K. L. Willard, T. W. Guinnane and H. S. Rosen , 'Turning Points in the Civil War, 
Views from the Greenback Market,' American Economic Review, vol. 86, no. 4 
(September 1996), pp. 1001-18. 
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contrary, cannot help us identify what news were perceived to be more important 
by contemporaries since it does not pitch one event against another but can help 
us identify whether an event was something really unusual or not. 
Moreover, for the search for turning points to be a meaningful exercise 
one requires a list of unambiguous events. Again, this may be the case with the 
outcome of battles but is not so straightforward in more intricate cases such as 
the hypothesis we are investigating. How should we, for example, interpret the 
U.S. securing military base rights in the Azores islands in the Autumn of 1951? 
This may indicate that the U.S. will no longer be so eager to reach an agreement 
with Franco or perhaps it reveals the strength of the interest in bases within the 
American administration. 
The spirit of the event study methodology is to compare the observed 
returns of assets during the event-window (the time period where the news 
happen) with the normal returns that we would expect in the absence of news 
(estimated running actual returns observations during a period prior to the event 
using a particular estimation method). A test is then drawn to establish whether 
the difference between the observed and the predicted returns is significantly (in 
an statistical sense) different from zero. There are seven steps that can be 
identified in an event-study:54 
a. Event definition 
b. Selection criteria and estimation window 
c. Normal and abnormal returns 
d. Estimation procedure 
e. Testing procedure 
f. Empirical results 
g. Interpretation and conclusions 
54 J. Y. Campbell, A. W. Lo and A. C. MacKinlay, The econometrics of financial 
markets (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1997). 
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6.5.2. An event study of the Pact of Madrid 
We will now both discuss the theory and apply it to the event study of the 
announcement of the Pact of Madrid between Spain and the U.S. in which the 
Americans committed themselves to provide an unspecified amount of aid in 
exchange of the use of military facilities in Spain. 
a. Event definition 
One of the main problems of event-studies is to make precise the date in which 
the event was known to the public. It is usually difficult to know if the news 
reached the market in the day of the announcement or there was a lag, a feature 
that has led investigators to refine the method to allow for event-date 
uncertainty.55 
In our case we want to concentrate on the announcement of the signature 
of the agreements between Spain and the U.S., which took place on 26th 
September 1953. Of course, American support was not an overnight decision and 
it can be argued that the change in the attitudes of the U.S. to Spain had already 
changed by the summer of 1950, when the first loan was approved. Yet, the 
announcement of the agreements did have news content about the American 
support to Spain. As we have seen in Chapter Four above, up until the last 
moments there was the possibility that the negotiations could stall. 
In fact, the advantage of the event study over the search for turning points 
is that we can isolate instances which unequivocally convey sufficient and 
exclusive information about the argument we are interested to explore. As we 
will shortly see, the signing of the agreements does meet those requirements. 
The agreements were signed on 26th September, Saturday, and given that 
the Spanish market only traded Tuesday to Friday, the first day in which the 
response could have been felt was Tuesday 29th September. Given that there 
were three calendar days between the signing of the agreements and the opening 
of the market it seems appropriate to consider event date certainty on Tuesday 
29th September. 
55 C. A. Ball and W. N. Torous, 'Investigating Security-Price Performance in the 
Presence of Event-Date Uncertainty,' Journal of Financial Economics, vol. 22 (1988), 
pp. 123-53. 
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It is important that we establish whether there was any other overlapping 
news that might have affected the market during those days. The days that we 
may want to consider critical are Friday 25th September (since perhaps the news 
might not have reached the market that day) to Tuesday 29th (since we may 
suggest that the market could have been reacting to news of this very day). To 
answer this we consulted the journal Moneda y Credito, which provides a 
comprehensive list of all laws, decrees, government regulations and ministerial 
orders, etc, providing the date of their announcement. Out of the 153 items that 
the journal reported to have been announced over the months of July to 
September, none relating to 'stock exchange and finance' or 'general economic 
questions' were announced in the period 25th-29th September, where there were 
only three minor policy decisions pertaining to the method of importing vehicles 
(27th September), the amounts of subsidies in a particular cotton producing 
region (28th September), and the concession of a railway line between the 
ENSIDESA factory and a nearby village (28th September). Given that there was 
no other major market-wide news, it seems reasonable to think of our event-
window as a clearly defined one. 
Because the absence of other news, the quasi ceteris paribus situation 
provides us with a natural experiment in which the American support to Spain is 
the only impulse to be received by the securities market.56 
b. Selection criteria and estimation period 
This simply refers to the question of what should be the sample. Our likely 
sample will cover all the market, since this is a market wide event. 
The Madrid Stock Exchange provides a feasible test. However, the 
Madrid Stock Exchange (Bolsa de Madrid) only started to elaborate a daily index 
in 1963. Thus we will need to construct our own daily index. The task of 
selecting which stocks to include and which weights assign to them is one 
through which potential biases may be introduced. Thus, it seems appropriate to 
56 Because, as argued by Neal, securities markets provide the 'most sensitive 
seismographs of all' they can instruct us about the nature of those shocks, L. Neal, 'A 
Shocking View of Economic History,' Journal of Economic History, vol. 60, no. 2 (June 
2000), p. 326. 
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use as a starting point a study by the Madrid Stock Exchange Research 
Department which constructs a monthly index (hereafter Bolsa index) from 1940 
onwards.57 For 1953 the Bolsa index includes 47 stocks, weighted according to 
their relative capitalisation on 31st December 1952. Their index of 47 stocks 
comprises 34,469 million pesetas (or 75.63%) out of the total market 
capitalisation of 45,574 million pesetas on 31st December 1952 (see Table A. 10 
in the Appendix for a list of stocks, the codes used in the tables and the sector of 
activity of each firm). 
The data on stock prices have been gathered from the financial press, in 
particular the weekly El Economista and Espana Economica. Of these 47 stocks 
it has not been possible to find data on three: Urbis, Cros, and Trasmediterrdnea. 
Urbis is a very small stock and the Bolsa gives it a 0.06% weight in the index so 
the omission does not seem too important. Cros and Trasmediterrdnea are more 
puzzling cases, since they are given a relatively large weights (2.81% and 2.14% 
respectively). Cros was a chemicals producer and Trasmediterrdnea a ferry 
company, both traded regularly in the Barcelona Stock Exchange but, although 
tradable, only infrequently in Madrid. This leaves us with a 44-stock-index. 
We therefore collected data for each stock to calculate daily returns for 
each stock for 120 days, our estimation period. The choice of estimation period is 
necessarily arbitrary. The figure of 120 days for the estimation period is one that 
seems to be reasonable in this type of study.58 The estimation period is going to 
be 120 daily returns from immediately before. This raises the issue of the 
possibility that leaks took place and that the last days in the estimation period 
have already been affected by the news. As noted in Chapter Four above there 
were many instances in which the public perceived that the agreements were 
about to be finalised.59 In Spain, the weekly magazine El Economista reported 
for the first time the possibility of a closing of the negotiations two weeks before 
57 Bolsa de Madrid, Indices de cotizacion de acciones. 
58 Campbell, Lo and MacKinlay, The econometrics of financial markets, p. 152. 
59 'The U.S. is about to conclude a bilateral agreement with Spain' stated The 
Economist, 21st July 1951, p. 144. The Fortnightly review of business and economic 
conditions of the Bank of London and South America noted on 24th January 1953 the 
'possibility of the early signature of the Mutual Aid agreement...', vol. 18, no. 426, p. 
66. 
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the actual signature. It reported that it disagreed with the view of the majority 
that the signing would lead to a swift increase in stock prices. In a revealing 
editorial it suggests that agents are already discounting the event. However, it has 
been decided not to make any adjustment for these possible leaks. By not 
accounting for this possible discounting we are only biasing against the 
likelihood of finding a statistically significant reaction during the event window. 
The same reasoning can be applied to the choice of undertaking the event study 
on the announcement of the agreements as opposed to other previous dates. 
Because the announcement takes place at a later date, it is to be expected that 
part of the reaction of agents to the American rapprochement with Spain had 
already been discounted by then. The difficulty of identifying other instances in 
which we could ascertain that stock prices are responding to the underlying 
phenomenon of U.S. support to Spain (i.e., the difficulty of finding other events 
which had sufficient and exclusive news content about the U.S. support to Spain) 
makes the announcement of the agreements the most likely choice. In any case, it 
should once more be noted that if any bias is introduced it is to make it less likely 
to find a reaction. 
We encounter at this point the first technical problem: thinly traded 
stocks. Many days some of the stocks did not trade, (and others we simply did 
not have information). In our total possible of 5,368 cells (122 days * 44 stocks) 
we have true prices for 4,111 of them (or 76.7%). Thus we need a method of 
'filling in' those empty cells if we are to be able to calculate the daily returns on 
a comparable basis, i.e. using the same index. The days in which stocks were not 
traded had to be assigned a price in order to proceed with the estimation. We 
have chosen to report the price quoted on the immediate day that the stock had 
previously traded, in other words, the return on non-trading days would be zero. 
The literature on methods of filling in data suggests a way of assigning 
the returns over a period to each of those non-trading days.60 However, in the 
case of the 44-stock index, out of the 1,257 empty cells, 508 correspond to days 
in between trading days where there was no such price change at all, thus there is 
no return to be assigned in those days. The changes in prices do not tend to be 
60 R. Heinkel and A. Kraus, 'Measuring Event Impacts in Thinly Traded Stocks,' 
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, vol. 23, no. 1 (March 1988), pp. 71-88. 
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particularly high even after several days of non trading, and there is no indication 
that it was a run on stocks that tended to lead to lack of trading on a particular 
day. In fact, it is the opposite, not enough sellers, that is given as the reason in 
those occasions that the specialised press comments on a stock not trading.61 
The 44-stock-index would constitute our first choice for an index for the 
relatively large number of stocks included. There are, however, possibilities in 
undertaking some sort of sensitivity analysis by withdrawing from the index 
those stocks that only traded very thinly during the estimation period. Of the 44 
remaining stocks, three stocks did not trade on the event day leaving us with a 
41-stock-index if we withdraw them. 
Table 6.1 below reports the 44- and 41-stock index features, but also two 
further indices, which have been derived from the 44-stock-index, omitting those 
stocks that traded so thinly during the estimation period as to be traded on less 
than 50% of days (resulting in the 38-stock-index), and then excluding those 
stocks that traded less than 75% of days (resulting in the 27-stock-index). 
61 By not distributing the returns among the non-trading days we may in fact be biasing 
upwards the standard deviation and thus reducing the chance of finding a statistical 
significance in the event return being different from the mean over the estimation period. 
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Table 6.1. Madrid Stock Exchange indices 
Bolsa 44~- 41^ 38^ Th~ 
index stock stock stock stock 
(47 index index index index 
stocks) 
Total capitalisation in index 
(in million pesetas) 34,469 
As % of market capitalisation 
(45,574 million pesetas) 75.6% 
% of'true-data-cells' 
% of aggregate daily return 


















To obtain the «% of 'true-data-cells'» we compute the number of days each 
of the stocks included in the index did trade throughout the 121 days. 
«% of aggregate daily return obtained from ' true-data-cells'» has been 
obtained by computing for each day which stocks did not trade (and 
therefore the return implied is zero), using their respective stock weight to 
arrive at the actual share of imputed aggregate daily return (a.d.r.) These 
were then added throughout the period. 
Table 6.1 above shows the expected trade-offs between decreasing the 
instances in which we need to fill in stock prices and market capitalisation and 
number of stocks included in the index. The weights used for the stocks in each 
of the indices have been derived from the original 47-stock-index. Whenever we 
reduced the number of stocks included the weights of those withdrawn stocks 
were assigned to the stocks that remained in the index proportionately. Table 6.2 
below provides the details of the weights to be used. 
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Table 6.2. Composition of Madrid stock market indices 
Bolsa (47) 44-stocks 38-stocks 27-stocks 41-stocks 
ESP 2.73 2.87 2.98 3.37 2.99 
BTO 4.55 4.79 4.96 5.61 4.98 
HIS 4.00 4.21 4.36 4.93 4.38 
FEN 1.81 1.91 1.97 2.23 1.98 
HES 6.63 6.98 7.23 8.18 7.26 
IBE 10.24 10.78 11.16 12.63 11.21 
NAN 0.76 0.80 0.83 0.94 0.83 
SEV 3.20 3.37 3.49 3.95 3.50 
UEM 1.94 2.04 2.11 2.39 2.12 
RIF 2.69 2.83 2.93 3.32 2.95 
MDF 1.59 1.67 1.73 1.96 1.74 
PON 1.67 1.76 1.82 2.06 1.83 
AHV 4.74 4.99 5.17 5.84 5.19 
AUX 2.13 2.24 2.32 2.63 2.33 
TEL 7.75 8.16 8.45 9.56 8.49 
CAM 1.82 1.92 1.98 2.24 1.99 
TAB 0.56 0.59 0.61 0.69 0.61 
AGI 0.97 1.02 1.06 1.20 1.06 
AZU 0.70 0.74 0.76 0.86 0.77 
INM 1.91 2.01 2.08 2.36 2.09 
ARA 1.01 1.06 1.10 1.25 1.11 
ERT 3.66 3.85 3.99 4.51 4.01 
CEP 6.48 6.82 7.06 7.99 7.10 
FEF 0.59 0.62 0.64 0.73 0.65 
SNC 3.17 3.34 3.46 3.91 3.47 
NAV 1.15 1.21 1.25 1.42 1.26 
MDM 2.65 2.79 2.89 3.27 2.90 
EBR 0.96 1.01 1.05 
MER 0.53 0.56 0.58 0.58 
URM 0.63 0.66 0.69 0.69 
DRC 0.91 0.96 0.99 1.00 
HCV 0.17 0.18 0.19 0.19 
MMM 0.21 0.22 0.23 0.23 
GUI 0.23 0.24 0.25 0.25 
CAN 0.83 0.87 0.90 0.91 
CEN 2.70 2.84 2.94 2.96 
BEE 1.11 1.17 1.21 1.22 
UFX 2.35 2.47 2.56 
CPL 0.35 0.37 
POP 0.46 0.48 0.50 
RES 0.55 0.58 0.60 
INS 0.16 0.17 0.18 
CGI 0.13 0.14 0.14 




99.99 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
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c. Normal and abnormal returns 
The purpose of the event-study is to derive estimates of the 'abnormal' returns 
during the event period and compare them with the normal returns obtained 
throughout the estimation period so as to determine, using a test statistic (the 
average abnormal return divided by the estimated standard deviation) to 
determine whether we can reject the null hypothesis that abnormal returns are 
zero. Therefore the model that is used in predicting the normal returns, in other 
words the yardstick with which to measure the returns obtained during the event 
period, is crucial to the outcome of the test. 
Returns will be calculated on a daily basis since the literature tends to 
recommend strongly the use of daily return data to estimate information effects, 
'with the possible exception of cases in which there is uncertainty about the date 
62 
of the information release' which is not our case. 
Daily returns are defined as the ratio of the increase in price to the 
previous price. The computation is straightforward, the only necessary 
adjustment being the dividends paid. For this information it was necessary to go 
to the Boletin Oficial de Cotizacion de la Bolsa de Madrid (Official Daily 
Listings of Madrid Stock Exchange) which provides details of how much was 
paid, net of tax, to the stocks and the precise date of payment. 
Table 6.3 below shows the steps followed in order to incorporate the 
dividend payments in a comparable way to the return derived from price 
changes. Having obtained these payments, they were added to the daily return 
computed from price changes. Those stocks that are not in the list did not pay 
dividends through the estimation period and event window. 
62 D. Morse, 'An Econometric Analysis of the Choice of Daily Versus Monthly Returns 
in Tests of Information Content,' Journal of Accounting Research, vol. 22, no. 2 (1984), 
p. 606. 
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Table 6.3. Computing the returns from dividends over the estimation period 
















dividend as return 
% on previous 
day price 
ESP 45 23 Jul 83 531 500 2655 1.69% 
BEE 30.8 21 May 48 228 500 1140 2.70% 
BTO 14 1 May 39 515 500 2575 0.54% 
HIS 30.5 1 Jul 70 390 500 1950 1.56% 
CEN 29 5 Aug 90 330 500 1650 1.76% 
MER 29.53 15 Jul 78 173 500 865 3.41% 
POP 21 27 Apr 36 218 500 1090 1.93% 
POP 18.4 1 Sep 105 220 500 1100 1.67% 
FEN 32.23 1 Jul 70 120 5000 6000 0.54% 
CAN 15 1 Jul 70 119 500 595 2.52% 
HES 25 1 Jul 70 210 500 1050 2.38% 
IBE 27.5 1 Jul 70 194 500 970 2.84% 
NAN 13.35 20 May 47 104 500 520 2.57% 
SEV 15.26 15 Apr 29 107 500 535 2.85% 
UEM 7.57 15 Jun 61 112 500 560 1.35% 
RIF 23.25 10 Jun 58 543 50 271.5 8.56% 
MDF 30 20 Jun 65 230 500 1150 2.61% 
GUI 29.7 15 Jun 61 203 400 812 3.66% 
PON 15 1 Jul 70 380 250 950 1.58% 
AHV 30 1 Jun 54 181 500 905 3.31% 
AUX 20 8 Jun 57 177 500 885 2.26% 
MMM 48.9 15 Apr 29 158 1000 1580 3.09% 
TEL 24.06 20 May 47 170 500 850 2.83% 
CAM 20.8 8 Jun 57 150 500 750 2.77% 
TAB 14.56 1 Jul 70 160 500 800 1.82% 
AZU 22.5 1 Aug 89 117 500 585 3.85% 
HCV 18.92 1 May 39 108 500 540 3.50% 
DRC 18.25 11 May 44 139 500 695 2.63% 
INM 12.5 1 Jul 70 118 500 590 2.12% 
URM 15 4 Apr 24 482 300 1446 1.04% 
ARA 26.85 1 Apr 24 172 500 860 3.12% 
18.42 15 Jul 78 140 500 700 2.63% 
CEP 26.22 13 Apr 28 368 500 1840 1.43% 
RES 16.22 15 Apr 29 119 250 297.5 5.45% 
FEF 14.2 24 Aug 101 130 500 650 2.18% 
SNC 45 15 May 46 289 500 1445 3.11% 
NAV 18.96 15 Jun 61 116 500 580 3.27% 
MDM 15 4 Apr 24 137 500 685 2.19% 
INS 22.5 15 Jun 61 98 500 490 4.59% 
Source: constructed with Boletin de Cotizacion Oficial. 
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d. Estimation procedure 
There are two types of models that we can use in estimating the normal returns of 
stocks: statistical and economic. By statistical models we refer to those that 
simply assume that asset returns can be described by statistical means. Economic 
models rely on assumptions about agents' behaviour, allowing for restrictions on 
the parameters derived from, for example, the Capital Asset Pricing Model or the 
Arbitrage Pricing Theory. The simplest statistical model referred to in the 
literature is the constant-mean return model. The constant-mean return model is 
literally described in its name and assumes that event window returns above the 
mean calculated throughout the estimation period are abnormal. 
Perhaps surprisingly, economic models have not been widely used, and 
empirical papers tend to focus on statistical models. In particular, most studies 
make use of the statistical market model. By the market model they simply refer 
to a relationship in which the returns of a particular stock depend on the returns 
of the market as a whole adjusted by a p coefficient which measures the 
responsiveness in the stock's return to changes in the market's return. Thus, a (3 > 
1 stock implies that the stock is more volatile than the market. They estimate the 
parameters a and (3 for each firm, and then, with the overall market returns from 
the event window obtain the predicted return for individual stocks. 
yy 
The R in the estimation of the coefficients is interpreted as the 
percentage of variation in a stock's return that is due to market changes. The 
higher this R2, the more different would be results using the market model or the 
constant-mean return model. 
The problem using the market model is that it focuses on the evolution of 
returns due exclusively to changes in firm-specific risk. This is so because the 
purpose may be estimating the effect of a merger announcement on stock prices, 
where it is important to control for a change in the market return. However, in 
our case controlling for market-wide changes would simply dilute the true effect 
in the reduction of systematic risk that may be associated with the American 
support. Using the market model will bias downwards the type of effect that we 
want to capture. This can be shown best with a simple example. Let us think of a 
market composed by two stocks only. These stocks' returns always move exactly 
the same (say 0.01% daily), and consequently the market's return is 0.01% too. If 
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we estimate the model we will obtain a=0 and (3=1. Let us now suppose that 
during the event, returns for both stocks jump to 0.02% (and obviously the 
market return jumps to 0.02%). Yet, if we calculate the estimated expected return 
this would be 0.02% (= a + (3*0.02) and thus the abnormal return would be zero. 
The theoretical literature is clear about the recommendations: the market 
model performs well under a wide variety of conditions, and, in some situations, 
'even simpler methods which do not explicitly adjust for market-wide factors 
[...] perform no worse' . Moreover, very similar judgements can be read in the 
recent literature. The use of the Capital Asset Pricing Model has 'almost ceased' 
in event studies, while that of the Arbitrage Pricing Theory has 'little practical 
advantage relative to the unrestricted market model'; in sum, 'there seems to be 
no good reason to use an economic model rather than a statistical model in an 
event study.'64. Nevertheless, despite the original backing of mean-reversion by 
Brown and Warner, there has been a theoretical strand of the literature on event 
studies that emphasises the benefits of using regression based models.65 
However, the choice of model will also be driven by empirical matters. 
The potential improvement of the market model over the mean reverting one is 
that by removing the part of the return linked to market returns the estimated 
variance of the abnormal return is reduced. The increase in the ability to detect 
event effects will depend on the R2 of the regressions. Table A. 11 in the 
appendix below reports the Ordinary Least Squares estimation of the market 
model.66 
The extremely poor performance of Ordinary Least Squares in estimating 
the market model makes it clear that in this case it is not sensible to attempt such 
63 S. J. Brown and J. B. Warner, 'Measuring Security Price Performance,' Journal of 
Financial Economics, vol. 8 (1980), p. 205. 
64 Campbell, Lo and MacKinlay, The econometrics of financial markets, pp. 156-57. 
65 J. Cable and K. Holland, 'Regression vs. non-regression models of normal returns: 
implications for event studies,' Economics Letters, vol. 64 (1999), pp. 81-85 and J. 
Cable and K. Holland, 'Modelling normal returns in event studies: a model-selection 
approach and pilot study,' European Journal of Finance, vol. 5 (1999), pp. 331-41. 
66 Rit = a+ p Rmt + m where Rit is the return of the i-stock and Rmt is the return on the 
market portfolio. 
215 
Ch. 6. Credibility effects of American aid 
estimation with that technique, a point made in the literature.67 Ultimately the 
choice of return generating models comes determined by the market-wide nature 
/ t o 
of our set up. This setting is in fact an unusual one in event-study literature. In 
fact, in many papers discussing market-wide effects there is a tendency to find 
ways of splitting the sample into good- and bad-news, or their set-up is one in 
• • M 
which it is possible to have more than one event. 
Thus, unless we embark on significantly more complicated methods of 
robust estimation of the market model, it appears that the mean reversion should 7 0 be preferred to the market model. We will proceed by using a simple mean 
71 
reversion model, which receives support in the literature. 
e. Testing procedure 
The aim of the event-study is to employ a statistical test that will enable us to 
reject (or not), with some degree of confidence, the null hypothesis that the 
abnormal performance of returns during the event window is zero. 
The basis of inference in this type of studies is usually a t-statistic. This 
test requires us to assume that the abnormal returns throughout the estimation 
67 J. A. Coutts, T. C. Mills and J. Roberts, 'Testing Cumulative Prediction Errors in 
Event Study Methodology,' Journal of Forecasting, vol. 14 (1995), pp. 107-15.1 thank 
Professor Terry Mills for drawing my attention to this issue. 
68 Still, there are examples, such as J. Mutti, R. Sampson and B. Yeung, 'The Effects of 
the Uruguay Round: Empirical Evidence from U.S. Industry,' Contemporary Economic 
Policy, vol. 18, no. 1 (2000), pp. 59-63. 
69 M. Pincus, 'Stock price effects of the allowance of LIFO for tax purposes,' Journal of 
Accounting and Economics, vol. 23 (1997), pp. 283-308 and R. Hudson, K. Keasey and 
M. Dempsey, 'Share prices under Tory and Labour governments in the U.K. since 
1945,' Applied Financial Economics, vol. 8 (1998), pp. 389-400. 
70 T. C. Mills, J. A. Coutts and J. Roberts, 'Misspecification testing and robust 
estimation of the market model and their implications for event studies,' Applied 
Economics, vol. 28 (1996), pp. 559-66. 
71 Campbell, Lo and MacKinlay, The econometrics of financial markets, p. 154. In fact, 
Cable and Holland motivate their paper as a reaction against the 'current tendency to 
favour cruder but simpler mean- or market-adjusted returns models.' Cable and Holland, 
'Modelling normal returns,' p. 331. 
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period are normally distributed, and that there is no event-induced change in the 
variance. In the case of a market wide phenomenon, we construct a portfolio 
representative of the market as a whole, on which we can employ the traditional 
t-test statistics. Formally, we obtain the returns for each time period (day) t for 
each stock i, Rih which are then aggregated into the portfolio return for that day t, 
Rpt, as done in equation 6.2 below. 
(eq.6.2) = ^XiRt 
i=1 
where ^ 1 5>« = 1 
/=i 
and N is the number of stocks in the portfolio 
It is then that the estimation of the excess return for the portfolio over the 
event window takes place as in equation 6.3: 
(eq.6.3) E(R,) = jrZAp* = & 
t=i 
And statistical inference based on the portfolio t-statistic for the abnormal 
return on event day, gPt event,derived as in equation 6.4: 
b p, event \J\. p. event — 
(eq-6-4) t = s(R,) Vr+T 
where S(RP) is the historical standard deviation of the returns to the portfolio 
over the estimation period (1,.. ,,T) 
This test will be Student-t distributed provided the abnormal returns, € Pth 
are normally distributed and the variance of the return generating process 
remains constant. However, statistical inference is made difficult by two 
problems: non-normality of returns, and possible increase in variance of returns 
as a consequence of the event. These problems render the portfolio t-statistic 
72 G. W. Schwert, 'Using Financial Data to Measure Effects of Regulation,' Journal of 
Law and Economics, vol. 24 (1981), pp. 121-58. 
217 
Ch. 6. Credibility effects of American aid 
suggested above mispecified. Similarly, the clustering of events (i.e., the event 
falls on the same date for all of our stocks), makes cross-sectional dependence of 
stocks a potentially serious problem. Thus, for a test to be suitable in our set up, 
it needs to be well specified (i.e., it does not reject too often the null hypothesis 
when it is in fact true) under those three circumstances. 
In sum, there are four statistical issues that need to be addressed 
satisfactorily to underpin the results of our event study: 
- non-normality of abnormal returns 
- event-induced shifts in the variance of returns 
event date clustering which may result in cross-sectional dependence of 
stocks' returns 
- choice of return generation model (as discussed above) 
The rank test is one of two non-parametric tests that are generally used in 
the context of event studies.73 The idea behind using ranks is that we avoid the 
problems derived from skewness or other non-symmetries in the distribution of 
returns. For this reason, non-parametric tests are also sometimes referred to as 
distribution-free tests. However, cross-sectional dependence of stock returns 
would still need to be taken into account. 
The spirit of the rank test is very similar to the portfolio test statistic. 
Instead of the difference between the actual and expected portfolio return in the 
numerator, it uses an aggregate of the differences between the actual and 
expected rank of stocks' abnormal returns on event day. The denominator is an 
estimate of the standard deviation of the numerator throughout the estimation 
period.In order to compute this test, we need to rank the returns for each of the i 
stocks for the entire data set (both estimation period and event window). Given 
the abnormal returns (generated from the constant-mean return generation 
model) for stock i, Ait,, let us denote Kit as: 
73 J. J. Binder, 'The Event Study Methodology Since 1969,' Review of Quantitative 
Finance and Accounting, vol. 11 (1998), pp. 111-37 and A. C. MacKinlay, 'Event 
Studies in Economics and Finance,' Journal of Economic Literature, vol. 35 (1997), pp. 
13-39. 
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(eq.6.5) Kit = rank (Ait) 
Once this ranking has taking place we need to obtain the so-called 
standardized rank, £4.74 This is the value of the rank adjusted for the number of 
returns that are available for that particular stock (i.e., the number of days traded 
or non-missing returns, Mi), thus adjusting for thin trading, as shown in equation 
6.6 below: 
(eq.6.6) Uu = — 
l + Mi 
Not taking into account missing returns would result in the rank test being 
misspecified. Eq.6.6 yields order statistics of uniform distributions with an 
expected value of one-half. Table 6.4 below shows this exercise for event date. 
74 C. J. Corrado and T. L. Zivney, 'The Specifiication and Power of the Sign Test in 
Event Study Hypothesis Tests Using Daily Stock Returns,' Journal of Financial and 
Quantitative Analysis, vol. 27, no. 3 (September 1992), pp. 465-78. 
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Table 6.4. Ranking event day returns (29th September 1953) 
rank of event No. of Standardized 
day returns rank 
abnormal return 
ESP 41 113 0.36 
BEE 26 63 0.41 
BTO 36 118 0.30 
HIS 34 113 0.30 
CEN 30 90 0.33 
MER 6 62 0.10 
POP 3 50 0.06 
FEN 58 60 0.95 
CAN 5 64 0.08 
HES 35 119 0.29 
IBE 85 120 0.70 
NAN 2 108 0.02 
SEV 95 119 0.79 
UEM 10 121 0.08 
REU 9 46 0.19 
RIF 19 121 0.16 
MDF 6 99 0.06 
GUI 23 81 0.28 
PON 74 118 0.62 
AHV 3 116 0.03 
AUX 9 114 0.08 
MMM 2 73 0.03 
TEL 2 121 0.02 
CAM 38 121 0.31 
TAB 83 96 0.86 
AGI 16 100 0.16 
AZU 43 116 0.37 
HCV 2 62 0.03 
DRC 5 79 0.06 
INM 9 94 0.09 
URM 18 77 0.23 
ARA 27 105 0.25 
ERT. 4 117 0.03 
CEP 6 119 0.05 
RES 11 46 0.23 
FEF 34 116 0.29 
SNC 18 106 0.17 
NAV 3 80 0.04 
MDM 34 115 0.29 
INS 17 50 0.33 
CGI 9 51 0.17 
These calculations are then carried out for each day in the estimation 
period. It is also necessary to consider the number of stocks that trade on each of 
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the days of our period. With this information we constructed the rank test, T3, 
according to formulae given in equation 6.7. 
and Nt represents the number of non-missing returns in the cross-section of N-
firms on day t. 
Inferences can be made using the result that T3 is asymptotically standard 
normal distributed.75 A very important feature of the rank test, T3, is that it is 
well specified under event-date clustering because cross-sectional dependence is 
taken into account via the aggregation of the individual stocks ranks into a time 
series of portfolio mean ranks.76 Results from simulation with data from other 
thinly traded stocks, as in our case, suggest that the rank test dominates the 
portfolio test statistic under a variety of circumstances and deals particularly well 
77 
with small samples. 
Given that the rank test does not rely on a symmetric distribution of 
returns and that it deals well with event date clustering, the only other situation 
that needs to be examined is whether event-induced variance shift may affect it. 
The generalised sign test is the preferred event study test under that 
circumstance. We therefore now turn to discuss the sign test. 
As with the rank test, the sign test is non-parametric in the sense that it 
only considers whether the abnormal returns are positive, zero, or negative, 
assigning values (+1, 0, -1). The generalized sign test, Z, assumes that the 
number of stocks that have positive abnormal returns on event date is binomially 
75 C. J. Corrado, 'A Nonparametric Test for Abnormal Security Price Performance in 
Event Studies,' Journal of Financial Economics, vol. 23 (1989), pp. 385-95. 
76 C. J. Campbell and C. E. Wasley, 'Measuring security price performance using daily 
NASDAQ returns,' Journal of Financial Economics, vol. 33 (1993), p. 88. 
77 Campbell and Wasley, 'Measuring security price performance', p. 83. 
78 C. Giaccotto and J. M. Sfiridis, 'Hypothesis Testing in Event Studies: The Case of 
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distributed with probability p, a parameter that captures the proportion of positive 
abnormal returns during the estimation period.79 Thus, for each stock the number 
of positive abnormal returns is obtained for the estimation period and then 
aggregated so as to determine the parameter p according to the formula in 
equation 6.8 below. 
N f Ti \ 
(eq.6.8) ^ = 
where nit = 1 if A,p>0, =0 otherwise 
and Ti is the number of days stock i trades 
Equally on event day we compute the number of stocks displaying 
positive abnormal returns, w. Formally, Cowan's Z test is calculated according to 
the following formulae in equation 6.9. 
(eq.6.9) z = W~NP 
•s]Np(l-p) 
Statistical inference is based on the result that w will for large samples be 
normally distributed with mean np and variance np(l-p). However, potentially 
the most serious problem for this test is cross-sectional dependence as a result of 
on 
event date clustering. The rank test would be the preferred test statistic if it was 
possible to establish no event-induced variance changes. Unfortunately, the tests 
of this eventuality that the literature discusses are based on the market model. 
Therefore, there are trade-offs in using the tests, and no single test 
emerges as the most powerful for all circumstances. In consequence, a variety of 
tests will be undertaken so as to provide some sort of sensitivity analysis of the 
results. 
79 A. R. Cowan, 'Nonparametric Event Study Tests,' Review of Quantitative Finance 
and Accounting, vol. 2 (1992), pp. 353-71. 
80 'The sign test, [...] requires that the abnormal returns are independent across 
securities', Campbell, Lo and MacKinlay, The econometrics of financial markets, p. 172. 
This assumption is clearly violated when there is event-date clustering. 
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f. Empirical results 
Table 6.5 below shows the results obtained for the portfolio t-statistic for the 
different indices constructed. 
Table 6.5. Portfolio t-statistic of event study of the Pact of Madrid 
share Share Share of Event average Event daily t = 
of market of'true a.d.r. daily a.d.r. excess returns excess / 
capitalisation data- obtained Return days 1- return std dev std dev 
cells' from 'trae- 120 days 1-
data-cells' 120 
44-stock- 73.5% 76.6% 84.5% 0.5432% -0.0020% 0.5452% 0.002741 1.9894** 
index 
41-stock- 65.1% 78.0% 88.9% 0.5650% -0.0047% 0.5697% 0.002864 1.9890** 
index 
38-stock- 59.5% 82.2% 90.7% 0.5392% -0.0026% 0.5418% 0.002796 1.9378* 
index 
27-stock- 54.6% 92.4% 93.9% 0.5642% -0.0104% 0.5746% 0.003109 1.8480* 
index 
As expected, the abnormal returns on event date were found not to 
conform to a normal distribution (Jarque-Bera test value of 31.8), thus casting 
doubts about the specification of the t-statistic. Table 6.6 below reports the 
results for the different tests undertaken, always based on a set of abnormal 
returns generated by assuming constant-mean returns. 
Table 6.6. Summary of event study results of Pact of Madrid 
29th September 1953 
44 41 38 27 
stocks stocks stocks stocks 
Portfolio test statistic (t) 1.98** 1.98** 1.94* 1.85* 
Rank test (T3) -2.46** -2.10** 
Generalized sign test (Z) 3.20*** 2.47** 
Note: asterisks represent statistical significance as follows: 
*=10%, **=5%, ***=1%. 
The non-parametric tests were only carried out for the portfolios where 
all stocks traded on the event day, given that the formulation of the tests takes 
into account that the number of stocks in the portfolio may vary through time. 
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This also avoids having to make assumptions about missing prices by 
withdrawing the cells that are not filled in with true price data. Given that many 
stocks were thinly traded in our study, this constitutes an added advantage of the 
non-parametric tests. 
The statistical evidence in favour of a reaction of the stock exchange to 
the news of the 1953 agreements appears to be quite solid. The preferred non-
parametric tests show statistical significance at the 5% confidence level for both 
indices. This is interpreted as supporting the hypothesis that private agents' 
expectations changed as a result of the American backing of the regime 
exemplified by the signing of the Pact of Madrid. This is so especially if we 
consider that we have put ourselves in the extreme example of a one-day event 
window.81 
g. Conclusions and shortcomings 
There are two broad issues that we need to expand on further. Firstly, we want to 
analyse more carefully the theoretical basis on which the event study 
methodology is founded. This is particularly important, if we are to address 
effectively critics that may disagree with the view of financial markets as 
efficient. In other words, we need to ask the question of just how dependent is 
event-study methodology on the efficient market hypothesis? What if stock 
prices do not respond to changes in so-called fundamentals? 
Event studies are based on the EMH in the sense that they a priori rule 
out the possible explanation that statistically significant abnormal returns may 
not be due to the incorporation of information into the price but rather to 
irrational 'fads and fashion'. Occasionally, writers have warned specifically 
about the consequences that pervasive anomalies in pricing would imply for 
event studies. However, both the 'fads' and 'efficiency' hypotheses of the 
81 In fact, given the nature of the market, what we are capturing here is the price 
response within fifteen minutes of trading, since that was the time that each stock was 
open to trade. The degree of sensitivity analysis allowed here is also, comparable to the 
event studies in the current financial economics literature, see U. Bhattacharya et al, 
'When an event is not an event: the curious case of an emerging market,' Journal of 
Financial Economics, vol. 55 (2000), pp. 69-101. 
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oo 
functioning of markets 'make exactly the same prediction about true news.' 
Accepting that market participants may trade on 'noise' does not necessarily 
imply that true information will be ignored. 
In our particular event study we may also have a further line of defence 
against EMH sceptics. Given the very low per capita incomes and savings and 
the uneven distribution of income, most of the players in the Madrid stock 
market can be seen as 'smart-money' rather than 'noise-traders' (investors less 
than fully rational and with erroneous stochastic beliefs). Provided there was a 
sufficient number of buyers and sellers so that all participants in the market can 
be assumed to have been price takers, one of the apparent shortcomings of 
Spanish stock data (thinness of the market) might not be such a big liability as it 
appeared to be, especially if we see the noise-traders as driving the fads and 
bubbles.83 To the extent that the anomalies in the efficient valuation of stocks are 
influenced by noise-traders and that a priori investors in the Spanish stock 
exchange would appear to be smart-money, the confidence in our methodology is 
strengthened. 
Despite the shortcomings in the event study methodology, the method is 
useful. The rationale for the effect of the announcement of the agreements on 
stock prices is simple and the assumptions on which it is based on are openly 
stated. The event window is clearly defined, and the portfolio has a sufficient 
number of stocks to make conclusions statistically significant. There is an 
extensive literature on the methodology and, although the typical event study is 
firm- or industry-specific and thus the remedies are usually targeted at those, 
there is a body of literature which enables us to use statistical tests that deal with 
the violation of normality assumptions by the portfolio abnormal returns. 
Another feature a priori strengthening the case for using the event-study 
method in our case is that the event was unscheduled. The empirical literature 
82 L. H. Summers, 'Does the Stock Market Rationally Reflect Fundamental Values?,' 
Journal of Finance, vol. 41, no. 3 (1986), pp. 596-97. 
83 J. B. De Long et al, 'Noise Trader Risk in Financial Markets,' Journal of Political 
Economy, vol. 98, no. 4 (1990), p. 704. The term 'noise traders' comes from F. Black, 
'Noise,' Journal of Finance, vol. 41 (1986), pp. 529-43, who characterised these 
investors as acting on noise as if it were information that would give them an edge. 
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suggests that scheduled announcements of news tend to have less persistent 
effects on financial returns, perhaps because agents can prepare a response 
strategy or because they may engage in searching for information as to the 
content of the news-to-be. In order for an event to be news it must be truly 
unanticipated, otherwise the market will already have taken into account the 
available information in the formation of prices and the event-study method will 
be misguided because the event-window can not be precise. This is the problem 
that event-study analysis faces with the effect of changes in regulation, which 
Oyl 
can be very difficult to date. 
The particulars of our case study make it also difficult to quantify 
precisely the effect of the American support on the stock market. In single event 
processes, and assuming a strong form of the efficient market hypothesis, the 
increase in capitalisation during the event window can be interpreted as the 
discounted value of the increased future earnings for the companies traded. 
However, in our case the process in which we are interested took place over 
several years (roughly 1950-1953) and arguably part of the gains would have 
already been discounted by the time of our event study. The selection of an event 
date such as the signing of the agreements was to test whether even as late as 
September 1953 the market responded to such news. McCloskey's question 'how 
big?' would ideally be answered in the context of a growth modelling exercise 
involving the specification of a variable of political credibility within an 
investment function. However, the exercise is unlikely to be insightful not least or 
because of the paucity of information available for such a modelling exercise. 
A further issue we may want to raise in this section is the extent to which 
event studies can identify the cause of the abnormal returns. Is it improved 
earnings prospects or risk reduction? In other words, is the change in the 
valuation of the stock due to the effects of news on the expected value of future 
cash flows, or due to the effects of news on the discount rate applied? In the form 
84 Schwert, 'Using Financial Data.' 
85 For example, estimates of capital stock are only available on an annual basis. The 
limitations of such an approach can be seen in O. Calvo-Gonzalez, 'The Impact of 
American Aid in the Spanish Economy in the 1950s,' LSE Economic History Working 
Paper Series no. 47 (January 1999), appendices. 
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of the valuation model presented in Equation 6.1 above, is the change driven by 
changes in the expected dividend growth (g), on the discount rate (r) or on both? 
In the event-study conducted above, the news was the announcement of 
the signing of the agreements in which the actual amounts of aid that Americans 
would furnish were unspecified. At the time of signing the 1953 agreements the 
extent of aid to be received was unclear. We thus suggest that the market 
captured a reduction in systematic risk, reacting to the general programme of aid 
rather than to the amounts of aid and interpret the event-study as supporting the 
credibility hypothesis. 
That the changes in the observed valuations are driven by a change in the 
discount rate is important to validate the credibility hypothesis, as it may have 
been possible that such increases be driven by changes in the expected growth 
rate of dividends. In order to make inferences we depart from the premise that 
while the indirect effects that the credibility hypothesis captures may affect both 
g and r, direct effects such as the relief of input bottlenecks would only affect g. 
We will exploit further this line of argument by undertaking a similar event study 
of a previous announcement of aid for the Spanish economy, the so-called 
Franco-Peron alliance, and in particular the event to be studied is the 
announcement of the so-called Protocol, as well as developing a further measure 
of systematic risk, the equity-risk premium.86 
86 The description that follows is based on R. Rein, The Franco-Peron Alliance 
(Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1993), Chapter 3. 
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6.5.3. Event study of the Franco-Peron Protocol 
This section provides the results of an event study of the Madrid stock exchange 
reaction to the news of the announcement of the disbursement of unconditional 
aid to the Franco regime by the Argentine government. 
fh 
On 4 April 1947 the so-called Franco-Peron Protocol was announced in 
Madrid. This was a credit for 1,750 million pesos (4,600 million pesetas) for the 
import of Argentinean foodstuffs and raw materials. The credit, equivalent to 
$425 million at official exchange rates, would be spread over four years and was o n 
hailed by Spanish officials as a substitute for Marshall dollars. There was 
clearly an effort on the part of the Spanish government to exploit the 
announcement propagandistically and ample coverage was devoted to it by the 
press. On the 5 April there were 'spontaneous' demonstrations in front of the 
Argentinean Embassy in Madrid to give thanks for her generosity. This was not, 
however, the first Argentinean aid that Spain received. Since Peron's arrival at 
the Casa Rosada, he had promised economic aid to the Spanish representatives, 
which resulted in a credit that was rapidly exhausted in 1946 and 1947. The 
Protocol on which we are focusing is an extension of that programme, although 
significantly enlarged. 
The announcement took place on 4th April, in the middle of the Easter fh 
holiday; the stock market only reopened on Tuesday 8 April. This seems to 
justify considering event date certainty on this day. It is more difficult, however, 
to be certain that no other major market-wide events took place throughout the 
period that the stock market was closed given that it remained so for an entire 
week. 
Summing up, the reasons for focusing on this event are as follows: it was 
a substantial aid package that was announced, it was given sufficient publicity 
(similar to the one that would follow the 1953 agreements), and, crucially, the 
only conditions attached to the aid were of a commercial nature (that the monies 
would have to be spent in Argentine goods), in contrast with the political 
conditionality which the American aid-for-bases agreement meant. 
Having defined the event, and using the same estimation period (120 
trading days) and method (constant-mean return) as for the event study of the 
87 Rein, The Franco-Peron Alliance, p. 90. 
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1953 Pact of Madrid, we have to consider the sample. The monthly index of the 
Madrid Stock Exchange comprised 38 stocks. Of those, 27 stocks have data on a 
relatively regular basis. The 9 stocks for which I do not have data are relatively 
small in the weighted index, their combined weight being 7.15% of the Bolsa 
index. Of these 27 stocks, two did not trade on the event day: Telefonica and 
Union y el Fenix. Telefonica was in fact a heavily weighted stock (9.35% of the 
Bolsa index) and non-trading would appear disappointing. In fact, it did not trade 
for some 48 days of the estimation period, as it was undergoing a nationalisation 
process with one big price jump following the 48 days of inaction. Excluding it 
seems the best way to capture the movement of the market as a whole. 
With regard to other possible biases, it must be noted that dividend data 
were not collected for this event study. Since dividend payments would increase 
some daily returns during the estimation period, omitting them would have a 
marginal effect in biasing downwards the mean-return and upwards abnormal 
returns, thus increasing (very marginally) the likelihood of rejecting our null 
hypothesis of no change in returns on event date. The event day is also the first 
day after a relatively long period of closure due to the Easter vacation, which 
may be seen as an unusual day in which high returns would be expected in any 
case. Again, this would only bias the results in favour of rejecting the null 
hypothesis. 
Table 6.7 below shows the stocks that constitute the two indices 
constructed, for which information on daily prices was gathered for the 
immediate 120 trading days before the event. 
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Table 6.7. Composition of Madrid Stock Exchange market indices in 1947 
27-stocks 25-stocks 
ESP 4.50 3.98 
BEE 2.63 2.32 
BTO 6.98 6.16 
HIS 5.15 4.55 
CEN 2.25 1.99 
MER 1.54 1.36 
HES 11.96 10.55 
SEV 3.57 3.15 
UEM 2.72 2.39 
IBE 18.65 16.45 
RTF 3.54 3.12 
MDF 2.44 2.15 
GUI 0.26 0.23 
NAV 1.87 1.65 
CAM 1.53 1.35 
MDM 8.22 7.25 
AGI 0.93 0.82 
AHV 3.21 2.83 
AZU 0.72 0.64 
EBR 2.79 2.46 
AUX 1.52 1.34 
CEP 4.89 4.32 
ERT 6.59 5.81 
INM 1.00 0.88 




Table 6.8 below shows the descriptive statistics, as well as the t ratios for 
event day, obtained for the two indices. 
Table 6.8. Portfolio test statistics of event study of Franco-Peron Protocol 
share Share Share of Event Average Event daily t = 
of market of'true a.d.r. day a.d.r. Excess returns excess / 
capitalisation data- obtained Return days 1-120 Return std dev std dev 
cells' from 'true- days 1-120 
data-cells' 
27- 62.9% 90.4% 87.2% 1.421% 0.3827% 1.039% 0.0011 0.935 
stock-
index 
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The parametric t test was completed with two non-parametric tests, the 
rank test (T3) and the generalized sign test (Z), computed using the formulae as 
detailed above. The results of these, as well as the portfolio t test, are reported in 
Table 6.9 below. 




Portfolio test statistic (t) 0.94 1.48 
Rank test (T3) 1.36 
Generalized sign test (Z) 1.95* 
Note: asterisks represent statistical significance 
as follows: *=10%, **=5%, ***=1%. 
Only the sign test seems to show any statistical significance (and only at 
the 10% level). These results compare very unfavourably with the consistent 
statistical significance that was found when undertaking the 1953 event study 
which, for convenience are replicated (together with 1947 results) in Table 6.10 
below. 













1.98** 1.98** 1.94* 1.85* 0.94 1.48 
Rank test (T3) -2.46** -2.10** -1.36 
Generalized sign 
test (Z) 
3.20*** 2.47** 1.95* 
Note: asterisks represent statistical significance as follows: 
*=10%, **=5%, ***=1%. 
Source: own elaboration, as described in text above. 
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The results support the view that no statistically significant reaction took 
place in the pricing of equity after the announcement of the Franco-Peron 
Protocol, as opposed to the reaction that followed the signing of the Pact of 
Madrid. This is interpreted here as supportive of the view that the reaction in 
1953 was due more to the conditions that were attached to aid than to the 
amounts of aid per se. Of course, this exercise cannot be taken as a ceteris 
paribus comparison, and it has obvious limitations. It could still be argued that 
the size of aid expected from the Americans may have been larger and that the 
agents were responding to that. The donor being different may also raise doubts, 
since it can be argued that the likelihood to default on the 'promise' of giving aid 
was not the same for the U.S. and for Argentina. 
To pin down further the argument that the stock price reaction in 1953 
was in fact a response to a perceived improvement in stability we now turn to 
estimate the equity risk premium. 
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6.6. Estimating the equity risk premium 
Under the dividend discount model (DDM) the driving forces behind changes in 
o o 
a stock's market valuation are straightforward. Put simply, the DDM sees the 
valuation of stocks as a function of two elements: dividend growth and the 
discount rate. These sources of change in valuation are clearly not mutually 
exclusive and it is not intended here to suggest so or to imply that expected 
dividend growth remain unaltered. It is however important to note that, if the 
expectations hypothesis outlined above has any merit, we would expect at least a 
decrease in the discount rate linked to a reduction in risk. If, on the contrary, the 
likely effect of aid had been exclusively through a direct impact on alleviating 
supply bottlenecks, we would expect not to see a change in the discount rate but 
only an increase in expected dividend growth. This is why we are interested in 
capturing a measure of risk in the market. 
The equity risk premium is the extra return that investors expect from 
stocks over a (relatively) risk-free asset, usually government bonds. As such, it is 
an ex ante measure. In practice, however, the equity risk premium, rp, is usually 
approximated by an ex post measure of the average excess return during a 
specified historical period of the market's return, earnings to price, or E/P, over 
oq 
the return of government bonds, r. Under the assumption of constant growth 
rate of earnings it can be shown that equation 6.10 below can be derived from the 
DDM:90 
(eq.6.10) rp = E/P - r 
88 As originally discussed by M. J. Gordon, 'Dividends, Earnings, and Stock Prices,' 
Review of Economics and Statistics, vol. 31, no. 2 (May 1959), pp. 571-79 and M. H. 
Miller and F. Modigliani, 'Dividend Policy, Growth, and Valuation of Shares,' Journal 
of Business, vol. 34, no. 4 (October 1961), pp. 411-33. 
89 For a review of the theoretical literature on the equity risk premium see J. H. 
Cochrane, 'Where is the market going? Uncertain facts and novel theories,' NBER 
working paper 6207 (1997) and IMF, World Economic Outlook 2000 (Washington, 
D.C.: International Monetary Fund, 2000), Chapter 3. 
90 H. Levy and D. Gunthorpe, Introduction to Investments (Cincinnati, Oh.: South-
western College Publishing for ITP, 1999), pp. 721-23. 
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An alternative method is to calculate the implied ex ante equity risk 
premium for year t (rpt) as in equation 6.11 below. 
(eq.6.11) rpt = (E/P)t + ge~re 
Where g equals the expected GDP growth rate (approximated by a 
moving-average or fitting a regression line) and re is expected real interest rate 
(estimated similarly).91 The second method is, in principle, closer to the ex ante 
nature that the equity risk premium should indicate. Current applied research 
makes use of forecasts on inflation and GDP (assuming that earnings and 
09 
dividends will grow at the same rate). However, this avenue is not available in 
our case since we do not have a data set of expected values of inflation and GDP. 
Wadwhani reports that using a ten-year trailing moving average for this purpose 
gives results which are unlikely to be significantly improved by more refined 
regression methods. In our case, however, using such a method leads to 
expected real interest rates which are negative. Because of these difficulties with 
the 'forecast' methods of estimating the equity risk premium, we will report the 
excess returns formula for the equity risk premium as in equation 6.10 above. 
The availability of a series of earnings for a large number of Spanish 
firms eased the exercise considerably.94 Matching the firms from the Madrid 
Stock Exchange index provided by the Bolsa with information available from 
Tafunell we constructed a P/E ratio for the market as a whole, using the standard 
91 S. Wadwhani, 'The U.S. stock market and the global economic crisis,' National 
Institute Economic Review, no. 167 (January 1999), pp. 86-105. 
92 See IMF, World Economic Outlook 2000, Table 3.1. 
93 Wadwhani, 'U.S. stock prices', p. 88, emphasises the similar results that this simple 
method produces when compared to regression-based estimates as in O. J. Blanchard, 
'The Vanishing Equity Premium,' in R. O'Brien (ed.) Finance and the international 
economy, vol. 7. The Amex Bank Review prize essays: in memory of Richard Maijolin 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 23-39. 
94 X. Tafunell, 'Los benefecios empresariales en Espana,' Documento de Trabajo 9601, 
Fundacion Empresa Publica (Madrid, 1996). 
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methodology.95 Graph 6.11 produces the equity risk premium as the difference in 
E/P and bond yields (see Table A. 12 in the Appendix for data).96 
Graph 6.11. The equity risk premium in the Madrid stock exchange, 1948-1962 
Sources: Tafunell, 'Los beneficios,' and Bolsa de Madrid, Indice, and Instituto 
Nacional de Estadlstica, Boletin Mensual de Estadistica. For availability of 
earnings data for stock-index firms see Table A. 13 in the Appendix. 
These results show a clear reduction of the equity risk premium in the 
mid-1950s. The evolution of the risk premium seems to be determined primarily 
by the price changes, which are dramatic both in late 1953 and early 1957, 
calling into question the utility of the estimation of the risk premium in our case 
95 Dividing total market capitalisation of stocks included in the index by the sum of total 
earnings of those stocks. The earnings used to calculate the P/E for year t are those from 
year t-1. FTSE, FTSE International Guide to Calculation Methods for U.K. Indices 
fhttp://www.ftse.com, version 3.0, January 1999), p. 31. It is possible to calculate other 
measures, such as a weighted average of the P/E ratios of stocks in which the weights 
attached to the P/E ratios of individual stocks mirror the weights of those stocks in the 
index. This exercise was undertaken but results did not differ significantly from the total 
market P/E. 
96Instituto Nacional de Estadistica, Boletin mensual de Estadistica, various issues. The 
yield of the government bonds provided is an average of four debt issues (4% perpetuity 
interior; 3% amort. 1928; 4% amort. 15-Nov-1945 and 3.5% l-Jan-1946), as reported in 
Instituto Nacional de Estadistica, Tercer Suplemento al Boletin Mensual de Estadistica 
(December 1950), p. 105. 
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study. This is particularly so since the risk-free asset that we use in the 
calculation is the Spanish government bond. Given the nature of the argument 
explored, no Spanish asset can be free of the political risk (which is country-
wide), and since capital exports were forbidden, there is arguably no good 
substitute to use as a benchmark. 
The short-lived nature of the changes detected in Graph 6.11, as in many 
other indicators, calls for some discussion. It may be argued that the reverse in 
the trends shown from 1957 indicates that whatever credibility effects the 
American support to Spain had were temporary. This would cast serious doubts 
on the validity of the argument, since the essence of the credibility hypothesis is 
long-term in nature. But, as emphasised throughout, a feature of the financial 
time-series is the multiplicity of shocks that affect them. The time-series were 
presented primarily as a first hurdle to see whether they would refute the 
hypothesis or not. That is why it was argued above that the event study 
methodology was needed if we were to ascertain the causal link between the 
American support and the enhanced business sentiment. As we will see in 
Chapter Seven below, the financial instability from 1957 onwards is associated 
with an eventful period of Spanish economic policy which it is reasonable to 
expect would affect the financial markets. 
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6.7. Conclusion 
The evidence presented is supportive of the credibility hypothesis. As with any 
use of financial market data to infer agents' expectations, a strong disbelief in the 
efficient market hypothesis would cast doubts about the information content of 
stock prices and thus on the validity of the event study method. However, the 
analysis does not rely on one specific set of evidence, qualitative or quantitative, 
or on a particular statistical test. The evidence presented above is consistent even 
though each individual piece may suffer from its own shortcomings. Thus, 
original sources point to the responsiveness of Spanish private investors to the 
American rapprochement to Spain, yet it may be questioned whether their 
behaviour was in fact representative. The general pattern of private investment 
and financial indicators is consistent with the hypothesis and suggests the 
potential economic significance of the underlying process, yet does not help us 
isolate the driving forces behind the improved business sentiment. The event 
study allows us to show unequivocally that the Spanish business community 
responded to the Spanish-American agreements. However, given the nature of 
the hypothesis, the event study methodology cannot help us to quantify the 
precise impact of the improved political credibility deriving from the American 
support on investment and Spanish economic growth as expected by Spanish 
agents. 
On the nature of the argument presented it should be stressed that the 
economic implications of the agreements were unintended consequences. As we 
saw in Chapter Four, each side entered the negotiations with other very concrete 
goals in mind. It should also be stressed that the argument here is not one in 
which the credibility effects of aid are weighed against its direct impact on, for 
example, resolving supply bottlenecks. The two are not mutually exclusive and 
no such attempt at weighing is made here. The aim has been the more modest 
one, yet still novel, of underpinning a link that theory suggests may be important. 
Although this is no growth-accounting exercise, the conclusion from this chapter 
affects the Spanish historiography in its search for explanations for economic 
growth during the 1950s, particularly if the actual economic policy change that 
took place throughout the decade is confirmed to have been limited. 
The analysis presented here may also be informative for other studies of 
the effect of aid programmes. The emphasis on the incentive structure of the 
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donor and the nature of its commitment to the recipient has typically taken a back 
seat to the study of the direct impact of aid-financed goods or of the attempts by 
the donor at exercising leverage over the recipient countries. Even the revival of 
the literature on the Marshall Plan, with its emphasis on indirect institutional 
effects, has given pre-eminence to leverage and outright conditionality rather 
than to the commitment to the stability of the recipient countries. 
On a methodological level, it has been argued here that the event study is 
a good method to proxy for the effect that the American support had on Spanish 
private investors' expectations. This was so because factors other than the 
hypothesis under study were certainly affecting any of the financial indicators 
available. Thus, a search for turning points would not have allowed us to 
discriminate between the multiplicity of potential contending interpretations that 
could have been given to individual turning points. Yet, discussion of these 
identification problems has not featured highly in current application of the 
search for turning points methods to economic history. 
Chapter 7. Multilateral donors' leverage and 
its contribution to the adoption of economic policy reform 
Index 
7.1. Introduction 
7.2. The motivations of the parties: supply and demand for multilateral 
aid 
7.3. The involvement of the multilateral organisations in the 1959 
Stabilisation Plan and outcome of the negotiations 
7.4. Conditionality beyond the 1959 Stabilisation Plan: what was the role 
of the multilateral organisations in the implementation of reform? 
7.5. Conclusion 
Abstract 
This chapter discusses the aid episode by which multilateral organisations 
provided aid to the Spanish government as part of the Stabilisation Plan 
launched in 1959. It analyses the interaction between the multilateral 
organisations and the Spanish government, focusing on the extent to 
which this aid was conditional on the adoption of policy change and the 
mechanisms through which donors may have affected the recipient. The 
chapter argues that the mechanisms through which international 
participation strengthened the pro-reform movement in Spain are not 
sufficiently discussed in the existing literature. It contributes to making 
good that shortcoming by using original sources, primarily from the 
multilateral organisations, providing a refinement as to the ways in which 
such organisations attempted to influence the adoption of the reform 
programme. 
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The stabilisation and liberalisation programme now being launched differs 
strongly from the economic plans which followed Spain's earlier major aid grant 
from the United States in 1953. The difference is that this time, rather than risk 
sending good money after bad, the U.S. credits of $375 million are only being 
made available with a number of strings attached. 
Economist Intelligence Unit, Economic Review of Spain, October 1959 
7.1. Introduction 
On 30th June 1959 the Spanish government addressed a memorandum to the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Organisation for European Economic 
Cooperation (OEEC) pledging a series of economic policy reforms. The 
memorandum, which became known as the Stabilisation Plan, represented an 
orthodox stabilisation programme with the goals of halting inflation and 
redressing the balance of payments difficulties as well as aiming at the internal 
and external liberalisation of the Spanish economy.1 As highlighted by the initial 
quote, the above-mentioned multilateral organisations provided financial support 
which was to some extent conditional on the adoption of the reforms envisaged 
in the memorandum. But, just how tight were the strings attached to this 
multilateral aid? And what role did those strings and the multilateral donors in 
general play in the unfolding of the Stabilisation Plan? This chapter addresses 
such questions, or, in other words, the contribution of the multilateral aid 
programme to the adoption and implementation of the economic policy reform 
programme crystallised in the 1959 Stabilisation Plan. 
Existing answers to those questions are often disappointingly vague. The 
general literature on Spanish international relations during the Franco period 
tends to focus on bilateral relationships, discussing the involvement of the 
multilateral organisations in the 1959 Stabilisation Plan only superficially.2 Even 
1 Hence the emphasis of some authors, such as J. Sarda, in referring to the programme as 
the ' 1959 Stabilisation and Liberalisation Plan.' See 'Conversation con el profesor 
Sarda,' in M. Varela Parache (coord.), El Fondo Monetario International, el Banco 
Mundialy la economia espanola (Madrid: Ed. Piramide, 1994), p. 470. 
2 M. Espadas Burgos, Franquismo y politica exterior (Madrid: Rialp, 1988), p. 222; R. 
Calduch, 'La politica exterior espanola durante el franquismo,' in R. Calduch (coord.), 
La Politica Exterior Espanola en el Siglo XX(Madrid: Ed. Ciencias Sociales, 1994), p. 
128; A. Marquina, 'La politica exterior,' in J. Andres-Gallego et al, Espana Actual 
240 
Ch. 7. Multilateral donors' leverage and policy reform 
accounts that focus specifically on the relationship between the Bretton Woods' 
institutions and Spain deal with these issues only marginally. There are, 
nevertheless, more detailed accounts and analyses of the relations between Spain 
and the OEEC, primarily because of the interest in explaining the evolution of 
the Spanish response to the wider and general process of European integration. 
As such, the interaction between the multilateral organisations and the Spanish 
authorities over an isolated policy instance, such as the 1959 Stabilisation Plan, 
does not represent their main object of study.4 Other authors focus on the 
consequences of economic liberalisation on the formulation of Spanish foreign 
policy, to some extent a mirror image of the object of study here: the effect of 
some foreign policy aspects on economic liberalisation.5 
There is, however, an extensive literature dealing precisely with the 1959 
Stabilisation Plan. There are excellent summaries and chronologies of the 
stabilisation policies adopted and succinct yet comprehensive sketches of the 
macroeconomic position of Spain at the time.6 There are also several 
Espana y elMundo (1939-1975) (Madrid: Ed. Gredos, 1995), pp. 517-22; F. Portero and 
R. Pardo, 'Las relaciones exteriores como factor condicionante del franquismo, Ayer, no. 
33, 1999, p. 218; and R. Pardo, 'La politica exterior del franquismo: aislamiento y 
alineacion internacional,' in R. Moreno Fonseret and F. Sevillano Calero (eds.), El 
franquismo. Visionesy balances (Alicante: Universidad de Alicante, 1999). 
3 For relations with the IMF see J. Muns, Historia de las relaciones entre Espana y el 
Fondo Monetario Internacional 1958-1982 (Madrid: Alianza, 1986). 
4 A. Moreno Juste, Franquismo y construction europea, 1951-1962 (Madrid: Tecnos, 
1998) and M. T. La Porte, Lapolitica europea del regimen de Franco, 1957-1962 
(Pamplona: Ed. Univ. Navarra, 1992). Covering an earlier period, F. Guirao, Spain and 
the reconstruction of Western Europe, 1945-57 (London/New York: Macmillan/St. 
Martin's Press, 1998). 
5 V. Perez-Diaz and J.C. Rodriguez, 'From reluctant choices to credible commitments: 
foreign policy and economic and political liberalization -Spain 1953-1986,' in M. 
Kahler (ed.), Liberalization and foreign policy (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1997), pp. 193-233. 
6 M. J. Gonzalez, La economia politica del franquismo (1940-1970) (Madrid: Tecnos, 
1979); J. Clavera et al> Capitalismo espanol: de la autarquia a la estabilizacidn (1939-
1959), vol. 2 (Madrid: Edicusa, 1973); J. Sarda Dexeus, 'El Banco de Espana (1931-
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autobiographical accounts of participants in the Stabilisation Plan.7 The latter 
have reinforced the long-running concern of the literature with the role of 
individual Spanish policy-makers in the shaping of the Plan.8 Although these 
accounts address the question of the contribution of international organisations to 
the formulation of the policy-change, they do so in an unsystematic and largely 
undocumented way resulting, as we will shortly see, in confusing claims about 
the role that conditional aid played in contributing to policy-change. 
This is not to say that the participation of the multilateral organisations in 
the adoption of the 1959 Stabilisation Plan is not considered in these narratives. 
On the contrary, one of the most authoritative and extensively documented 
interpretations of Spanish foreign trade policy places great emphasis on the 
foreign dimension to the 1959 reform programme.9 In fact, the almost unanimous 
view accords great importance to external factors in the stabilisation. The 
stabilisation 'had to be undertaken in Spain from overseas,' as Minister of 
1962),' in F. Ruiz Martin et al., El Banco de Espana. Una historia economica (Madrid: 
Banco de Espana, 1970) and reprinted in Varela Parache (coord.), El Fondo, pp. 475-86. 
7 A. Ullastres, 'La estabilizacion contada por un protagonista de excepcion' in Varela 
Parache (coord.), El Fondo, pp. 463-74; M. Navarro Rubio: 'La batalla de la 
estabilizacion,' Anales de la RealAcademia de Ciencias Morales y Politicas, no. 53 
(1976), pp. 173-202 and Mis memorias (Barcelona: Plaza & Janes, 1991); andM. Varela 
Parache, 'El Plan de Estabilizacion como yo lo recuerdo,' Informacion Comercial 
Espanola, nos. 676-77 (Dec. 1989-Jan. 1990). 
8 R. Sanchez Lissen, El profesor Fuentes Quintana ante tres cambios fundamentals de 
la economia espanola (Fundacion Caixa Galicia, 1997). On Sarda's role see, for 
example, P. Martin Acena, El servicio de estudios del Banco de Espana, 1930-2000 
(Madrid: Banco de Espana, 2000), pp. 152-60. Gonzalez, La economia politica del 
franquismo, p. 11, stresses the origin of his work as a study of economists and economic 
ideas contribution to policy change. The Stabilisation Plan has since been used a source 
of personal legitimacy for a group of 'belligerent economists [...] who had long advised 
on the right direction' for whom 'it will always be an honour to «to have been there»,5 J. 
Velarde, 'La nueva politica economica espanola y el Informe del Banco Mundial,' in 
Varela Parache (coord.), El Fondo, p. 323. 
9 A. Vinas et ah, PolUica comercial exterior en Espana (1931-1975), vol. 2 (Madrid: 
Banco Exterior de Espana, 1979), esp. chapters 7 and 8. 
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Commerce Alberto Ullastres famously put it.10 But the particulars through which 
this importance manifested itself are not always sufficiently explained. It is not 
uncommon simply to note the 'decisive role' played by the international 
organisations in the shaping of the Stabilisation Plan 'through both technical and 
financial help.'11 Those who go further and give more details about the positive 
influence of the multilateral organisations in the stabilisation programme 
typically put forward two arguments. 
The first argument hinges on the leverage that multilateral organisations 
allegedly had over the Spanish regime. Thus, 'pressure from the OEEC and IMF 
to introduce a stabilisation plan as a condition for joining both international 
institutions' is regarded as one of the three key elements that made reform 
possible.12 Fuentes Quintana explicitly refers to the 'policy conditionality 
attached to the (financial and technical) aid' as one of three positive 
consequences of the involvement of multilateral organisations in the 
13 * 
programme. Very similar views are expressed by Gonzalez, who concludes that 
'[f]ortunately, Spain did not escape this type of [policy] conditions' under which 
the Bretton Woods institutions granted assistance.14 Implicitly, leverage stems 
from the desperate foreign exchange position that Spain suffered. Unmistakably, 
the argument is that the foreign exchange crisis led to Franco's 'grudging 
acceptance of the 1959 operation' after having 'reluctantly conceded defeat.'15 
Some aspects of the publicised measures in July 1959 did in fact include 
statements of conditionality. Most notably, it was stated that '[b]efore the end of 
July 1959, Spain will, under the OEEC Code of Liberalisation, free at least 50% 
10 E. Fuentes Quintana, 'El Plan de Estabilizacion economica de 1959, veinticinco afios 
despues,' Informacion Comercial Espanola, nos. 612-13 (Aug.-Sept. 1984), p. 30. 
11 J. A. Biescas, 'Espana y las organizaciones economicas internacionales: el FMI y el 
Banco Mundial (1958-1993),' in Varela Parache (coord.), El Fondo, p. 292. 
12 The other two are the 'threat of international insolvency' and the existence of a pro-
reform committed group of high-level civil servants; G. de la Dehesa, 'Spain' in J. 
Williamson (ed.), The political economy of policy reform (Washington, D.C.: Institute 
for International Economics, 1993), p. 124. 
13 Fuentes Quintana, 'El Plan de Estabilizacion economica,' p. 30. 
14 Gonzalez, La economia politica del franquismo, p. 195. 
15 Vinas, 'Franco's dreams of autarky,' pp. 306, 313. 
243 
Ch. 7. Multilateral donors' leverage and policy reform 
of her private imports from quantitative restrictions.' The OEEC extended a $100 
million credit 'of which 75 million units of account will be available 
straightaway, the remainder on 1st February 1960, subject to satisfactory review 
by the OEEC.'16 Similarly, the Spanish authorities were required, 'no later than 
31st March 1960, [...to] submit new proposals to the Organisation with regard to 
17 
a first extension of the list of liberalised products.' 
A second type of argument sees the role of the multilateral organisations 
as advisors. Sarda goes as far as to argue that, although financial assistance 
played a part in the brokering of the stabilisation programme, 'its role was less 
important than the unanimous nature of the international opinion which had 
made itself evident.'18 The IMF and OEEC staffs are seen as giving 'immense 
encouragement' to the modernising Spanish officials.19 Crucially, the multilateral 
organisations are seen not only as providers of 'efficient technical advice' but 
also as lending credibility to the reform programme because of the 'resonance 
given to the opinion of the international organisms.'20 Thus, it is argued, 'it 
became possible to get accepted the ideas of a minority which were not fully 01 
understood by the majority.' In short, international experts 'would strengthen 
the hand of those reformist Spanish high officials who were trying to disseminate 
a minimum of economic rationality.'22 
Usually these two arguments are juxtaposed without further thought. Yet, 
the role of the multilateral organisations in each of these arguments is based on a 
16 OEEC Press Release (Press/A(59)33), Paris, 20th July 1959; Historical Archive of the 
European Communities [henceforth HAEC], Organisation for European Economc Co-
operation Fond [henceforth OEEC] 581. 
17 OEEC Council, 'Special notification by Spain,' Paris, 6th July 1959, C(59)182; 
HAEC, OEEC 411. 
18 J. Sarda, 'OECD as economic adviser. The example of Spain,' in Essays in honour of 
Thorkil Kristensen (Paris: OECD, 1970), p. 244. 
19 Vinas, 'Franco's dreams of autarky,' p. 313. 
20 Fuentes Quintana, 'El Plan de Estabilizacion economica de 1959,' p.30. 
21 Sarda, 'OECD as economic adviser,' p. 241. 
22 Vinas, 'Franco's dreams of autarky,' pp. 310-12 compares the 'rationality' of the pro-
reformers with the 'obsessions of Franco and Carrero Blanco' in their pursuit for 
autarky. 
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clearly different reasoning. The logic of the first argument is that the desperate 
foreign reserves situation gave leverage to the multilateral organisations, who 
were the only ones who could prop up the regime by providing loans. In contrast, 
the second argument of multilateral organisations as providers of 'intellectual 
credibility' to the reform assumes that the advice of international organisations 
was highly regarded across-the-board, not only by pro- but also by anti-
reformers. As such, the logic of this argument contradicts the mainstream view 
that anti-reformers were 'deeply suspicious' of external influence and advice. 
For these arguments both to be correct, a missing element in the 
explanation must be included. Much squaring is left to be done by the reader.24 
However, despite these shortcomings, there is little debate in the literature about 
the relationship between the multilateral organisations and Spain. A first aim of 
this chapter is therefore to spell out more fully the logic of these arguments. 
It should also be stressed that the contribution of this chapter to the 
Spanish historiography is not an encyclopaedic discussion of the Stabilisation 
Plan. By focusing on one of its aspects, namely the role of the multilateral 
organisations in the brokering of the programme, it aims to provide a historical 
case study of conditionality in practice. This is relevant both to the Spanish 
historiography, as it aims to fill in a knowledge gap about the Stabilisation Plan, 
and to a wider literature on the effectiveness of conditionality. As noted in the 
introductory chapter, this has recently been a very active research area leading to 
a burgeoning theoretical and empirical literature. Significantly, the consensus has 
quickly evolved into one that emphasises how attaching policy conditions to aid 
disbursements may only improve the likelihood of the adoption of a reform in 
23 Vinas et al, Politica comercial exterior, vol. 2, pp. 990-1002. Vinas, 'Franco's 
dreams of autarky,' p. 315 recently rehearsed this view that 'mistrust of the international 
arena and Franco's sheer inability to cast off his own ideological shackles provided for 
continuous retrenchment.' 
24 Surprisingly, Vinas suggests that 'some elements of economic rationality had begun to 
penetrate General Franco's thinking by the end of 1957' and speaks of the 'acceleration 
of Franco's learning curve' in 1957-1959; Vinas, 'Franco's dreams of autarky,' p. 309. 
Not only is his analysis based on a sui generis interpretation of scant evidence, it is also 
at odds with his insistence on the reluctance and grudging acceptance of Franco to 
change policy. 
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cases where the recipient government was already committed to carrying through 
the reform.25 This should prompt a (re)examination of past episodes of 
conditional aid disbursements. 
The aim of the chapter is not, however, to undertake a mere 
reinterpretation of the 1959 Stabilisation Plan in the light of this new consensus 
on the effectiveness of conditional aid in promoting policy reform. First, this 
chapter also contributes to the Spanish historiography by using archival sources 
previously unavailable or little used. Given the limited documentary base in 
existing discussions of the role played by the multilateral donors in inducing 
policy reforms, such evidence may help to enrich existing explanations. 
Secondly, the use of a language similar to that of the recent literature on 
conditionality should not be interpreted as an uncritical application of the 
concepts and findings of that literature but simply as a means to facilitate the 
dialogue between the historical case-study and theory. 
To permit comparison with the bilateral aid episode already discussed, 
the chapter follows a similar structure to that of Chapters Four and Five above. It 
first discusses the motivations of donors and recipients, then reviews the 
negotiation process through which the multilateral organisations agreed to grant 
aid and the outcome of such negotiation, and finally studies the implementation 
phase. 
25 P. Mosley, J. Harrigan and J. Toye, Aid and Power, 2 vols. (London: Routledge, 1991) 
is an early example of this revisionist position on conditionality. Similar conclusions 
have been reached by the World Bank in Assessing Aid (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1998), and-most recently the IMF review of conditionality concluding that aid 
cannot buy reform and calling for a streamlining of conditionality; IMF, Structural 
Conditionality in IMF-Supported Programmes (Washington, D.C.: IMF, 2001) and other 
documents released in March 2001 
(http://www.imf.org/extemal/np/pdr/cond/2001/eng/overview/index 
26 The Archives of the IMF [henceforth AIMF], opened to the public in November 2000, 
as well as the OEEC Fond in the HAEC and the personal diary of IMF Managing 
Director Per Jacobsson [henceforth PJ Diary]. To the best of my knowledge, the latter 
has not been previously used for the analysis of the Stabilisation Plan other than briefly 
in E. Jacobsson, A life for sound money. Per Jacobsson, his biography (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1976), pp. 348-49. 
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7.2. The motivations of the parties: supply and demand for multilateral aid 
The incentive structure of the IMF and the OEEC in granting financial assistance 
to Spain was different from that of the U.S. Unlike the Americans, the 
multilateral organisations had no overriding interest prompting them to pour 
endless financial resources to prop up what they believed was a badly managed 
economy. Although the U.S. had an obvious direct influence over the IMF, and 
indirectly over the OEEC, it could not decide policy for those organisations on its 
own and, perhaps most important, consciously restrained itself from doing so. In 
fact, as we saw in Chapter Five above, the Americans concluded that further 
improvements in Spanish economic policy were dependent on more forceful 
pressure than the U.S. itself could apply. The U.S. welcomed the involvement of 
the multilateral organisations with Spain, as they expected that they would be 
better suited to exercise pressure over the Spaniards. Therefore, the multilateral 
organisations would be under little pressure to provide financial assistance and 
enjoyed a position different from that of the U.S. 
The multilateral organisations also had clear views as to what economic 
policies Spain should adopt. Of course, consensus between the two was not 
always present, a point which we will later see surfacing. However, by and large 
they agreed on a common set of diagnoses as to what was wrong with the 
Spanish economy and policy-making. The policies advocated to remedy the 
situation included a unified and fixed exchange rate, aiming for convertibility, 
easing foreign direct investment, the reduction of many internal controls and, to a 
certain extent, the multilateralisation of foreign trade. The multilateral 
organisations were willing to provide financial assistance if the Spaniards were 
to endorse such policies. To ensure that the reform programme would be 
implemented and thus ultimately to safeguard their resources, the multilateral 
organisations relied on attaching a number of strings to their offers of financial 
assistance. Some elements could be referred to as in-built conditionality, such as 
the impossibility of drawing from IMF resources before a unified exchange rate 
had been agreed with the Fund. Others implied the tying of future financial 
assistance to the continued implementation of reforms, such as the progressive 
liberalisation of foreign trade. By 1959, the OEEC and IMF had been involved in 
several stabilisation programmes, most notably in France and Turkey, featuring 
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all the elements above mentioned.27 The 'aid with strings' formula appeared to 
have been tested and proved effective, justifying American hopes that the 
multilateral organisations could exert more forceful pressure on the Spaniards. 
The motivation of the Spanish authorities in requesting aid from the 
multilateral organisations and their view on the possibility of it being tied to 
specific reforms is far more complex. Therefore, this section will focus on the 
Spanish position. 
The completion of the agreements with the U.S. in 1953 and the 
incorporation into the United Nations in 1955, signalled in the Spanish 
administration the possibility of tapping in more resources from some of the 
specialist organisations of the U.N. Some authors suggest that dissatisfaction 
with the meagre amounts of American aid led the Spanish leadership to pursue 
the possibility of aid from other sources. Thus, the warming towards 
international organisations and European regional organisations is sometimes 
• 90 
depicted 'as an alternative to the dependence relationships with the U.S.' 
Obviously, the prospect of aid was positively regarded: 
Membership of Spain in the Fund-World Bank system (and provided we 
follow their orthodoxy) would be the opportunity to obtain amounts of aid 
that has not been possible to reach in the bilateral system with the U.S.30 
However, this appears to be more of an added bonus than a primary 
reason for the approach. The prospect of further aid was an ad hoc argument 
used erratically and referred to without much elaboration.31 hi fact, the document 
27 H. James, International monetary cooperation since Bretton Woods (Washington, 
D.C./Oxford: IMF/Oxford University Press, 1996), pp. 103-08. 
28 Vinas, 'Franco's dreams of autarky,' p. 302. 
29 E. Barbe, 'Spain: the uses of foreign policy cooperation,' in C. Hill, The actors in 
Europe's foreign policy (Routledge, 1996), p. 119. 
30 J. M. Ruiz Morales [Chief of Negotiating Delegation before IMF and IBRD] to F. 
Castiella [Minister of Foreign Affairs], 14th July 1958; Archive of the Spanish Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs [henceforth MAE], Leg. 5910, Exp. 1. 
31 For example, at times membership of the OEEC was supported as it would provide for 
aid outlays that would compensate the meagreness of American aid. Others it would be 
argued that it would lead to further American aid. For example, F. J. Elorza [Vice-
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just quoted is unusual in its explicit reference to the possibility of larger amounts 
of aid to be received. This reference to the prospect of aid was made in a moment 
in which particular expediency was required. Spain had agreed with Greece and 
Italy to form a Mediterranean bloc that would secure an Executive Director seat 
for the group.32 This required that the membership be formalised before the 
Annual Meetings in the autumn. Infighting between the Ministry of Commerce 
and the Ministry of Finance over which Spanish official body was to represent 
Spain as 'Fiscal Agency' before the IMF and the Bank had resulted in the 
Council of Ministers delaying the approval of the membership agreement put 
before it on 20th May 1959.33 Officials in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
complained about the attempts of Commerce to 'monopolise' the accession.34 
The trip of Alejandro Bermudez, Director of the Spanish Foreign Exchange 
Institute (IEME) to Washington to arrange with American banks loans for the 
payment of the quota was particularly poignant for the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs. The Spanish Foreign Exchange Institute (IEME) which was under the 
President of Spanish permanent delegation before the OEEC], 21st July 1956, as quoted 
in Vinas et al., Politica comercial exterior, vol. 2, p. 854n. 
32 Unsigned note for Castiella, 'Fund-World Bank,' Madrid, 17th June 1958; MAE, Leg. 
5908, Exp. 1. 
33 E. Dominguez Passier [Counsellor of Embassy in Washington] to Ruiz Morales, 8th 
April 1958; MAE, Leg. 5908, Exp. 1. Unsigned note for Castiella, 1st July 1958; MAE, 
Leg. 5910, Exp. 1. 
34 Ruiz Morales to Areilza, Madrid, 20th March 1958 and 22nd March 1958; MAE, Leg. 
5908, Exp. 1. Unsurprisingly, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs favoured the Bank of 
Spain over the IEME. See unsigned note to Castiella, 'Fund-World Bank,' Madrid, 17th 
June 1958; MAE, Leg. 5908, Exp. 1 and unsigned note to Navarro Rubio dated 17th June 
1958; MAE, Leg. 5910, Exp. 1. 
35 Areilza to Castiella, Washington, 10th June 1958; MAE, Leg. 5908, Exp. 1. The IMF 
quota had been agreed at $100 million of which 10% had to be deposited in gold. The 
subscription of the 18% of the $100 million World Bank shareholding represented less 
problems since the Bank was 'prepared to accept 756 million pesetas ($1=42 pesetas).' 
M. M. Mendels [Secretary of the World Bank] to Jaime Alba [Minister Counsellor of 
Spanish Embassy in Washington], Washington, 11th April 1958; MAE, Leg. 5908, Exp. 
1. 
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Ministry of Commerce was finally favoured over the Bank of Spain (as the 
Ministry of Finance preferred) on 4th July, thus clearing the way for the 
agreements to be signed. 
In earlier internal discussions of reasons to approach the Bretton Woods 
institutions the prospect of aid is often marginal or simply not discussed.36 
Irrespective of the enticement that the prospect of aid may have provided, 
the Spanish administration increasingly favoured the approach to the multilateral 
organisations for its own sake. Economically, the benefits of belonging to the 
OEEC were particularly cherished, and politically, any further incorporation into 
international organisms was to be welcomed as further proof of the end of 
37 
ostracism. Spain had been included in the Green Pool, an early idea for the 
organisation of the European market for certain agricultural produces in 1951, 
and when this was incorporated in the OEEC in July 1954 it secured membership 
of all OEEC agricultural committees by virtue of an agreement signed in January 
1955. Spain's reaction and ability to take advantage of the evolution of European 
cooperation in the field of agriculture provides an early example of Spanish 
willingness and interest in engage with European integration initiatives to further O 
her economic and political goals. Spain stepped up her approaches to these 
organisations, successfully negotiated an agreement to become associate-member 
of the OEEC in January 1958. Spain then applied for membership to the Bretton 
Woods institutions and, after a swift negotiation, became a member in September 
1958.39 
Crucially, none of these agreements allowed Spain access to financial 
resources from the multilateral organisations. Spain paid up 10% of the $100 
36 Juan Jose Rovira [Director-General of Economic Cooperation] to Arburua, Madrid, 
21st January 1957, in a communication that sketches the 'main reasons that advice 
incorporation into the [Bretton Woods] organisms' does not even refer to the prospect of 
foreign aid; MAE, Leg. 5908, Exp. 1. 
37 Moreno Juste, Franquismo y construccion europea, and Guirao, Spain and the 
reconstruction of Western Europe. 
38 F. Guirao, 'Spain and the Green Pool: challenge and response,' in R. T. Griffiths and 
B. Girvin (ed.), The Green Pool and the origins of the common agricultural policy 
(London: Lothian Press, 1995). 
39 Muns, Historia de las relaciones entre Espana y el Fondo, pp. 19-27. 
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million IMF quota assigned but this did not allow drawings from the Fund until 
exchange restrictions were lifted and the exchange rate parity agreed with the 
Fund. The Spanish authorities were acutely aware of this fact: 
If we are to enjoy the benefits from the Fund [...] we ought to get used to 
the idea that our entire economic policy orientation needs to be 
transformed radically... [...] All this is called 'monetary stabilisation' and it 
is precisely one of the Fund's objectives to provide financial assistance to 
its members when it sees them determined to undertake such a 
programme.40 
Likewise, assistance from the World Bank was out of the question 'unless 
a financial stabilisation is achieved.'41 In the interim the Fund would conduct 
annual consultations with Spain under Article XIV (countries with exchange 
restrictions). The Fund could theoretically request a country engaged in 
negotiations with the Fund to modify exchange restrictions and agree on a parity, 
cancelling a country's membership of the Fund if a satisfactory agreement could 
not be reached 42 In practice this did not happen, and the first IMF mission 
arrived in Madrid in February 1959 to conduct consultations under Article XIV. 
A similar situation characterised the position of Spain in the OEEC. In fact, 
Spain's application for full membership had been discussed at length throughout 
40 Areilza to Castiella, 10th June 1958 and Areilza to Navarro Rubio, 11th June 1958; 
MAE, Leg. 5908, Exp. 1. 
41 Aragones to Navarro Rubio, Washington, 2nd December 1958; MAE, Leg. 5908, Exp. 
3. Eugene Black [President of the World Bank] reiterated, somehow unnecessarily, that 
'the Bank could contemplate lending significant amounts to Spain only as appropriate 
measures are taken and prove effective in stabilising the economy and improving the 
balance of payments.' Black to Navarro Rubio, Washington, 19th January 1959; MAE, 
Leg. 5908, Exp. 3. Per Jacobsson would later notice 'some bitterness' in Navarro 
Rubio's reference to his correspondence with Black and reflected on how the Bank had 
handled people 'the wrong way. ' PJ Diary, Entry 22nd June 1959. 
42 The Spanish authorities had noted that 'even before the parity was fixed, we undertake 
the obligation of not undertaking any modification to the exchange rate without prior 
knowledge by the Fund.' Enrique Dominguez Passier [Spanish Embassy in Washington] 
to Ruiz Morales [Director-General of Cultural Relations], Washington, 1st April 1958; 
MAE, Leg. 5908, Exp. 1. 
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1956 and 1957, but rejected since the OEEC concluded that Spain was not in a 
position to fulfil the multilateralisation of trade required from members. In short, 
nominal membership of the OEEC and IMF came with no rights as well as no 
policy obligations. 
In such circumstances, discussions throughout 1958 with the OEEC about 
a plan to multilateralise trade did not lead to any results. However, it would not 
be long before 'the virtual exhaustion of all international reserves' would make 
the prospect of financial aid an attractive one.43 The link between foreign 
exchange crisis, need for assistance to bridge the gap and involvement of the 
multilateral organisations in the Spanish situation is in fact a cornerstone of the 
traditional interpretation of the Plan. The literature expands on this point very 
graphically: 'By the summer [of 1959] Franco could not have paid for a month's 
supply of oil from his coffers, and he was crying out for a new loan.'44 
According to Minister of Finance Navarro Rubio's famous account, taking the 
opportunity of the routine IMF mission to Spain in February 1959, he requested 
an audience with Franco to persuade him to lift his opposition to further 
discussions with the IMF about a Stabilisation Plan. Franco thought this 
unnecessary and only agreed to his requests after Navarro Rubio's arguments 
that... 
...we were heading for bankruptcy; the most authorised opinion of the 
country was in agreement to start a liberalisation process and opening of 
the economy, and that resistance by the government was a serious mistake, 
not only economically but also politically.45 
It is easy to get carried away by Navarro Rubio's account, dwelling on 
how, as foreign reserves 'dwindled ominously,' Spain was 'sick' and in need of a 
'rescue operation.'46 This is still a very powerful image in some of the 
43 Sarda, 'Conversation con el profesor Sarda,' p. 469. 
44 A. Lloyd, Franco (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1969), p. 222. 
45 Navarro Rubio, 'La batalla de la estabilizacion,' p. 198. 
46 B. Crozier, Franco: a biographical history (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1967), pp. 
462-63. 
252 
Ch. 7. Multilateral donors' leverage and policy reform 
literature.47 Significantly, these characterisations paint a picture in which the 
Plan appears to be the outcome of an outside imposition: '[c] ailing in foreign 
doctors implied a prior commitment to swallow whatever medicine was 
prescribed,' which would be 'hard to swallow and unpleasant,' yet, 'the doctors 
promised, if the patient did swallow the plan, there would be all manner of 
48 
benefits.' The policy changes requested from the multilateral donors are thus 
construed as undesired by the Spanish authorities. 
There is no reason to doubt that the foreign exchange crisis was crucial in 
Franco's thought process.49 A year after the adoption of the Stabilisation Plan, 
Franco commented to his cousin and confidant that without the stabilisation 'we 
were heading towards bankruptcy.'50 The stabilisation effort instilled Franco 
47 'It was only when the Finance Minister, Navarro Rubio, confronted Franco personally, 
impressed on him the absolute and urgent necessity of devaluing the peseta, and asked 
him how he would feel if ration cards had to be reintroduced, that Franco reluctantly 
gave in. The IMF plan was adopted...'; S. M. Ellwood, Franco (London: Longman, 
1993), p. 180. 
48 Crozier, Franco, pp. 462-63. The medical metaphor was particularly irresistible: 
'Franco and his advisers had realised at last that they had no choice. The realisation was 
borne in upon them by the diagnoses and prescriptions of teams of foreign and domestic 
specialists called to the bedside of the Spanish patient.' A. P. Whitaker, Spain and the 
defense of the West: ally and liability (New York: Harper, 1961), p. 200. 
49 Vinas et al., Politica comercial exterior, vol. 2, pp. 1022n, 1030, criticise Navarro 
Rubio for his unreliability. However, their criticisms are levelled at his portrayal of 
Ullastres and at some factual mistakes, such as confusion of dates. The substance of 
Navarro Rubio's account, how reluctantly Franco adopted the reform programme, is 
nevertheless fully incorporated in their analysis. 
50 F. Franco Salgado-Araujo, Mis conversaciones privadas con Franco (Barcelona: 
Planeta, 1976), p. 294. Access to Franco's personal papers may provide new evidence. 
However, even Suarez, who has had privileged access to those papers relies extensively 
on Sarda, 'El Banco de Espana,' and Navarro Rubio, 'La batalla de la estabilizacion.' 
See L. Suarez, Francisco Franco y su tiempo, vol. 6 (Madrid: Fundacion Nacional 
Francisco Franco, 1984), chapters 1 and 5, though the latter makes more use of 
documentation from Franco's papers. 
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with 'fear.'51 He personally intervened in July 1959 to ask for higher wages for 
the military.52 Similarly, whilst supporting the proponents of Stabilisation in the 
cabinet, Franco gave little public endorsement of the operation until mid-1960, 
by when the benefits of the Plan appear unqualified.53 In short, as the standard 
account of the 1959 Stabilisation Plan goes, the stabilisation was 'accepted as 
inevitable by Franco but unenthusiastically.'54 The image of near-insolvency 
appears to have been similarly crucial in persuading many anti-reform elements 
of the necessity of the stabilisation effort.55 
Before we slip into assigning great bargaining power to the multilateral 
organisations and importance to the role of conditionality, let us analyse the 
argument put forward thus far. That the foreign exchange situation was 
unsustainable does not mean that the adoption of the overall reform package was, 
strictly speaking, inevitable.56 Implicitly acknowledging this, it is common in the 
literature to refer to the exhaustion of the autarkic model and to play up the 
51 Ullastres, 'La estabilizacion contada por un protagonista de exception,' p. 465. 
52 Suarez, Francisco Franco y su iiempo, vol. 6, p. 178n. 
53 In a 1959 end-of-year speech to the parliament he would refer to 'a well-thought 
stabilisation plan,' F. Estape, Sin acuse de recibo (Barcelona: Plaza & Janes, 2000), p. 
195. In speeches in the spring and summer of 1960, Franco would be more vocal about 
his endorsement of the goal of stabilisation, as noted by J. P. Fusi, Franco (Madrid: 
Taurus, 1995 [1985]), p. 169. 
54 J. Tusell, La Espana de Franco (Madrid: Historia 16,1989), p. 168. 
55 At a meeting in January 1961 of the Government Delegate Commission for Economic 
Affairs in which some tension between pro-reformers and anti-reformers arose,' Alonso 
Vega recalled how the stabilisation was absolutely indispensable because in the summer 
of 1959 we were running out of reserves.' The situation was no longer so desperate and 
hence Alonso Vega argued for toning down the policy. Reported in L. Lopez Rodo, 
Memorias (Barcelona: Plaza & Janes, 1990), vol. 1, p. 257. 
5 6 ' [T]he plans which [the technocrats] carried out were very much the only way out of 
the crisis,' J. Crespo MacLennan, Spain and the process of European integration, 1957-
1985 (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2000), p. 22. 
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economic crisis.57 This makes it more plausible to argue that 'there were not 
many alternatives [to the Stabilisation Plan].'58 But, leaving aside the foreign 
exchange position for a moment, the type of crisis that the Spanish economy was 
undergoing in 1958-1959 was far from dramatic.59 True, inflation had increased 
from 9% in 1956 to 15.5% in 1957 but the measures adopted during 1957 
precluded higher figures.60 Real per capita GDP growth had slowed down from 
6% in 1956 to 2.9% in 1957 and 2.3% in 1958. But this can hardly be seen as a 
desperate situation for the Franco regime if we take into account that the same 
metric had averaged throughout the 1940s an annual growth of 0.4%.61 The 
peseta was devalued from 10.95 to 42 pesetas to the dollar in April 1957 and the 
rediscount rate was increased from 4.25% to 5% in July 1957. Most importantly, 
fiscal discipline in 1957 had been reinforced by a fiscal reform in December of 
that year which, among other elements, terminated funds from the budget to INI 
which now had to raise funds in the capital markets. Revenues increased in 1957 
57 'Autarky had led to ruin and in 1957 Spain virtually lacked foreign reserves. To 
overcome this situation it was necessary to unify the exchange rate, undertake a 
Stabilisation Plan and reform our fiscal system,' F. Olivie, ' Apuntes para una historia de 
la politica exterior desarrollada por Espana entre el 26 de febrero de 1957 y el 29 de 
octubre de 1969,' pp. 189-212 in L. Suarez (dir.) Franco y su epoca. Adas Universidad 
Complutense de Madrid -Cursos de verano 1992 (Madrid: 1993), p. 203. Olivie was a 
high official at the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
58 Sarda, 'Conversation con el profesor Sarda,' p. 471. 
59 The American Ambassador John Davis Lodge, in a lecture given before the American 
Club in Madrid on 15th October 1959 summarises well the necessity to downplay the 
critical situation: 'Despite the Spanish economy had not reached a phase of crisis, and 
despite external and internal debt was much lower than that of many other countries, the 
government decided to undertake the corrective measures...'; General Archive of the 
Administration [henceforth AGA], box 36624. 
60 J. Maluquer de Motes, 'Precios, salarios y beneficios. La distribution funcional de la 
renta,' in A. Carreras (coord.), Estadisticas historicas de Espana. SiglosXIX-XX 
(Madrid, Fundacion Banco Exterior, 1989), pp. 495-532 shows a 13.5% increase in the 
retail price index for 1958. The not uncommon situation of the 1940s, when the mark of 
30% inflation was surpassed in 1941 and 1946, had been avoided. 
61 L. Prados de la Escosura, Spain's Gross Domestic Product, 1850-1993: Quantitative 
Conjectures. Appendix, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid Working Paper No.95/06 
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and 1958 so issues of debt to finance deficit were reduced from 30% of total 
budget expenditures in 1956 to 16% in 1957 and 1% in 1958. Some isolated 
voices in the literature thus argue that the Stabilisation Plan came to solve 
fil 
'problems that were already partly overcome.' 
True, official reserves may have been close to being depleted. This 
reflected an unrealistic exchange rate expected to be devalued. Black market 
operations were common, with estimates of the turnover in the market of 
Tangiers alone ranging at $200 million annually, smuggling into Spain was 
common as was flight of capital -an estimated $300 million may have been held 
/TO 
by Spaniards abroad by June 1959. Despite rising number of tourists, official 
receipts from foreign travel kept falling.64 Officially controlled financial 
institutions in Spain received 'probably three-fourths of the country's foreign 
62 M. Rubio Jimenez, CE1 Plan de Estabilizacion de 1959,' Moneday Credito, no. 105, 
June 1968, p. 29. The figures on budget deficit are in p. 23. The American Ambassador 
John Davis Lodge, in a lecture given before the American Club in Madrid on 15th 
October 1959, summarises well the necessity to downplay the critical situation: 'Despite 
the Spanish economy had not reached a phase of crisis, and despite external and internal 
debt was much lower than that of many other countries, the government decided to 
undertake the corrective measures [...],' General Archive of the Spanish Administration 
[henceforth AGA], box 36624. 
63 These were the estimates of the multilateral organisations, as discussed in Madrid 
between the OEEC and IMF delegations in June 1959; PJ Diary, Entry 21st June 1959. 
64 The increase of foreign visitors from 1.6 million in 1956 to 2 million in 1957 and to at 
least 2.4 million in 1958 hardly squared with foreign exchange earnings dropping from 
$97 million in 1956, to $77 million in 1957 and $72 million in 1958. Minutes of sixth 
meeting, Spanish consultations, Madrid, 20th February 1959; AIMF, Central Files 
[henceforth C]/Spain/420.1 Exchange Restrictions Consultations - 1958, Minutes of 
Meetings. The OEEC had similarly asked if 'some explanation could be given' to the 
fall in net earning from travel in 1957 despite it having 'been a good tourist year.' 
Managing Board of the European Payments Union, 'Some questions to be put to the 
representatives of Spain,' Paris, 19th November 1958; HAEC, European Payments Union 
and European Monetary Agreement Fond [henceforth EPU/EMA] 68. 
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exchange earnings.'65 The Bank of England, for example, estimated that sterling 
transfers to the Spanish monetary area during 1955-1956 totalled £121 million 
whilst the Spanish Foreign Exchange Institute (IEME) only acknowledged 
receipt of £81 million.66 In early 1959 the practice of under-invoicing and the 
retention of export proceeds abroad intensified, 'evidently in the expectation of a 
devaluation of the peseta.' 
This situation may have forced some action as to the exchange regulation. 
But, why did an unsustainable situation in the foreign exchange reserves lead to 
the adoption of a comprehensive reform programme that implied internal 
liberalisation, opening to foreign investment, commitment to a balanced budget, 
and reduction of interventionism in the economy? Before attempting an answer 
to this question let us refer to Navarro Rubio's gripping account of his 
persuading of Franco and how the choice was presented before the Council of 
Ministers: 
The Cabinet meeting was certainly difficult for proponents of the 
stabilisation. The Ministers of Finance and Commerce defended it firmly, 
but the minister of Commerce, as usual, would not volunteer data about the 
situation of the Foreign Exchange Institute. [...] The Minister of Finance 
asked him to speak up about our critical situation. [...] Prompted and 
authorised by this question, the Minister of Commerce, with everybody's 
attention, uncovered in moments of true suspense, that our situation was 
certainly critical. The Minister of Commerce had to listen to the reproaches 
of some ministers for not having kept them informed of the situation. He 
replied, with dignity, that he had wanted to bear the burden on his own. 
And in this atmosphere, close to desperate, the government finally 
approved the Stabilisation Plan.68 
Beyond. Navarro Rubio's flamboyant style there is a more subtle 
'rhetorical use' of the foreign exchange crisis to mobilise support for the reform 
65 Economic Summary for Spain, Fourth Quarter 1959, by F. Weaver, Madrid, 12th 
January 1960, in 'Spain Quarterly Economic Reports 1959-1961', Spain, Madrid Emb., 
CGR, 1953-1963, FSPF, RG84 (entry 3167B, box 11), NACP. 
66 'Sterling balance of payments of the Spanish monetary area,' May 1957; Bank of 
England Archive [henceforth BoE], OV61/5. 
67 Minutes of sixth meeting, Spanish consultations, Madrid, 20th February 1959; AIMF, 
C/ Spain/420.1 Exchange Restrictions Consultations - 1958, Minutes of Meetings. 
68 Navarro Rubio, 'La batalla de la estabilizacion,' p. 202. 
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programme. Pro-reformers warned that 'by October [1959] there will be no 
money to pay for oil imports.'69 Focusing on the foreign exchange bottleneck 
was a particularly suitable strategy. It fitted the Francoist official line that 
Spain's ailments stemmed from the loss of its gold reserve (shipped to Moscow 
by the Republican government during the Civil War) and lack of Marshall Plan 
70 • • 
funds. The point is not to deny that such foreign exchange problems existed, 
but to highlight how peculiar it was that other alternatives less comprehensive 
than the Stabilisation Plan were not even considered. The 'menu' of policy 
choices had been carefully written so as to present no alternative to the running 
out of reserves but a fully-fledged orthodox reform programme. 71 
The rhetorical use of the foreign exchange crisis by pro-reform elements 
is supported by the fact that this was an argument overwhelmingly used 
internally rather than externally. There was in fact little discussion of amounts of 
aid with the international organisations themselves. The Spanish authorities did 
not use their presentations to the OEEC 'to plead its case for aid' but rather to 
impress upon the OEEC of the Spanish 'intentions to improve the economic . 70 . . . 
situation.' For pro-reformers the provision of generous amounts of aid would 
enhance the credibility of the reform programme. Large amounts of aid, perhaps 
as much as $500 million were necessary 'to permit this reorientation [in 
economic policy] to take place.'73 But these large amounts were not calculated as 
the foreign exchange gap that needed to be filled. Rather, Ullastres argued to the 
69 Estape, Sin acuse de recibo, p. 192. It was thus the 'spectre of the gasogeno [solid fuel 
for cars] what brought the Stabilisation Plan.' 
70 A. Vinas, El oro de Moscu. Alfa y omega de un mito franquista (Barcelona: Grijalbo, 
1979). 
71 Vinas et al, Politica comercial exterior, vol. 2, p. 968, note how the IEME suggested 
some mere modifications of the exchange rates, but 'these came to nothing.' 
72 'Observations at OEEC Annual Review of Spain' by C. S. Hinman, 17th March 1959 
(the review took place in Paris on 12th March 1959), in 'OEEC 1959-1961', Spain, 
Madrid Emb., CGR 1953-1963, FSPF, RG84 (entry 3167B, box 11), NACP. 
73 'Conversation with L. Lopez Rodo [Technical Secretary-General, Ministry of 
Presidency],' by Milton Barall [Counsellor of Embassy for Economic Affairs], Madrid, 
19th January 1959, in 'Memos of conversation, 1959-1961', Spain, Madrid Emb., CGR, 
1953-1963, FSPF, RG84 (entry 3167B, box 11), NACP. 
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American representatives that it was of the 'utmost psychological importance' 
that the Americans provide a credit line as part of the aid package although... 
...[n]either he [Ullastres] nor the Foreign Minister anticipated drawings 
against such a line of credit but they thought it would be extremely 
important in building up Spanish support for the measures agreed to.74 
The possibility that this was merely an attempt at securing ever larger 
amounts of aid from would-be donors should be discarded given how fluid and 
transparent was the communication between Ullastres and the Americans. In 
May 1959, he cheerily confided that the situation in the balance of payments was 
'much better than had been anticipated and there is almost no trade deficit so far 
this year.'75 Had Ullastres thought of the Plan primarily as a mechanism to fight 
a foreign exchange crisis this would have led to a reconsideration of policy 
options. On the contrary, Ullastres seemed pleased with the possibility that the 
Stabilisation Plan may be given credit for an outcome already on its way. In fact, 
Ullastres was slightly worried about the toughness of the OEEC in concluding 
the negotiations since he hoped that the plan could start being implemented by 
the end of June, 'which is a good time because of seasonality in the foreign 
exchange.'76 It was important that the Plan appeared to have positive effects from 
the start even if its sponsors acknowledged that such success were partly due to 
other factors. Compare this with the tone of the standard narrative, in which 'the 
dramatic situation of foreign payments did not allow waiting much longer.' 
Similarly, amongst pro-reform elements, developments such as the 
French franc devaluation and declaration of convertibility of many European 
currencies at the end of 1958 were seen rather as a 'unique opportunity for the 
government [...] to reorient itself economically without admitting that it has made 
74 'Views of the Minister of Commerce on OEEC membership and economic 
stabilisation', by Barall, Madrid, 14th May 1959, in Spain, Madrid Emb., CGR 1953-
1963, FSPF, RG84 (entry 3167B, box 11), NACP. 
75 Ibid. 
16 Ibid. 
77 Vinas et al, Politica comercial exterior, vol. 2, p. 1060. A recurring theme in their 
analysis is to highlight the deterioration of the Spanish foreign sector as a primary 
reason for the reorientation in economic policy (pp. 878, 890). 
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errors in the past.'78 Thus, they emphasised these aspects, like the foreign 
exchange crisis, not only because of their intrinsic relevance but because they 
were useful elements in their attempts at securing the reform of policy, for their 
rhetorical value. 
The foreign exchange crisis cannot, strictly speaking, inevitably imply the 
adoption of a comprehensive orthodox stabilisation programme, including a 
balanced budget, fixed and credible exchange rate, liberalisation of trade, etc. 
Suggesting that the Plan was inevitable 'because by then it was the only possible 
remedy,'79 is as fallacious as the claim, put forward by regime propagandists, 
that autarky was imposed and the regime had no other option during the 1940s 
and 1950s.80 
True, had the Stabilisation Plan not been adopted the outcome would 
have been different, and the type of sustained growth that the 1960-1973 period 
saw in Spain may not have been achievable had an alternative course of action 
been followed. However, this does not imply that alternatives did not exist. This 
aspect is insufficiently emphasised in the existing literature.81 Recognising that 
this was the case can only enrich the explanation as to why a particular course of 
action was followed. It prompts questions about the 'menu-writing' and why pro-
autarkic elements were unable to suggest middle-of-the-road alternatives, which 
78 Memorandum of conversation Barall, A. Garrigues [lawyer and frequent intermediary 
between U.S. Embassy andUllastres], E. Garrigues [Ministry of Foreign Affairs], 
Rovira, Count of Mieres [industrialist], J. Beltran [Banco Urquijo] and J. Tejero [Banco 
Hispano-Americano], Madrid, 23rd Januaryl959 in Spain, Madrid Emb., CGR 1953-
1963, FSPF, RG84 (entry 3167B, box 11), NACP. 
79 Vinas et al., Politica comercial exterior, vol. 2, p. 1055. 
80 In other words, 'events [...] could have, almost always, been different,' as has recently 
been emphasised in relation to the establishment and early activities of the Instituto 
Nacional de Industria; E. San Roman, 'La gestation castrense del INI,' in A. Gomez 
Mendoza (ed.), De mitos y milagros. El Instituto Nacional de Autarquia (Barcelona: 
Edicions de la Universitat de Barcelona, 2000), p. 66. An example of this view of 
autarky as imposed from the outside is Suarez, Francisco Franco y su tiempo, vol. 6. 
81 Cfr. L. Marti, 'Estabilidad y desarrollo,' Information Comercial Espanola, no. 500 
(April 1975), pp. 42-57. 
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would advance our understanding of the adoption of the plan and the policy-
making of the Franco regime.82 
Part of the answer to those questions may be related to the difficulty in 
QO 
ascertaining the extent of the growing numbers in pro-reform elements. The 
lack of an open political market where ideas and policies could be discussed and 
the relative strength of parties weighed made any assessment about the backing 
of the stabilisation programme an enduring incognita. For many pro-reformers, it 
would ultimately prove 'surprising' that the stabilisation was carried through, 
since they believed that the forces in favour of maintaining the status quo were 
'almost invincible.'84 It is in this context that pro-reformers moved quietly and 
cautiously. The famous 'questionnaire' by the Ministry of Finance to survey 
several Spanish organisations has long been regarded in the literature as an • • oc 
exercise of affirmation rather than a genuine search for opinions. 
Historians of the approach of Spain to European organisations have 
documented how the attitude of Spanish officials shifted throughout the 1950s, 
being increasingly in favour of integration and multilateralisation.86 As early as 
July 1955 the Spanish delegation before the OEEC recommended an application 
for membership. The most powerful argument was the potential economic 
82 C. W. Anderson, The political economy of modern Spain (Madison: University of 
Wisconsin Press, 1970), pp. 120-8 deals with this issue in relation to the January 1959 
questionnaire on policy options submitted by the Ministry of Finance to several 
organisations within Spain. 
83 A full consideration of the questions about policy-menu writing and weakness of 
autarkic element lies outside the scope of this section (focused on the motivations of the 
Spanish government to request aid) and indeed of this thesis, and will not be pursued 
any further here. 
84 Fuentes Quintana, 'El Plan de Estabilizacion economica de 1959,' p. 35. 
85 Anderson, The political economy of modern Spain, p. 122 and Gonzalez, La economia 
politica del franquismo, p. 171. 
86 Guirao, Spain and the reconstruction of Western Europe. 
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an 
benefits of expanded trade. Similar views were held by Spanish officials 
oo 
dealing with the approach to the Bretton Woods institutions. 
By mid-1956, observers detected a change in the attitude of Spanish 
officials towards multilateralisation and praise among Spanish officials for the oq 
European Payments Union. The inflation resulting from the 1956 wage 
increases subsequently led to a 'general feeling that the government will have to 
take strong measures to arrest the inflationary trend.'90 Similarly, there were 
'many rumours among well-informed circles in Madrid of some modification in 
the rate for the peseta,' and in particular about the possible unification of 
exchange rates, a move which had previously been 'resisted on grounds of 
prestige and also because extensive and influential vested interests are 
involved.91 This non-internal evidence indicating that a change of policy was on 
the cards before the cabinet reshuffle of February 1957 is important to put in 
perspective the argument that the reforms were undertaken by a 'liberal no 
commando without infantry.' That no blueprint existed m February 1957 
should not conceal the fact that the tide was already changing. 
87 Moreno Juste, Franquismoy construction europea, pp. 96-129 provides a 
documented account of the early Spanish approach to the OEEC. 
88 Ruiz Morales to Jose Nunez Iglesias [Under-Secretary of Foreign Economy], 
Washington, 11th February 1957, sketches some unofficial contacts with the Bretton 
Woods institutions and states how he 'always awaits with interest the official request to 
prepare the membership application;' MAE, Leg. 5908, Exp. 1. 
89 'Spain', by S. J. Turner, 7th June 1956; BoE, OV61/5. 
90 This was the view of the Vice-Governor of the Bank of Spain as transmitted to the 
Bank of England, 'Spain', by Turner, 20th December 1956; BoE, OV61/5. 
91 It was expected that the pound be devalued to 125 pesetas. 'Spain', by Turner, 20th 
December 1956; BoE, OV61/5. In April 1957 the new rate for the pound was set at 
117.6 pesetas, compared to the previous range of 30.66 to 106.9 pesetas to the pound. 
92 Gonzalez, La economia politica delfranquismo, p. 33. 
93 Ibid., p. 16 goes as far as arguing that the Plan was the 'unexpected outcome' of 
incorporating a new element in the cabinet, the Opus Dei technocrats, to preserve the 
balance of power within traditional Francoist 'families.' Ullastres later speculated about 
the reasons for his ministerial appointment noting that it was 'possibly influenced my 
specialisation in monetary matters of devaluation and stabilisation when nobody knew 
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This growing support for reform is especially relevant if we concur with 
the typical characterisation of Franco as a pragmatic arbiter, who 'almost always 
went for the majority of the ministers.'94 Similarly, it is the more important if we 
see Spanish foreign policy as 'overall pragmatic, lacking idealism and focused on 
qc 
the survival of the regime as the ultimate objective.' 
This is not to say that there was no opposition within the Spanish 
government to this policy by both autarkic elements and, surprisingly, by 
elements within the reformist camp. Disputes within the government between 
autarkic elements and reformers have long been the focus of the literature.96 
The issue of the divisions within the reform camp is one that is not often 
sufficiently emphasised. As already noted, 'litigation' between the Ministries of 
Commerce and Finance was long-standing.97 In fact, there were many personal 
conflicts, amongst which the most discussed is the rivalry between Navarro QO t 
Rubio and Ullastres. Despite sharing a common long-term vision for Spanish 
economic policy, concerns about their individual success appear to have been 
about these things and I had published on those issues;' quoted in Lopez Rodo, 
Memorias, vol. 1, p. 91. 
94 Lopez Rodo, Memorias, vol. 1, p. 85. On Franco as arbiter see Fusi, Franco, p. 128. 
95 J. M. Armero, La politica exterior de Franco (Barcelona: Ed. Planeta, 1978), pp. 64-
68. Cfr. Vinas, 'Franco's dreams of autarky,' still puts great weight on the ideological 
basis of Francoist foreign economic policy. Vinas tries to demonstrate the importance of 
Franco's personal ideology on economic matters as a driving force behind autarky, and 
further claims that such ideology remained untouched throughout Franco's lifetime. 
However, by showing that Franco's personal preferences apparently did not change at a 
time when foreign economic policy is changing line is changing, Vinas effectively 
undermines his very thesis that Spanish foreign economic policy can be explained by 
Franco's own ideology. 
96 Vinas et al., Politica comercial exterior, pp. 992-1036. See also Sarda, 'Conversation 
con el profesor Sarda,' p. 470. 
97 Ruiz Morales to Areilza, Madrid, 20th March 1958; MAE, Leg. 5908, Exp. 1. 
98 Personal confrontations affected not only politicians but also technical staff. Estape, 
Sin acuse de recibo, p. 109, recalls, for example, how Luis de Olariaga despised Sarda, 
despite both being proponents of more liberal economic policies; J. Velarde, 
Economistas espanoles contemporaneos: primeros maestros (Madrid: Espasa Calpe, 
1990), p. 189. 
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overriding. Personal animosities were particularly important in a regime where 
power ultimately depended on Franco's personal intervention." 
The ultimate example of infighting within the reform camp is Arburua's 
opposition to the Stabilisation Plan.100 As we saw in Chapter Five above, 
Arburua had been, as Minister of Commerce, one of the early and leading voices 
in favour of a more liberal economic policy during the 1950s. Arburua's 
dissatisfaction with the 1959 operation was, however, notorious. For example, an 
editorial of SP magazine, in which Arburua had a personal interest, bitterly 
complained about the 'lost independence' and how the Plan implied giving up of 
'control over the domestic economy,' prompting the issue to be seized by the 
censor at the personal intervention of Ullastres.101 Perhaps Arburua, despite his 
1 07 
pro-reform feelings, acted out of personal antagonism. In other words, 
Arburua's first and overruling priority may have been not policy reform but his 
personal advancement within the regime.103 
99 Fuentes Quintana, 'El Plan de Estabilizacion economica de 1959,' p. 28n attacks 
Lopez Rodo for having 'expropriated Professor Torres' project [creation of an Economic 
Coordination and Planning Unit],' further arguing that this would have 'grave 
consequences for Spanish economic policy-making,' accusing Lopez Rodo of diluting 
the reforms envisaged. 
100 Even Vinas et al., Politica comercial exterior, vol. 2, p. 871 recognise their surprise 
at Arburua's opposition to the Stabilisation Plan. This is particularly revealing in a text 
otherwise referred to as 'excessively pro-Arburua' by Fuentes Quintana, 'El plan de 
Estabilizacion economica de 1959,' p. 37n. 
101 E. Tertsch [Spanish Economic News Service] to Jacobsson, Madrid, 6th July 1959; 
AIMF, C/Spain/810 Mission, Jacobsson, Ferras and Staff, June 1959. 
102 Arburua had been replaced amidst widespread accusations of corruption and perhaps 
saw in the publicity of those accusations an interested hand. Arburua reportedly had 
ambitions to become Foreign Minister, F. de Rose [Charge d'Affaires in Madrid] to C. 
Pineau [French Foreign Minister], Madrid, 4th September 1956; HAEC, French Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs [MAEF] 371. Of course, it could be alternatively argued that by 1959 
Arburua was not a reformer himself anymore. 
103 Gonzalez, La economia politica del franquismo, p. 299, claims that throughout the 
1960s the reforms were stalled precisely because the accession to power of a group of 
politicians that aimed to maximise their power above everything else. 
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We may want tentatively to characterise someone that has those 
preferences as an 'egotist reformer.' The presence of such individuals would 
therefore make more likely the danger of conditionality hampering the reform 
programme. In Chapter Five above we argued that unconditional disbursements 
of American aid eased the position of pro-reform elements within the 
government as they could not be accused of selling out the sovereignty of the 
country. Conditional aid disbursements could have been played up by those in 
favour of the status quo as a loss of sovereignty that would have damaged the 
position of the pro-reformers. If our characterisation of 'egotist reformers' has 
any merit, the risk of playing up conditional assistance did not come exclusively 
from autarkic elements. 
To conclude this section it should thus be emphasised that the motivation 
of the Spanish authorities in demanding aid was a complex one. It is important to 
emphasise that the Spanish government was de facto a coalition government, in 
which different groups regarded aid as beneficial for different reasons and 
perceived in a very different light the prospect of aid being tied to the adoption of 
particular policies. This heterogeneity of motivations is crucial in the analysis. 
This, however, is not a usual element in the theoretical analysis of the 
effectiveness of conditionality and foreign aid programmes. Combining 'egotist 
reformer' preferences with the existence of a coalition government can affect 
under which circumstances conditionality would be effective, ineffective or 
counterproductive for the adoption of the reform. It would do so by extending the 
range of variations in preferences, not to be limited only to donor and recipient 
but also within donor variation.104 
Some members of the coalition government came to accept the prospect 
of the Stabilisation Plan as a necessary evil to remedy the foreign exchange 
crisis. Pro-reformers were successful at avoiding giving the impression that their 
104 H. White and O. Morrissey, 'Conditionality when donor and recipient preferences 
vary,' Journal of International Development, vol. 9, no. 4 (June 1997), pp. 497-505. In 
White and Morrissey's model, conditionality may be counterproductive if it were to 
punish an otherwise reform-committed regime that had failed to fulfil a condition 
through no fault of its own. The presence of 'egotist reformers' would expand the range 
of situations in which conditionality can be counterproductive. 
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argument ran from the foreign exchange crisis to a need for aid, which in turn 
would come with strings attached imposing the Stabilisation Plan. Rather, they 
predominantly presented a line of argument in which the foreign exchange crisis 
led to a need for the Stabilisation Plan, in which foreign aid was to come as a 
bonus. By doing so they minimised possible accusations of giving way to 
external interests and loss of sovereignty -anathema in Spanish politics and one 
of the raisons d'etre of the Franco regime. This was particularly true of public 
manifestations of pro-reformers. Ullastres' speech on Sunday 25th January 1959 
thus puzzled an American observer: 
Perhaps the most striking facet of the current situation in the view of the 
Spanish government, as illustrated by Ullastres, that corrective action can 
be taken only after Spain is assured of external assistance. This is 
diametrically opposed to the view of foreign observers that initial 
assistance can only be forthcoming in connection with economic reforms. 
Whether Spanish reaction to the tough approach expected of OEEC-IMF 
will take the form of hurt pride, retreat behind the banner of sovereignty 
and/or blandly generalised assurance -as in the case of past U.S. 
suggestions for an economic housecleansing- positive action is not yet 
clear.105 
But, were the OEEC and IMF to exercise such a 'tough approach'? Let us 
turn to discuss the negotiations between the multilateral organisations and the 
Spanish authorities. 
105 Weekly Economic Review no. 5, 23rd-29th January 1959, Madrid Embassy, by A. J. 
Cefaratti [Commercial Attache], in 'folder 500 US Aid to Spain', Spain, Madrid Emb., 
CGR 1953-1963, FSPF, RG84 (entry 3167B, box 11), NACP. 
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7.3. The involvement of the multilateral organisations in the 1959 
Stabilisation Plan and outcome of the negotiations 
Before concentrating at length on the crucial negotiations that took place in 1959 
let us recapitulate what the process of the Spanish approach to the multilateral 
organisations had been up to the end of 1958. As suggested by Spanish officials 
before the OEEC as early as summer 1955, the Spanish government unofficially 
approached the OEEC in 1956 with regards to a possible application for 
membership. This led to the establishment by the Council of the OEEC of a 
working party in March 1956 to study the prospects of a Spanish closer 
association with the organisation.106 Although the conclusion was that Spain 
could not comply with M l membership, it recommended further talks. Another 
working party was established to submit proposals defining the conditions under 
which the association of Spain with the OEEC might be developed. The working 
party was impressed with the frankness of Spanish authorities and recommended 
that the OEEC enter negotiations with Spain for a possible associate membership 
status. Such an agreement was finally approved by the Spanish Council of 
Ministers in December 1957 and signed in January 1958. Under the association 
agreement of January 1958 Spain was simply committed in principle to liberalise 
progressively and as quickly as her situation permitted, her trade and current 
payments with OEEC member countries. The agreements, however, reported no 
further practical gain before further negotiations specified the terms of such 
liberalisation. These negotiations were slow throughout 1958. Spain's initial 
proposals were deemed unsatisfactory by the OEEC. However, after securing 
membership of the Bretton Woods institutions in the autumn of 1958, the 
Spanish authorities intensified the contacts with all multilateral organisations. 
This is a well-known process. As noted above, the participation of the 
multilateral organisations in the run-up to the stabilisation programme in 1959 
• • 107 
has been stressed m the literature. Despite initially noting the concern of the 
OEEC about the true commitment to reform within the Spanish government, that 
106 Events in this paragraph are described at length in Vinas et al., Politica comercial 
exterior, vol. 2, pp. 834-48, 855-67, 888-90. 
107 In particular see Muns, Historia de las relaciones entre Espana y el Fondo and Vinas 
et al., Politica comercial exterior, vol. 2. 
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aspect is quickly abandoned in the literature and the object of analysis becomes 
almost exclusively the balance of payments crisis. For these authors the OEEC 
reports are crucial because they uncover how bad the situation is. Similarly, it is 
argued that because they are external they have more credibility and hence some 
of the ideas endorsed are more easily accepted. In short, this is the advisor role 
that, as we noted above, ultimately proves unconvincing because there is no 
evidence to support the suggestion that an increasing number of decision-makers 
were influenced in that fashion. That pro-reformers consciously used this tactic 
1 OR 
or thought it effective does not prove its success. More worryingly, the only 
evidence of 'changing minds' in decision-makers are those of Franco and 
Carrero, who are precisely those cited as the paramount examples of deep 
suspicion of external influence. Irrespective of the persuasiveness of that 
interpretation, the fixation with proving the importance of the balance of 
payments and the advisory role of the multilateral organisations overshadows 
certain aspects of their involvement which may be of importance. 
What distinguishes the account of the negotiations that follows from the 
earlier literature is not primarily the documentary base, though partially different, 
but more importantly the questions underlying this narrative.109 Who controlled 
the pace and agenda of the negotiations? To what extent were the reforms 
imposed? How aware were the multilateral organisations of internal support for 
the reforms? Thus, much more emphasis will be devoted here in following up the 
multilateral organisations' concern with monitoring the degree of commitment to 
reform in the Spanish administration. Similarly, more stress will be put on the 
restraint and flexibility displayed by the multilateral organisations. 
108 'The intensification of the approach to the economic international organisms that 
Manuel Varela quickly endorsed, would become the transmission mechanism that, 
indirectly via the reports from such organisms, would allow the Spanish experts to 
triumph in Madrid over what the internal mores would not have always allowed to 
succeed.' Vinas et al., Politica comercial exterior, vol. 2, p. 872, see also pp. 890, 962, 
964, 1019. 
109 As noted above, the Central Files of the IMF are now open to the public, which 
provide, with the OEEC fond at the HAEC a richer picture of the interactions between 
the parties than the thoroughly-edited official-use documents available to Vinas et al., 
Politica comercial exterior. 
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After concluding the association agreement, the OEEC did not put any 
sort of pressure on Spain to proceed towards full membership. Similarly, 
although it was up to the Fund to request Spain to communicate a proposed par 
value, rather than putting pressure on the Spanish the Fund thought it better to 
wait until the Spanish authorities desire for Fund's resources made them bring up 
the issue. Referring to the scheduled visit of IMF staff to proceed with the first 
consultation between the IMF and Spain, the Spanish Embassy in Washington 
emphasised this aspect: 
The business of this mission may be limited to the consultations under 
Article XTV, but if the Spanish government wishes that some financial 
stabilisation plan be considered, the Fund would be willing to study it and 
if it was necessary to provide assistance. It all depends, therefore, on what 
our government wishes.110 
The Fund, however, expected such a request. In fact, the IMF had 
indications that at least some elements within the Spanish government were 
willing to consider an overhaul of the economy: 
[T]he Spanish Government would like to take advantage of this visit to 
discuss thoroughly the drawing up of a general plan, the application of 
which would put the Spanish economy in a position to allow a greater 
participation by Spain in the European organisations. Such a plan would 
have to refer to the measures we should have to take as well as to the 
necessary external co-operation to achieve these goals.111 
Thus, the Fund planned to use the Article XIV consultations "to sound 
119 
out the Spanish authorities" on the matter of the par value. However, it was far 
from certain that pro-reformers were in a majority position. Moreover, even if a 
majority of policy-makers had by then converted to the stabilisation credo, the 
110 Aragones to Navarro Rubio, Washington, 16th January 1959; MAE, Leg. 5908, Exp. 
3. Emphasis in the original. 
111 J. Bastos [Director IEME] to H. Merle Cochran [Deputy Managing Director, IMF], 
Madrid, 29th January 1959; AIMF, C/Spain/810 Mission, Ferras and Staff, February 
1959. 
112 'Spain - 1959 Consultations Briefing Paper,' approved by G. Ferras and Irving S. 
Friedman, 9tb February 1959; AIMF, C/Spain/810 Mission, Jacobsson, Ferras and Staff, 
June 1959. 
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particulars of the programme could easily prove unworkable. As the Spanish 
Ambassador in Washington Jose Maria de Areilza wryly put it, the reformers 
'are all unanimous; what they still have to do is agree.'113 Spanish pro-reform 
officials continued to lobby for an expansion of the IMF mission into a 
discussion of the 'application of economic plans that are absolutely necessary' 
and played up 'the extraordinary importance of the visit' and how it was a 
'unique occasion.'114 The big question, however, was whether the pro-reformers 
were going to be able to outgun the opposition and successfully broker the 
operation: 
[W]hat we have written does not go far enough in guessing what the real 
intentions of the Spanish government may be and in judging the degree of 
acceptance of economic reforms which may take place in the Cabinet and 
in such powerful non-Cabinet officials such as Suanzes. [...] I gather that 
the IMF team feels the same way, but it, too, is trying hard to assess what 
the real intentions of the government may be.115 
The IMF staff report on the February consultations stated that 'the 
Spanish authorities agree with this view [on the need for a stabilisation 
programme] and are now engaged in working out a comprehensive stabilisation 
programme of corrective measures to be implemented in the near future.'116 
However, Gabriel Ferras, Director of the IMF European Department and Head of 
the IMF Mission to Spain, had been surprised by the lack of decisiveness found 
in Madrid and reported that, despite the agitation in certain quarters, ' [t]here was 
113 Lodge [reporting on lunch attended by Ullastres, Navarro Rubio, Areilza, Cortina, 
Rovira, Aldrich, Barall and Lodge] to Dulles, Madrid, 30th January 1959, in Spain, 
Madrid Emb., CGR 1953-1963, FSPF, RG84 (entry 3167B, box 11), NACP. 
114 F. Armijo [Director-General of Economic Relations] and Director-General of 
International Organisms to Castiella, Madrid 12th February 1959; MAE, Leg. 5908, Exp. 
2. 
115 Barall to E. J. Beibel, Madrid, 18th February 1959, in 'Aid to Spain (other countries)', 
Spain, Madrid Emb., CGR 1953-1963, FSPF, RG84 (entry 3167B, box 11), NACP. 
116 Staff Report and Recommendations - 1958 Consultations,' approved by Ferras and 
Friedman, 22nd April 1959 (covering consultations 16th February-6th March); AIMF, 
C/Spain/420.1 Exchange Restrictions Consultations - 1958. 
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no such thing as a stabilisation programme.'117 In fact, when Navarro Rubio 
finally told Ferras that Spain wanted to obtain the Fund's views on certain 
reforms, Ferras stayed in Madrid 'to be in a position to know whether the 
Spanish authorities have reached the stage at which a stabilisation programme 
can be concretely worked out.'118 
Caution was similarly characteristic of the OEEC. Reflecting on the half-
year up to April 1959, Hans-Karl von Mangoldt, Chairman of the Board of 
Management of the European Monetary Agreement, warned that 'the Spanish 
Government itself must first know somewhat better what it is able and willing to 
do.'119 
In particular, judging Franco's position with regards to the programme 
was, and would continue to be, crucial. As such, it involved the authorities at the 
highest level. Gian Gaspare Cittadini Cesi, Deputy Secretary General of the 
OEEC, came to the conclusion that 'there was real support in the Spanish 
government [...] for a firm program of economic reforms' and that he 'felt that 
this attitude might also extend to Franco himself.'120 The multilateral 
organisations were aware that the Spanish Council of Ministers had approved on 
30th April the 'general lines of the programme' and noted how, 'we have been 
told that it holds the total support of General Franco.'121 They felt, however, that 
there continued to be 'a non-negligible room for discussion on many aspects of 
the programme.'122 The main points 'still not finalised' were 'the precise rate of 
exchange, and the initial list of liberalisation and global quotas.'123 
117 Ferras to Cochran, Madrid, 26th February 1959; AIMF, C/Spain/810 Mission, 
Jacobsson, Ferras and Staff, June 1959. 
n*Ibid. 
119 Von Mangoldt to Jacobsson, Munich, 1st April 1959; AIMF, C/Spain/420 
Stabilisation Programme, 1957- July 6, 1959. 
120 Memorandum of conversation between OEEC and U.S. officials, 22nd April 1959, in 
'OEEC, 1959-1961', Spain, Madrid Emb., CGR 1953-1963, FSPF, RG84 (entry 3167B, 
box 11), NACP. 
121 C. Castoriadis to R. Sergent [Secretary-General of OEEC], 4th May 1959; HAEC, 
OEEC 581. 
122 Ibid. 
123 J. D. Fay to Sergent, 15th May 1959; HAEC, OEEC 581. 
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By mid-May, the pro-reform ministers were privately boasting of the 
support that Franco had lent them: 
In reply to a question, Ullastres stated that the stabilisation program 
concluded with the IMF and the OEEC had the absolute approval of the 
Chief of State. He said he had called on Franco the day before the last 
Cabinet meeting, about two weeks ago, to talk with him about the 
stabilisation program. The Chief of State made no comment, but the 
following day, in his regular roundup of developments of the preceding 
fortnight, which is the first item on the agenda of the Cabinet, Franco 
informed all the other Ministers of his firm support for the program and 
said it had the highest priority. [...] Ullastres added that he had told this to 
no one, but he felt the United States had the right to know.124 
The British Commercial Counsellor in Madrid similarly wrote on 19th 
May 1959 that Spanish officials emphasised that the Council of Ministers was 
'fully behind the stabilisation programme, and alleged that Franco has made it 
plain to the Council that any Minister who fails to co-operate will be 
1 
replaced.' Ferras, however, still worried that despite the approval of the 
Ministers of Finance and Commerce of the Plan, 'it has not yet been specifically 
approved, as a whole, by the Cabinet.'126 
The issue of the endorsement of the programme by Franco, who 
ultimately had veto power, inevitably continued to be a Damocles' sword 
permanently hanging over the fate of the stabilisation effort. It was thus a relief 
for Per Jacobsson to find that, although Franco did not talk technicalities, 'it was 
clear he knew a lot about the programme.'127 In fact, the entry in Per Jacobsson's 
diary of his visit to El Par do palace to meet Franco captures well the importance 
124 'Views of the Minister of Commerce on OEEC Membership and Economic 
Stabilisation', by Barall, Madrid, 14th May 1959, in Spain, Madrid Emb., CGR 1953-
1963, FSPF, RG84 (entry 3167B, box 11), NACP. 
125 Quoted in 'Report of British Embassy in Spain on IMF-OEEC Negotiations', by 
Barall, Madrid, 20th May 1959, in Spain, Madrid Emb., CGR 1953-1963, FSPF, RG84 
(entry 3167B, box 11), NACP. 
126 Ferras to Jacobsson, 29th May 1959; AIMF, C/Spain/420 Stabilisation Programme 
(Oversize file). 
127 PJ Diary, Entry 25th June 1959. 
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given by the multilateral organisations to ascertaining the commitment to reform 
within the Spanish government: 
I asked Mr Franco if he was fully behind the program —Mr Ullastres said 
smilingly that Mr Jacobsson had put that question already twice to the 
Ministers. They had assured him that General Franco was fully backing the 
program-and now he put the same question again. 
I explained that this was a most important question -that I had seen many 
technically good programs failing because the political backing was 
insufficient. Therefore, I had to put the question. 
Franco -also smilingly- and probably a bit flattered because it was made 
clear that we considered his backing of the program essential -assured us 
that he was fully behind the program -that he would see to it that it was 
carried out -that he considered it in the interest of Spain. 
My second point was: You will probably find that during the first months 
there will be difficulties -then it will probably be easier -but there will be 
complaints. They have to be taken cooly. 
Franco: we have been used to take many things cooly -you need have no 
fears on that score. 
And then we talked a bit about tapestries [...].128 
The multilateral organisations were acutely aware that Franco could at 
any time withdraw his support for the reform programme. It was a risk that 
therefore ought to be calculated and reinforced their attention to the position of 
pro-reformers within the Spanish government.129 In the event, the multilateral 
organisations did not commit themselves until they trusted the intentions and the 
position of the reformers. Yet, it was a trust that the Spanish authorities had 
gained by delivering initial steps at stabilisation before the actual consultation 
with the multilateral organisations. 
The February 1959 consultations gave Ferras and his team ample 
evidence of prior actions by the Spanish government. The Spanish authorities 
impressed upon the Fund staff how the fiscal reform of December 1957 had cut 
the budget deficit, which had been 13.6 billion pesetas in 1957, to 3 billion 
mIbid. 
129 'The Ministers made a good impression -that was also the opinion of von Mangoldt. 
They knew their subjects; they had no need of calling in experts. Several times they 
referred to ideas they had about reforms in the future -that applied especially to the 
Minister of Finance. They spoke frankly -there was no question of withholding 
information and there was an evident desire to succeed with the programme.' PJ Diary, 
Entry 22nd June 1959. 
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pesetas in 1958, better than the original estimate of 11.9 billion. The Spanish 
authorities stressed that the Law of December 1958 on medium-term and long-
term credit was designed primarily so that central bank advances to INI might 
eventually be terminated. This law represented, as emphasised by the Spanish 
authorities, a significant new departure in credit legislation. It not only extended 
its reach from commercial banks to official credit institutions, it also permitted a 
new type of government bonds which would not automatically be pledgeable in 
the Bank of Spain -the so-called 'pignoration'.130 The reference in the draft 
memorandum to the IMF and OEEC to the Spanish government intention 'to 
continue with the progress initiated in 1957' towards balancing the budget and 
credit restraint was not a mere platitude.131 The sheer length of negotiations, 
lasting several months in the case of the IMF and even longer in the case of 
OEEC-Spanish contacts, allowed the international organisations to ascertain the 
commitment to reform of first technicians, then ministers, and ultimately Franco 
himself. All these elements reinforced the trust relationship that was being 
developed. 
The international organisations were in return very flexible. A good 
example is the acceptance by the IMF of the ceiling on commercial banks credit 
as one of the stabilising measures. Open market operations were out of the 
question since the central bank lacked a portfolio of securities. In fact, even if it 
had held such a portfolio, they would have been frustrated by the pledging 
('pignoracion') of the securities in the hands of the banks.132 Thus, ceilings on 
total discount and advances by commercial banks were to be part of the 
programme. This, Ferras noted, 'is not an ideal monetary policy device, but given 
the impossibility of pursuing an effective open-market policy under the given 
130 Spanish consultations, Madrid, 16th-28th February 1959, Spanish consultations; 
AIMF, C/Spain/420.1 Exchange Restrictions Consultations - 1958, Minutes of Meetings. 
131 Memorandum for the International Monetary Fund Mission, unsigned, 12th March 
1959; AIMF, C/Spain/810 Mission, Jacobsson, Ferras and Staff, June 1959. 
132 Of the total amount of Treasury paper outstanding with commercial banks (59.5 
billion pesetas as of end of 1958) 47.4 billion pesetas were pledged. Minutes of first 
meeting, Spanish consultations, Madrid, 16th February 1959; AIMF, C/Spain/420.1 
Exchange Restrictions Consultations - 1958, Minutes of Meetings. 
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circumstances, there is a need for such ceilings.'133 Not only were the ceilings a 
second best, the Spanish authorities 'lacked the necessary legal power to take 
such a measure' and ultimately had to rely on 'a gentlemen's agreement with the 
banks.'134 It was therefore inevitable that much of the statement of the Spanish 
authorities in regard to credit policy and control of banking remained 'rather 
vague,' though Ferras did 'not think it necessary to get more definite 
commitments.' Per Jacobsson recorded the discussion with Navarro Rubio on 
this issue as follows: 
Mr Navarro thinks he needs a certain flexibility [on the question of 
rediscounting limits] He does not want the limit of 6.5 billion to be 
exceeded -but he must be able to tell industrialists and bankers that if 
something unforeseen would happen he has the freedom to act. 
PJ: Could a suitable letter be written to that effect? 
Navarro: Yes. (Ferrras took a note).136 
This prompted the letter from Navarro Rubio to Jacobsson: 
I am writing you this personal note in order to answer your fears that the 
general ceiling on bank credit to be imposed on the commercial banks in 
the stabilisation program might be frustrated by the banks resorting to large 
scale rediscount of commercial paper with the Bank of Spain. I wish to 
assure you that my policy will be to prevent this. We have ceilings now on 
rediscounts by the commercial banks at the Bank of Spain which amount in 
the aggregate to Pts 6.5 billion and in fact the rediscounts in the portfolio 
of the Bank of Spain are at this time well under Pts 6 million. While I do 
not feel able to take a formal commitment to hold the total strictly within 
the ceiling of Pts 6.5 billion, it is my firm intention to maintain severe 
restraint on rediscounts and not to allow any bank to exceed its ceiling 
except under conditions of exceptional need. I am sure that the whole 
stabilisation program will be accepted more readily if I am left in a 
position to give assurance to the business and financial community that 
sufficient flexibility has been left to me to cope with any emergency 
situations that might arise.'137 
133 Ferras to Jacobsson, 29th May 1959; AIMF, C/Spain/420 Stabilisation Programme 
(Oversize file). 
134 Minutes of ninth meeting, Spanish consultations, Madrid, 23rd February 1959; AIMF, 
C/Spain/420.1 Exchange Restrictions Consultations - 1958, Minutes of Meetings. 
135 Ferras to Jacobsson, 29th May 1959; AIMF, C/Spain/420 Stabilisation Programme 
(Oversize file). 
136 PJ Diary, Entry 23rd June 1959. 
137 Navarro Rubio to Jacobsson, Madrid, 25th June 1959; AGA, box 36624. Another 
letter from Navarro Rubio to Jacobsson from the same date expressed the Spanish 
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Beyond showing the flexible approach by the IMF this exchange 
highlights also how the Spanish pro-reformers did not welcome conditionality as 
1 
a way of tying their hands. Quite the contrary they appear to have been 
arguing that the best chance for reform laid with them and that some leeway 
would enhance the likelihood of their remaining in power. 
Similar flexibility was followed by the multilateral organisations with 
regard to foreign investment. The Spanish suggested a new law in which there 
would be a distinction between productive and non-productive investment, and 
special permission was to be required if foreign ownership was to exceed 50% of 
shareholding. For the multilateral organisations 'both features were undesirable' 
and they made this clear.139 Yet, they did not press the Spanish government to 
undertake any legal change prior to the announcement of the Stabilisation Plan. 
The Fund's flexibility led it to accept some policies which otherwise it 
would not have endorsed. The import deposits, in particular, were singled out at 
the IMF Executive Board meetings by Executive Directors who were 'somewhat 
surprised to find advance deposits featuring in the program' and thought it 
'strange to find such an unorthodox and dubious measure.'140 A further example 
is the Spanish proposal to apply export taxes on goods such as oranges and 
import subsidies on items such as meat. The OEEC thought this 'the least 
satisfactory part' of the memorandum under preparation.141 Ferras similarly 
thought them 'regrettable,' but argued that its maintenance 'should not stand in 
government intention to increase in the discount rate from 5% to 6.25% as well as 
pledging that the Bank of Spain 'will consider further increases.' Ibid. 
138 This has been suggested by the recent literature as one of the mechanisms through 
which conditionality may actually enhance the likelihood of the adoption of a reform 
programme. See footnote 25 above. 
139 Fay to Sergent, 15th May 1959; HAEC, OEEC 581. 
140 The first quotation corresponds to the Earl of Cromer, the second to B. N. Adarkar, 
IMF Executive Board Meetings/59/31, Washington, 17th July 1959; AIMF, 
C/Spain/420.1 Exchange Restrictions Consultations, 1958. 
141 Fay to Sergent, 15th May 1959; HAEC, OEEC 581. 
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the way of an agreement with the Spanish authorities if, as is likely they consider 
it necessary.'142 
Even where there appears to have been more watertight conditionality, 
namely the commitment to liberalise trade that we saw Spain undertook with the 
OEEC, there were obvious loopholes. The commitments were made at a time 
when the Spaniards had yet to approve a tariff reform. This prompted some 
concern from certain members of the OEEC, such as the Benelux members. The 
Spaniards got away with a mere reassurance that it was 'in no way the intention 
of the [Spanish] government to establish the new import duties in such a way as 
to jeopardise the effects of import liberalisation.'143 
The establishment of a new parity for the peseta, a cornerstone of the 
reform, was another element that reflected the attitude of the multilateral 
organisations. The topic has in fact attracted much attention in the literature, 
which often has given it a mysterious or entertaining tone.144 Agreement to a 58 
pesetas per dollar exchange rate had been given by the Spanish authorities by 
mid-May. However, Ferras and most members of the OEEC wanted a rate of 62 
or even higher. Although Ullastres and Navarro Rubio considered that a rate of 
60 would probably be preferable, they doubted it would be easily acceptable by 
the Spanish cabinet. Navarro Rubio indicated to Jacobsson that a figure higher 
than 60 would certainly not be agreed by the Cabinet.145 The exchange rate was 
eventually fixed at 60. The Spanish authorities had a clear input to the 
decision.146 The new parity had not being imposed by the multilateral 
142 Ferras to Jacobsson, 29th May 1959; AIMF, C/Spain/420 Stabilisation Programme 
(Oversize file). 
143 Minutes of the 447th meeting of the Council, Paris, 27th and 28th July 1959. 
C/M(59)22; HAEC, OEEC 90. 
144 Estape narrates the well-circulated story according to which Ullastres went to visit 
Franco to put forward the case that 'it was necessary to fix the rate at 58 pesetas. [...] 
Upon returning, Ullastres commented: «The general says that we put it at 60, that it's a 
round figure».' Estape, Sin acuse de recibo, p. 193. 
145 PJ Diary, Entry 22nd June 1959. 
146 Ullastres summarised the process as follows: 'In meetings with the directors of the 
IMF, with American banks and the OEEC, they suggested a 63 pesetas/dollar exchange 
rate -the one in Tangiers, Geneva, etc. But I did not listen to them since it was not 
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organisations. As Navarro Rubio put it, the exchange rate was fixed at 60 'with 
the participation of all interested parties.'147 It is worth noting that this was an 
intentional outcome. 
In private, Jacobsson put it in the following terms to Hans-Karl von 
Mangoldt, chairman of the Board of Management of the European Monetary 
Agreement and head of the OEEC mission to Madrid in June 1959: 
I went on to say that in exchange rate matters I wanted, whenever I could, 
to accept a rate proposed by the country itself. If the rate was clearly [an] 
unsuitable one would have to say so -but here, when no human being 
could say, for certain, whether the proper rate was 58, 60 or 62,1 would 
not quarrel with the proposal of 60. Nobody can now say that it is the Fund 
that has forced Spain to devalue -its is their own proposal that has been 
accepted.148 
On Spanish public television, Jacobsson explained how stabilisation 
programmes 'can only succeed if there is the will to succeed in the countries 
themselves' and thus the 'Fund does not impose conditions on countries; they 
themselves freely have come to the conclusion that the measures they arrange to 
take -even when they are sometimes harsh- are in the best interests of their own 
countries.'149 In the language of the recent literature on conditionality, the reform 
programme was 'owned' by the recipient's government: 'while the program itself 
was significant, the most important factor was the determination of the Spanish 
necessary: such rate was inflated due to speculation, lack of confidence in the Spanish 
economy and other reasons. I proposed to the IMF and to Franco, who accepted it, a 
change of 60 pesetas, which appeared to me to be sufficient.' Ullastres, 'La 
estabilizacion contada por un protagonista de exception,' p. 466. 
147 Navarro Rubio, 'La batalla de la estabilizacion,' p. 201. 
148 PJ Diary, Entry 23rd June 1959. 
149 Television interview at TVE, Madrid, 23rd June 1959, as quoted in James, 
International monetary cooperation, p. 109. The text of the interview can be found in 
MAE, Leg. 5908, Exp. 2. James finds this a 'surprisingly modem tone' and in fact opens 
his book by noting the similarities in the content of the interviews of Jacobsson to TVE 
in 1959 and by Michel Camdessus, then Managing Director of the IMF, to Izvestiya in 
1993, p. vii. 
278 
Ch. 7. Multilateral donors' leverage and policy reform 
government to put its house in order.'150 The IMF representatives wanted a 
stabilisation programme that was 'strong enough to inspire confidence at home 
and abroad,' but in reality showed utmost restraint in pressing for more stringent 
measures.151 
Moreover the multilateral organisations were conscious of the coalition 
nature of the government and of who supported the reform. This was carefully 
weighed when choosing the reform layout and what was targetted. If not trying to 
tilt the balance towards pro-reformers, there was a conscious attempt not to do 
anything that would endanger the unity of the pro-reform coalition. The 
following letter from Ferras to Jacobsson exemplifies this sensibility: 
As you know, one of the main deficiencies of the Spanish administrative 
structure lies in the extreme weakness of the Bank of Spain. The question 
is now being discussed in Madrid, but it unfortunately causes conflict 
between the two Ministers who are working hardest for stabilisation, the 
Minister of Finance and the Minister of Commerce. I am afraid that any 
effort on our part to bring about an early change in the system would only 
destroy the existing unity between the two Ministers and have the Spanish 
authorities committed to reforming both the organisation of the banking 
system and the instruments of monetary policy at their disposal.152 
Perhaps this exemplifies that the way in which the IMF and OEEC 
conducted themselves did matter. The IMF and OEEC appear to have affected 
1 ^  
the 'political sustainabihty' of the reforms. Had they not been flexible enough 
the pro-reformers may not have decided to give it a go, had they appeared to be 
150 Statement from O. Paranagua, Executive Director from Brazil. IMF Executive Board 
Meetings/59/31, Washington, 17th July 1959; AIMF, C/Spain/420.1 Exchange 
Restrictions Consultations, 1958. 
151 Staff Report and Recommendations - 1958 Consultations,' approved by Ferras and 
I.S. Friedman, 22nd April 1959; AIMF, C/Spain/420.1 Exchange Restrictions 
Consultations - 1958. 
152 Ferras to Jacobsson, 29th May 1959; AIMF, C/Spain/420 Stabilisation Programme 
(Oversize file). 
153 J. Nelson, 'The political economy of stabilisation: commitment, capacity and public 
response,' in R. H. Bates (ed.), Toward a political economy of development (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1988), pp. 80-130. 
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too pushy they may have jeopardised the chances of political survival of the pro-
reformers by allowing them to be accused of selling out. 
A subtle diplomatic sense prompted the OEEC and the IMF to agree on 
simultaneous missions at the proposal of the Spanish authorities. OEEC officials 
were opposed to such simultaneous missions but felt that they 'could not give a 
completely negative answer to the Spanish request.'154 In fact, there appear to 
have been some frictions between the IMF and OEEC in relation to the 
multilateralisation of trade, as the existing literature notes.155 However, overall 
there was a generally clear division of labour between the multilateral 
organisations. The World Bank, for example, having sent a team to visit Spain in 
October 1958, decided that it would not be effective to finance any projects 
before the economic policy-making had been sorted out and communicated to the 
IMF that it was the Fund's mission to contribute to the stabilisation.156 
This account has thus far paid very little attention to the discussion of the 
amounts of aid to be received by Spain. This is but a reflection of the 
negotiations. The provision of financial assistance was a sine qua non condition 
for the undertaking of the operation, yet discussions of this issue were very 
limited. By mid-May, Ferras had arrived at a figure of $250 million as a likely 
total sum that was needed to cushion any trade imbalances during the first year of 
1 cn 
the programme. The Spaniards worked with a provisional breakdown of IMF 
$50 million, OEEC (European Monetary Agreement) $60-$70 million, private 
banks $50 million, U.S. Treasury $30-$50 million.158 Spanish pro-reform 
elements were satisfied with that position. Although the Spaniards would have 
obviously wanted as large amounts as possible, there was little bargaining over 
this matter. Only at the very end of June and beginning of July, as we will see 
154 J. P. Salle to Cochran, Paris, 4th February 1959; AIMF, C/Spain/810 Mission, 
Jacobsson, Ferras and Staff, June 1959. 
155 Vinas et al, Politica comercial exterior, vol. 2, p. 1085. 
156 Discussion with MrLejeune of IBRD, 22nd December 1958; AIMF, C/Spain/801 
Relations with Missions of Other Organizations in the Area of Fund Interest and 
Jurisdiction. 
157 'Meeting on payments position,' note by Ferras dated 11th May 1959, and Fay to M. 
Ouin, 15th May 1959; HAEC, OEEC 581. 
158 Areilza to Castiella, 22nd May 1959; AGA, box 36624. 
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below, do the Spanish authorities appear to have launched an offensive to secure 
further aid. And even then, the purpose was simply to enhance the credibility of 
the programme, as noted above. 
This discussion of the role of the amounts of aid takes us to the issue of 
American support for the Stabilisation programme. It has been argued that the 
Americans were reluctant to give financial assistance to the Plan.159 Why, if the 
Americans had an interest in the undertaking of the Stabilisation policies would 
they withdraw a support they had generously given before? The literature 
remains silent about this paradox. The apparent reluctance of the U.S. to commit 
funds to support the stabilisation programme has to be understood in the context 
of their acknowledgement that direct bilateral pressure had failed and that 
multilateral organisations might be more effective in inducing policy change in 
Spain. 
This should not be confused with a lukewarm endorsement of the 
Stabilisation Plan. The American Embassy in Spain was as eager as anybody else 
to see the programme finalised, and hence called for Washington to 'exert all 
necessary influence to minimise time needed for mechanics and politics of 
OEEC processing, and to assure final Council approval on 17th July.'160 The 
Americans were simply implementing a strategy to 'wait for Spain to work out 
an economic reform programme with the OEEC and IMF' and only then provide 
assistance.161 The Americans had, as early as April 1959, informed the OEEC 
that 'once the OEEC-IMF work with Spain had reached the point of developing a 
159 'It was surprising that the State Department appeared not to be willing to support 
financially the programme.' Vinas et al., Politica comercial exterior, vol. 2, pp. 1106-07 
and also pp. 953, 1067, 1114. 
160 P. Armstrong to Christian A. Herter [U.S. Secretary of State], Madrid, 15th June 1959, 
in Spain, Madrid Embassy, Classified General Records 1953-1963, FSPF, RG84 (entry 
3167B, box 11), NACP. 
161 Memorandum of Conversation, Selwyn Lloyd [British Foreign Secretary] and Herter, 
Paris, 29th April 1959, in Spain, Madrid Emb., CGR 1953-1963, FSPF, RG84 (entry 
3167B, box 11), NACP. 
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programme of action, the U.S. would be prepared to give appropriate support.'162 
In fact, it was the Americans themselves that volunteered the new credits via the 
Eximbank. Per Jacobsson approached Douglas Dillon to impress upon him how 
it was politically important for Spain to be able to point to an American credit. 
Dillon immediately responded that 'Spain will get a substantial amount from the 
Eximbank, which can be announced at the same time.'163 The only fresh money 
the Americans were willing to commit was via the Eximbank, as the State 
Department saw difficulties in securing funds from other outlays. The position of 
the U.S. appears thus to have been decided long before the visit by Ullastres to 
Washington.164 The Americans, aware that the aid announcements were 
necessary mainly for publicity purposes, were therefore eager not to commit 
fresh funds and simply to repackage previously authorised funds. By pooling all 
resources from the OEEC, IMF, private banks, American defense support, PL480 
sales, etc., in a single announcement the effect would thus be achieved. 'That 
ought to be politically impressive!' sneered Dillon at Jacobsson.165 The press 
releases in 20th July 1959 therefore presented the total credits at $375 million. 
The OEEC was granting $100 million, the IMF $75 million, private American 
banks $70 million and the U.S. would provide $130 million (although only $30 
million in Eximbank loans had not been previously announced).166 
Let us now discuss the involvement of the multilateral organisations in 
the implementation of the policy reforms. 
162 Memorandum of Conversation, I. White [Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for 
European Affairs] and Cittadini Cesi, Washington, 22nd April 1959, in Spain, Madrid 
Emb., CGR 1953-1963, FSPF, RG84 (entry 3167B, box 11), NACP. 
163 PJ Diary, Entry 30th June 1959. 
164 The importance of this visit, and the 'capital interview' between Ullastres and Dillon, 
to secure the funds is thus exaggerated in Vinas et al., Politica comercial exterior, vol. 
2, p. 1107. 
165 PJ Diary, Entry 30th June 1959. 
166 OEEC Press Release, Paris, 20th July 1959, Press/A(59)33; HAEC, OEEC 581. 
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In the Spanish case, as in others, the IMF did not hand over all its promised 
aid in one lump sum but it will dole it out piecemeal, as the prescribed 
reforms are carried out. The OEEC does likewise; its credit was to be made 
available in two instalments, and the second of these was approved only at 
the end of 1959, after it had made an independent survey of the progress of 
the Spanish economy. The two organisations thus hold watching briefs to 
see that the Spanish government lives up to the austerity programme it has 
adopted as a condition of the 'package loan'. 
A. P. Whitaker, Spain and the defense of the West: ally and liability (New 
York: Harper, 1961), p. 204 
7.4. Conditionality beyond the 1959 Stabilisation Plan: what was the role of 
the multilateral organisations in the implementation of reform? 
As pledged in the memorandum of 20th July to the multilateral organisations, the 
Spanish authorities produced a first list of liberalised trade items within ten days 
of joining the OEEC, rendering 50% of its trade liberalised. In August, the Bank 
of Spain raised the discount rate, as promised by Navarro Rubio to Jacobsson, 
from 5 to 6.25%.167 Imports, discouraged by a 25% advance deposit and by the 
elimination of the possibility of speculating with import licences, plummeted. 
Continuing budgetary discipline, a wage freeze, and increases in the prices of 
goods supplied by the state monopolies such as petrol or public transport 
contributed to curbing demand. Stocks soon accumulated and many businesses 
started to experience difficulties. From July to December 1959 a total of 18 
tli 
government control agencies were eliminated. On 27 July a law regulating 
foreign direct investment was approved. The Plan, launched with much fanfare 
from the officially controlled press, proved a more bitter pill than perhaps many 
had anticipated. Demand for credit dried up to the extent that the credit ceilings 
set by the government for total private commercial credit were not reached.168 
The multilateral organisations considered the economic developments 
since mid-July as being 'conducive to prudent optimism' and emphasised how 
167 J. M. Olarra Jimenez, Medidas de politica monetaria adoptadas en elperiodo 1957-
1973 (Madrid: Banco de Espana, 1974), p. 20. 
168 An excellent summary of policy measures adopted in the first two years after the 
programme is Banco Urquijo, Stabilisation policy in Spain, 1959-1961 (Madrid: 
Servicio de Estudios del Banco Urquijo, 1961) 
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the evolution of the peseta exchange rate in the Tangiers black market was 
considered as 'satisfactory.'169 As shown in Graphs 7.1 and 7.2 below, the 
contrast between the unofficial foreign exchange evolution after the 1957 and 
1959 devaluations could not be more striking. 
Graph 7.1. Peseta exchange rates in foreign markets, 1957-1961 
Notes: J. M. Serrano Sanz and M. J. Asensio, 'El ingenierismo cambiario. La 
peseta en los anos del cambio multiple,' Revista de Historia Economica, vol. 15, 
no. 3 (1997), p. 558 provide the average peseta-dollar rate concealed by the 
multiplicity of rates before (1956: 34.419, 1957: 40.043; 1958:43.418; 19591: 
46.959). 
Sources: together with the more common monthly Tangiers exchange rate 
system Information Comercial Espanpola, June 1961, the graph includes the 
weekly swiss franc-peseta exchange rate in Zurich as quoted by Credit Suisse 
and reported by El Economista, which allows us to capture better the decrease in 
volatility in the unofficial exchange rate after the Stabilisation Plan. 
169 The comment refers to Castoriadis' views. IMF European Office to Jacobsson and 
Cochran, Paris, 16th September 1959; AIMF C/Spain/420 Stabilisation Programme 
(oversize file). 
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Graph 7.2. Peseta exchange rates in foreign markets, 1959-1961 
Sources: As in Graph 7,1 above and Pick, Black Market Yearbook (New York: 
Pick's World Currency Report), several issues. 
The international organisations, however, kept a close eye on events, hi 
late summer 1959, an official from the IMF, Ugo Sacchetti, visited Spain to 
report on the progress of the Stabilisation Plan.170 Although the progress of the 
implementation of the Stabilization Plan was, 'on the whole, favourable,' 
Sacchetti highlighted that measures had been taken in a 'piecemeal fashion and 
rather slowly.' For example, global quotas had only recently been opened, the 
regulations on the operation of the exchange market had just been issued but not 
yet put into effect, and despite the Law on foreign investment being enacted on 
tin 
27 July, the regulations were delayed until mid-September. More worrying was 
what Sacchetti felt was an 'excessive optimism' in the attitude of the authorities. 
170 All quotes in this paragraph are taken from 'Spain: stabilisation programme progress 
report,' by U. Sacchetti, 22nd September 1959; AIMF, C/Spain/810 Visit, Sacchetti, 
September 1959. 
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Navarro Rubio confidently told the IMF staff that the plan had taken 'a firm hold 
in the Spanish economy and that the public believes in it.' The Minister 
considered that the measures applied had been of such severity that they may 
have 'overshot the mark' and believed that 'something may have to be done in 
the near future to alleviate a situation of extreme monetary stringency.' Sacchetti, 
who thought the public was 'not fully convinced that the program is here to stay' 
worried that 'any such step may convince the public that this plan is another of 
1 71 
the many attempts made in the past that did not last more than a few months.' 
Other foreign observers concurred in this view and noted how informed 
circles such as bankers feared that the Plan 'owing to indecision at the top, will 
lose its momentum before full success has been attained.'172 The Americans 
worried that despite the 'balance of payments deficit, price levels, and the budget 
seem to be under control' the general economic outlook was far from optimum 
'because of the reluctance of the business community to make plans in the light 
of lack of clarity of government economic policy.' Unsurprisingly, this analysis 
led 'American observers to express the hope that OEEC/IMF visits will 
encourage the government to take necessary decisions and to find some way of 
communicating to the public a clear statement of the intentions of the 
government.'173 
Other Fund staff equally concluded that there was a 'wait-and-see attitude 
on the part of the public fostered by a lack of confidence in the determination of 
the government to make the new economic course stick.'174 Similarly, they 
worried that little had been done to enhance the flexibility of the economy or to 
eliminate restrictive labour and business practices. However, maintaining the line 
adopted since the first consultations, their interpretation as to what 'pressure' 
171 'Spain: stabilisation programme progress report,' by U. Sacchetti, 22nd September 
1959; AIMF, C/Spain/810 Visit, Sacchetti, September 1959. 
172 'Visit to Spain, October 1959,' by Turner, 6th November 1959; BoE, OV61/7. 
173 Frank A. Southard, Jr. [U.S. Executive Director at IMF] to Cochran, 18th November 
1959; AIMF, C/Spain/420 Stabilisation Programme (Oversize file). 
174 'Recent developments in Spain: what to do next?' A. Pfeifer to Ferras, 6th November 
1959; AIMF, C/Spain/810 Mission, Ferras, December 1959. 
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should be put on the Spanish remained very soft. Given the peculiarities of the 
Spanish situation, such a restrained approach was bound to continue to be the 
best way to induce policy change or prevent policy reversals. 
The Spanish government was notably divided over the need to stabilise 
and, especially, to liberalise. These divisions exacerbated the difficulties that a 
regime such as Francoist Spain would have in credibly committing to the 
reforms. As a Bank of England observer acutely put it: 
Of course the presence on the scene now of the OEEC and IMF makes a 
considerable difference but it does not alter the fundamental fact that the 
Cabinet is not united and that Franco is still at his old game of siding now with 
one side and now with the other. [...] There is a real risk that [Franco] may 
unexpectedly withdraw his support from the Ministers of Finance and Economy 
and plump for a dose of reflation.176 
The pro-reform Spanish politicians and officials were under pressure.177 
Even among the most ardent pro-reformers the 'shock effect of the stabilisation 
plan had been greater than expected'.178 They were concerned over the extent of 
the slowdown in economic activity and showed their intentions to modify policy 
to make it less stringent. By the end of the summer, they were considering the 
175 'The Spanish authorities should be told that the best hopes of again increasing 
activity and ending the present uncertainty is to carry out vigorously the basic reforms 
outlined in their stabilisation programme.' 'Recent developments in Spain: what to do 
next?' Pfeifer to Ferras, 6th November 1959; AIMF, C/Spain/810 Mission, Ferras, 
December 1959. 
176 'Visit to Spain, October 1959,' by Turner, 6th November 1959; BoE, OV61/7. 
177 M. Navarro Rubio, 'La batalla del desarrollo,' Anales de la RealAcademia de 
Ciencias Moralesy Politicas, no. 54 (1977), p. 198 refers to the attacks to the 
stabilisation policies in the Council of Ministers, which used to begin with a 
enumeration of all bankruptcies declared in the preceding week. Real per capita income 
fell by 2.7% in 1959. L. Prados de la Escosura and J. C. Sanz, 'Growth and 
macroeconomic performance in Spain, 1939-1993,' in N. Crafts and G. Toniolo (eds.), 
Economic growth in Europe since 1945 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1996), p. 370. 
178 Comments by Sarda, 1st meeting with IMF officials on Exchange Restrictions 
Consultations 1960, Madrid, 23rd May 1960; AIMF, C/Spain/420.1 Exchange 
Restrictions Consultations 1960, Minutes of Meetings. 
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abolition of the advance deposit equivalent to 25% of the value of imports that 
had been introduced with the Plan in July. The advance deposits had come to be 
regarded as a 'relatively ineffective as a commercial policy measure' and 
therefore must have appeared to the reformers to be a good place to start giving 
1 7 0 
signals to the market that the worst was over. However, when Manuel Varela 
Parache, Technical Secretary-General of the Ministry of Commerce, confirmed 
to Fund officials that 'a change in this respect was in his mind' the IMF staff 
discouraged him as follows: 
I told him that, apart from the danger that such a change may be interpreted 
in the sense that other similar relaxations may follow, the absence of safe 
indicators as to the direction in which the economy is moving suggested 
strongly that any action be delayed until a clear picture is obtained as to the 
trends in the various sectors of the economy.180 
However, the Fund staff took note and subsequently considered it one of 
their first concessions should they 'encounter strong pressure to 'undo' the 
stabilisation.'181 In fact, the advance deposits on imports were one of the very 
first measures to be repealed, in late January 1960. Whether the interaction 
between the multilateral organisations and the Spanish authorities was the crucial 
element in explaining this and other policy issues is arguable. In any case, the 
tone of the exchange is noteworthy. There was no outright pressure but rather a 
true exchange of opinions. Even a more conscious attempt at subtle diplomacy 
was displayed when the exchanges took place with elements that may not have 
been as convinced pro-reformers as was Varela. The following excerpt from 
Sacchetti's report is illustrative of the general attitude: 
179 Comments by Iranzo, 5th meeting with IMF officials on Exchange Restrictions 
Consultations 1960, Madrid, 25th May 1960; AIMF, C/Spain/420.1 Exchange 
Restrictions Consultations 1960, Minutes of Meetings. 
180 'Spain: stabilisation programme progress report,' byU. Sacchetti, 22nd September 
1959; AIMF, C/Spain/810 Visit, Sacchetti, September 1959. 
181 'There should be no harm in dropping this measure [importers' deposits] now that it 
has achieved its purposes.' 'Recent developments in Spain: what to do next?' A. Pfeifer 
to Ferras, 6th November 1959; AIMF, C/Spain/810 Mission, Ferras, December 1959. 
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Mr Sarda told me, on a confidential basis that a controversy is going on 
behind the fa?ade as to whether or not to comply with the commitment (in 
the Spanish memorandum) not to issue government bonds with the clause 
that entitles the holder to pledge them as a collateral against loans. In the 
meeting with Mr Ortiz I did not raise directly this subject but I asked 
whether any internal order had been issued to the effect that the mentioned 
clause would be omitted.182 
The OEEC mission to Spain in early December 1959 concurred with the 
views from the Fund discussed above. It considered the stabilisation an 
'outstanding success thus far' although also noted how the implementation of 
many measures had been 'slow or incomplete.' It advocated caution to the 
Spanish authorities despite recognising that the revitalisation phase might be 
due.183 
In response to the increase in the number of registered unemployed, 
which totalled 73,000 by mid-1959 and had increased to 91,000 by the end of the 
year, a system of unemployment benefit was introduced in February 1960.184 The 
Spanish authorities kept the discount rate untouched until April 1960, when it 
was decreased from 6.25% to 5.75%. The purpose of this reduction was 'largely 
psychological,' to show the business community 'that the stabilisation effort was 
succeeding and that a beginning could be made with relaxing some of the more 
stringent measures.'185 
Industrialists were still 'hesitant to make definite business decisions for 
the future' and that '[uncertainty as regards the new tariff, the possibilities under 
the foreign investment regulations and the policies of the Ministry of Industry in 
182 'Spain: stabilisation programme progress report,' by U. Sacchetti, 22nd September 
1959; AJMF, C/Spain/810 Visit, Sacchetti, September 1959. 
183 Report by the mission sent to Spain in December 1959 on the implementation of the 
Spanish Stabilisation Programme and its future problems, Paris, 28th December 1959, 
AMC(59)93; HAEC, EMA 111(1). 
184 For this and other statistical evidence see Rubio, 'El plan de estabilizacion de 1959.' 
185 Comments by Sarda, 2nd meeting with IMF officials on Exchange Restrictions 
Consultations 1960, Madrid, 23rd May 1960; AIMF, C/Spain/420.1 Exchange 
Restrictions Consultations 1960, Minutes of Meetings. 
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regard to new establishments.' Pro-reformers had the difficult task of 
persuading the business community that the reform was there to stay and that, 
despite the industrial slump in late 1959, the time for resuming investment had 
come. They maintained the adequacy of the stabilisation measures whilst 
recognising that the government may soon need to take more forceful measures 
to reactivate the economy. The future that was promised comprised stable prices, 
protection being lifted only very slowly and liberalisation of the economy 1 
proceeding at a very slow pace too. 
The new tariff was announced and came into force in June 1960. By then 
the economic situation in Spain had improved significantly. Inventories were 
once again being reduced and production and investment resumed. In particular, 
the inflow of foreign exchange had 'far exceeded the original expectations.'188 
The foreign exchange reserves, which had declined from $224 million at the end 
of 1955 to $54 million by mid-1959, jumped to $360 million by May 1960.189 
Ullastres took pains at explaining how the multilateralisation of trade had 
contributed to this outcome by improving Spain's terms of trade, as she was now 
186 Comments by Sarda, 1st meeting with IMF officials on Exchange Restrictions 
Consultations 1960, Madrid, 23rd May 1960; AIMF, C/Spain/420.1 Exchange 
Restrictions Consultations 1960, Minutes of Meetings. 
187 'El Plan de Estabilizacion de la economia espanola: realizaciones y perspectivas,' 
speech of Ullastres at University of Barcelona, 4th April 1960, reproduced in J. Ros 
Hombravella (ed.), Trece economistas espanoles ante la economia espanola (Barcelona: 
Oikos-Tau, 1975), pp. 53-79. 
188 Comments by Sarda, 1st meeting with IMF officials on Exchange Restrictions 
Consultations 1960, Madrid, 23rd May 1960; AIMF, C/Spain/420.1 Exchange 
Restrictions Consultations 1960, Minutes of Meetings. 
189 J. Catalan, 'Spain, 1939-1996' inM.-S. Schulze (ed.), Western Europe: economic 
and social change since 1945 (London: Addison Wesley Longman, 1998), p. 358. 
Although different sources show discrepancies in the figures, they all exhibit a similar 
trend. Data reported to the IMF report on the consultations in May 1960 states that 'the 
increase in holdings of gold and convertible currencies during the 11-month period June 
30, 1959-May 31, 1960 was $222 million.' 'Staff Report and Recommendations - 1960 
Consultations,' 26th July 1960; AIMF, C/Spain/420.1 Exchange Restrictions 
Consultations - 1959/1960. 
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'not obliged to purchase from a particular country' to settle the bilateral trade and 
could thus get better prices.190 It was important that the success be related to the 
package as a whole and to stress the importance of the trade multilateralisation. 
However, the bulk of this improvement was most likely due to the devaluation of 
the peseta to a realistic value.191 We will shortly return to other aspects related to 
the improvement of the foreign exchange position and an alleged abandonment 
of the reform programme. This will be necessary because, as in the analysis of 
the causes of the Plan, the literature has overly focused on the connection 
between foreign exchange reserves and the pace of reforms. Let us first 
summarise some aspects of the relationship between the multilateral donors and 
the Spanish authorities in the crucial first twelve months after the launching of 
the Plan. 
The multilateral organisations kept to their previous style of contact with 
the Spanish authorities. They restricted contact to pro-reform elements, they 
never attempted to exercise any pressure and proved flexible enough so as to 
ensure that pro-reformers did not receive undue 'slaps on their wrists.' In short, 
they played a very limited role in affecting policy making in Spain after the 
1 q'p 
adoption of the Stabilisation Plan. A notable exception to the way the 
multilateral organisations conducted themselves was the World Bank, which sent 
a much publicised 17-member mission that remained in Spain from March to 
190 p | a n ^ EstabiiiZacion de la economia espanola: realizaciones y 
perspectivas,'speech of Ullastres at University of Barcelona, 4th April 1960, p. 64. 
Ullastres, perhaps'tellingly, does not provide any estimates as to the quantitative 
importance of this effect. 
191 Only in the first five months of 1960 tourist receipts, unaffected by possible terms of 
trade effects, reached $99 million whilst remittances amounted to $20 million. During 
the amnesty for repatriation of capital (up to end-1959) some $35 million were 
repatriated. 'Staff Report and Recommendations - 1960 Consultations,' 26th July 1960; 
AIMF, C/Spain/420.1 Exchange Restrictions Consultations - 1959/1960. 
192 Vinas et al., Politica comercial exterior, vol. 2, p. 1141 agree on this characterisation. 
Of course, the difference between the view portrayed here and that of Vinas et alia is 
that, instead of a continuity, they consider this as a discontinuity for which they offer no 
explanation. 
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mid-June 1961 and drafted a lengthy report that was transmitted to the Spanish 
authorities in August 1962.193 
Building on the trust relationship between the pro-reformers and the 
multilateral organisations, the latter were updated regarding future policy 
measures as well as informed of the existing difficulties in implementing the 
reforms thus facilitating continued monitoring of the degree of commitment to 
reform within the Spanish government. For example, during the consultations 
that took place between Spain and the IMF in May 1960, Lopez Rodo stated that 
they were 'attempting to achieve the elimination of the controls on establishment 
and expansion of industrial enterprises, but is meeting opposition from the 
Ministry of Industry and from established industries.'194 
Opposition from the Ministry of Industry was crucial given the existing 
system of prior licensing for all new industrial and commercial operations, as 
well as expansions of existing ones. In fact, the Ministry of Industry did exercise 
such blocking power. This is how an observer described the situation in late 
1960: 
[T]here is no difficulty in securing a permit for the import of say 
machinery [from the IEME]. However, firms proposing to extend or 
modernise their plant must secure the approval of the Ministry of Industry. 
If such plans are considered likely adversely to affect one of the 
nationalised industries delays will occur. The application may not actually 
be refused but it just does not make any progress.195 
The only concession of the Ministry of Industry throughout 1960 was to 
abolish the permits needed for establishing new industries or expanding existing 
193 A summary of the report was published by the Spanish government in 1963 and 
quickly became a best-seller. However, given the timing of events, it appears difficult to 
argue that it contributed much to the policy-making of the 1959-1962 period. See World 
Bank, The economic development of Spain (Spain: BOE, 1963) andBiescas, 'Espana y 
las organizaciones economicas internacionales,' pp. 297-99. 
194 Comments by Lopez Rodo, 15th meeting with IMF officials on Exchange Restrictions 
Consultations 1960, Madrid, 31st May 1960; AIMF, C/Spain/420.1 Exchange 
Restrictions Consultations 1960, Minutes of Meetings. 
'Visit to Spain. October-November 1960,' unsigned copy, 16th November 1961; BoE, 
OV61/7. 
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ones only in those cases that the amount spent did not exceed 2 million pesetas, 
where no imports of capital was involved and where no expansion had taken 
place during the preceding months. The Bank of England observer thought this 
'so derisory as to be almost insulting.'196 The slow progress was symptomatic of 
the ongoing fight between pro-reform and autarkic elements within the Spanish 
government. As Ullastres put it to the Americans, he was 'not alone in this 
particular Cabinet' and could 'not claim unique responsibility for Spain's 
economic policy.'197 
Progress may have been slow but it continued. In 1960 two new lists of 
commodities had been added to the products whose importation was free, and a 
fourth list was published in 1961, prompting the Minister of Commerce to 
declare that 70% of trade had by then been liberalised. This was slightly behind 
the schedule of what had been agreed with the OEEC, though this did not elicit a 
reaction from the latter.198 Other external measures included the initial contacts 
with the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and the declaration of the 
foreign convertibility of the peseta in July 1961.199 The official request to open 
negotiations with the European Economic Community in 1962 has also been 
interpreted as "part of the international component of stabilisation."200 This 
instance is of particular interest since it was the result of a calculus within the 
Franco government which only pursued it when other options were perceived as 
inadequate to sustain economic growth, and the choice to pursue with the 
196 'Visit to Spain. May 1961,' unsigned copy, 7th June 1961; BoE, OV61/7. 
197 Biweekly Economic Review, by Aldrich, Madrid, 29th December 1960, in 'Spain 
Quarterly Economic Reports 1959-1961', Spain, Madrid Emb., CGR 1953-1963, FSPF, 
RG84 (entry 3167B, box 11), NACP. 
198 Vinas et al., Politica comercial exterior, vol. 2, p. 1132. 
199 It would finally become a part to it in July 1963. M. A. Diaz Mier, 'Espana-GATT: 
25 anos de historia,' Information Comercial Espanola, nos. 612-13 (Aug.-Sept. 1984), 
pp. 85-96. 
200 F. Guirao, 'Association or Trade Agreement? Spain and the EEC, 1947-1964,' 
Journal of European Integration History, vol. 3, no. 1 (1997), p. 117. 
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approach to the EEC manifests the increasing importance of economic prosperity 
as a source of legitimacy for the regime.201 
That the implementation of the plan was slow was a common feature in 
all external reports commenting on progress. Yet, despite the slow pace they also 
OCY) noted the seemingly continuing nature of the process. 
The influence of INI was waning. This had significant repercussions 
for the industrial licences and foreign investment regulations. In March 1962 a 
ministerial order authorised foreigners to invest in Spanish shares and in May 
foreign investors were permitted freely to repatriate capital and to remit profits. 
A decree of November 1962 granted semi-automatic approval of foreign 
holdings of more than 50% in Spanish firms and, crucially, eliminated the 
licensing system for industrial and commercial concerns of either foreign or 
Spanish origin. Anti-monopoly and pro-competition measures were similarly 
enacted 
at the end of 1962.204 As one of the mushrooming business reports on 
Spanish legislation for prospective foreign investors put it, 'slowly, as its 
confidence increased and foreign exchange reserves began to build up, the 
government has begun further liberalising the rules affecting foreign 
201 F. Guirao, '«Solvitur Ambulando»: the Place of the EEC in Spain's Foreign 
Economic Policy,' in A. S. Milward and A. Deighton, Widening, Deepening and 
Acceleration: the European Economic Community, 1957-1963 (Baden-Baden: Nomos), 
p. 347. 
202 This is true not'only of reports made public but also the internal view within the 
multilateral organisations. For example, 'Spanish economic situation,' C. L. Merwin to 
Jacobsson, 6th August 1962; AIMF, C/Spain/420 Stabilisation Programme (Oversize 
file). 
203 'INI is no longer able to exert its former influence against modernisation of plant' 
reported the Bank of England observer. 'Visit to Spain. October-November 1961,' 
unsigned copy, 10th November 1961; BoE, OV61/7. 
204 Vinas et al., Politica comercial exterior, vol. 2, p. 1136 highlight how these measures 
were at the heart of the 1959 initial memorandum to the OEEC and IMF and stress that 




Ch. 7. Multilateral donors' leverage and policy reform 
investors.'205 The reference to the soaring foreign reserves is of particular 
interest. 
In fact, it has long been argued that the liberalising prospects of the 1959 
programme were not fully realised because as soon as the reforms begin to yield 
fruits, vested interests successfully captured the reform programme.206 The 
mainstream view can be captured in the following quotation: 
It was to be expected and feared that the ideas and interests of the old 
policy, humiliated and surrendered by the situation of external bankruptcy 
in 1959 that forced the acceptance of the Stabilisation Plan, would 
resurface as soon as the economy recovered. [...] Foreign exchange 
reserves kill the reformist wishes of Spanish governments of any political 
sign. This is what happened in Spain from 1961 onwards.207 
This would have been, of course, what we would expect if the lack of 
foreign exchange had been a fundamental reason driving the adoption of the 
Plan. Recall that the foreign exchange crisis had been played up by pro-reformers 
as the reason to undertake the reform programme. Thus, it is unsurprising that 
those that see the adoption of the 1959 Plan 'out of necessity' are particularly 
keen on this view: 
As soon as the urgency imposed by the external bottleneck disappeared 
and the balance of payments started to improve [...] the regime gave way in 
its attempts at enhancing the flexibility of the economy.208 
At the very least, this confuses the reluctance to liberalise further of some 
groups such as the Ministry of Industry and INI with the 'regime' as a whole. In 
fact, the story of the years 1960-63 can be told as the defeat of INI. In that 
process the multilateral organisations appear to have done very little. 
205 Business Europe, The Spanish report (Business International, 1962), p. 12. 
206 Gonzalez, La economia politica del franquismo, pp. 299, 353-54. Foreign exchange 
reserves are shown to improve from $589 million at the end of 1960 to $891 million in 
1961, $1067 million in 1962, $1158 million in 1963 and peaking at $1508 million in 
1964 (p. 309). 
207 Fuentes Quintana, 'El Plan de Estabilizacion economica,' p. 39. 
208 Vinas et al., Politica comercial exterior, vol. 2, pp. 1168, 1138. Contrast this with 
their own argument as referred to in footnote 204 above. 
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As far as this thesis is concerned, the reason to review the existing 
arguments linking foreign exchange reserves and the adoption of reforms has 
stemmed from the implicit leverage that it gave the multilateral organisations. 
The experience reviewed here suggests that the reasons for the much-discussed 
stalling of the reform around the mid-1960s ran deeper than a mere increase in 
the foreign exchange reserves.209 Nevertheless, a puzzle that further research 
needs to clarify may be highlighted. If the 'rhetorical use' of the foreign 
exchange crisis by pro-reformers did persuade Franco, why did not he withdraw 
his support after the storm had been weathered? As a research agenda the reader 
may consider the possibility that Franco's decision to go ahead with the plan 
might have been motivated by more than the immediacy of suspension of 
payments. Perhaps more fruitful would be to explore the evolution of the terms in 
which the delegation of authority from Franco to his ministers took place and 
how the latter were ultimately assessed. 
209 For early expositions about the stalling of reforms in the mid-1960s see J. Ros 
Hombravella, Politica economica espanola (1959-1973) (Barcelona: Ed. Blume, 1979) 
and L. A. Rojo, 'Panorama economico,' in J. Ros Hombravella (ed.), Trece economistas 
espanoles ante la economia espanola (Barcelona: Oikos-Tau, 1975), pp. 157-78. 
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7.5. Conclusion 
The experience of multilateral aid in the 1959 Stabilisation Plan is not one of 
strict conditionality. Formal conditionality was extremely limited and played, at 
best, a very limited role in mobilising support for the plan and none in its 
implementation. The American expectation that multilateral organisations would 
contribute to policy reform in Spain was only partially right. Contact between the 
multilateral organisations and Spain may have contributed to the adoption of 
reforms in Spain but not because of their greater effectiveness at exercising 
pressure. 
As the case study shows, the virtue of the multilateral organisations was 
correctly to assess the willingness and strength of pro-reform elements. They did 
so by focusing on prior actions of the recipient during a long period of 
monitoring and by developing a trust relationship with pro-reform elements 
within the recipient government. They also carefully avoided any instance that 
might jeopardise the position of pro-reformers vis-a-vis autarkic elements and, 
similarly, consciously setting aside issues that might have put at risk the cohesion 
within the pro-reform group. Once the Stabilisation Plan was in place, the 
multilateral organisations again showed utmost restraint in their dealings with the 
recipient authorities so as not to jeopardise the chances of the success of the 
reform. The conscious goal of the multilateral organisations was the 
establishment of a relationship based on trust, rather than leverage. Formal 
• • • 91ft 
conditionality had no significance in explaining the outcomes. 
This is not to say, however, that foreign aid played no role in enhancing 
the credibility of the reform programme. The sheer size of aid available at the 
disposal of the Spanish government to defend the peseta parity must have 
contributed to buttressing the credibility of the parity. The involvement of the 
multilateral organisations was probably a necessary condition, if only because no 
policy-maker in Spain dared to accomplish the reform programme without a 
sufficient safety net in the form of financial assistance that would cover possibly 
210 Cfr. Sacchetti, in his recollections of the Spanish operation, emphasises the role of 
conditionality to ensure the programme would be undertaken. U. Sacchetti, 'El FMI y el 
programa espanol de 1959. Una perspectiva personal' in Varela Parache (coord.), El 
Fondo, p. 319. 
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very large initial trade deficits. The involvement of the multilateral organisations 
may have thus provided a stimulus to the shaping of the programme, but not 
because of the exercise of any sort of pressure from the multilateral 
organisations. 
It is also difficult to see how the involvement of the multilateral 
organisations could have shifted the balance as drastically as is often claimed in 
the literature. Their role was limited and could not have substituted for the most 
important factor, that by 1957-1959 there existed pro-reform elements within the 
Spanish government that successfully pressed for the reform. The different 
outcomes in terms of policy reform achieved by the bilateral and multilateral 
donors do not stem from differences in the formal elements of conditionality 
attached to aid. 
The chapter has also raised questions about the general explanations of 
the Plan itself. In particular, the inevitability of the reform programme and the 
reluctance of the leadership to the adoption of the plan are analytical categories 
that do not help the debate and may preclude the posing of questions that would 
yield a deeper understanding of this episode in Spanish economic history. 
Finally, we may want to recapitulate some of the insights that the 
involvement of the multilateral donors in the Spanish 1959 Stabilisation Plan can 
provide to the wider literature on the use of foreign aid to induce policy reform. 
Our case study supports the view that replacing the assumption of a unified and 
benevolent government with that of a divided one may result in different policy 
recommendations.211 It equally supports recent theoretical literature on the 
political economy of conditionality that argues that it is key to realise the 
"centrality of conflict or heterogeneity of interests in understanding 
conditionality. "212 
211 M. Boycko, A. Shleifer, R. W. Vishny, 'Second-best economic policy for a divided 
government,' European Economic Review, vol. 40 (1996), pp. 161-1 A. 
212 A. Drazen, 'Conditionality and Ownership in IMF Lending: A Political Economy 
Approach,' paper presented at the Second Annual IMF Research Conference, 29-30 
November 2001 (http://ww.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/staffb/2001/00-0Q/pdf.drazen.pdf), 
p. 42. 
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This heterogeneity of preferences within the recipient government not 
only refers to the coalition nature of the government but also to the possible 
existence of 'egotist reformers' who may value their personal success above that 
of the reforms. Similarly, the conscious exploitation of asymmetries in 
information and perceptions, the 'rhetorical use' of a particular crisis, adds a 
further layer of analysis to the role of crisis in inducing policy-reform.213 
213 D. Roclrik, 'Understanding Economic Policy Reform,' Journal of Economic 
Literature, vol. 34, no. 1 (March 1996), pp. 9-41. 
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Conclusions 
The impact of foreign aid in the Spanish economy has been treated with some 
ambiguity in the historiography. It has featured consistently among the issues 
raised in accounts of the Spanish economic revival of the 1950s, yet it is a topic 
that has received little further discussion. It has been claimed that foreign aid lent 
a breathing space to the autarkic policies by alleviating shortages in the Spanish 
economy during the mid-1950s, when in fact disbursements were very limited 
during that time. Aid disbursements increased towards the latter years of the 
decade, a fact that is not easily incorporated in the standard account that the 
increasingly desperate balance of payments situation prompted policy change. In 
fact, by the time the conventional account reaches the year 1959, foreign 
leverage, including American pressure which had thus far not featured in the 
story line, is credited with contributing to the adoption of particular economic 
policy reforms, such as the Stabilisation Plan adopted in July 1959. In short, 
discussions of the effects of foreign aid in the Spanish economy tend to be 
brought to the mainstream narrative of Spanish economic performance on an ad 
hoc basis, rather than being incorporated fully in the analysis in a consistent 
argument. The consensus view in the literature is in no way unanimous but the 
absence of conclusive evidence has only meant an even more disappointingly 
vague treatment of the role of foreign aid in the political economy of mid-
Francoism. 
This dissertation moves the discussion further by focusing on individual 
transmission mechanisms, both direct and indirect, through which the foreign aid 
programmes affected the Spanish economy. This allows a more in-depth analysis 
of some of the existing arguments in the literature, such as the role of American 
aid in relieving input bottlenecks and the contribution of Americans and 
multilateral organisations to the process of policy change. Inevitably, this implies 
that there are alternative questions that could be asked about the effects of the 
foreign aid programmes on the Spanish socio-economic fabric that escape this 
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dissertation. The criteria used to select the individual transmission mechanisms 
to be explored were relevance in the existing historiography and theoretical 
considerations. 
The economics of foreign aid, and in particular recent literature on the 
use of conditional aid as an inducement for policy reform in the recipient 
country, suggests that we pay particular attention to the structure of incentives of 
the donor. This focus on the structure of incentives of the donor proved to have a 
parsimonious appeal to it. It helped us in interpreting why the attempts by the 
Americans at exercising leverage over the Spanish policy-makers failed. Thus, 
this dissertation not only uncovers much original archival evidence showing the 
ineffectiveness of American pressure but also provides a clear theoretical 
rationale for it. 
The focus on incentives also helped us to structure and pursue the 
economic implications of the improved political recognition that the American 
rapprochement to Franco's Spain implied. The issues raised centred around the 
effect of an enhanced political credibility on the expectations of private 
economic agents and prompted the question of whether we could detect a 
reaction of Spanish business sentiment to the American involvement in Spanish 
affairs. The 'political conditionality' of the aid-for-bases agreements, that is, the 
way in which the Americans implicitly committed themselves to the stability of 
Spain, contributes to our understanding of both the failure of the American 
attempts at exercising leverage as well as the improved business sentiment and 
the reaction of Spanish private investors. 
Similarly, we examined the role of multilateral donors in the 1959 
Stabilisation Plan, providing an archival-based account of this little known, yet 
often regarded as significant, aspect of the stabilisation operation. The alleged 
importance of the multilateral organisations stems from the commonly held view 
that a foreign exchange crisis proved to be decisive in prompting the adoption of 
the Stabilisation Plan in July 1959. Such a crisis situation presumably increased 
the bargaining power of multilateral organisations leaving them in a better 
position to make their financial support of the stabilising operation conditional 
on the adoption of reforms by the Spanish authorities. However, the evidence 
mobilised here shows that no such crude bargaining approach took place. The 
multilateral organisations played a much subtler role in brokering the Plan, 
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primarily limited to consciously attempting not to undermine the more reforming 
elements within the Spanish government. Most stabilising policy initiatives were 
native rather than suggested, let alone imposed, from the outside, evidence that is 
conducive to the view that the 1959 Plan was the culmination, rather than the 
beginning of, a longer-standing process towards policy change. Our discussion of 
this aspect of the Stabilisation Plan suggests that understanding of the whole 
stabilisation operation would benefit from a fuller archivally based account than 
is currently available in the literature. Combining the conclusions drawn from 
both the bilateral and multilateral aid episodes, this dissertation shows that the 
process of economic policy change in Spain during the 1950s had very little to do 
with foreign pressure. 
The contribution of aid-fmanced goods to the alleviation of bottlenecks 
was addressed using the standard input-output methodology. This exercise 
showed that the contribution of aid-fmanced goods to economic performance via 
the relief of input bottlenecks was very limited. By formally accounting for 
linkage effects, it provides more conclusive evidence than a simple comparison 
of aid-financed goods with actual imports, and underlines the view that the 
American aid programme provided very little direct relief. 
Albeit not a growth-accounting exercise, the argument put forward in this 
dissertation has implications for the historiography of explaining the substantial 
resumption of economic growth in Spain during the 1950s. The double paradox 
of high-profits yet low-investment during the 1940s and the high-growth yet little 
policy-change during the 1950s is resolved perhaps. It should prompt further 
research on the effort to explain such performance, including better knowledge 
on the extent of actual policy-change and the role and determinants of private 
investment. 
The conclusions drawn in this dissertation are obviously limited in 
geography and time to the case under study. Yet, the interplay between 
economics and history is by no means a one-way street, resulting in implications 
for a wider literature. In our discussions of the American attempts at influencing 
Spanish economic policy-making we realised the importance of the divisions 
within the Spanish government and argued that current models of the 




Focusing attention on the donor's incentives is in fact an insufficiently 
explored area of many other foreign aid programmes. The literature on the 
Marshall Plan, for example, has been preoccupied with reconciling the limited 
direct impact of the programme with its widely perceived importance. It has thus 
focused on the credibility effects of the programme, the argument being that it 
allowed Western European countries credibly to commit to market-friendlier and 
growth conducing policies, such as a higher degree of intra-European trade, than 
would have been possible in the absence of Marshall Plan initiatives such as the 
European Payments Union. The most common rationale provided is, however, 
that the enticement of Marshall aid (and the threat of its withdrawal) proved 
decisive for engaging Western European governments. As such, this hypothesis 
has not been fully investigated and therefore has received no archival refutation 
or support. However, research has shown that American attempts at exercising 
leverage over domestic economic policy of the recipient countries systematically 
failed. The burden of proof thus appears to rest on those arguing that the promise 
of aid was effective in changing the foreign economic policy of Marshall Plan 
recipients. The discussion of the incentives of the donor suggests that other 
credibility effects may stem from the American commitment towards Western 
Europe that the Marshall Plan implied. Under this hypothesis the supply response 
need not be motivated by substantial economic policy change in the domestic or 
foreign spheres. 
Similarly, Chapter Six provides a discussion of the advantages and 
drawbacks of the event study methodology, still little used in the economic 
history literature. In particular, a word of caution was raised as to the exclusive 
use of the search for turning points in financial indicators time series, given the 
problems of interpretation of the driving forces behind those turning points in 
complex historical analyses. 
The interaction between Spanish officials and members of the multilateral 
organisations showed that the latter were acutely aware of their limited leverage 
and the importance of the commitment to reform of the Spanish government for 
the programme to succeed. The records show their words and actions display a 
surprisingly modern tone. 'Surprising' because those very international 
organisations would in later decades toy with the practice of strict policy 
conditionality and 'modern' because the recent literature has consistently argued 
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that 'aid cannot buy reform,' irrespective of the strict formal conditionality 
attached to aid programmes. Was the type of involvement of the multilateral 
organisations in the 1959 Spanish reforms the common practice of the day? How 
did these organisations come to believe in the effectiveness of conditionality in 
later years? Studies of the practice of conditionality by these institutions that 
benefit from the range of sources available to the historian are still few. The 




Table A.l. Loans under the Eximbank: $62.5 million credit line 
Loan Beneficiary Purpose Date of Amount 
approval disbursed ($) 
52-1 Banco de Espana Cotton 8 Feb 51 4,999,750 
52-2 Id. Fertilizer 8 Feb 51 3,499,583 
52-3 Id. Tractor and spare parts 8 Feb 51 3,444,929 
52-4 Soc. Iber. Nitrogeno Fertilizer manuf.equip. 8 Feb 51 698,579 
52-5 Banco de Espana Wheat 15 Mar 51 7,221,777 
52-6 Central Siderurgica Coal 5 Jul 51 3,495,451 
52-8 RENFE Railway equipment 19 Jul 51 8,262,894 
52-9a Cia. E. Minas del Rif Mining equipment 2 Aug 51 199,131 
52-9B Banco de Espana Id. 2 Aug 51 1,136,629 
52-9C Cia.Min.Montanas Sur Id. 2 Aug 51 221,961 
52-9D Agroman Id. 2 Aug 51 163,374 
52-9E Banco de Espana Id. 2 Aug 51 1,416,764 
52-10 U. Elect. Madrilena Electrical equipment 2 Aug 51 2,337,909 
52-11 AHV Equip, for steel plant 9 Aug 51 3,799,654 
52-13 ENESA Floating power plant 16 Aug 51 727,912 
52-14 Id. Equip, for steam plant 16 Aug 51 1,032,452 
52-15a Potasas Espanolas Mining equipment 23 Aug 51 1,499,089 
52-15B Minas de Almaden Id. 23 Aug 51 86,555 
52-16 EN Calvo Sotelo Equip, for power plant 29 Nov 51 629,741 
52-17 UNESA Electrical equipment 6 Dec 51 1,970,971 
52-18 Banco de Espana Oack staves 17 Jan 52 474,155 
52-19 Id. Tin plate 24 Jan 52 1,995,759 
52-20 EN Calvo Sotelo Equip, for power plant 31 Jan 52 1,663,269 
52-22 CEPSA Steel plates for tanker 17 Jul 52 343,482 
52-23 Banco de Espana Farm machinery 31 Jul 52 2,990,312 
52-24 Hidro Nitro Espanola Ammonium sulphate plant 31 Jul 52 1,833,732 
52-25 Arazabal Agricultural machinery 21 Aug 52 159,000 
52-26 Turrow Collieries Development of mines 31 Dec 52 474,000 
52-27 Fabrica de Mieres Id. 31 Dec 52 850,317 
52-28 Carbones de Langreo Id. 31 Dec 52 129,517 
52-29 Duro Felguera Id. 31 Dec 52 722,946 
52-30 Minas de Figaredo Id. 31 Dec 52 367,542 
52-31 Hulleras de Riosa Id. 31 Dec 52 440,117 
52-33 Frutos Espanoles Food processing plant 31 Dec 52 174,038 
52-34 EN Elcano Steel for tanker 31 Dec 52 499,982 
52-35 Fluoruros Fluorspar mining 7 Oct 53 399,148 
52-36 Central Siderurgica Coal and coking coal 7 Oct 53 1,796,621 
52-37 Ind. Subsid. Aviation Automobile industry 30 Jan 57 103,642 
Total 62,262,684 
Source: 
Export-Import Bank of Washington, Report to the Congress for the period 
ending June 30, 1959, Part 2: 'Loan Operations as Agent for International 
Cooperation Administration and Others', pp. 170-73. 
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Table A.2.. Details of second phase Eximbank loans 
Loan Beneficiary Purpose Date of Amount 
approval disbursed, at 30th 
June 1963 ($) 
568 Cia. Elec. Langreo Thermal power unit 15 Jul 54 1,031,108 
574 Manuf. Met. Madril. Steel mill equipment 14 Oct 54 159,198 
705 Hidroelectrica Esp. Thermal power unit 7 Jul 55 7,018,523 
579-1 INI Steam boilers 15 Sep 55 887,571 
579-3 EN Calvo Sotelo Boiler unit 17 Nov 55 582,358 
687-2 Gumersindo Garcia SA Diesel shovel 17 Nov 55 -
731-1 Nitratos de Castilla Heavy duty compressors 23 Dec 55 -
AOFC-4 CEPSA Ammonium sulphate plant 23 Feb 56 -
752-1 SA Sanllehi Knitting machines 10 May 56 -
752-2 J Rossell SA Id. 10 May 56 -
752-3 Medias Sacma SA Id. 10 May 56 -
752-4 Manuf. Antonio Gassol Id. 10 May 56 -
752-5 F y F Marimon SA Id. 10 May 56 -
752-6 Hijos de M.Vallhonrat Id. 10 May 56 -
752-7 Miguel Gil SA Id. 10 May 56 -
752-8 Miguel Bosch SA Id. 10 May 56 -
844 Jta. Energla Nuclear Atomic research reactor 11 Oct 56 385,000 
955 RENFE Diesel locomotives 17 Oct 57 7,999,500 
1000 UNINSA Steel mill facilities 1 Apr 58 5,223,637 
1017 Iberduero Power generating equip. 12 Jun 58 8,226,820 
1018 ENESA Id. 12 Jun58 14,445,390 
1059 ENSIDESA Steel mill equipment 15 Jan 59 3,840,087 
1096 Abonos Sevilla Fertilizer plant 21 Aug 59 6,985,752 
1097 REPESA Id. 21 Aug 59 9,180,290 
1101 Firestone Hispania Tyre manufacture equip. 24 Sep 59 382,113 
1139 Termicas Asturianas Power generating equip. 11 Mar 60 7,946,356 
1140 Sevillana de Elect. Thermal power plant 11 Mar 60 8,175,504 
1146 Iberia Aircraft 24 Mar 60 10,857,142 
1178 Ind. Subsid. Aviation Engine manufact. Equip. 9 Jun 60 748,127 
1225 AHV and Basconia Electrolyt. tinning mill 28 Jul 60 4,063,467 
1267 ENSIDESA Rolling mill rolls 8 Sep 60 2,299,897 
1338 Jose R. Mora-Figueroa Irrigation pumps 10 Nov 60 137,500 
1441 INI Thermal power unit 26 Jan 61 7,396,102 
1493 ENSIDESA Iron and steel plant 9 Mar 61 12,268,725 
1557 Bco. Cdto. Industrial Capital goods 26 Apr 61 -
1561 AHV Strip mill 4 May 61 -
1666 Tex. Reu. Algodoneras Cotton ginning machinery 6 Jul 61 60,876 
1694 J.E. Llaneza SA Soil compactor 27 Jul 61 8,691 
1974 Centrales Ter. Norte Thermal power unit 12 Feb 62 10,103,594 
8-1 Coop. Ag. Algodonera Cotton ginning machinery 20 Mar 62 48,052 
8-2 Coop. Ag. Guadalete Id. 20 Mar 62 43,571 
8-3 Cult, y Desmot. Algo. Id. 20 Mar 62 48,880 
8-4 Coop. Ag. Cordobesa Id. 28 Mar 62 48,052 
2021 Sevillana de Elect. Thermal power unit 31 May 62 7,224,025 
2026 Lagunas del Barbate Reclamation project 7 Jun 62 598,379 
2056 GESA Power plant at Alcudia 27 Sep 62 -
5-18 Coop. Algod. 'Reyes' Cottonseed oil mill 1 Oct 62 170,139 
2073 ENESA Thermal power unit 18 Dec 62 -
2074 ENSIDESA Iron & steel facilities 18 Dec 62 -
5-26 Babcock & Wilcox Vertical grinder 19 Dec 62 -
5-34 Coop. Ag. Cordobesa Cottonseed oil mill 5 Mar 63 -
Total 138,594,426 
Source: Export-Import Bank of Washington, Report to the Congress for the 
period ending June 30, 1963, Part 2, pp. 64-67. Some loans were cancelled. 
306 
Appendix 
Table A.3. Military aid disbursed, FY1954 to FY1963 (in thousands of dollars) 
FY1954 FY1955 FY1956 FY1957 FY1958 FY1959 
23,200 39,000 65,400 96,800 48,200 51,600 
FY1960 FY1961 FY1962 FY1963 CUMULATIVE 
60,700 51,800 20,700 26,500 524,000 
Source: Agency for International Development, US Foreign 
Assistance and assistance from International Organizations: 
Obligations and Loan Authorizations, July 1, 1945- June 30, 
1962, and Idem, US Overseas Loans and Grants from International 
Organizations, July 1, 1945-June 30, 1963. The source is not 
generally that useful for other case because it shows 
authorization values 'with the exception of military assistance, 
where the annual data represent the value of goods delivered' 
(Foreword). Still, this raises the issue of valuation as 
discussed in the text. 
Table A.4. Repayments on Eximbank loans (in thousands of dollars) 
FY1954 FY1955 FY1956 FY1957 FY1958 
53(2) 54(1) 54(2) 55(1) 55(2) 56(1) 
1st cotton loan 



















1,503 2,562 2,876 7,850 
Notes: the Eximbank reports first refer to repayments on the $62.5 million credit 
line in June 1956 and stop referring to these after FY1960, although most 
certainly repayments of those loans proceeded normally. 
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Table A.5. Exchange rate of peseta in New York (in pesetas per $) 
Jan-47 30 Jan-50 48.5 Jan-53 44 Jan-56 45 Jan-59 62.5 Jan-62 60.6 
Feb-47 30 Feb-50 60 Feb-53 43.6 Feb-56 44.9 Feb-59 60 Feb-62 60.35 
Mar-47 32 Mar-50 54 Mar-53 43.15 Mar-56 44.85 Mar-59 59.25 Mar-62 60.25 
Apr-47 31 Apr-50 53.5 Apr-53 43.25 Apr-56 43.9 Apr-59 59.5 Apr-62 60 
May-47 32.25 May-50 56.5 May-53 43.25 May-56 43.75 May-59 58 May-62 59.95 
Jun-47 33 Jun-50 52.5 Jun-53 43.5 Jun-56 43.5 Jun-59 58.25 Jun-62 60 
Jul-47 34.5 M-50 43 Jul-53 43.4 Jul-56 44 Jul-59 60 Jul-62 60 
Aug-47 34.5 Aug-50 48.4 Aug-53 43.5 Aug-56 47.5 Aug-59 60.9 Aug-62 59.8 
Sep-47 39 Sep-50 51.1 Sep-53 43.3 Sep-56 47 Sep-59 61.25 Sep-62 60 
Oct-47 40 0ct-50 52.4 Oct-53 42.9 Oct-56 47.15 Oct-59 60.75 Oct-62 60.3 
Nov-47 39.5 Nov-50 51.75 Nov-53 43.7 Nov-56 50.5 Nov-59 60.5 Nov-62 60.3 
Dec-47 41.5 Dec-50 51.45 Dec-53 43.25 Dec-56 50.5 Dec-59 60.75 Dec-62 60.3 
Jan-48 39 Jan-51 52 Jan-54 43.4 Jan-57 53.25 Jan-60 60.6 Jan-63 60.25 
Feb-48 37 Feb-51 53.9 Feb-54 43.6 Feb-57 54.5 Feb-60 60.75 Feb-63 60.15 
Mar-48 38 Mar-51 54.3 Mar-54 43.25 Mar-57 53.25 Mar-60 60.85 Mar-63 60.3 
Apr-48 33 Apr-51 52.45 Apr-54 43.3 Apr-57 51.25 Apr-60 61.5 Apr-63 -
May-48 34 May-51 51.6 May-54 43.25 May-57 51.4 May-60 61.75 May-63 -
Jun-48 35 Jun-51 50.5 Jun-54 43 Jun-57 52.15 Jun-60 61.75 Jun-63 -
Jul-48 33.5 Jul-51 47.65 Jul-54 42.25 Jul-57 52.25 Jul-60 62 Jul-63 -
Aug-48 33 Aug-51 47.75 Aug-54 42.75 Aug-57 55.5 Aug-60 61.5 Aug-63 -
Sep-48 34 Sep-51 48 Sep-54 42.65 Sep-57 57 Sep-60 61.5 Sep-63 -
Oct-48 35.5 Oct-51 51 Oct-54 42.75 Oct-57 61.25 0ct-60 61.5 Oct-63 -
Nov-48 37.5 Nov-51 52.7 Nov-54 43.6 Nov-57 61 Nov-60 61.5 Nov-63 -
Dec-48 37.5 Dec-51 52 Dec-54 44 Dec-57 60 Dec-60 61.5 Dec-63 -
Jan-49 36.5 Jan-52 52 Jan-55 44.45 Jan-58 57.5 Jan-61 61.5 
Feb-49 37.75 Feb-52 52 Feb-55 44.5 Feb-58 56.6 Feb-61 61.5 
Mar-49 38.5 Mar-52 48.25 Mar-55 43.8 Mar-58 54.25 Mar-61 61.25 
Apr-49 38 Apr-52 49.1 Apr-55 43.4 Apr-58 56.25 Apr-61 61 
May-49 39 May-52 47.75 May-55 42.6 May-58 55.5 May-61 61 
Jun-49 38.5 Jun-52 49.15 Jun-55 42.7 Jun-58 54.75 Jun-61 61 
Jul-49 39 Jul-52 49 Jul-55 42.1 Jul-58 54 Jul-61 60.25 
Aug-49 38.5 Aug-52 51 Aug-55 42.5 Aug-58 54.25 Aug-61 59.95 
Sep-49 43 Sep-52 49 Sep-55 43.85 Sep-58 56.2 Sep-61 60.85 
Oct-49 43.85 Oct-52 49.25 Oct-55 44 Oct-58 59.3 Oct-61 60.35 
Nov-49 45.5 Nov-52 - 48.5 Nov-55 43.65 Nov-58 58.25 Nov-61 60.3 
Dec-49 47.75 Dec-52 47.7 Dec-55 43.85 Dec-58 59.6 Dec-61 61.15 
Source: F. Pick, Black Market Yearbook (New York: Pick's World Currency 
Report), several years. 
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Table A. 6. Peseta-dollar exchange rates 
(in pesetas per dollar unless otherwise stated) 
Official 
basic Spread Spread Spread Spread 
Tangiers balance Tangiers - Tangiers- Tangiers- Tangiers-ePPP 
rate rate EPPP official ePPP official (in %) (in %) 
1947 33.93 10.95 25.06 22.98 8.87 210% 35% 
1948 34.02 10.95 24.8 23.07 9.22 211% 37% 
1949 40.27 15.38 28.2 24.89 12.07 162% 43% 
1950 52.52 20.6 32.08 31.92 20.44 155% 64% 
1951 51.27 29.11 36.96 22.16 14.31 76% 39% 
1952 48.54 31.21 37.77 17.33 10.77 56% 29% 
1953 43.3 32.16 40.39 11.14 2.91 35% 7% 
1954 42.98 32.99 40.17 9.99 2.81 30% 7% 
1955 43.16 34.11 40.89 9.05 2.27 27% 6% 
1956 45.19 34.32 42.98 10.87 2.21 32% 5% 
1957 53.95 40.24 48.89 13.71 5.06 34% 10% 
1958 54.99 43.19 53.4 11.8 1.59 27% 3% 
Jul-59 59.39 60 54.23 -0.61 5.16 -1% 10% 
Notes and sources: ePPP stands for the exchange rate that satisfies the 
purchasing power parity, as calculated by Aixala, La peseta y los precios. 
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Table A.7. Exchange rate of peseta in Zurich(in Swiss Francs per 100 pesetas) 
1946-1 1947-1 12 12.5 12.3 1948-1 10 10.3 10.21949-1 11.2 11.5 11.35 
2 2 12 12.5 12.3 2 2 11.2 11.5 11.35 
3 3 12 12.5 12.3 3 9.8 10.1 9.95 3 11 11.25 11.125 
4 4 12 12.5 12.3 4 9.8 10.1 9.95 4 10.9 11.15 11.025 
5 5 11.5 12 11.8 5 9.9 10.3 10.1 5 10 11 10.5 
6 6 11.5 12 11.8 6 10.1 10.5 10.3 6 9.5 10.25 9.875 
7 7 11.3 12 11.6 7 10.1 10.5 10.3 7 10 10.5 10.25 
8 8 12 12.5 12.3 8 10.1 10.5 10.3 8 10.1 10.6 10.35 
9 9 9 10.3 10.5 10.4 9 10.5 10.8 10.65 
10 10 12 12.5 12.3 10 10.6 10.9 10.8 10 10.5 10.8 10.65 
11 11 11 11.1 11.3 11.2 11 10.4 10.8 10.6 
12 12 12 11.1 11.3 11.2 12 10.3 10.7 10.5 
13 13 11.8 12.3 12 13 13 10.3 10.7 10.5 
14 14 14 11.1 11.3 11.2 14 10.5 11 10.75 
15 15 15 11.2 11.4 11.3 15 10.5 11 10.75 
16 16 11.3 11.8 11.5 16 11.8 12 11.9 16 10.5 11 10.75 
17 17 17 17 
18 18 18 12.3 12.5 12.4 18 10.4 10.65 10.525 
19 19 19 12.1 12.4 12.3 19 10.5 10.8 10.65 
20 20 20 12.9 13.2 13.1 20 10.5 10.8 10.65 
21 21 21 13.3 13.8 13.5 21 10.4 10.7 10.55 
22 22 22 13 13.5 13.3 22 10.3 10.6 10.45 
23 23 23 12.3 12.8 12.5 23 10.3 10.6 10.45 
24 24 24 12.3 12.8 12.5 24 10.3 10.6 10.45 
25 13 14 13.5 25 25 12.3 12.7 12.5 25 10.3 10.5 10.4 
26 13 13.5 13.3 26 26 12.6 12.9 12.8 26 10.2 10.5 10.35 
27 27 12 12.3 12.2 27 12.9 13.2 13.1 27 10.2 10.4 10.3 
28 13 13.5 13.3 28 11.8 12.3 12 28 12.8 13.3 13 28 10.1 10.3 10.2 
29 13 13.5 13.3 29 11.8 12.3 12 29 12.8 13.3 13 29 10.2 10.4 10.3 
30 13 13.5 13.3 30 11.8 12.3 12 30 12.8 13.2 13 30 10.15 10.35 10.25 
31 13 13.5 13.3 31 11.8 12.3 12 31 12.9 13.2 13.1 31 10 10.25 10.125 
32 12.5 13.5 13 32 11.8 12.3 12 32 12.9 13.2 13.1 32 
33 12 13 12.5 33 33 12.8 13.1 13 33 9.9 10.15 10.025 
34 12 13 12.5 34 34 12.5 13 12.8 34 9.75 10 9.875 
35 12 13 12.5 35 11.5 11.8 11.7 35 12.5 13 12.8 35 9.75 10 9.875 
36 12 13 12.5 36 11.4 11.7 11.6 36 12.3 12.6 12.5 36 9.75 10 9.875 
37 12 13 12.5 "37 11.3 11.6 11.5 37 11.7 12.1 11.9 37 9.75 10 9.875 
38 12 13 12.5 38 11.3 11.6 11.5 38 11.8 12.3 12.1 38 9.75 10 9.875 
39 12.3 13.3 12.8 39 11 11.3 11.1 39 12 12.4 12.2 39 
40 12 12.8 12.4 40 40 11.8 12.3 12 40 9.9 10.2 10.05 
41 41 10.9 11.2 11 41 11.5 12 11.8 41 9.8 10.1 9.95 
42 42 11 11.2 11.1 42 11.3 12 11.6 42 
43 43 11 11.2 11.1 43 11.5 12 11.8 43 9.9 10.25 10.075 
44 12 12.5 12.3 44 44 11.3 12 11.6 44 9.8 10.1 9.95 
45 45 10.3 10.8 10.5 45 11.3 11.8 11.5 45 9.8 10 9.9 
46 46 10.9 11.1 11 46 11.5 12 11.8 46 9.7 9.95 9.825 
47 47 10.3 10.5 10.4 47 11.6 12 11.8 47 9.4 9.65 9.525 
48 12 12.5 12.3 48 10 11 10.5 48 11.6 12 11.8 48 9.5 9.7 9.6 
49 12 12.5 12.3 49 9.5 10 9.75 49 11.4 11.7 11.6 49 9.45 9.55 9.5 
50. 11.8 12.3 12 50 10 10.5 10.3 50 11.3 11.6 11.5 50 9.35 9.5 9.425 
51 11.8 12.3 12 51 51 11.4 11.7 11.6 51 9.2 9.4 9.3 
52 52 10.1 10.4 10.3 52 52 8.8 9.1 8.95 
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Table A. 12. Continued 
1950-1 8.9 9.1 91951-1 1952-1 1953-1 
2 8.5 8.7 8.6 2 8.1 8.2 8.15 2 8.32 8.4 8.36 2 9.1 9.2 9.15 
3 8.65 8.9 8.78 3 8.1 8.2 8.15 3 8.57 8.57 8.57 3 9.02 9.1 9.06 
4 8.7 8.9 8.8 4 8.1 8.3 8.2 4 8.4 8.5 8.45 4 9.27 9.37 9.32 
5 8.9 9 8.95 5 8.15 8.25 8.2 5 8.45 8.52 8.49 5 9.75 9.95 9.85 
6 8.8 9 8.9 6 8.1 8.2 8.15 6 8.42 8.5 8.46 6 9.6 9.7 9.65 
7 8.55 8.7 8.63 7 8 8.12 8.06 7 8.35 8.45 8.4 7 9.77 9.85 9.81 
8 8 8.2 8.1 8 7.95 8.1 8.03 8 8.47 8.55 8.51 8 9.72 9.82 9.77 
9 6.75 7.25 7 9 7.95 8.1 8.03 9 8.62 8.7 8.66 9 9.77 9.82 9.795 
10 7.1 7.3 7.2 10 10 8.65 8.65 8.65 10 
11 7.7 8 7.85 11 7.95 8.1 8.03 11 8.52 8.6 8.56 11 9.82 9.87 9.845 
12 12 12 8.58 8.58 8.58 12 10.02 10.12 10.07 
13 7.9 8.05 7.98 13 8 8.1 8.05 13 8.85 8.95 8.9 13 10 10.1 10.05 
14 7.8 7.9 7.85 14 14 14 
15 15 8.3 8.4 8.35 15 9.1 9.2 9.15 15 9.85 9.95 9.9 
16 8 8.1 8.05 16 8.12 8.2 8.16 16 16 9.72 9.82 9.77 
17 7.95 8.05 8 17 8.17 8.25 8.21 17 9.15 9.25 9.2 17 9.8 9.9 9.85 
18 7.95 8.05 8 18 8.33 8.33 8.33 18 8.9 9 8.95 18 9.9 10 9.95 
19 19 8.35 8.35 8.35 19 8.75 8.85 8.8 19 9.8 9.9 9.85 
20 7.97 8.05 8.01 20 8.45 8.45 8.45 20 8.85 8.85 8.85 20 9.75 9.82 9.785 
21 7.4 7.6 7.5 21 8.42 8.5 8.46 21 8.75 8.85 8.8 21 9.85 9.85 9.85 
22 22 8.4 8.4 8.4 22 9 9.1 9.05 22 9.87 9.92 9.895 
23 7.75 7.9 7.83 23 8.47 8.47 8.47 23 9 9.1 9.05 23 9.9 10 9.95 
24 8.15 8.3 8.23 24 8.47 8.55 8.51 24 8.85 8.95 8.9 24 9.87 9.95 9.91 
25 8.15 8.3 8.23 25 8.52 8.6 8.56 25 8.85 8.85 8.85 25 9.9 9.95 9.925 
26 8.25 8.4 8.33 26 8.55 8.6 8.58 26 8.87 8.95 8.91 26 9.9 9.95 9.925 
27 8.45 8.65 8.55 27 8.57 8.65 8.61 27 27 9.82 9.9 9.86 
28 8.7 8.9 8.8 28 8.95 9.1 9.03 28 8.85 8.95 8.9 28 9.82 9.87 9.845 
29 9.05 9.2 9.13 29 9 9.15 9.08 29 8.82 8.9 8.86 29 9.9 10 9.95 
30 30 8.85 9 8.93 30 8.85 8.9 8.88 30 9.92 9.98 9.95 
31 10.2 10.5 10.4 31 9.05 9.15 9.1 31 8.75 8.8 8.78 31 9.9 9.95 9.925 
32 32 9.25 9.35 9.3 32 8.75 8.85 8.8 32 9.9 9.95 9.925 
33 9.5 9.75 9.63 33 9.9 9.9 9.9 33 8.7 8.8 8.75 33 9.95 9.95 9.95 
34 9.2 9.4 9.3 34 9.5 9.5 9.5 34 8.5 8.6 8.55 34 10.02 10.02 10.02 
35 8.8 9 8.9 35 9.3 9.45 9.38 35 8.6 8.67 8.64 35 9.92 10 9.96 
36 8.95 9.1 9.03 36 9 9.15 9.08 36 8.55 8.62 8.59 36 9.83 9.88 9.855 
37 8.75 8.85 8.8 37 9.1 9.2 9.15 37 8.62 8.7 8.66 37 9.8 9.86 9.83 
38 8.6 8.7 8.65 38 8.95 9.05 9 38 8.65 8.65 8.65 38 9.83 9.88 9.855 
39 8.3 8.45 8.38 39 9.05 9.15 9.1 39 8.62 8.67 8.65 39 9.85 9.9 9.875 
40 8.05 8.25 8.15 40 8.9 9 8.95 40 8.65 8.7 8.68 40 9.9 9.95 9.925 
41 8.2 8.3 8.25 41 41 8.63 8.69 8.66 41 9.95 10.05 10 
42 8.2 8.3 8.25 42 8.8 8.9 8.85 42 8.71 8.71 8.71 42 10.02 10.1 10.06 
43 8 8.1 8.05 43 8.6 8.75 8.68 43 8.7 8.75 8.73 43 10.03 10.08 10.055 
44 8.1 8.2 8.15 44 8.7 8.7 8.7 44 8.7 8.75 8.73 44 9.95 10 9.975 
45 8.4 8.5 8.45 45 8.3 8.45 8.38 45 8.65 8.7 8.68 45 9.93 9.96 9.945 
46 8.3 8.4 8.35 46 8.3 8.4 8.35 46 8.74 8.78 8.76 46 9.87 9.92 9.895 
47 8.12 8.22 8.17 47 8.25 8.35 8.3 47 8.77 8.85 8.81 47 9.88 9.93 9.905 
48 48 9.25 9.75 9.5 48 8.8 8.87 8.84 48 9.9 9.93 9.915 
49 8.2 8.3 8.25 49 8.27 8.27 8.27 49 8.85 8.85 8.85 49 9.75 9.82 9.785 
-50 8.25 8.35 8.3 50 8.15 8.25 8.2 50 8.75 8.85 8.8 50 9.83 9.86 9.845 
51 51 8.25 8.35 8.3 51 8.85 8.9 8.88 51 9.84 9.87 9.855 
52 8.1 8.25 8.18 52 8.4 8.4 8.4 52 8.95 8.95 8.95 52 9.89 9.94 9.915 
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1958-1 7.13 7.18 7.161959-1 7.43 7.45 7.441960-1 7.12 7.13 7.13 1961-1 7.16 7.22 7.19 
2 7.18 7.24 7.21 2 7.3 7.4 7.35 2 7.13 7.15 7.14 
3 7.32 7.4 7.36 3 7.4 7.42 7.41 3 7.14 7.15 7.15 
4 7.6 7.7 7.65 4 7.42 7.46 7.44 4 7.14 7.15 7.15 
5 7.7 7.8 7.75 5 7 7.15 7.08 5 7.14 7.16 7.15 
6 7.5 7.6 7.55 6 6.82 6.9 6.86 6 7.15 7.16 7.16 
7 7.65 7.7 7.68 7 6.97 7.01 6.99 7 7.16 7.17 7.17 
8 7.6 7.7 7.65 8 7 7.03 7.02 8 7.17 7.18 7.18 
9 7.56 7.62 7.59 9 7.1 7.14 7.12 9 7.16 7.17 7.17 
10 7.6 7.65 7.63 10 7.22 7.25 7.24 10 
11 7.69 7.72 7.71 11 7.3 7.35 7.33 11 7.23 7.25 7.24 
12 7.73 7.78 7.76 12 7.34 7.37 7.36 12 7.17 7.18 7.18 
13 8.05 8.09 8.07 13 7.37 7.4 7.39 13 7.16 7.18 7.17 
14 8.1 8.15 8.13 14 7.3 7.35 7.33 14 7.24 7.26 7.25 
15 8.05 8.1 8.08 15 7.36 7.4 7.38 15 7.19 7.2 7.2 
16 8 8.05 8.03 16 7.41 7.43 7.42 16 7.19 7.21 7.2 
17 7.71 7.74 7.73 17 7.26 7.31 7.29 17 7.16 7.18 7.17 
18 7.71 7.75 7.73 18 7.31 7.34 7.33 18 7.21 7.25 7.23 
19 7.82 7.84 7.83 19 7.36 7.38 7.37 19 
20 7.95 7.98 7.97 20 20 
21 7.83 7.86 7.85 21 7.53 7.55 7.54 21 7.2 7.24 7.22 
22 7.85 7.9 7.88 22 7.42 7.45 7.44 22 
23 23 23 
24 24 7.61 7.66 7.64 24 7.17 7.21 7.19 
25 25 25 7.17 7.21 7.19 
26 7.86 7.9 7.88 26 7.47 7.52 7.5 26 7.17 7.21 7.19 
27 7.84 7.88 7.86 27 7.43 7.48 7.46 27 7.17 7.21 7.19 
28 7.96 8.02 7.99 28 7.57 7.6 7.59 28 7.2 7.22 7.21 
29 8.05 8.1 8.08 29 7.6 7.65 7.63 29 7.2 7.22 7.21 
30 7.95 8.05 8 30 7.1 7.3 7.2 30 7.17 7.23 7.2 
31 7.99 8.04 8.02 31 7.24 7.29 7.27 31 7.17 7.21 7.19 
32 8 8.04 8.02 32 7.27 7.3 7.29 32 7.17 7.21 7.19 
33 8.05 8.1 8.08 33 7.22 7.26 7.24 33 7.17 7.21 7.19 
34 7.95 8.02 7.99 34 7.1 7.16 7.13 34 7.2 7.22 7.21 
35 7.95 8 7.98 35 7.03 7.08 7.06 35 7.16 7.18 7.17 
36 7.88 7.92 7.9 36 7.1 7.12 7.11 36 7.12 7.14 7.13 
37 7.98 8.03 8.01 37 7.08 7.11 7.1 37 7.12 7.14 7.13 
38 7.95 8 7.98 ' 38 7.09 7.12 7.11 38 7.14 7.16 7.15 
39 7.86 7.92 7.89 39 7.03 7.07 7.05 39 7.1 7.12 7.11 
40 7.73 7.76 7.75 40 7 7.05 7.03 40 7.09 7.12 7.11 
41 7.63 7.7 7.67 41 7.03 7.08 7.06 41 7.1 7.12 7.11 
42 7.52 7.56 7.54 42 7.1 7.13 7.12 42 7.14 7.21 7.18 
43 7.37 7.39 7.38 43 7.13 7.15 7.14 43 7.12 7.13 7.13 
44 7.35 7.4 7.38 44 7.12 7.15 7.14 44 7.12 7.13 7.13 
45 7.15 7.22 7.19 45 7.11 7.13 7.12 45 
46 7.25 7.3 7.28 46 7.15 7.17 7.16 46 7.11 7.13 7.12 
47 7.35 7.4 7.38 47 7.15 7.17 7.16 47 7.12 7.13 7.13 
48 7.37 7.38 7.38 48 7.15 7.17 7.16 48 7.12 7.13 7.13 
49 7.35 7.38 7.37 49 7.16 7.17 7.17 49 7.12 7.13 7.13 
50 7.35 7.37 7.36 50 7.16 7.18 7.17 50 7.12 7.13 7.13 
•51 7.38 7.4 7.39 51 7.13 7.15 7.14 51 7.11 7.12 7.12 
52 7.39 7.41 7.4 52 7.13 7.14 7.14 52 7.11 7.12 7.12 
Source: Credit Suisse, as reported in El Economista 
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Table A. 8. Price of ounce of gold in Madrid (unofficial market) (in $), 
price of ounce of gold in Zurich (in $) and spread (in %) 
(Madrid) (Zurich) (Spread) (Madrid) (Zurich) (Spread) 
Jan-47 52 45.5 12.5% Jan-50 52 43 17.3% 
Feb-47 51.5 43.75 15.0% Feb-50 54 40.5 25.0% 
Mar-47 50 41.8 16.4% Mar-50 49.5 39.5 20.2% 
Apr-47 51.75 40.5 21.7% Apr-50 49 39.25 19.9% 
May-47 53 40.25 24.1% May-50 45 37.25 17.2% 
Jun-47 52 40 23.1% Jun-50 45 40.5 10.0% 
Jul-47 52.75 41.25 21.8% Jul-50 44 40 9.1% 
Aug-47 51.5 40.75 20.9% Aug-50 43.25 39 9.8% 
Sep-47 50 41.5 17.0% Sep-50 42 38.75 7.7% 
Oct-47 51.75 41.5 19.8% 0ct-50 41.5 38 8.4% 
Nov-47 52.5 42 20.0% Nov-50 41.75 38.9 6.8% 
Dec-47 51 42 17.6% Dec-50 42.5 40.25 5.3% 
Jan-48 52.5 42.5 19.0% Jan-51 44.75 42.75 4.5% 
Feb-48 51 42.5 16.7% Feb-51 45.25 42.5 6.1% 
Mar-48 51 42 17.6% Mar-51 43 40.5 5.8% 
Apr-48 51.5 42.5 17.5% Apr-51 44.5 42.25 5.1% 
May-48 51 42 17.6% May-51 43.75 40.5 7.4% 
Jun-48 52.5 42.5 19.0% Jun-51 42 40.25 4.2% 
Jul-48 51 42.75 16.2% Jul-51 42 40.25 4.2% 
Aug-48 50.5 42.5 15.8% Aug-51 42.5 40.5 4.7% 
Sep-48 50.25 42.5 15.4% Sep-51 41.25 40.37 2.1% 
Oct-48 50.75 42.5 16.3% Oct-51 41.25 38.75 6.1% 
Nov-48 52.5 43.5 17.1% Nov-51 42 39 7.1% 
Dec-48 51.5 43 16.5% Dec-51 41.75 39.13 6.3% 
Jan-49 52.5 45 14.3% Jan-52 41.75 39 6.6% 
Feb-49 53.25 43.5 18.3% Feb-52 41.5 38.9 6.3% 
Mar-49 52 43 17.3% Mar-52 40.75 38.25 6.1% 
Apr-49 54.25 43.5 19.8% Apr-52 39.75 37.5 5.7% 
May-49 53.5 44 17.8% May-52 39.85 37.75 5.3% 
Jun-49 53.75 44.5 17.2% Jun-52 39.5 37.4 5.3% 
Jul-49 54.5 43 21.1% Jul-52 39.75 37.7 5.2% 
Aug-49 54 46 14.8% Aug-52 39.75 37.6 5.4% 
Sep-49 54.25 46.5 14.3% Sep-52 39.25 37.25 5.1% 
Oct-49 52.5 46 12.4% Oct-52 40 37.5 6.3% 
Nov-49 50.75 45.5 10.3% Nov-52 39 37 5.1% 
Dec-49 51.5 41 20.4% Dec-52 39.4 37.45 4.9% 
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(Madrid) (Zurich) (Spread) (Madrid) (Zurich) (Spread) 
Jan-53 39.5 37.8 4.3% Jan-56 36.85 35 5.0% 
Feb-53 38.6 37.3 3.4% Feb-56 36.6 34.99 4.4% 
Mar-53 38.5 37.2 3.4% Mar-56 36.15 34.99 3.2% 
Apr-53 38.15 37 3.0% Apr-56 36.75 35 4.8% 
May-53 38 36.95 2.8% May-56 36.75 35 4.8% 
Jun-53 38 36.55 3.8% Jun-56 36.75 35.03 4.7% 
Jul-53 38 36.5 3.9% Jul-56 36.75 35.05 4.6% 
Aug-53 37.75 36.55 3.2% Aug-56 36.9 35.06 5.0% 
Sep-53 37.5 36.4 2.9% Sep-56 36.65 35.04 4.4% 
Oct-53 37.25 35.9 3.6% Oct-56 38 35.02 7.8% 
Nov-53 36 34.95 2.9% Nov-56 37.6 35.06 6.8% 
Dec-53 36.25 35.2 2.9% Dec-56 36.1 34.9 3.3% 
Jan-54 36.5 35.2 3.6% Jan-57 35.75 34.88 2.4% 
Feb-54 36.25 35.15 3.0% Feb-57 35.75 34.9 2.4% 
Mar-54 35.6 35.05 1.5% Mar-57 35.6 34.92 1.9% 
Apr-54 35.85 35.15 2.0% Apr-57 35.55 34.95 1.7% 
May-54 35.8 35.1 2.0% May-57 35.75 34.97 2.2% 
Jun-54 35.85 35.1 2.1% Jun-57 35.5 34.95 1.5% 
Jul-54 36 35.13 2.4% Jul-57 35.5 34.93 1.6% 
Aug-54 35.95 35.13 2.3% Aug-57 35.7 35.1 1.7% 
Sep-54 35.9 35.1 2.2% Sep-57 35.75 35.05 2.0% 
Oct-54 36 35.1 2.5% Oct-57 35.5 35.02 1.4% 
Nov-54 35.9 35.1 2.2% Nov-57 35.4 35.03 1.0% 
Dec-54 35.85 35.08 2.1% Dec-57 35.85 35.02 2.3% 
Jan-55 35.9 35.1 2.2% Jan-58 35.5 35.08 1.2% 
Feb-55 35.8 35.08 2.0% Feb-58 35.5 35.11 1.1% 
Mar-55 35.8 35.08 2.0% Mar-58 35.75 35.14 1.7% 
Apr-55 36 35.08 2.6% Apr-58 35.7 35.145 1.6% 
May-55 36 35.08 2.6% May-58 35.8 35.15 1.8% 
Jun-55 36 35.05 2.6% Jun-58 35.7 35.11 1.7% 
Jul-55 36 35.05 2.6% Jul-58 35.3 35.15 0.4% 
Aug-55 35.95 35.05 2.5% Aug-58 35.85 35.1 2.1% 
Sep-55 35.9 34.99 2.5% Sep-58 35.9 35.16 2.1% 
Oct-55 36.25 35 3.4% Oct-58 35.25 35.14 0.3% 
Nov-55 36.25 35 3.4% Nov-58 35.5 35.14 1.0% 
Dec-55 36.25 35 3.4% Dec-58 35.65 35.12 1.5% 
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(Madrid) (Zurich) (Spread) (Madrid) (Zurich) (Spread) 
Jan-59 36.35 35.12 3.4% Jan-62 3580 35.29 99.0% 
Feb-59 36.3 35.1 3.3% Feb-62 35.7 35.18 1.5% 
Mar-59 36 35.1 2.5% Mar-62 35.65 35.17 1.3% 
Apr-59 35.65 35.13 1.5% Apr-62 35.6 35.15 1.3% 
May-59 35.5 35.13 1.0% May-62 35.6 35.15 1.3% 
Jun-59 35.5 35.14 1.0% Jun-62 35.65 35.16 1.4% 
Jul-59 35.1 35.15 -0.1% Jul-62 35.65 35.17 1.3% 
Aug-59 35.35 35.14 0.6% Aug-62 35.5 35.18 0.9% 
Sep-59 35.4 35.155 0.7% Sep-62 35.5 35.2 0.8% 
Oct-59 35.3 35.12 0.5% Oct-62 35.55 35.185 1.0% 
Nov-59 35.35 35.09 0.7% Nov-62 35.45 35.16 0.8% 
Dec-59 35.3 35.1 0.6% Dec-62 35.4 35.17 0.6% 
Jan-60 35.35 35.13 0.6% Jan-63 35.35 35.15 0.6% 
Feb-60 35.35 35.12 0.7% Feb-63 35.36 35.17 0.5% 
Mar-60 35.3 35.15 0.4% Mar-63 35.41 35.19 0.6% 
Apr-60 35.35 35.17 0.5% Apr-63 - -
May-60 35.35 35.16 0.5% May-63 - -
Jun-60 35.4 35.17 0.6% Jun-63 - -
Jul-60 35.45 35.22 0.6% Jul-63 - -
Aug-60 35.65 35.35 0.8% Aug-63 - -
Sep-60 37.75 35.45 6.1% Sep-63 - -
0ct-60 38.5 36.6 4.9% Oct-63 - -
Nov-60 38 35.9 5.5% Nov-63 - -
Dec-60 37.8 35.85 5.2% Dec-63 - -
Jan-61 37.8 35.8 5.3% 
Feb-61 36.25 35.22 2.8% 
Mar-61 36 35.24 2.1% 
Apr-61 36.15 35.3 2.4% 
May-61 36 35.24 2.1% 
Jun-61 35.9 35.24 1.8% 
Jul-61 36 35.3 1.9% 
Aug-61 36.1 35.36 2.0% 
Sep-61 36.08 35.35 2.0% 
Oct-61 36.1 36.36 -0.7% 
Nov-61 35.75 35.33 1.2% 
Dec-61 35.8 35.28 1.5% 
Source: F. Pick, Black Market Yearbook (New York: Pick's World Currency 
Report), several years. 
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Table A.9. Selected bond trading data 
Perp. 1908 1928 Perp. 1908 1928 Perp. 1908 1928 Perp. 1908 1928 
1946-1 91.3 107 100.5 1947-1 93.5 99.75 93.5 1948-1 1949-1 87.5 96.25 89 
2 91.3 106.2 102 2 90 100 90 2 88.15 99.5 92 2 87 96.75 87 
3 91.3 106 101.8 3 90 100.3 90 3 89 99.75 90.5 3 88 96.75 89.25 
4 91.3 98 101.8 4 90.5 100.3 90.5 4 89.5 102 91 4 88 97.25 90.5 
5 91.3 106.2 101.8 5 90 100.3 89.75 5 89.25 102.3 91 5 88 97.5 89.5 
6 91.3 106.5 101.3 6 91 100.3 90.5 6 89.25 102.3 91.5 6 88 99 88.75 
7 91.5 106.5 102.3 7 91.5 100.3 91 7 89.25 102.3 91 7 87.5 98.5 88 
8 91.5 108.3 102 8 91.25 100.3 91 8 90.5 101 91.5 8 87.75 98.5 88.75 
9 91.5 108.3 101 9 91.5 100.3 91.5 9 89 99.5 92 9 88.75 98.5 89.65 
10 91.5 109 101 10 91.5 100.5 91.75 10 89 99.5 91.25 10 88.75 98 88.5 
11 91.5 109 102.5 11 91.75 100.8 92 11 88.25 100 91.25 11 88.75 98.5 89 
12 91.5 109.5 102.3 12 91.75 100.8 91.75 12 88.35 100.5 90.25 12 89 98.5 89 
13 91.5 110 103.8 13 91.5 101.8 92.5 13 89.5 100.5 90.75 13 89.25 99 89.75 
14 91 108 99.75 14 91.5 101.8 92.5 14 90.25 99.75 91.25 14 86.75 98.25 86.5 
15 91 109 99.75 15 91 101 90.35 15 88 99.75 89.5 15 86.75 98.25 87.75 
16 91 109 99.25 16 91.5 101 91.5 16 88.75 99.75 89.5 16 87 98.5 86.15 
17 91 109 99.5 17 91.5 101 91.5 17 88.25 99.75 89 17 86.85 98.5 86.5 
18 91 107 100.3 18 91.5 101 91.75 18 88 100 87.5 18 86.75 98.75 85.5 
19 91 107 101 19 91.5 101 92 19 88 100 88 19 86.75 98.75 87.25 
20 91 107 100.5 20 92 101 91.75 20 87.75 99.75 87 20 86.75 98.75 86.5 
21 91 108 95.5 21 91.75 101 92 21 88.5 99 88.5 21 8 6.6 98.75 86.5 
22 91 108 99 22 92 101.4 92 22 88 98.75 87.5 22 86.75 98.75 87 
23 91 107 98.5 23 92.25 101.5 92.5 23 88.25 98 87 23 86.6 98.75 87.25 
24 91 108 99.85 24 92.5 102 93.75 24 88 96.5 89 24 87 98.75 87.5 
25 91 107 100.3 25 93 102 95.25 25 88.75 96 91 25 86.75 99 88.5 
26 91.25 107 99.75 26 94 102 95 26 88 95 90.5 26 86.25 99 88.5 
27 90.75 106 97 27 93.5 101.3 91 27 87.5 94 90 27 86.5 98.25 87 
28 90.75 108 96.5 28 95.5 101.3 93.75 28 87.75 94 87 28 86.25 98.5 85.25 
29 90.75 104 97.25 29 99.5 101.3 93.5 29 87.5 93.75 86.75 29 86.25 98.5 85 
30 90.75 103.5 97.25 30 90.5 101.3 93 30 87.5 93 87.5 30 86 98.5 85.5 
31 90.75 102 96.5 31 89 101.3 92.75 31 88 87.7 87.75 31 86.15 98.5 85.5 
32 90.75 102 96.5 32 91.25 101.3 93.5 32 88.25 95.5 86.5 32 86 98.5 84.75 
33 90.75 102 95.5 33 92 101.3 93.5 33 88.25 97.5 88 33 85.75 98.75 85 
34 90.75 97 95 34 92.75 102 92 34 87.5 97.5 88.75 34 86.25 98.75 85.5 
35 90.75 97.25 95 35 92 102 92 35 87.75 97.5 90 35 86.5 98.75 85.25 
36 93.25 99 95 36 91 102 91 36 88 99.5 88 36 86 98.75 85.25 
37 92.5 99 95 37 89 102 91 37 88.5 100 87.75 37 86 99 85.75 
38 91.75 99 98.5 38 89 102 91.5 38 88 100 88 38 86 99 87 
39 93.5 99 99 39 89 101.8 92.25 39 88.25 100 87.6 39 86.25 99 86 
40 92.5 98.25 94.75 40 89 101 91 40 88.25 100 87.5 40 85.75 98.75 85.6 
41 91 98 94 41 88.75 99.75 90.5 41 87.25 99.75 87.75 41 85.75 98.75 85.5 
42 42 88 99.75 87.5 42 87.25 100 87.75 42 86 98.75 84.5 
43 91.25 97.5 92.25 43 87.9 99.75 88.5 43 88 100.5 88 43 85.75 99 84.25 
44 92.5 98 92.25 44 87.9 100.3 88 44 87.5 100.5 87.5 44 85.85 99.25 84 
45 93 97.75 95 45 88 100.5 89 45 87.5 100.5 89 45 86 99.25 81.5 
46 93 100 95 46 89 100.5 87 46 88 101 89 46 87.75 99.25 82.25 
47 93 100 95 47 87.75 100.3 87 47 87.75 101 89.5 47 87.75 99.25 85 
48 93 100 95 48 87.75 99.75 87 48 87.75 101 88.5 48 86.4 99.25 83 
49 93 100 93 49 88.5 100.3 86.25 49 88 100.8 88.25 49 86 99.25 82.25 
50 93.5 100.3 92 50 88.5 100.5 86 50 88 100.5 88.5 50 86 99.25 83 
51 93 100.5 94 51 88.5 100.5 89 51 87.5 100 88.5 51 86.25 99.25 83.25 
52 93.25 100.5 93.5 52 89.5 100.5 91 52 88.75 99.5 88 52 87 99.25 84 
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Perp. 1908 1928 Perp. 1908 1928 Perp. 1908 1928 Perp. 1908 1928 
1 87 98.5 841951-1 85 92.5 88.25 1952-1 84 94 88 1953-1 83.8 91.75 86.5 
2 86.25 98.5 84.75 2 85 92.5 87.5 2 84.25 94 87.5 2 83.25 92 86.25 
3 86.25 98.5 85.25 3 84.75 92.5 86.75 3 85 95 86 3 83.4 92 85.75 
4 86.5 99.5 87.5 4 85 93 87 4 84.5 95.5 85.75 4 83.25 92 86 
5 86.5 99.5 88.25 5 84.5 93 87 5 84 95.75 86.5 5 84 92 86 
6 86.25 99.5 88 6 85 93 88 6 84 96 86.5 6 83.75 92.75 87 
7 86.75 99 88.75 7 84.75 93 86.25 7 83.5 93 86.5 7 83.5 93.25 86.5 
8 86.25 99 87.5 8 84.5 93 86.25 8 83.75 93 86.75 8 83.95 93.25 88.5 
9 86 98.75 85.25 9 84.25 93 85 9 83.5 93 88 9 83.65 87.5 
10 86.25 98 85.25 10 84 93 85 10 83.75 91.5 86.5 10 83.75 93 87 
11 85.75 97.5 85.5 11 84 93 88 11 84 91.5 86 11 83.85 93 87.5 
12 86 97 84 12 84 93 88 12 85 91.5 86.75 12 83.6 93 87.05 
13 87.75 97 84 13 84.5 92.75 88 13 84 91.5 87.25 13 83.5 93 89.25 
14 85.35 96 83.75 14 84.75 91.75 86.5 14 83.5 90.5 86.5 14 
15 85.25 95 85.25 15 85 91 89 15 84 90 86 15 83.6 93.25 86.5 
16 85.25 94.5 85.25 16 85 91 90.5 16 84.5 92 83.75 16 84 93.5 86.25 
17 85.35 94.25 85.5 17 85 90 89 17 83.5 92 84.5 17 84.15 94.5 87 
18 85 94.25 85 18 85.5 90 89.5 18 83.95 92 86 18 84.25 98 87 
19 85 94.25 85.75 19 84.5 91 86.5 19 84 92 85.75 19 84.25 98 87 
20 85 93.75 85 20 84.5 91 84.5 20 83.5 85 20 84 98 87 
21 85.1 93.5 85.75 21 83.5 90.75 86 21 83.75 92 84.5 21 84 97.5 87.5 
22 85 89 86 22 84 90.75 85.5 22 84.5 94 85.5 22 83.5 98 87 
23 85 89 85.5 23 82.5 90.75 84.75 23 84.9 94 86 23 84.25 98 87.75 
24 85 88.25 85.75 24 83.5 90.75 85.5 24 83.5 93 86.75 24 84.25 98 88.75 
25 85 89 85 25 82.5 90.75 86 25 84.5 93 87.75 25 84.25 98 88.75 
26 85 88.25 85.5 26 83.75 90.75 87 26 84.75 91.25 86.75 26 84 98 88.75 
27 85 87.5 83.5 27 82 89.5 85.75 27 83.25 90 88 27 83.1 97 89 
28 85 87 84 28 82.25 87.5 86.5 28 83.5 90 89.5 28 83 97 90 
29 85 87.5 84.55 29 82.5 87.5 86.5 29 83 91.5 88 29 83 98 88.5 
30 85 87.5 84 30 83 87.75 86.5 30 84.25 91.5 88 30 83 98 88.5 
31 85 87.75 84.5 31 83.25 87.75 86.5 31 83.75 91.5 86 31 83 98 88.5 
32 85 87.75 85.25 32 83.5 88 87.25 32 84.25 92.25 88 32 83.25 90 89.25 
33 80.5 87.75 85.25 33 83.75 88 87 33 85 92.5 88 33 83 99.25 88.5 
34 85 87.75 83.75 34 83.75 88 87 34 84.75 92.5 87.5 34 83.35 99.25 87.5 
35 84.75 88.25 83.85 35 83 87.75 83 35 85 93 88.25 35 83.3 99.5 89 
36 84.75 88.25 84.25 36 83.5 87.5 86 36 84.65 93 89 36 83.75 99.5 89 
37 85 90.75 85.25 37 84.5 87.5 85.25 37 84.5 93.25 89.25 37 84.15 99.5 89.75 
38 85.15 90.75 86.25 38 85.75 87.5 86 38 85 93.5 89 38 83.85 98.5 88.25 
39 85.75 92 85.75 * 39 85.65 88.25 86 39 85 94.5 88 39 83.75 99 88.5 
40 85.5 93 84.75 . 40 83.5 88.25 86.5 40 83.5 92.5 88.25 40 83.4 99.5 87.6 
41 85 94 85 41 84.25 88.25 86.5 41 83.6 89.25 89.75 41 83.45 98.5 88.25 
42 85 94 85 42 84.5 88.5 87 42 83.8 92.5 90.75 42 83 97.5 87.75 
43 85 94 84.75 43 84.3 90.25 86.5 43 83.25 92.5 90.25 43 83.15 96.5 87.5 
44 85.25 93.5 84.5 44 84.1 90.25 86 44 83.5 93 89.5 44 83.4 95.5 87.75 
45 85.15 93 85.25 45 84.25 91 85.5 45 83.5 93 87.25 45 83.25 96 87.25 
46 85.5 92.5 86.5 46 83.5 91 85.25 46 83.9 93 86.75 46 83.75 97.25 88.25 
47 85.25 92 87.5 47 84 92 84.5 47 83.75 93 87 47 84.25 97.5 87.5 
48 85.5 92 88 48 83.8 92.25 86.25 48 84 93 93 48 84.15 97.5 88.5 
49 85.5 92 88 49 85 93 86.25 49 84 93 88 49 83.5 97.5 88.25 
50 85 92 88.75 50 85.5 93.5 87.75 50 84.6 93 88 50 83.6 97.5 87.25 
51 86 93 89 51 85.5 93.5 88.75 51 84.5 93 88.5 51 83.5 97.5 88.5 
52 86 93 86.75 52 85 95.5 89 52 84 92.5 88.5 52 84 98 87.75 
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Table A. 12. Continued 
Perp. 1908 1928 Perp. 1908 1928 Perp. 1908 1928 Perp. 1908 1928 
1954-1 83.5 97.5 89 1955-1 83 100 921956-1 82.25 92 90 1957-1 80 90 82.5 
2 83.5 97.5 88.5 2 83 100 90 2 82.25 94 90 2 80 90.2 82.75 
3 83.5 97.5 88.5 3 82.65 100 89 3 82.25 94 90.5 3 
4 83.25 97.5 89 4 82.55 100 90 4 82.5 94.5 89.75 4 80 90 82.75 
5 83.5 98 90 5 82.75 100 90.5 5 82 94.5 89.5 5 80 90 82.75 
6 83.35 98 89.75 6 83 100 90.75 6 82.25 95.5 90 6 80 90 82.75 
7 83.5 98 88 7 83 100.5 90 7 81.8 96.5 90.5 7 80 90 82 
8 83.25 98 88.25 8 82.75 100 90.5 8 82.15 98 90 8 80 90 82 
9 83.25 97.75 88 9 82.95 99.75 90.5 9 82 98 89.75 9 
10 83.15 97.75 89 10 82.5 99.5 91 10 82.25 98 90.5 10 80 90 82.25 
11 83.25 97.75 89 11 83 100 91.25 11 82 98 90.75 11 
12 83.25 98 88.5 12 82.55 100 92 12 82.25 96.5 90.5 12 80.3 90 82.25 
13 82.5 98 89 13 82.75 100 91.15 13 82 95 89.5 13 80.35 90 81 
14 82.5 98.5 87.5 14 82.6 100.3 90 14 81.5 94 89.75 14 80 90 80.5 
15 82.5 15 82.6 100.3 91.3 15 81.5 94 89 15 80 90 81 
16 82.5 99 88 16 82.45 100 91.25 16 81.75 94 88.25 16 80 90 81 
17 82.7 99.5 87.25 17 82.35 100 90 17 81.75 93.5 88 17 80.2 90 81.5 
18 82.75 99.5 88 18 82.25 100 90 18 18 80.2 90 81.5 
19 82.85 99.5 88 19 82.5 100 91.35 19 81.75 86.5 19 80.35 90 80 
20 83.25 99.5 87.75 20 82.4 100 91.25 20 81.75 92 88 20 80.3 90.25 80 
21 82.25 98 88 21 82.4 100.9 90.25 21 81.75 92 87 21 80.4 91 80.5 
22 83.25 98 88.5 22 82.5 100.5 90.75 22 81.75 92 89 22 80.3 92 81 
23 83.25 99 88.75 23 82.5 100.5 91.25 23 81.75 92 87.5 23 
24 83.25 98 89.5 24 82.85 100.5 91.5 24 81.95 92 86 24 80.5 93.5 82.75 
25 83 98 89.75 25 82.75 100.5 91.5 25 81.75 92 85.75 25 80.75 93.5 83 
26 82.65 97 89 26 82.3 100 91 26 82 92 85.75 26 80.75 93.5 84 
27 82.8 97.5 89 27 82.25 100 91.5 27 81 90.5 86 27 80 92.5 83.5 
28 83 98 89.75 28 82 100.5 91.5 28 81.2 90.5 86 28 80 92.5 83 
29 82.5 98.75 89.75 29 82.4 100.5 91 29 81.4 90.5 86 29 80.1 92.5 83 
30 82.5 99.25 89.75 30 83 100.5 91 30 81 90.5 86 30 80.1 92.5 83 
31 82.75 90.25 31 82.5 100.5 89.5 31 81 90.5 85.25 31 80.2 92.5 81.5 
32 82.75 100.5 90.25 32 82.75 102.5 91 32 81.15 90.5 85.75 32 80.4 92.5 79.5 
33 82.75 101.5 89.5 33 83 100 90.75 33 81.3 90.5 85.75 33 80.2 92.5 78.5 
34 82.75 101.5 90.5 34 82.25 99.5 92 34 81.3 91 85.75 34 80.4 92.5 79.5 
35 83 101.5 91.5 35 82.75 98 35 81.4 92.5 85.75 35 80.4 92.5 79 
36 83.45 101.5 91.25 36 82.5 98.25 91.6 36 81.5 92.5 85.75 36 80.6 92.5 77.25 
37 83.1 101.5 90.5- 37 82.5 98.25 92 37 81.4 92.5 85.75 37 80.5 92.5 77 
38 83.35 101.5 91 38 82.65 98 93.5 38 81.3 87 38 80.6 93 77.75 
39 83.45 101.5 91 39 82.9 98 93.25 39 81.5 92.5 88 39 80.6 92.5 80 
40 82.65 100.5 90.75 40 82.4 97 92 40 80 92.5 89 40 79.9 91.5 79 
41 82.6 101 90.5 41 82.1 98 92 41 80 93 89 41 80.1 91.5 79 
42 82.8 100 90 42 82.5 98 92 42 80 93 88.5 42 80 80 
43 82.65 99 91 43 82.4 96.5 91.75 43 80 92.5 88 43 79.9 91.5 80 
44 83 99.5 91 44 82.25 96 91.5 44 80.3 93 87.5 44 79.9 91.5 81 
45 82.75 99 90 45 82.25 95.5 91.75 45 80.2 93 85.5 45 80 91.5 81.5 
46 83.25 99.5 90.5 46 82.5 96 90 46 80.2 91.5 84 46 80.1 91.5 82.5 
47 83.25 100 91 47 82.35 95.5 90.75 47 80.2 90.5 83.5 47 80.3 91.5 82.5 
48 83.25 100 90.5 48 82.3 95.5 90 48 80.2 90 82.5 48 80.1 91.5 82.5 
49 83.25 90 49 82.9 90.75 49 80.3 90 81 49 80.1 91.5 82.5 
50 83.5 100.5 91 50 83 95.5 91 50 80.3 90 82.5 50 80.1 92.5 83 
51 83.4 100.5 90.5 51 82.75 95.25 90 51 80.4 90 82.5 51 80.1 93 83.25 
52 83.25 100.5 90.75 52 83 95 91 52 80.65 90.5 82.5 52 80.1 93 84 
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Table A. 12. Continued 
1958-1 1959-1 80.2 97 84.75 1960-1 79.6 100 86 1961-1 91.5 102.5 98 
2 2 2 78.8 100 85.8 
3 3 79.55 96 84 3 78.8 100 85.5 
4 4 79.6 96 84 4 78.8 100 85.5 
5 5 79.55 96 83 5 78.8 100 85.5 
6 6 79.7 96.5 82.5 6 78.9 100 85.5 
7 7 79.7 97 82 7 78.9 100 85 
8 8 80 97 83 8 79.15 100 84.75 
9 9 80 97 81.5 9 79 100 85.75 
10 10 80 98.5 81.25 10 79.1 100.3 86.75 
11 11 80.1 98.5 82 11 79.4 100.5 87.25 
12 80.3 96.5 85 12 80.15 98.5 83 12 79.3 100.5 88 
13 13 80.15 98.5 83.5 13 79.65 100.5 88.5 
14 14 79.15 98.5 82.75 14 79.15 100 88.75 
15 15 79.15 97.5 82.25 15 79.3 100 88.5 
16 16 79.3 98 82 16 79.5 100 88.5 
17 17 79.3 98.6 81.25 17 79.5 100 88.5 
18 18 79.3 98.6 81.25 18 80 100 88.5 
19 19 79.45 99 81 19 80.25 100 89.25 
20 20 79.45 99 82.25 20 80.25 100 90.5 
21 21 79.6 99 81 21 80.1 101 90.5 
22 22 79.6 81 22 80 101.5 90.5 
23 23 79.8 99 81.5 23 80 100.5 90 
24 24 79.75 99 82.25 24 80.1 101.5 89.75 
25 25 80 100 82.75 25 80.55 101.8 90.75 
26 26 80.2 100 82.5 26 81 103 91.5 
27 27 79.2 99 82.35 27 81 101.8 90.5 
28 28 79.2 99 82.5 28 80.5 101.8 92 
29 29 79.4 98.75 82.5 29 80 101.8 91.5 
30 30 79.6 99 83 30 80.5 101.8 91.5 
31 31 79.4 99 83 31 80 101.8 91.75 
32 32 79.5 99 83 32 80.75 101.8 91.75 
33 33 79.5 99 83 33 80.75 101.8 91 
34 34 79.6 99 81.5 34 81.25 101.8 92 
35 35 79.6 99.25 83.5 35 81.3 102.5 92 
36 36 79.7 99.25 82.5 36 83 102.5 94 
37 37 79.7 99.25 83 37 83.75 102.5 95.5 
38 38 79.9 83 38 83.8 102.5 96 
39 39 79.9 99.5 83.5 39 82.5 94.25 
40 40 79.25 96 82.25 40 81 102.5 94 
41 41 79 98 81 41 81.25 102 95.5 
42 ' 42 79.1 98 82 42 81.3 102 95.5 
43 43 79.1 98 83 43 85.25 102 95.75 
44 44 79.1 98 84.25 44 85.5 102 96 
45 45 79.2 98.5 85.5 45 87 102 97 
46 46 79.4 98.5 86 46 87 102 96.5 
47 47 79.35 86 47 87.5 102 95 
48 48 79.35 99 86.5 48 88 102 96.75 
49 49 79.5 99 86.5 49 87.5 102 97 
50 50 79.5 99.75 86.5 50 87.9 102 99 
51 51 79.6 100 84.75 51 88.5 102 99 
52 52 79.8 100 85 52 89.5 102.5 98.9 
Source: as reported in El Economista 
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Table A. 10. List and code of stocks in 1953 Madrid Stock Exchange Index 
Code Company Sector 
ESP Banco de Espana Banking 
BTO Banco Espanol de Credito Banking 
HIS Banco Hispano Americano Banking 
FEN Union Electrica Fenosa Electricity 
HES Hidroelectrica Espanola Electricity 
IBE Iberduero Electricity 
NAN Saltos del Nansa Electricity 
SEV Sevillana de Electricidad Electricity 
UEM Union Electrica Madrilena Electricity 
RIF Minas del Rif Mining/Steel 
MDF Manufacturas Duro Felguera Mining/Steel 
PON Minerosiderurgica de Ponferrada Mining/Steel 
AHV Altos Hornos de Vizcaya Mining/Steel 
AUX Construcciones Auxiliares de 
Ferrocarril 
Mining/Steel 
TEL Telefonica Telecommunications 
CAM CAMPSA (Monopolio de petroleos) Chemicals/Oil 
TAB Tabacalera Food 
AGI El Aguila Food 
AZU Azucarera General Espanola Food 
INM Inmobiliaria Urbanizadora Building 
ARA Industrias Aragonesas Chemicals/Oil 
ERT Explosivos Chemicals/Oil 
CEP CEPSA Chemicals/Oil 
FEF FEF ASA Chemicals/Oil 
SNC SNIACE Chemicals/Oil 
NAV Construcciones Navales Transport 
MDM Metro de Madrid Transport 
EBR Ebro Food 
MER Banco Mercantil e Industrial Banking 
URM Urbanizadora Metropolitana Building 
DRC Dragados Building 
HCV Hidrocivil Building 
MMM Manufacturas Metalicas Madrilenas Mining/Steel 
GUI Los Guindos Mining/Steel 
CAN Hidroelectrica del Cantabrico Electricity 
CEN Banco Central Banking 
BEE Banco Exterior de Espana Banking 
UFX Union y el Fenix Sundry 
CPL Portland Valderribas Building 
POP Banco Popular Banking 
RES Union Resinera Espanola Chemicals/Oil 
INS INSA Sundry 
CGI Compania General de Inversiones Sundry 
REU Reunidas de Zaragoza Chemicals/Oil 
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Table A.l 1. Ordinary Least Squares estimation of the market mode 
OLS n = 120 n - only trading days 
alfa Prob beta Prob R-squared no. Alfa Prob beta Prob R-
obs. square 
A 
ESP 0.089 0.05 0.084 0.61 0.00 112 0.001 0.05 0.087 0.64 
U 
0.00 
BEE 0.138 0.10 0.107 0.72 0.00 62 0.003 0.10 0.173 0.76 0.00 
BTO 0.023 0.57 -0.051 0.73 0.00 117 0.000 0.57 -0.052 0.73 0.00 
HIS 0.069 0.15 0.029 0.87 0.00 112 0.001 0.16 0.012 0.95 0.00 
CEN 0.090 0.00 0.105 0.13 0.02 89 0.001 0.00 0.120 0.21 0.02 
MER 0.008 0.91 0.159 0.55 0.00 61 0.000 0.93 0.366 0.53 0.01 
POP 0.038 0.09 0.002 0.97 0.00 49 0.001 0.19 0.012 0.93 0.00 
FEN 0.026 0.67 0.607 0.01 0.06 59 0.000 0.87 0.994 0.02 0.09 
CAN 0.028 0.39 -0.244 0.04 0.03 63 0.000 0.77 0.008 0.97 0.00 
HES -0.066 0.37 1.908 0.00 0.30 118 -0.001 0.41 1.921 0.00 0.30 
IBE -0.014 0.81 1.860 0.00 0.39 118 0.000 0.82 1.861 0.00 0.39 
NAN 0.057 0.28 0.755 0.00 0.12 109 0.001 0.25 0.807 0.00 0.13 
SEV -0.004 0.95 1.197 0.00 0.14 118 0.000 0.98 1.201 0.00 0.14 
UEM -0.047 0.51 0.506 0.05 0.03 120 0.000 0.51 0.506 0.05 0.03 
REU 0.024 0.79 0.685 0.04 0.03 45 0.002 0.36 1.847 0.04 0.09 
RIF 0.055 0.60 2.088 0.00 0.20 120 0.001 0.06 2.089 0.00 0.20 
MDF -0.060 0.37 0.662 0.01 0.06 98 -0.001 0.29 0.842 0.00 0.07 
GUI 0.003 0.97 0.341 0.15 0.02 80 0.000 0.94 0.427 0.19 0.02 
PON 0.055 0.40 1.548 0.00 0.27 117 0.001 0.36 1.562 0.00 0.27 
AHV -0.119 0.23 2.400 0.00 0.27 115 -0.001 0.21 2.470 0.00 0.28 
AUX -0.013 0.69 0.185 0.12 0.02 113 0.000 0.66 0.192 0.12 0.02 
MMM -0.017 0.88 0.977 0.02 0.05 72 -0.001 0.78 1.460 0.02 0.07 
TEL -0.016 0.64 0.169 0.18 0.01 120 -0.016 0.64 0.169 0.18 0.01 
CAM 0.013 0.87 1.248 0.00 0.13 120 0.000 0.87 1.248 0.00 0.13 
TAB -0.002 0.98 -0.095 0.83 0.00 97 0.000 0.88 0.101 0.85 0.00 
AGI 0.050 0.39 0.581 0.00 0.06 99 0.001 0.39 0.658 0.01 0.07 
AZU 0.033 0.70 -0.284 0.37 0.01 115 0.000 0.69 -0.288 0.38 0.01 
HCV 0.000 0.99 0.237 0.38 0.01 61 -0.001 0.61 0.504 0.31 0.01 
DRC 0.050 0.53 0.514 0.08 0.02 78 0.000 0.73 0.717 0.14 0.02 
INM -0.049 0.54 1.198 0.00 0.13 93 0.000 0.80 1.628 0.00 0.17 
URM -0.031 0.65 0.348 0.17 0.02 76 -0.001 0.65 0.460 0.21 0.02 
ARA -0.057 0.56 0.660 0.07 0.03 104 -0.001 0.31 1.034 0.01 0.06 
ERT 0.026 0.71 1.158 0.00 0.15 116 0.000 0.62 1.187 0.00 0.15 
CEP 0.044 0.52 1.873 0.00 0.33 118 0.000 0.58 1.890 0.00 0.33 
RES -0.027 0.77 0.634 0.07 0.03 45 -0.002 0.50 1.503 0.14 0.05 
FEF -0.233 0.09 2.724 0.00 0.20 115 -0.002 0.10 2.762 0.00 0.21 
SNC -0.095 0.25 1.998 0.00 0.27 105 -0.001 0.13 2.232 0.00 0.31 
NAV 0.089 0.21 0.168 0.52 0.00 79 0.001 0.23 0.504 0.19 0.02 
MDM -0.062 0.57 0.649 0.10 0.02 114 -0.001 0.60 0.668 0.11 0.02 
INS -0.004 0.98 0.446 0.34 0.01 49 -0.001 0.75 1.607 0.25 0.03 
CGI -0.016 0.72 -0.269 0.09 0.02 50 0.000 0.75 -1.238 0.02 0.11 
UFX 0.074 0.29 -0.130 0.61 0.00 
EBR 0.052 0.65 -0.051 0.90 0.00 
CPL 0.021 0.77 0.446 0.10 0.02 
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Price index (Dec 
1940= 100) capitalisation E/P P/E rp = E/P-r 
Jan-48 3.78% 1251 289.1 21266.2 5.9% 17.0 2.1% 
Feb-48 3.78% 1251 256.1 18837.1 6.6% 15.1 2.9% 
Mar-48 3.77% 1251 227.2 16713.3 7.5% 13.4 3.7% 
Apr-48 3.80% 1251 224.1 16486.0 7.6% 13.2 3.8% 
May-48 3.79% 1251 206.6 15198.6 8.2% 12.1 4.4% 
Jun-48 3.77% 1251 213.5 15707.6 8.0% 12.6 4.2% 
Jul-48 3.79% 1251 208.7 15350.1 8.1% 12.3 4.4% 
Aug-48 3.77% 1251 240.0 17656.4 7.1% 14.1 3.3% 
Sep-48 3.77% 1251 218.9 16101.2 7.8% 12.9 4.0% 
Oct-48 3.79% 1251 215.9 15883.5 7.9% 12.7 4.1% 
Nov-48 3.79% 1251 203.7 14986.0 8.3% 12.0 4.6% 
Dec-48 3.77% 1251 220.1 16192.4 7.7% 12.9 4.0% 
Jan-49 3.77% 1552 215.3 17348.2 8.9% 11.2 5.2% 
Feb-49 3.78% 1552 198.7 16007.5 9.7% 10.3 5.9% 
Mar-49 3.78% 1552 209.1 16844.6 9.2% 10.9 5.4% 
Apr-49 3.74% 1552 199.2 16051.8 9.7% 10.3 5.9% 
May-49 3.75% 1552 193.6 15594.2 10.0% 10.0 6.2% 
Jun-49 3.82% 1552 186.4 15015.7 10.3% 9.7 6.5% 
Jul-49 3.84% 1552 191.2 15404.9 10.1% 9.9 6.2% 
Aug-49 3.84% 1552 206.0 16597.3 9.3% 10.7 5.5% 
Sep-49 3.84% 1552 221.8 17867.9 8.7% 11.5 4.8% 
Oct-49 3.84% 1552 207.5 16714.1 9.3% 10.8 5.4% 
Nov-49 3.84% 1552 206.0 16595.7 9.4% 10.7 5.5% 
Dec-49 3.82% 1552 205.8 16578.7 9.4% 10.7 5.5% 
Jan-50 3.81% 1652 209.2 18613.5 8.9% 11.3 5.1% 
Feb-50 3.88% 1652 208.9 18585.1 8.9% 11.2 5.0% 
Mar-50 3.85% 1652 207.6 18465.0 8.9% 11.2 5.1% 
Apr-50 3.86% 1652 218.3 19416.9 8.5% 11.8 4.6% 
May-50 3.86% 1652 216.5 19263.0 8.6% 11.7 4.7% 
Jun-50 3.87% 1652 213.7 19012.1 8.7% 11.5 4.8% 
Jul-50 3.85% 1652 215.9 19208.7 8.6% 11.6 4.8% 
Aug-50 3.88% 1652 219.6 19535.2 8.5% 11.8 4.6% 
Sep-50 3.84% 1652 221.4 19694.5 8.4% 11.9 4.5% 
0ct-50 3.86% 1652 221.2 19682.9 8.4% 11.9 4.5% 
Nov-50 3.85% 1652 221.5 19707.8 8.4% 11.9 4.5% 
Dec-50 3.83% 1652 228.1 20295.0 8.1% 12.3 4.3% 
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Table A. 12. Continued 
Earnings Price index (Dec 
Bond yield (lagged) 1940= 100) capitalisation E/P P/E rp = E/P - r 
Jan-51 3.85% 2291 238.5 22077.5 10.4% 9.6 6.5% 
Feb-51 3.86% 2291 276.5 25593.1 9.0% 11.2 5.1% 
Mar-51 3.84% 2291 250.0 23139.3 9.9% 10.1 6.1% 
Apr-51 3.82% 2291 247.2 22884.7 10.0% 10.0 6.2% 
May-51 3.88% 2291 243.4 22533.0 10.2% 9.8 6.3% 
Jun-51 3.87% 2291 252.0 23324.4 9.8% 10.2 6.0% 
Jul-51 3.89% 2291 259.6 24026.9 9.5% 10.5 5.6% 
Aug-51 3.92% 2291 269.0 24895.2 9.2% 10.9 5.3% 
Sep-51 3.89% 2291 267.1 24721.2 9.3% 10.8 5.4% 
Oct-51 3.92% 2291 271.1 25089.6 9.1% 11.0 5.2% 
Nov-51 4.08% 2291 266.2 24638.8 9.3% 10.8 5.2% 
Dec-51 3.92% 2291 270.0 24994.2 9.2% 10.9 5.2% 
Jan-52 3.95% 2844 275.9 26464.0 10.7% 9.3 6.8% 
Feb-52 3.94% 2844 281.8 27030.0 10.5% 9.5 6.6% 
Mar-52 3.94% 2844 283.4 27184.4 10.5% 9.6 6.5% 
Apr-52 3.95% 2844 282.7 27123.0 10.5% 9.5 6.5% 
May-52 3.95% 2844 284.0 27240.1 10.4% 9.6 6.5% 
Jun-52 3.95% 2844 278.1 26680.8 10.7% 9.4 6.7% 
Jul-52 3.95% 2844 282.6 27105.7 10.5% 9.5 6.5% 
Aug-52 3.94% 2844 287.0 27527.9 10.3% 9.7 6.4% 
Sep-52 3.94% 2844 290.7 27883.8 10.2% 9.8 6.3% 
Oct-52 3.94% 2844 288.5 27677.5 10.3% 9.7 6.3% 
Nov-52 3.94% 2844 285.5 27392.6 10.4% 9.6 6.4% 
Dec-52 3.94% 2844 289.9 27811.8 10.2% 9.8 6.3% 
Jan-53 3.95% 3601 292.0 31267.0 11.5% 8.7 7.6% 
Feb-53 3.95% 3601 291.0 31162.1 11.6% 8.7 7.6% 
Mar-53 3.94% 3601 286.4 30671.6 11.7% 8.5 7.8% 
Apr-53 3.95% 3601 283.2 30323.5 11.9% 8.4 7.9% 
May-53 3.95% 3601 286.2 30653.4 11.7% 8.5 7.8% 
Jun-53 3.94% 3601 287.3 30769.1 11.7% 8.5 7.8% 
Jul-53 3.94% 3601 285.6 30587.0 11.8% 8.5 7.8% 
Aug-53 3.94% 3601 294.1 31495.2 11.4% 8.7 7.5% 
Sep-53 3.94% 3601 296.8 31786.4 11.3% 8.8 7.4% 
Oct-53 3.95% 3601 310.4 33246.1 10.8% 9.2 6.9% 
Nov-53 3.94% 3601 317.1 33956.2 10.6% 9.4 6.7% 
Dec-53 3.94% 3601 320.7 34344.9 10.5% 9.5 6.5% 
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Table A. 12. Continued 
Earnings Price index (Dec 
Bond yield (lagged) 1940= 100) capitalisation E/P P/E rp = E/P-r 
Jan-54 3.94% 4408 333.7 35845.2 12.3% 8.1 8.4% 
Feb-54 3.94% 4408 338.2 36329.7 12.1% 8.2 8.2% 
Mar-54 3.94% 4408 350.6 37657.4 11.7% 8.5 7.8% 
Apr-54 3.95% 4408 357.8 38437.2 11.5% 8.7 7.5% 
May-54 3.94% 4408 356.9 38338.4 11.5% 8.7 7.6% 
Jun-54 3.94% 4408 359.5 38616.6 11.4% 8.8 7.5% 
Jul-54 3.94% 4408 376.8 40470.6 10.9% 9.2 7.0% 
Aug-54 3.94% 4408 387.5 41621.1 10.6% 9.4 6.7% 
Sep-54 3.94% 4408 393.2 42234.4 10.4% 9.6 6.5% 
Oct-54 3.94% 4408 389.1 41797.3 10.5% 9.5 6.6% 
Nov-54 3.94% 4408 408.4 43868.3 10.0% 10.0 6.1% 
Dec-54 3.94% 4408 423.9 45534.3 9.7% 10.3 5.7% 
Jan-55 3.94% 4862 435.8 48654.0 10.0% 10.0 6.1% 
Feb-55 3.94% 4862 456.0 50909.5 9.5% 10.5 5.6% 
Mar-55 3.94% 4862 465.9 52017.1 9.3% 10.7 5.4% 
Apr-55 3.94% 4862 471.0 52589.9 9.2% 10.8 5.3% 
May-55 3.94% 4862 454.9 50796.7 9.6% 10.4 5.6% 
Jun-55 3.94% 4862 474.7 52999.7 9.2% 10.9 5.2% 
Jul-55 3.94% 4862 507.2 56626.3 8.6% 11.6 4.6% 
Aug-55 3.91% 4862 539.1 60195.9 8.1% 12.4 4.2% 
Sep-55 3.90% 4862 550.6 61480.0 7.9% 12.6 4.0% 
Oct-55 3.90% 4862 570.5 63697.4 7.6% 13.1 3.7% 
Nov-55 3.91% 4862 594.4 66366.0 7.3% 13.7 3.4% 
Dec-55 3.91% 4862 643.5 71855.0 6.8% 14.8 2.9% 
Jan-56 3.91% 6084 655.4 79684.7 7.6% 13.1 3.7% 
Feb-56 3.91% 6084 699.8 85088.1 7.2% 14.0 3.2% 
Mar-56 3.91% 6084 721.0 87667.1 6.9% 14.4 3.0% 
Apr-56 3.91% 6084 692.2 84166.5 7.2% 13.8 3.3% 
May-56 3.92% 6084 705.5 85783.6 7.1% 14.1 3.2% 
Jun-56 3.92% 6084 731.9 88991.2 6.8% 14.6 2.9% 
Jul-56 3.92% 6084 766.7 93222.5 6.5% 15.3 2.6% 
Aug-56 3.92% 6084 820.7 99790.7 6.1% 16.4 2.2% 
Sep-56 3.91% 6084 807.3 98160.2 6.2% 16.1 2.3% 
Oct-56 3.92% 6084 827.1 100570.1 6.0% 16.5 2.1% 
Nov-56 3.93% 6084 889.2 108111.1 5.6% 17.8 1.7% 
Dec-56 3.93% 6084 892.0 108451.5 5.6% 17.8 1.7% 
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Table A. 12. Continued 
Earnings Price index (Dec 
Bond yield (lagged) 1940= 100) capitalisation E/P P/E rp = E/P - r 
Jan-57 3.93% 7393 970.9 123393.3 6.0% 16.7 2.1% 
Feb-57 3.93% 7393 936.1 118964.3 6.2% 16.1 2.3% 
Mar-57 3.94% 7393 833.7 105958.2 7.0% 14.3 3.0% 
Apr-57 3.93% 7393 882.7 112185.5 6.6% 15.2 2.7% 
May-57 3.94% 7393 836.9 106353.4 7.0% 14.4 3.0% 
Jun-57 3.93% 7393 828.2 105252.8 7.0% 14.2 3.1% 
Jul-57 3.93% 7393 840.6 106823.6 6.9% 14.4 3.0% 
Aug-57 3.94% 7393 861.4 109476.0 6.8% 14.8 2.8% 
Sep-57 3.94% 7393 793.6 100856.9 7.3% 13.6 3.4% 
Oct-57 3.94% 7393 767.2 97497.9 7.6% 13.2 3.6% 
Nov-57 3.93% 7393 718.5 91317.7 8.1% 12.4 4.2% 
Dec-57 3.91% 7393 787.7 100102.0 7.4% 13.5 3.5% 
Jan-58 3.91% 10192 772.6 99984.2 10.2% 9.8 6.3% 
Feb-58 3.92% 10192 736.3 95283.8 10.7% 9.3 6.8% 
Mar-58 3.93% 10192 720.3 93218.2 10.9% 9.1 7.0% 
Apr-58 3.94% 10192 737.6 95458.5 10.7% 9.4 6.7% 
May-58 3.93% 10192 704.7 91195.4 11.2% 8.9 7.2% 
Jun-58 3.93% 10192 702.1 90861.5 11.2% 8.9 7.3% 
Jul-58 3.93% 10192 728.3 94256.2 10.8% 9.2 6.9% 
Aug-58 3.92% 10192 737.4 95432.6 10.7% 9.4 6.8% 
Sep-58 3.93% 10192 737.1 95396.3 10.7% 9.4 6.8% 
Oct-58 3.93% 10192 792.6 102581.6 9.9% 10.1 6.0% 
Nov-58 3.93% 10192 749.8 97033.5 10.5% 9.5 6.6% 
Dec-58 3.92% 10192 750.4 97111.1 10.5% 9.5 6.6% 
Jan-59 3.93% 12486 817.7 111917.8 11.2% 9.0 7.2% 
Feb-59 3.93% 12486 780.8 106864.7 11.7% 8.6 7.8% 
Mar-59 3.93% 12486 739.0 101142.3 12.3% 8.1 8.4% 
Apr-59 3.94% 12486 734.2 100483.9 12.4% 8.0 8.5% 
May-59 3.94% 12486 711.8 97426.3 12.8% 7.8 8.9% 
Jun-59 3.93% 12486 698.5 95600.5 13.1% 7.7 9.1% 
Jul-59 3.93% 12486 679.8 93043.8 13.4% 7.5 9.5% 
Aug-59 3.93% 12486 633.3 86672.6 14.4% 6.9 10.5% 
Sep-59 3.93% 12486 663.3 90788.3 13.8% 7.3 9.8% 
Oct-59 3.93% 12486 646.1 88423.2 14.1% 7.1 10.2% 
Nov-59 3.92% 12486 608.6 83292.0 15.0% 6.7 11.1% 
Dec-59 3.92% 12486 678.3 92831.7 13.4% 7.4 9.5% 
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Table A. 12. Continued 
Earnings Price index (Dec 
Bond yield (lagged) 1940= 100) capitalisation E/P P/E rp = E/P - r 
Jan-60 3.92% 13102 673.7 98383.7 13.3% 7.5 9.4% 
Feb-60 3.92% 13102 666.6 97341.0 13.5% 7.4 9.5% 
Mar-60 3.91% 13102 684.8 99997.4 13.1% 7.6 9.2% 
Apr-60 3.91% 13102 740.8 108181.2 12.1% 8.3 8.2% 
May-60 3.91% 13102 714.0 104273.3 12.6% 8.0 8.7% 
Jun-60 3.91% 13102 706.1 103109.4 12.7% 7.9 8.8% 
Jul-60 3.90% 13102 715.8 104530.3 12.5% 8.0 8.6% 
Aug-60 3.90% 13102 741.5 108280.5 12.1% 8.3 8.2% 
Sep-60 3.90% 13102 728.6 106402.4 12.3% 8.1 8.4% 
0ct-60 3.89% 13102 733.0 107040.6 12.2% 8.2 8.4% 
Nov-60 3.89% 13102 729.3 106498.8 12.3% 8.1 8.4% 
Dec-60 3.89% 13102 741.9 108338.9 12.1% 8.3 8.2% 
Jan-61 3.89% 15781 753.2 109792.4 14.4% 7.0 10.5% 
Feb-61 3.89% 15781 808.0 117780.4 13.4% 7.5 9.5% 
Mar-61 3.89% 15781 829.8 120953.7 13.0% 7.7 9.2% 
Apr-61 3.90% 15781 835.2 121736.5 13.0% 7.7 9.1% 
May-61 3.90% 15781 850.7 124004.6 12.7% 7.9 8.8% 
Jun-61 3.90% 15781 926.9 135114.9 11.7% 8.6 7.8% 
Jul-61 3.91% 15781 966.4 140869.7 11.2% 8.9 7.3% 
Aug-61 3.90% 15781 1001.0 145913.3 10.8% 9.2 6.9% 
Sep-61 3.90% 15781 998.0 145480.3 10.8% 9.2 6.9% 
Oct-61 3.91% 15781 1009.3 147118.7 10.7% 9.3 6.8% 
Nov-61 3.90% 15781 1006.3 146690.2 10.8% 9.3 6.9% 
Dec-61 3.89% 15781 1024.1 149279.0 10.6% 9.5 6.7% 
Jan-62 3.89% 17173 1062.9 154557.9 11.1% 9.0 7.2% 
Feb-62 3.89% 17173 1081.1 157194.1 10.9% 9.2 7.0% 
Mar-62 3.89% 17173 1156.1 168111.3 10.2% 9.8 6.3% 
Apr-62 3.89% 17173 1136.5 165252.6 10.4% 9.6 6.5% 
May-62 3.89% 17173 1089.5 158417.0 10.8% 9.2 7.0% 
Jun-62 3.89% 17173 1080.9 157176.7 10.9% 9.2 7.0% 
Jul-62 3.89% 17173 1122.2 163179.1 10.5% 9.5 6.6% 
Aug-62 3.89% 17173 1167.7 169792.2 10.1% 9.9 6.2% 
Sep-62 3.89% 17173 1208.6 175735.0 9.8% 10.2 5.9% 
Oct-62 3.89% 17173 1238.5 180081.2 9.5% 10.5 5.6% 
Nov-62 3.88% 17173 1229.5 178775.5 9.6% 10.4 5.7% 
Dec-62 3.88% 17173 1224.0 177984.5 9.6% 10.4 5.8% 
Sources: Tafunell, 'Los beneficios;' Bolsa de Madrid, Indices, and Instituto 
Nacional de Estadistica, Boletin Mensual de Estadistica. 
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Table A. 13. Availability of earnings data for stocks included in Madrid Stock 
Exchange Index, 1946-1963 
(a) (b) (c) 
Year Number of Of which data Total capitalisation of 
firms in on earnings column (b) firms as a 
Bolsa index available percentage of capitalisation 
of column (a) firms 
1946 33 33 100 
1947 38 37 99,60 
1948 39 38 99,56 
1949 40 39 99,09 
1950 47 47 100 
1951 48 47 99,67 
1952 48 47 97,86 
1953 47 46 99,64 
1954 47 46 99,62 
1955 50 48 99,71 
1956 53 49 97,96 
1957 58 54 98,48 
1958 58 54 98,48 
1959 60 54 98,11 
1960 61 54 97,52 
1961 70 57 96,05 
1962 71 57 95,84 
1963 74 60 94,65 
Sources: Tafunell, 'Los beneficios empresariales,' and Bolsa de Madrid, Indice. 
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